

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

Final Document

Volume III

**Part IV
Summary records and list of participants**

New York, 2010

Please recycle 

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to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
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Note

The Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consists of four parts in three volumes:

Volume I NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)

Part I Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference

Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions

Part II Organization and work of the Conference

Volume II NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. II)

Part III Documents issued at the Conference

Volume III NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. III)

Part IV Summary records and list of participants

Part IV

Summary records and list of participants

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A. Summary records of the 1st to 8th and 10th to 16th plenary meetings

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

Distr.: General
4 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 3 May 2010, at 10.30 a.m.

Acting President: Mr. Yelchenko..... (Ukraine)
President: Mr. Cabactulan..... (Philippines)

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- Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the second session of the Preparatory Committee
- Election of the President of the Conference
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- Adoption of the rules of procedure
- Requests for observer status
- Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee
- Election of Vice-Presidents
- Appointment of the Credentials Committee
- Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Conference
- Adoption of the agenda
- Programme of work
- General debate

The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the second session of the Preparatory Committee

1. **The Acting President**, introducing the final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/1), recalled that the Treaty had played a crucial role in promoting nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy since its entry into force. The current Review Conference provided an opportunity for States parties to reaffirm their full commitment to the Treaty to ensure that it remained the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

2. The Preparatory Committee had held three sessions between April 2007 and May 2009; 135 States parties to the Treaty had participated in one or more of those sessions, together with States not parties to the Treaty, specialized agencies, international and regional intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and members of academia who had participated in accordance with the agreed modalities. At each session, one meeting had been set aside for presentations by non-governmental organizations.

3. The Preparatory Committee had reached agreement on all main issues related to the organization of the Conference, including: the election of the President; the date and venue of the Conference; the draft rules of procedure; the financial arrangements; the provisional agenda; and the allocation of items to the Main Committees. The recommendations on those issues were reflected in the report. However, it had decided to defer consideration of a final document or documents of the Conference to the 2010 Review Conference.

4. Most of the Preparatory Committee's meetings had been devoted to a substantive discussion of all aspects of the Treaty and of three clusters of issues based on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the 2005 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2005/DEC.1). The Committee had also considered the following three specific blocks of issues: nuclear disarmament and security assurances; regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and other provisions of the Treaty, including article X.

5. The Chairmen of the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee had prepared factual summaries contained in working papers of those sessions (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.78 and NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.43, respectively); at its third session, however, the Preparatory Committee had been unable to produce a consensus report containing substantive recommendations to the Review Conference.

Election of the President of the Conference

6. **The Acting President** announced that the Preparatory Committee, at its third session, had unanimously recommended the election of Mr. Libran Nuevas Cabactulan of the Philippines as President.

7. *Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines) was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.*

8. *Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines) took the Chair.*

Statement by the President of the Conference

9. **The President** said that, in order for the Review Conference to achieve a meaningful outcome for the common good, all those present would need to show maximum flexibility and avoid intractable positions and obdurate attitudes. In that respect, he was comforted by the fact that, during his year-long consultations, delegations had all stressed their strong and urgent desire to have a successful Review Conference. Such an outcome was indeed sorely needed.

10. He urged delegations to maintain the positive atmosphere engendered by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee, Mr. Boniface Guwa Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe. As President of the Review Conference, he intended to continue the latter's good work. To that end, he vowed to act impartially in an open, transparent and all-inclusive manner to help delegations make progress on all three pillars of the Treaty.

11. Full advantage must now be taken of the rare opportunity provided by the current Review Conference, particularly in the light of recent positive developments. The world expected a positive outcome which would ensure that the Treaty continued to be an effective instrument. Those present had a duty to work together to meet that expectation. He called upon them to do so.

Address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations

12. **The Secretary-General** said that the work being undertaken by the Review Conference was of immense importance to humankind. Hopes and expectations were running high: the world's people were looking to the States parties to the Treaty for action to protect them from the destructive power of nuclear weapons, to curb rising spending on nuclear weapons and to build a safer and more secure world.

13. Disarmament and non-proliferation ranked among his top priorities. While the achievement of those goals still remained possible, the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda had been dormant for too long. Convinced that the time to act had now arrived, he had put forward a concrete action plan. He had also sought to strengthen international laws and instruments and was committed to serving as a bridge among peoples and nations with different views, sometimes deeply held.

14. Chilling memories from his recent visit to Semipalatinsk, the former nuclear test site in Kazakhstan, were still fresh in his mind. On 6 August 2010, the sixty-fifth anniversary of the day the first atomic bomb was dropped, he intended to visit Hiroshima and to advocate once more for a world free of nuclear weapons. However, the world still lived under a nuclear shadow. How long would it take to eliminate that threat? How long would humanity continue to pass that problem on to succeeding generations?

15. The 2005 Review Conference had, quite plainly and simply, been a failure. The 2010 Review Conference could, and must, do better. There was a choice: to leave a legacy of fear and inaction, or to act with vision, courage and leadership.

16. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was one of the most important multilateral accords in history. Though not perfect, it was the cornerstone

of the world's nuclear non-proliferation regime and enjoyed near-universal membership. The world needed that regime as much as ever.

17. While the nuclear threat remained real, it had evolved into new and varied forms that must now be addressed. The world's people therefore expected more: more progress on disarmament, more arms cuts and more transparency.

18. Some of the multiple challenges to be faced included doubts about compliance; resentments between the nuclear "haves" and "have-nots"; a grave and growing concern over nuclear terrorism and the black market in nuclear technology and materials; and the danger that a regional conflict might "go nuclear". Solutions did not lie in elevating one of the three pillars over another: progress on disarmament could not await a world free of war, nuclear proliferation or terrorism; progress on non-proliferation could not await the elimination of the last nuclear weapon; and advancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could not be held hostage to either disarmament or non-proliferation. From the earliest days of the Treaty, the international community had understood that those goals were interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously.

19. There had been some encouraging signs of progress prior to the eighth Review Conference: the signature of the new Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; the Nuclear Security Summit held recently in Washington, D.C., to be followed by a further Summit in Seoul two years later; a variety of Government initiatives, including from other nuclear-weapon States; and mobilization by civil society. The international community must build on that momentum. He therefore wished to propose the following five benchmarks for success.

20. The first benchmark was real progress towards disarmament. To that end, he urged the nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm their "unequivocal undertaking" to eliminate nuclear weapons. The time had come to translate that commitment into action. Failure to do so would constitute a step backwards. In that connection, he encouraged States parties to the Treaty to update and expand on the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. The steps provided a solid platform on which to build and there was no need to start from scratch. What had been lacking hitherto was the political will to translate words into action.

21. The second benchmark for success was movement towards universality of the Treaty. He therefore urged those States that had not yet acceded to it to do so as soon as possible. Pending their accession, there was a need for measures to ensure the safety and security of those countries' arsenals and technology. Nuclear material must not be acquired by non-State actors and terrorists. Additional measures should include a moratorium on nuclear tests, tight export controls on fissile materials and related technologies, and stringent command and control systems for countries' arsenals. There was also a need to ensure that the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes did not have unintended consequences. It should be unacceptable for countries to use the Treaty as cover to develop nuclear weapons, only to withdraw afterwards. Moreover, nuclear energy must be developed under agreed safeguards, especially given predictions of a nuclear energy renaissance as energy demands grew and pressure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions increased.

22. The third benchmark entailed strengthening the rule of law. In that connection, he noted that the quest for a nuclear-weapon-free world also included a framework of legal instruments that complemented the Treaty. Since 1999, when he had served as Chairman of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, he had strongly advocated the early entry into force of that key instrument. The time had come to think very seriously about setting a time frame for ratification. The current mechanism for entry into force dated from a time when there had been questions about that Treaty's monitoring and verification system. However, times had changed. The system had proven its effectiveness.

23. Moreover, it had been 15 years since the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had been opened for signature. Once again, how long must the international community wait? Serious consideration must therefore be given to an alternative mechanism for bringing that Treaty into effect. In that context, he warmly welcomed the announcement of Indonesia that it would soon ratify that Treaty and urged others to follow suit. As the Treaty's depository, he stood ready to visit the capitals of the remaining countries whose ratification was essential, and to talk to the respective leaders about their concerns.

24. Another vital instrument was the landmark International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. He had therefore called for a conference to be held in either 2010 or 2011 to review its implementation.

25. He had also called on the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations immediately on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. If the Conference on Disarmament could not agree on its programme of work, it might need a stronger impetus from a higher political level. To that end, the members of the Conference on Disarmament might consider holding a ministerial meeting on the margins of the forthcoming General Assembly session to be held in New York in September 2010.

26. He also urged all States to accept additional protocols to their International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements. At the Nuclear Security Summit, he had been encouraged by the overwhelming support for improving the Agency's capacity and system of safeguards.

27. The fourth benchmark for success was progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and progress on other regional concerns. Such zones made significant contributions to disarmament and non-proliferation. They also helped to build confidence, which could lead to progress in other areas. He therefore strongly supported efforts to create such a zone in the Middle East and urged the relevant stakeholders to engage in a robust discussion of the matter.

28. With respect to the Iranian nuclear programme, he called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to fully comply with Security Council resolutions and to fully cooperate with IAEA. He also encouraged it to accept the nuclear fuel supply proposal put forward by the Agency as an important confidence-building measure and stressed that the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran should engage constructively in ongoing efforts to clarify doubts and concerns about his country's programme.

29. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should also make every effort to return to the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible, without preconditions, in order to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

30. His fifth and final benchmark for success was a strengthened review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including through more active engagement by the relevant United Nations bodies. Implementation of the Treaty would benefit from more systematic national reporting and the provision of substantive and organizational support. States parties to the Treaty might wish to consider ways in which a small, permanent structure could help.

31. The Treaty's lack of an effective tool to address non-compliance was a significant institutional deficit. The Security Council had a special and crucial role to play in filling that gap, including through regular ministerial meetings to follow up on the historic 2009 Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. He also recognized the importance of initiatives by the General Assembly, as set out in his action plan. His Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters had also put forward sound proposals that deserved consideration.

32. He recalled that the purpose of the Review Conference was not simply to avoid a nuclear nightmare, but also to build a safer world for all. Many countries had shown great leadership: those that had abolished nuclear weapons; those that had established nuclear-weapon-free zones; and those that had reduced their arsenals.

33. However, he challenged them all to go further still: to take the steps now to set the stage for a breakthrough tomorrow. What was needed were more examples of what could be achieved, not more excuses for why it was not possible. Now was the time to deliver on one of the deepest aspirations of humankind, and on one of the founding resolutions of the Organization. He therefore looked to the States parties to the Treaty to show the leadership required.

Address by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

34. **Mr. Amano** (Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that all the activities of IAEA were relevant to the work of the Review Conference. The Agency's action to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy was particularly important in view of the growing acceptance of nuclear power as a stable and clean source of energy that could help to mitigate the impact of climate change. More than 60 countries were considering introducing nuclear power to generate electricity and it was expected that by 2030 between 10 and 25 countries would be operating their first nuclear power plants. While the decision to use nuclear power rested with each sovereign State, the Agency could assist interested countries, developed and developing alike, in establishing a reliable nuclear infrastructure. Such power must be efficient, sustainable and profitable and any expansion in its use must be safe and secure and not increase the proliferation risk. He drew attention to the agreement he had signed with the Russian Federation, with the approval of the IAEA Board of Governors, to help ensure supplies of nuclear fuel to Member States. Other such supply mechanisms were currently under study.

35. Nuclear technology provided unique tools to meet basic human needs, in the fields of medicine and radiotherapy for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer, as well as in plant breeding, food irradiation, animal health, pest control, water management and environmental monitoring. In any such use, safety and security must always be ensured: the Agency had an important role in that regard, while recognizing the primary responsibility of Member States. It was true that, since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, nuclear safety had improved considerably, but vigilance

still needed to exercised. IAEA was the custodian of the relevant international safety conventions and standards and provided Member States with practical assistance in implementing them, in particular through its peer review missions.

36. Great progress had also been made in making nuclear and radioactive materials more secure, thereby helping to counter the risk of nuclear terrorism. IAEA was widely recognized as the focal point for strengthening efforts in that area. It was also active in promoting technical cooperation through its Technical Cooperation Programme, which had grown, as recommended by the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and was able to draw on more than \$100 million in annual resources, for projects in more than 120 countries and territories. Further efforts were needed, however, to ensure sufficient and predictable funding for the programme.

37. As had been recognized in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, IAEA safeguards were a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, played an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and helped to create an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and nuclear cooperation.

38. IAEA was currently working to resolve important safeguards implementation issues in three States. Since 2002, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had not allowed the Agency to implement safeguards and in 2009 that country had ceased all cooperation with the Agency in the implementation of the ad hoc monitoring and verification agreement arrangement pursuant to the Six-Party Talks process. The second State giving concern was the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was not cooperating sufficiently with the Agency for it to be able to confirm that all that country's nuclear material was being used for peaceful purposes. He called once again on Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council and to clarify activities with a military dimension. Lastly, since 2008 Syria had not been cooperating with the Agency in throwing light on the nature of the Dair Alzour site destroyed by Israel and other sites. He once again requested that country to engage with the Agency on all outstanding issues.

39. He urged all States that had not yet done so to bring into force IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The additional protocols were of vital importance to the Agency in that they provided a credible assurance not only that declared nuclear material was not being diverted from peaceful uses but also that there were no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in any given State. He noted that nuclear-weapon-free zones were an important factor in achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world and welcomed the entry into force since the previous Review Conference of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The IAEA General Conference had in recent years adopted resolutions on the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, including one the previous year on Israel's nuclear capabilities; he would be following up on those resolutions.

40. Progress in nuclear disarmament had a positive effect on non-proliferation efforts and vice versa and was being promoted by the Agency through its verification activities. He therefore welcomed the 2010 treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on strategic arms reduction, which

marked a step towards nuclear disarmament. Enhanced confidence in the non-proliferation regime, through a successful Review Conference, would provide the Agency with a stronger basis for its work in all areas.

Adoption of the rules of procedure

41. **The President** recalled that, at its third session, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend to the Conference the draft rules of procedure contained in annex III of its final report (NPT/CONF.2010/1). He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft rules of procedure.

42. *It was so decided.*

Requests for observer status

43. **The President**, speaking with reference to rule 44 of the rules of procedure, said that a request for observer status had been received from Palestine. He took it that the Conference wished to accede to that request.

44. *It was so decided.*

45. **The President** said that, with reference to rule 44, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure, requests for observer status had been received from the African Union, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the International Science and Technology Center, the League of Arab States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Pacific Islands Forum. He took it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests.

46. *It was so decided.*

47. **The President**, referring to rule 44, paragraph 4, of the rules of procedure, said that requests to attend meetings of the plenary or the Main Committee had been received from the 121 non-governmental organizations listed in document NPT/CONF.2010/

INF/4. Furthermore, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend to the Conference, in accordance with the rules of procedure, that representatives of non-governmental organizations should be allowed to attend meetings, other than those designated closed, and to receive documents of the Conference, and that, in accordance with past practice, non-governmental organizations should be allowed to make written material available, at their own expense, to the participants in the Conference and to address the Conference, consistent with the final document of the 2000 Review Conference. He took it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests and to proceed in accordance with the recommendation of its Preparatory Committee.

48. *It was so decided.*

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

49. **The President** recalled that, at its third session, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend that Main Committee I should be chaired by a representative of Zimbabwe, Main Committee II should be chaired by a representative of Ukraine and Main Committee III should be chaired by a representative of Japan. It had also agreed to recommend that the post of Chairman of the Drafting Committee should be assumed by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, and the post of Chairman of the Credentials Committee by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States. The following candidates for the posts of Chairman had been endorsed by the respective Groups of States: for Main Committee I, Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe); for Main Committee II, Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine); for Main Committee III, Mr. Nakane (Japan); for the Drafting Committee, Mr. Towpik (Poland); for the Credentials Committee, Mr. Momen (Bangladesh).

50. *Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe), Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine), Mr. Nakane (Japan), Mr. Towpik (Poland) and Mr. Momen (Bangladesh) were elected Chairmen of Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee, respectively.*

51. **The President** said that, in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference should elect two Vice-Chairmen for each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee. The following nominations for the posts of Vice-Chairmen had been received: for Main Committee I, Ms. Barbulescu (Romania) and Ms. Higgie (New Zealand); for Main Committee II, Mr. Abdelaziz (Egypt) and Mr. Grinius (Canada); for Main Committee III, Mr. Zimonyi (Hungary) and Mr. Labbe (Chile); for the Drafting Committee, Mr. Soltanieh (Islamic Republic of Iran) and Mr. Ahlström (Sweden); and for the Credentials Committee, Mr. Ismayilizada (Azerbaijan) and Mr. Kongstad (Norway).

52. *Ms. Barbulescu (Romania) and Ms. Higgie (New Zealand), Mr. Abdelaziz (Egypt) and Mr. Grinius (Canada), Mr. Zimonyi (Hungary) and Mr. Labbe (Chile), Mr. Soltanieh (Islamic Republic of Iran) and Mr. Ahlström (Sweden), and Mr. Ismayilizada (Azerbaijan) and Mr. Kongstad (Norway) were elected Vice-Chairmen of Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee, respectively.*

Election of Vice-Presidents

53. **The President** said that, in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Committee should elect 34 Vice-Presidents of the Conference. The following nominations had been received for the posts of Vice-President: from the Group of Eastern European States: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; from the Western Group, Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Spain and Switzerland; from the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States: Algeria, Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

54. *Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela were elected Vice-Presidents of the Conference.*

Appointment of the Credentials Committee

55. **The President** said that, in accordance with rule 3 of the rules of procedure, the Conference should appoint six members of the Credentials Committee on the proposal of the President of the Conference, in addition to the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen elected. Accordingly, he proposed the following members of the Credentials Committee, while noting that two further members remained to be proposed: Czech Republic, Mauritius, Republic of Moldova and Uganda.

56. *Czech Republic, Mauritius, Republic of Moldova and Uganda were elected members of the Credentials Committee.*

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Conference

57. **The President** said that, at its second session, the Preparatory Committee had decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2010 Review Conference. At its third session, the Secretary-General had nominated Mr. Thomas Markram, Department for Disarmament Affairs, to serve in that capacity.

58. *Mr. Markram was confirmed as Secretary-General of the 2010 Review Conference.*

Adoption of the agenda

59. **The President** said that he took it that the Conference wished to adopt the provisional agenda contained in annex IV of the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2010/1), including the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee in annex V on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the Conference.

60. *It was so decided.*

Programme of work

61. **The President** drew attention to the draft programme of work (NPT/CONF.2010/INF/3), which remained open to modifications, pending consideration by the Conference, should circumstances require and in order to ensure that time was utilized in as efficient a manner as possible. On that understanding, he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the draft programme of work.

62. *It was so decided.*

63. **The President** further noted that an updated version of the draft programme of work for the first week of the Conference, contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/INF/5, had been circulated.

General debate

64. **Mr. Natalegawa** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, expressed the hope that the Conference would produce a clear and balanced road map for strengthening implementation of the Treaty and of commitments undertaken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and at the 2000 Review Conference. For their part, the non-aligned States parties pledged their full cooperation in both areas.

65. Forty years after the entry into force of the Treaty and 20 years after the end of the cold war, much remained to be done to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. A peaceful world devoid of nuclear arms was the Movement's highest priority. Full implementation of the Treaty, the cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, would safeguard the world from the potential devastation by nuclear weapons. Global adherence to the Treaty should be promoted through a balanced and non-discriminatory approach to its three pillars, namely, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

66. While the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010 was a positive development, the reductions it stipulated did not meet the international community's expectation of more concrete and systematic disarmament efforts on the part of nuclear-weapon States. As global nuclear disarmament would require the sustained engagement of all States parties, nuclear-weapon States must demonstrate greater political will in the discharge of their multilaterally agreed obligations. Implementation of the 13 practical steps, in particular the nuclear-weapon States' commitment to eliminating their nuclear arsenals, were crucial to the credibility of the Treaty.

67. The disappointing failure of the 2005 Review Conference to yield a final outcome must not deter States parties from taking advantage of existing international goodwill and ensuring the success of the current Conference, as failure was not an option.

68. He underscored the Movement's concern at the grave threat to humanity posed by nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence doctrines. The non-aligned States parties reaffirmed their long-established positions on nuclear disarmament and remained fully committed to their Treaty obligations and the agreements reached in 1995 and 2000. It would be important to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the Conference in order to take up specific matters.

69. It was unacceptable for nuclear-weapon States, in violation of article VI of the Treaty, and States not party to the Treaty to retain and modernize their nuclear arsenals, imperilling regional and international peace and security, in particular in the Middle East. The Movement urged the Conference to reject the doctrine of nuclear deterrence — an effective obstacle to disarmament, rather than a means of bringing about international peace and security — and to ban all forms of nuclear weapons testing. To that end, the Conference should call for a time frame for the implementation of article VI and establish a mechanism to verify the compliance of nuclear-weapon States with their obligations.

70. The non-aligned States parties regarded the Treaty as a key instrument with regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It would be necessary to ensure a balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-

weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States in implementing the Treaty. Its indefinite extension did not imply indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals, nor did it foresee the indefinite preservation of non-State party status, which would undermine the Treaty's universality. Consideration of a convention banning all nuclear weapons should be an integral part of any plan of action to be adopted by the Conference. Pending the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority.

71. The non-aligned States parties underscored the inalienable right of States parties to research, produce and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination, a right explicitly enshrined in article IV of the Treaty. The unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be ensured, and nothing in the current discussion should be interpreted as affecting the Treaty's protection of that right. Furthermore, as the Treaty itself left no room to set conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the undue and unfortunate restrictions currently being imposed on many developing countries that were parties to the Treaty should be lifted.

72. Nuclear-weapon States must refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements. There should also be a total ban on transferring nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and on extending nuclear, scientific or technological assistance to States that were not parties to the Treaty. In that connection, non-aligned States parties viewed with concern any nuclear cooperation agreement allowing the transfer of nuclear materials to unsafeguarded facilities, in violation of article III of the Treaty.

73. With regard to the right of withdrawal from treaties, as explicitly defined in article X, he reiterated the position taken by the Movement at the 2005 Review Conference, namely, that the right of withdrawal of parties was governed by international treaty law.

74. He reiterated the Movement's support for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as called for by the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and expressed regret that the resolution had not yet been implemented.

75. The fact that Israel was the only Middle Eastern State not party to the Treaty posed an ongoing threat to the non-nuclear-weapon States of the region, given the operation of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of unknown safety standards and the potentially catastrophic regional nuclear arms race that might ensue. The current Conference must therefore address that unsustainable situation by renewing its unequivocal commitment to implementation of the 1995 resolution. Recalling that the 2000 Review Conference had reaffirmed the necessity of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, the Movement reiterated its request to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider proposals for the implementation of the 1995 resolution.

76. **Mr. Ahmadinejad** (Islamic Republic of Iran), responding to the Secretary-General's comments, said that his country had agreed to the fuel exchange from the

outset and that it was now up to the countries that should cooperate with Iran to make the next move.

77. The pursuit of sustainable security was an inherent human drive. No country could afford to ignore its security. Based on their faith in God, the divine prophets had sought to provide guidelines for harmonious and secure coexistence in a global society. Development efforts would be doomed to failure in the absence of security. However, the vast resources currently being allocated to national security in many countries had failed to mitigate perceived threats. Furthermore, some States, estranged from the teachings of the divine prophets, committed the gross and shameful mistake of relying on possession of such weapons to guarantee their security, thereby exposing themselves to the hazards associated with production and stockpiling. The perpetrators of the first atomic bombardment, a crime of staggering proportions, were among the most loathed in history.

78. For over 60 years, the Security Council had failed to maintain international peace and security. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation remained equally elusive, given IAEA's inability to fulfil its mandate. The current international climate posed particularly daunting challenges, including wars, the threat of nuclear strikes, and worst of all, the unjust policies adopted by a select group of expansionist States. During the previous four decades, some countries, including the Zionist regime, had acquired nuclear arms.

79. The policies of certain States and the inefficacy of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had contributed to the current situation of nuclear insecurity. Some States threatened and suppressed others in order to demonstrate their dominance and, in so doing, sowed the seeds of hatred and promoted the arms race internationally. Similarly, the production, stockpiling and qualitative improvement of nuclear armaments by any State justified the development of others' arsenals. Because treating nuclear weapons as a deterrent necessarily involved increasing their quantity and improving their quality, such a policy, as practised by the United States and others, was the main cause of the escalation of the arms race and constituted a violation of States' obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

80. It was regrettable that the Government of the United States and the Zionist regime, among others, not only had already used nuclear weapons, but continued to make threats involving their use against other countries, including his own. Certain nuclear-weapon States that enjoyed special privileges in the highest global decision-making bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), repeatedly exploited those platforms to the detriment of non-nuclear-weapon States, and in a way that was contrary to the spirit of the Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States had been unable to exercise their inalienable right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy without facing pressure or threats. Despite the clear provisions of article IV of the Treaty and of the Statute of IAEA, not a single report had been issued by IAEA inspectors on the nuclear weapons facilities of the United States and its allies, nor was there a plan for their disarmament. On the other hand, numerous resolutions had been adopted against non-nuclear-weapon States under false pretexts, with the clear intention of denying them their recognized rights. The Zionist regime, despite its stockpiling of nuclear warheads and continued threats to the people of the region, enjoyed the unconditional support of the United States Government and its allies and received the assistance necessary to develop its nuclear weapons programme.

The same States that supported the Zionist regime put pressure on IAEA members, using the false pretext of probable diversions from peaceful nuclear activities, without producing any evidence whatsoever.

81. Nuclear technology, which was both clean and cheap, could be applied effectively in the medical, industrial and agricultural fields, yet nuclear-weapon States unjustly equated nuclear energy with nuclear arms. In fact, those States sought to monopolize both nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in order to impose their will on the international community; that, too, ran counter to the spirit of the Treaty and was in flagrant violation of its provisions.

82. While its key mandates included facilitating the inalienable right of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the mechanisms and regulations established by the Treaty made it very difficult for countries seeking to develop such peaceful uses to do so. Furthermore, no effective mechanism had been devised to address the threat of nuclear weapons — another key mandate of the Treaty. Indeed, efforts in that regard had been limited to talks whose guarantees were not binding. While IAEA continued to put significant pressure on non-nuclear-weapon States on the pretext of the risk of proliferation, those that had nuclear bombs continued to enjoy full immunity.

83. It was questionable whether granting extraordinary authority to nuclear-weapon States within IAEA and entrusting them with the critical issue of nuclear disarmament was appropriate. Expecting such States to propose effective, voluntary initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation was naive and irrational. In that regard, it was difficult to believe the United States Government's Nuclear Posture Review, which ruled out the development of new nuclear weapons and attacks on non-nuclear-weapon States using such weapons, especially since that Government had never respected any of its commitments. In fact, some States that were both members of IAEA and committed parties to the NPT had been threatened with a pre-emptive nuclear strike. The United States Government regularly tried to divert attention from its non-compliance and unlawful actions; most recently, it had used the issue of nuclear terrorism as a basis for maintaining and upgrading its own nuclear arsenals. In its Nuclear Posture Review, the United States had kept silent regarding possible nuclear strikes against certain nuclear-weapon States in order to concentrate pressure on certain independent nations. Meanwhile, United States intelligence agencies and the Zionist regime continued to support major terrorist networks, credible evidence of which would be publicized, if necessary, at the upcoming conference on the global fight against terrorism to be held in Tehran. The qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons as set out in the Nuclear Posture Review was tantamount to vertical proliferation. While the Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C., was an effort by the United States to preserve its monopoly over discussions on nuclear weapons and its superiority over other countries, the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation conference, held in Tehran, was a joint initiative by all participants to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the motto, "Nuclear energy for all, nuclear weapons for no one".

84. A number of measures were necessary to achieve nuclear disarmament, to ensure non-proliferation and to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy. One such proposal was the comprehensive review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which should result in a nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaty with nuclear disarmament as a core mandate, to be achieved through transparent, binding and

effective mechanisms supported by solid international guarantees. The Review Conference must establish an independent international group for the purpose of creating guidelines to enforce the provisions of article VI of the Treaty. The group, which should involve the participation of all independent countries, should set a specific timetable for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Legally binding, comprehensive security guarantees without discrimination or preconditions should be introduced and maintained until complete nuclear disarmament was achieved by nuclear-weapon States.

85. It was imperative to terminate all research, development and improvement of nuclear weapons and related facilities immediately, and for the aforementioned independent international group to create a verification mechanism for that purpose. A legally binding instrument must be adopted to prohibit the production, stockpiling, improvement, proliferation, maintaining and use of nuclear weapons. States that used or threatened to use nuclear weapons should see their membership on the IAEA Board of Governors suspended, as their political influence prevented IAEA from carrying out its mandates.

86. In addition, nuclear cooperation with States that were not parties to the Treaty should cease and effective punitive measures should be adopted against States that continued such cooperation. It was crucial that any threat of the use of nuclear weapons or attack against peaceful nuclear facilities should be considered as a breach of international peace and security and should result in the termination of all cooperation of States parties to the Treaty with the threatening or aggressor State. Other necessary measures included the immediate and unconditional implementation of the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; the dismantling of nuclear weapons on the military bases of the United States and its allies in other countries; and a collective effort to reform the structure of the Security Council, which currently served the interests of the nuclear-weapon States. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which did not need nuclear bombs for its development and did not regard them as a source of honour or dignity, was prepared to do its part in carrying out such initiatives.

87. The production, stockpiling and threats involving the use of nuclear weapons were no longer viable practices in the modern world. He therefore enjoined States that continued to conduct such activities to change their ways and realize that the current era belonged to nations that sought security, peace and justice through logical reasoning, rather than bullying and arrogance.

88. **Mr. Asselborn** (Luxembourg) said that the 2010 Review Conference came at a key juncture for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. There had been hopeful signs in the preceding year in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation, while major challenges remained, including proliferation, the threat that nuclear materials could fall into the hands of terrorists, and that the international community would not react forcefully enough to actions that undermined the non-proliferation regime.

89. The vision of a world without nuclear weapons, recently stated by the President of the United States, was shared by all who wished to guarantee security with the lowest possible level of arms, whether conventional or nuclear. The September 2009 summit convened by the Security Council had given cause for optimism as well. The United States and the Russian Federation were to be commended for the recent conclusion of their agreement on further reductions in

their nuclear arsenals, opening the way to substantial arms reductions on both sides, but it was only the beginning of a process; nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty must be pursued. Such disarmament efforts could free enormous financial resources that could be put to better use, for example, in the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals.

90. Seeking security at the lowest possible level of arms represented an essential contribution to world stability, and along with Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Norway, his country had begun a debate within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to adapt its strategies to the new security environment. The recent Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., had emphasized the need for the international community to work together to promote and reinforce nuclear security. Substantial progress must also be made towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and towards the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

91. Unfortunately, the Review Conference was taking place in a context marked by serious crises relating to proliferation, in particular in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Those States' violation of their obligations under the Treaty had shaken the confidence of the international community and undermined the Treaty regime.

92. Iran was pursuing its nuclear programme in violation of five Security Council resolutions and refused to be transparent about its past and present nuclear activities. He appealed urgently to the Iranian authorities not to miss the opportunity for dialogue. Numerous proposals had been made to meet the concerns expressed by Iran; if possessing nuclear weapons was not a point of honour to that country, then cooperation with those proposals should not be a problem. He also appealed to all States in the region to advance the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and to refrain from measures that would prevent the achievement of that goal.

93. The efforts of IAEA to ensure that its safeguards regime remained effective and credible must be supported. He appealed to all States which had not yet done so to enter into safeguards agreements. It was also essential to begin consideration of measures to be taken in the event of a withdrawal from the Treaty. Article IV enshrined the right of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Responsible development of nuclear energy for civilian use must take place under the best possible conditions of safety, security and non-proliferation.

94. Luxembourg viewed the Treaty as a major tool for collective security. It was in the interests of all to support it, preserve its integrity and strengthen its three pillars. More than ever, there was a need for a strong Treaty in order to ensure the common good through international peace, security and stability. The Review Conference would be successful if it was able to strengthen collective security, stability and prosperity for all.

95. **Mr. Martin** (Ireland) said that his country had a long and close association with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in fact had introduced the first in a series of United Nations resolutions calling for the prevention of the further dissemination of nuclear weapons which had paved the way for its adoption. In recognition of that pioneering role, when the Treaty had been opened for signature in 1968, Ireland had

been invited to be the first country to sign; it was also the first country to ratify the Treaty.

96. The horrors which nuclear weaponry could unleash on mankind and the planet defied description. In addition to death and destruction on a massive scale, the environmental costs would be profound and long-lasting. During the cold war era, the world regularly stood on the brink of nuclear catastrophe, but with the Treaty, the international community had taken a decisive step back from the abyss. In the intervening years, the Treaty had become the most powerful bulwark available against the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. Support for the Treaty was a cornerstone of Irish foreign policy. Ensuring its universality remained of crucial importance, and he called on the small number of States who had not yet done so to adhere to it.

97. The Treaty regime was currently facing unprecedented challenges, among the most serious being the proliferation risks posed by Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It also risked being undermined by the reluctance of some States to implement its provisions fully. Selective approaches which stressed the urgency of non-proliferation while downplaying the need for progress in disarmament served merely to weaken the Treaty. There had been some encouraging developments in recent months, however, including the new agreement on the reduction of nuclear arms signed by the United States and the Russian Federation. The Nuclear Posture Review recently conducted by the United States was another positive development.

98. In terms of the desired achievements of the 2010 Review Conference, first and foremost was the re-establishment of the authority of the Treaty after the setbacks of recent years. States parties should reaffirm the undertakings given at previous conferences if further progress was to be made on a balanced, consensual and forward-looking package of decisions on all three pillars of the Treaty and on the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. For the great majority of States parties, the Review Conference would not be seen as a success unless agreement was reached on specific measures to advance disarmament. Implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was another important priority, as was the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty. Similarly, negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty should begin at the earliest opportunity.

99. Ireland pursued its disarmament and non-proliferation objectives both nationally and through its membership in the European Union, the New Agenda Coalition and the Vienna Group of Ten. Each of those groups would table working papers, which Ireland fully endorsed.

100. Circumstances were more propitious for a reaffirmation and strengthening of the Treaty regime than they had been for a decade. However, the Review Conference would not succeed without leadership, the political will to find the necessary compromises and hard work. All must play a part: the international community could not afford a further inconclusive Review Conference.

101. **Mr. Romulo** (Philippines) said that since 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been the reason that the nightmare vision of 15 to 20 nuclear States had been avoided, but it remained imperative to close the loopholes in the Treaty that made it possible for countries to acquire the skills to make nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian nuclear programme.

102. A danger to one country was a danger to all — no nation could remain unaffected by the events in another country or region. For a country like the Philippines, with its nationals spread around the globe, the dangers posed by nuclear weapons were particularly stark. It firmly believed that the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East must be implemented. Fulfilling that promise could help to usher in peace and stability in a region that had known neither.

103. Efforts towards nuclear disarmament could not be sustained unless fundamental changes were made in how some nations addressed security concerns. Finding comfort in deterrence had hindered nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and for lasting peace and security, deterrence must be replaced with diplomacy. The Philippines called on the five nuclear-weapon States to carry out existing commitments on irreversible cuts in their nuclear arsenals, in a transparent and time-bound manner, and on other States possessing those weapons to abandon them immediately.

104. The international community had reached a turning point. On the multilateral front, nuclear disarmament once again was taking centre stage on the agenda of the United Nations. The Secretary-General had pointed out that spending on weapons worldwide had reached over \$1 trillion per year. The General Assembly had recently held a thematic debate on disarmament, which had helped to build momentum towards the 2010 Review Conference. The Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., had also reaffirmed the commitment to nuclear disarmament. The arms reduction agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation was also a major step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

105. Article VI of the Treaty called on the nuclear-weapon States to pursue disarmament, yet it did not set timelines or benchmarks. It was up to the States parties through the Review Conference, therefore, to determine realistic and clearly defined benchmarks and specific timelines for those States to accomplish what they had promised. The Philippines believed that the Test-Ban Treaty provided a crucial complement to the NPT, and that its early entry into force would boost global efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Progress made at the Review Conference would also bolster the work of the Conference on Disarmament and help it to start work on a fissile material cut-off treaty, a vital element of an overall nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

106. The International Atomic Energy Agency must be strengthened and its safeguards fully respected. Impartiality and the avoidance of double standards were essential. Nuclear-weapon-free zones further strengthened the non-proliferation and disarmament regime: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had established such a zone in its region as a contribution to peace and stability.

107. The Philippines reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but adequate checks and safeguards were required. Accordingly, it supported the IAEA technical cooperation programme, which assisted developing countries in particular in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some 60 countries having indicated an interest in pursuing national nuclear power programmes, safety and security considerations must be addressed. Equal access to nuclear fuel should also be guaranteed and no monopoly of the nuclear fuel supply permitted.

108. Unlike other important international conventions, the Treaty did not have dedicated institutional support of its own. Although it was ultimately the strength of the commitment of States parties to the Treaty and not its institutional support that would decide whether it succeeded or failed, even the most basic institutional support could help States parties. Several proposals on how to strengthen the review process by adopting institutional mechanisms should be seriously considered during the Review Conference.

109. The Treaty regime would be stronger and more resilient when it had achieved universality. He called on States that had not yet done so to become party to that crucial agreement, and encouraged those who might be considering withdrawal to remain and to make every effort to work out their differences over the Treaty and its interpretation.

110. Every year, billions of dollars were spent on nuclear weapons research and arsenal maintenance, as much as \$30 billion by some estimates. For 2010, the World Food Programme had projected a shortfall of 75 per cent of its requirements. A fraction of what was spent on nuclear weapons could easily erase that shortfall. When countries continued to spend lavishly on weapons of mass destruction, mortgaging their children's future and letting people die of disease and hunger, there was clearly much still to be done to achieve a free and peaceful world.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

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**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

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Summary record of the 2nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 3 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Ashton** (High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), speaking also on behalf of the candidate countries Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the stabilization and association process countries; the potential candidate countries Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, expressed the European Union's conviction that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), based on the three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, represented a unique and irreplaceable framework for maintaining and strengthening international peace and security. It was the duty of all to maintain and strengthen its authority and integrity and to continue to advocate its universality. In that connection, the European Union welcomed Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted at the high-level meeting in September, and the significant new treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on strategic arms reduction, which would, it was to be hoped, be followed by further engagement on other strategic issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation. The European Union was convinced that intermediate steps towards a safer world without nuclear weapons could lead to significant increases in security for all and reaffirmed its commitment to treaty-based nuclear arms control and disarmament, including a renewal of multilateral efforts and a reactivation of multilateral instruments, in particular the Conference on Disarmament.

2. Strengthening the non-proliferation regime was a key priority and the European Union was gravely concerned at the major proliferation challenges posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which had continued to violate their international obligations in clear defiance of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), despite repeated offers by the international community to discuss the issues and work towards a diplomatic solution. Undeniably, each country had the right to define its own energy strategy and had the inalienable right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with its NPT obligations. The European Union, as a major provider of international assistance, would continue to cooperate actively with third countries and provide its full support to IAEA and its Technical Cooperation Programme with a view to promoting international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promoting nuclear safety and security and strengthening effective safeguards to prevent nuclear proliferation.

3. The European Union had come to the 2010 Review Conference with a firm determination to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and to help build consensus for a successful outcome based on a balanced approach to the three pillars in the review of the operation of the Treaty and on the adoption of a set of balanced, effective and consensual measures aimed at stepping up international efforts to combat proliferation, pursue disarmament and ensure the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

4. The European Union continued to support the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, as well as the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Given the importance

of the universality of the Treaty, the European Union called on all States not yet parties to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States and, in the meantime, to abide by its terms and pledge their commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament.

5. The Council of the European Union had recently adopted a decision identifying various priorities to be addressed by the Review Conference, including a reaffirmation by all States parties of their commitment to comply with their obligations and to fulfil the Treaty's goals, the strengthening of the implementation of the Treaty through the adoption of a set of effective consensual measures to promote the NPT pillars and to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; a reaffirmation of the commitment to achieve concrete progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty; the strengthening of the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the non-proliferation regime by making the conclusion of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol the verification standard; the strengthening of the Treaty through a common understanding by States parties on how to respond effectively to a withdrawal from the Treaty and to cases of non-compliance; and the broadening of support for the concept of the responsible development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the best safety and non-proliferation conditions, including a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle.

6. **Mr. Bildt** (Sweden) said that the Review Conference should seek to reinforce the commitment of the international community to take concrete steps that could give the Non-Proliferation Treaty credibility and strength. Sweden was working for the success of the Conference as a member of the European Union and of the New Agenda Coalition.

7. There had been important advances in the past year towards the goal that united all States, in particular the Security Council summit meeting in September, the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, and the successful Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. The treaty concluded between the United States and the Russian Federation was of great importance, both substantively and symbolically, in terms of the reductions agreed upon and in terms of demonstrating that nuclear weapons were increasingly weapons of the past. Members of the New Coalition urged the United States and the Russian Federation to engage in talks also on the reduction and eventual elimination of their sub-strategic nuclear arsenals.

8. The international community needed to strengthen its efforts to prevent new nations from acquiring nuclear weapons and to ensure that the Treaty was respected fully and by all. Sweden was deeply concerned that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had continued its policy of withdrawal from the Treaty and had even tested two nuclear devices in violation of Security Council resolutions. That country must be convinced to end its confrontation with the international community.

9. No one sought to deny the Islamic Republic of Iran the same rights as every other member of the Treaty, including the right to nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle, but a dark cloud of suspicion would hang over that country until it had clarified all open issues associated with its nuclear activities. That could only be done through full cooperation with IAEA in every respect. Adherence to the Additional Protocol would go a long way towards establishing trust in Iran's

activities. Confrontation was in the interest of no one and cooperation was the way forward.

10. Sweden supported a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The international community must be united in its determination to avoid any step that could jeopardize that objective and must be ready to discuss steps leading towards it.

11. He stressed the importance of making the peaceful use of nuclear energy available to every nation that desired it. In spite of its dependence on nuclear power, Sweden had never seen the need to invest in the complete nuclear fuel cycle, even though that would be well within its technological capabilities. Sweden strongly supported the work by IAEA on multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle. The vision of a world where every nation that so wished had access to peaceful nuclear energy was well within reach.

12. **Mr. Moratinos** (Spain) said that the current Review Conference was an opportunity that must not be missed to renew and strengthen the Treaty. The international community needed to come to an agreement on an ambitious action plan that would advance nuclear disarmament, prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and strengthen the security of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

13. The Government of Spain was firmly committed to contributing to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and to working towards the definition of a consensus based on concrete and irreversible steps towards the fulfilment of the goal sought by so many peoples and nations. The current momentum in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must be sustained in support of proposals that encouraged multilateralism and sought new consensus and international agreements. The unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) by heads of State and Government in September 2009 had been an enormously positive step outlining an ambitious and complex agenda.

14. All States shared the belief that security and disarmament were complementary and mutually reinforcing. New threats to international peace and security were linked to proliferation of and illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, terrorist groups and States outside or in violation of international law. At the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April, participating States had recognized that nuclear terrorism was one of the most serious threats to international security and required the maintenance of the highest standards of nuclear security as a preventative measure.

15. The 2010 Review Conference was opening in a spirit of optimism that the international community could forge a new consensus to strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime embodied in the Treaty. He was convinced that the renewed political drive would result in the adoption of a balanced political document reflecting advances in and strong commitments to the Treaty's three pillars, which would lead to a more secure world free of nuclear weapons in which the inalienable right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was guaranteed.

16. At the present time, nuclear disarmament, as envisaged in article VI of the Treaty, had become a realistic ambition thanks primarily to the political will shown by nuclear-weapon States. The Review Conference was beginning at an auspicious moment of positive advances between the two nuclear-weapon States that held 95

per cent of the world's nuclear arsenals. The new agreement on strategic arms reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States of America was a very positive step that should open the way to new rounds of global nuclear arms reduction, both strategic and sub-strategic. The new Nuclear Posture Review issued by the United States Government was also a significant step towards the establishment of a new climate. Spain welcomed the decreased role of nuclear weapons in security strategy and the commitment not to develop new nuclear weapons, as well as the commitment by the United States to the early ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the agreement reached in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in May 2009 to launch the negotiation of a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

17. Spain supported efforts to universalize the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The entire international community, in particular the three countries that had still not acceded to the Treaty, must abide by its terms. It was also crucial to devise appropriate measures in the event of a notice of withdrawal from the Treaty, as in the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in conformity with article X, with the goal of preserving the authority and integrity of the Treaty, and of respecting compliance with the safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

18. Mechanisms must be found to advance towards the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in order to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the region, which would represent a new advance in the Middle East peace process and strengthen mutual trust among the countries of the region and regional and global security. Spain supported the appointment of a special coordinator for the Middle East and the convening of a diplomatic conference, possibly in 2011, which would be a step towards the objective set in the 1995 resolution and would have a positive impact on the development of the peace process.

19. The international regime to combat nuclear proliferation must be strengthened by further vigorous support of the authority of IAEA, including the strengthening of its verification and monitoring capabilities. Spain, along with the entire European Union, supported the universal implementation of the Additional Protocol in conjunction with safeguards agreements as the new verification standard, which would strengthen transparency and confidence-building measures for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

20. There had been several instances of nuclear proliferation that represented serious failures in NPT compliance, namely, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The relevant resolutions of the Security Council must be complied with in order to restore the confidence of the international community and strengthen regional stability and security. Spain therefore urged those two countries to comply forthwith with international law.

21. Spain affirmed the right of every country to develop civilian nuclear programmes in conformity with the Treaty and sought therefore to promote mechanisms aimed at ensuring the responsible use of nuclear energy in the best conditions of security, safety and non-proliferation. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, such as the IAEA Nuclear Fuel Bank, should not be perceived as

new constraints on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but rather as cost-effective initiatives suited to current technology and concerns.

22. In all diplomatic negotiations, trust and good faith played a determining role. Spain was confident that all States parties to the Treaty were seeking in good faith a global agreement that would include concessions and compromises for all parties and would allow the international community to set some balanced future-oriented objectives to preserve the NPT regime. Spain, occupying the rotating Presidency of the European Union, would spare no effort to reach such a global agreement.

23. **Mrs. Clinton** (United States of America) said that reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons and materials was a central mission of United States foreign policy and that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons lay at the core of that mission. In a message addressed to the current Review Conference, President Obama of the United States had pointed out that the Treaty regime was under increasing pressure, which was why a year earlier in Prague he had made it a priority of the United States to strengthen each of the Treaty's key pillars with the aim of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and pursuing the peace and security of a world without them. Noting that the eyes of the world were upon the Review Conference, the President had urged all countries to come together in partnership to pursue a world without nuclear weapons.

24. Admittedly, there were many different perspectives and historical experiences represented in the Conference and there were those who doubted whether nuclear-weapon States, including her own country, were prepared to help lead such an effort. She underscored her country's commitment to a world without nuclear weapons and to taking concrete steps towards that end. Her delegation would put forward for the Conference's consideration sincere and serious proposals to advance the fundamental aims of the Treaty and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.

25. For her country, linking rights with responsibilities was not just a slogan but rather the guiding principle of its efforts. The United States recognized the rights of all countries in compliance with the Treaty to realize the benefits of nuclear energy and its own responsibility to commit the resources that would help spread those benefits as widely as possible. It also recognized its responsibility as a nuclear-weapon State to move towards disarmament. It was upholding its end of the basic bargain of the Treaty and asked all signatories to do the same by strengthening global non-proliferation rules and holding accountable those who violated them. The mission of the Conference was to create a safer world where future generations could realize their God-given potential without the threat of nuclear proliferation.

26. When the Non-Proliferation Treaty had entered into force in 1970, the world had been at a crossroads, with many asserting that nuclear proliferation was inevitable. However, the Treaty had helped to dispel the darkest predictions of that era and no nuclear weapon had been used in those four decades. The world was once again at a crossroads, facing the prospect of a new wave of proliferation. Once again, there were claims that the spread of nuclear weapons was unavoidable and that the world must learn to live with the fear and instability resulting from an increase in the number of nuclear-armed States and networks.

27. The vast majority of States were living up to their non-proliferation obligations, but a few had demonstrated a determination to violate the rules and defy the international community. During the past decade, one State had said it was

withdrawing from the NPT after being caught cheating and had subsequently announced two nuclear tests. Another had cynically claimed to be abiding by the Treaty while violating safeguards, expanding its enrichment programme, failing to cooperate with IAEA, and ignoring the injunctions of the Security Council.

28. In the face of such challenges, most nations had the opportunity to choose a different path. In that connection, the message that the United States President had delivered in Prague in 2009 had a new urgency. Rules must be binding, violations must be punished, words must mean something, and the world must stand together to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The time had come for a strong international response at the current Review Conference.

29. The review conferences held every five years for the past four decades had too often fractured along familiar lines: nuclear-weapon States versus non-nuclear-weapon States, or the Western group versus the Non-Aligned Movement. Instead of working together to meet a common challenge, States parties had retreated into predictable positions to protect their presumed interests. The current review conference must be different.

30. Obviously, some countries would choose not to be constructive. At the preceding meeting, Iran's President had offered the same tired, false, and sometimes wild accusations against the United States and others. Iran would do whatever it could to divert attention away from its own record and to attempt to evade accountability. Ultimately, however, countries were judged not by how assertively they claimed their rights but by how faithfully they upheld their responsibilities. As the Secretary-General had said, the onus was on Iran in that regard. So far, Iran had failed to meet its burden. Iran was the only country represented at the Conference that had been found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations. It had defied the Security Council and IAEA, and placed the future of the non-proliferation regime in jeopardy. That was why it was facing increasing isolation and pressure from the international community. Iran would not succeed in its efforts to divert and divide. The United States and the great majority of States parties had a much broader agenda: to strengthen a global non-proliferation regime that fostered the security of all nations, and to advance both their rights and their responsibilities. It was time to focus on promoting practical solutions, not pursuing unrealistic goals; and to build consensus, not block it. She called on Iran to join with all the other States parties in fulfilling their international obligations and working towards the goal of a safer world.

31. The stakes were currently as high as when the Treaty had first come into force. States parties must transcend old divisions and set a course for 40 more years of progress to stem the tide of proliferation, prevent the use of nuclear weapons, and use nuclear power for the purpose of peace and prosperity.

32. States parties must recommit themselves to strengthening the three pillars of the non-proliferation regime — nuclear disarmament, access to civilian nuclear energy, and non-proliferation. In that respect, the United States had been leading through deeds and not just words, beginning with its efforts to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in its own arsenal. Upon taking office, President Obama had recognized that the greatest potential danger facing the United States came from a terrorist group like al-Qaida obtaining a crude nuclear device, not from a global nuclear war. The threats of the twenty-first century could not be addressed with a massive nuclear stockpile. The United States was therefore taking irreversible,

transparent and verifiable steps to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The treaty concluded the month before between the United States and the Russian Federation on strategic arms reduction would limit the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the two countries to levels not seen since the 1950s. The new treaty was consistent with the Secretary-General's call to pursue nuclear disarmament through separate, mutually reinforcing instruments.

33. The Nuclear Posture Review recently conducted by the United States had ruled out the development of new nuclear weapons and new missions and capabilities for existing weapons. It had also confirmed that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT that were in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Her country had made a commitment to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and was ready to start multilateral negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. Her Government would be seeking the Senate's approval for ratification of protocols for United States participation in nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the South Pacific, giving parties to the relevant agreements a legally binding assurance that the United States would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them and that it would fully respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of the zones. The United States was also prepared to consult with the parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central and South-East Asia in an effort to reach agreement that would allow it to sign those protocols as well.

34. The United States supported efforts to realize the goal of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in accordance with the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Middle East might well represent the greatest current threat of nuclear proliferation. Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not universal in the region, and a few countries that were parties had violated their treaty obligations. In spite of such difficulties, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the objective of a Middle East free of such weapons of mass destruction and was prepared to support practical measures towards that end.

35. As the United States President had made clear, the country would retain a nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons existed in order to protect itself and its allies. It would, however, continue to seek further reductions and pursue increased transparency with respect to its nuclear arsenal. The United States pledged immediately to make public the number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile and the number of weapons it had dismantled since 1991.

36. The United States unequivocally supported the rights of States that were in compliance with the Treaty to access to nuclear technology and energy for peaceful purposes. It had been the biggest contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, providing nearly \$200 million over the past decade, and would make an additional commitment of \$50 million over the next five years for a new IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative. It hoped that others would match that contribution. The additional resources thus obtained could be used for constructive purposes, including the development of infrastructure for the safe and secure use of nuclear power. She welcomed the emphasis placed by the Director General of IAEA on expanding the use of civil nuclear energy for humanitarian purposes. The United States was also strengthening bilateral technical cooperation arrangements with

more than 40 States, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa and South-East Asia.

37. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was weakened when any State flouted the rules and developed illicit nuclear-weapon capabilities. Consequently, as States parties pursued progress on the three pillars, they must recommit themselves to bolstering the non-proliferation regime. When IAEA asked for more resources and authority to carry out its verification mission, States parties must respond. When IAEA called on States to sign and ratify an additional protocol to ensure that parties to the NPT were meeting their treaty obligations, States parties must act.

38. Improving the ability of IAEA to detect safeguard violations was not enough. Potential violators must know that they would pay a high price for breaking the rules. The international community's record of enforcing compliance in recent years was unacceptable. There should be automatic penalties for the violation of safeguards agreements, including the suspension of all international nuclear cooperation until compliance was restored. All possible financial and legal tools should be used to disrupt illicit proliferation networks. That meant tightening controls on trans-shipment and restrictions on transfers of sensitive technology. There was also a need to find ways to dissuade States from utilizing the Treaty's withdrawal provision to avoid accountability.

39. The United States was not proposing to amend the Treaty to limit the right of States to withdraw. However, it was unacceptable for a State committing treaty violations to say it would withdraw from the Treaty in an attempt to escape penalties and even pursue nuclear weapons. Parties to the Treaty had invested decades in building a global non-proliferation regime, and that work would be rendered meaningless if the international community continued to allow nations to break the rules with impunity.

40. The 2010 Review Conference must provide a foundation for future actions, including the strengthening of IAEA safeguards, the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disarmament and stronger action by the Security Council against proliferation violations.

41. The past 40 years had proved that nuclear proliferation was not inevitable. The United States believed that it could be stopped, but to do so required all States parties to recognize common dangers and find common ground, to think creatively, and to take practical steps together at the current Conference.

42. Sceptics said that when countries gathered at the United Nations, nothing happened but many words were used up. It was for the current Review Conference to prove those doubters wrong. In 40 years' time the world would mark the eightieth anniversary of the Treaty. The men and women who would gather on that occasion would not remember the words spoken at the current Conference unless those words were matched by actions. Whether the world would be more or less secure depended on the path taken at the current Review Conference and there was no greater reason than that to find a way to act together and to act decisively.

43. **Mr. Amorim** (Brazil) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was intrinsically unfair in that it divided the world into "haves" and "have-nots" and was therefore an expression of the imbalances in the international system produced in an era when military might, especially nuclear weapons, had been the main, if not the sole source, of prestige and political power. The perception that nuclear arms were a

means to political prominence had been reinforced by the unfortunate identification of the permanent members of the Security Council with the five nuclear-weapon States recognized by the Treaty. Article VI of the Treaty offered a possibility of correcting that destructive imbalance, but it had never been duly implemented.

44. Brazil was convinced that the best guarantee for non-proliferation was the total elimination of nuclear weapons, because as long as some States possessed nuclear arms, other States would be tempted to acquire or develop them. At the 2000 Review Conference, negotiations with the nuclear-weapon States, led largely by the New Agenda Coalition, of which Brazil was a member, had resulted in a forward-looking and realistic programme of action, which had come to be known as “the 13 steps to disarmament”. The Review Conference had agreed, among other measures, on an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, but that pledge and many others had remain unfulfilled.

45. In an effort to achieve implementation of the 13 steps, the New Agenda Coalition had subsequently submitted a working paper with more than a dozen recommendations on nuclear disarmament aimed at adding credibility to the Treaty through, inter alia, a clear commitment of no-first use by the possessor States, legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the renunciation of activities aimed at upgrading or developing new nuclear devices.

46. There had recently been a few positive steps, including the commitment the preceding year by the United States of America and the Russian Federation to a nuclear free world; the United States President’s speech in Prague providing fresh encouragement for those who pursued the total elimination of nuclear arsenals; and the new strategic arms reduction agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation, which had been a limited step in the right direction. Brazil also welcomed the conceptual advances in the new United States Nuclear Posture Review, mainly in relation to negative security assurances, and the commitment by the United States Government to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

47. In April in Washington leaders from more than 40 countries had confirmed their willingness to tackle issues related to nuclear security, and several speakers, including the President of Brazil, had asserted that the most effective way to reduce the risks of misuse of nuclear materials by non-State actors was the total and irreversible elimination of all nuclear arsenals.

48. However, unilateral and piecemeal measures would not lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament required comprehensive and verifiable steps, and a precise and realistic timetable. The days of mutually assured destruction (MAD) were long gone, but, paradoxically, the mindset of that era seemed to linger on, despite the fact that nuclear weapons were of no use in addressing current security threats. They could not combat transnational crime, prevent ethnic and religious conflicts, or curb cyber-war or terrorism. A world in which the existence of nuclear weapons continued to be accepted was intrinsically insecure.

49. Legitimate concern to promote non-proliferation must not hinder the exercise of the right to peaceful nuclear activities, and no country should be denied the right to peaceful nuclear activities as long as it complied with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and agreed IAEA requirements. Doubts about implementation of the Treaty

by specific countries must, to the maximum extent possible, be dealt with through dialogue and negotiation.

50. Ten years prior to acceding to the Treaty, Brazil had enshrined in its Constitution the prohibition of nuclear activities for non-peaceful purposes. Even before that, Brazil and Argentina had engaged in an unprecedented confidence-building process by implementing a comprehensive control and accounting system for nuclear materials. The Brazilian-Argentine model of cooperation should be an inspiration for other countries and regions. Brazil was also proud to be a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in an inhabited part of the planet.

51. Any commitments additional to those prescribed in the NPT must be considered in the light of the Treaty's overall implementation, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament. The world would be a safe place only when all countries felt that they were being treated with fairness and respect and when the root causes of conflict, such as poverty and discrimination, were overcome. Nuclear weapons bred instability and insecurity and deepened the sense of injustice. The international community could not wait another five years to translate the shared goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world into concrete political action.

52. **Mr. Verhagen** (Netherlands) said that the Review Conference should seize the opportunities presented by the announcement by the United States that it would take concrete steps towards achievement of a world without nuclear weapons and by the signing, in April 2010, of a new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation.

53. The best way to develop broad-based disarmament and non-proliferation measures was to strengthen the system of international treaties based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the ideas on which that instrument were based were as vital and relevant as ever. His delegation welcomed the conclusion of the 2010 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms as a sign that the two largest nuclear-weapon States were assuming their moral responsibility to lead the complex disarmament process, although there should be no illusions: that goal could not be achieved overnight.

54. Since non-proliferation and disarmament were mutually reinforcing, the non-nuclear-weapon States also had a role to play. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had begun consideration of a phased reduction of the role and number of nuclear weapons in Europe, and his delegation suggested that the American sub-strategic nuclear weapons on that continent should be a subject of discussion between the United States and the Russian Federation.

55. Some 20 years after the end of the cold war, the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was unacceptable to his country and to the people of the world. He was grateful to the United States President for organizing the Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C., on 12 and 13 April 2010, which had demonstrated the need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Additional protocols should be an integral part of the international safeguards system, which should be enhanced in response to new developments and insights. Countries such as Iran should meet the demands of IAEA; the unfounded and unacceptable accusations made by the President of that country at the previous meeting were not

helpful for the current debate. In that regard, he associated himself with the remarks made by the representative of Luxembourg.

56. The Treaty was too important for the attention of the Review Conference to be monopolized by the issue of Iran. The many States that had decided to make use of nuclear energy also deserved the attention and cooperation of the international community, which should have the means to verify the peaceful use of such energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. His own country's nuclear facilities were equipped with stringent safeguards and had been opened to peer review, and he called on all other States to take similar steps. Verification and compliance were pivotal for building trust, and failure to agree on measures for dealing with cases of non-compliance in a resolute, comprehensive manner would undermine the Treaty's integrity. Only when the nuclear safeguards system had been strengthened would the international community be able to capitalize on the current "nuclear spring".

57. Nuclear energy was a legitimate option for meeting future energy demands. Secure fuel supplies and secure access to them were key for States with nuclear power programmes. In order to ensure that the development of nuclear power met the highest safety, security and non-proliferation standards, the issue of supply security must be properly addressed. His Government had always supported talks and efforts related to multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and would continue to seek dialogue with all concerned parties. Such initiatives did not infringe on any State's rights; on the contrary, they could promote the exercise of States' inherent right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Lastly, he expressed his appreciation of the work done by IAEA, which must be enabled to continue its efforts.

58. **Mr. Spindelegger** (Austria) said that when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had entered into force 40 years earlier, the world had been in the depths of the cold war. At times, the threat of nuclear war had seemed imminent. The goals of the Treaty were, however, clear: to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to pursue nuclear disarmament.

59. Forty years later, it was deeply disturbing that so many nuclear weapons were still in existence; that North Korea had developed nuclear arms; and that, in spite of requests by IAEA and the United Nations, Iran was still not able or willing to dispel concerns about its nuclear ambitions.

60. In its 40 years of existence the Treaty had produced resolutions and decisions, high hopes and aspirations, and yet, the international community was still waiting for progress on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and for negotiations on a fissile material ban. In those 40 years, there had been dangerous incidents, a terrible accident in Chernobyl, and growing concerns over the misuse of sensitive nuclear technologies, and yet there was still no prospect of real solutions for environmental and health concerns, no universal commitment to recognize the IAEA Additional Protocol as the verification standard, and no real interest in safe and fair multilateral control of the nuclear fuel cycle through IAEA. Nevertheless, the inadequacies of the system must not be used to detract from the overall positive record. Since 1970, few new States had acquired nuclear weapons. Some States were giving up or reducing nuclear arsenals and dismantling weapons programmes.

IAEA had established a highly efficient system of monitoring and verification and become the accepted authority on nuclear issues.

61. The most important sign of the Treaty's relevance was the 2010 Review Conference itself, at which almost the whole world had gathered to support the Treaty as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. A review conference was an occasion to reflect on the past, but it should also focus on the future. There was a sense of optimism — thanks primarily to the inspirational approach of the President of the United States, which had made possible the signing of a new treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms by the Russian Federation and the United States just one month earlier. It was to be hoped that the improved atmosphere would lead to concrete steps forward at the Review Conference, especially with regard to the reduction of nuclear arsenals, the nuclear test ban, a fissile material ban, the Additional Protocol, a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and confidence-building. Progress required positive contributions by everyone, not confrontational rhetoric.

62. Austria would, as in the past, actively contribute to a successful outcome, for example with its proposal on a fair and transparent system for multilateral control of the nuclear fuel cycle. Most important for Austria was that the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world should become the central objective of the international community's endeavours. Such ideas had been considered idealistic dreams 40 years earlier, but just the preceding year the Security Council had embraced the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

63. Moving from the dream of a world free of nuclear weapons to actual “global zero” would take time and much effort. There were several promising ideas, including Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's Five-Point-Plan, which Austria supported. The most effective way to move towards “global zero” was through a universal legal instrument establishing a strict multilateral verification mechanism.

64. Austria was serious about disarmament issues and had been at the forefront of initiatives resulting in conventions banning mines and cluster bombs. The Austrian Government and legislature — which had recently adopted a formal resolution on a world without nuclear weapons — would be closely watching how disarmament was dealt with at the Review Conference. If there was no clear progress towards “global zero”, it would explore with others the feasibility of a global instrument to ban nuclear weapons. While the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, a static regime that has lost its vision might benefit from fresh ideas.

65. A meaningful outcome at the Conference would require contributions from many quarters. With no nuclear weapons to disarm, no international treaties left to ratify and no nuclear industry to monitor, Austria had sought to identify ways in which it might still make a contribution. The Austrian Government had decided to offer office space, equipment, a yearly stipend to offset personnel costs for 10 years and financial support for conferences in order to enable the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to establish and maintain a permanent liaison office in Vienna, which would enable it to devote more attention to the meetings on nuclear issues in Vienna. A presence close to institutions such as IAEA and CTBTO would also help UNODA to provide support to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially if a support unit for the NPT-review process along the lines of the Canadian proposal was established. Austria also firmly believed that strengthening

of the monitoring role of civil society could further the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. It therefore intended to assist in establishing in Vienna an international hub of expertise in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It would consult in the months ahead with Governments and civil society on how such a hub could contribute effectively to the global efforts for a world without nuclear weapons.

66. **Mr. Cannon** (Canada) said that at the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., in April 2010, the 47 participating countries had recognized nuclear terrorism as a significant security threat and expressed their commitment to enhancing nuclear security. On that occasion, by advancing non-proliferation as a theme for the upcoming Summit of the Group of Eight Canada had demonstrated its commitment to ensuring that weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, would not spread to States or terrorists that were prepared to use them under any circumstances. At a meeting in Gatineau in March, the Group's Foreign Ministers had issued a Statement on Non-Proliferation, Disarmament and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy as a contribution to the 2010 Review Conference.

67. IAEA safeguards were a fundamental element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. While there had been progress since the 2005 Review Conference, 21 States parties had yet to sign and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty. Moreover, the nature and scope of the Agency's annual conclusions, particularly with respect to the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities, was limited for States that had only a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force. That deficiency had been addressed through the IAEA Board of Governors' approval of additional protocols to safeguards agreements. The Conference should therefore recognize that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, represented the new verification standard.

68. Canada remained a strong supporter of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The inalienable right of all States parties to develop research on and produce and use such energy for peaceful purposes, affirmed in article IV of the Treaty, was explicitly linked with the compliance requirements established in articles I, II and III thereof.

69. There had been several recent challenges to the authority and integrity of the Treaty. He called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had demonstrated its complete disregard for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives by announcing its withdrawal from the Treaty in 2003, to re-accede to that instrument, dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards on its nuclear programmes. Furthermore, at the morning meeting, the Secretary-General had made it clear that the onus was on Iran to dissipate doubts and concerns about its nuclear ambitions. It was unfortunate that the President of Iran had decided to ignore that invitation by delivering a predictable and aggressive statement. Iran's extensive past undeclared nuclear activities, together with its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle without any justifiable reason, suggested that it was seeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability that was contrary to its Treaty commitments. Immediate and complete cessation of its uranium enrichment and other proliferation-sensitive activities in accordance with its obligations to the Security Council and IAEA would provide the only objective indicator of the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

70. Regional security was a crucial consideration for States that remained outside the Treaty. His Government supported efforts to bring peace to the Middle East and to make it a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. His delegation called upon the three States which had yet to accede to the Treaty to do so as non-nuclear-weapon States.

71. He drew attention to a working paper entitled “Other provisions: institutional reform, article X” (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.42), submitted by Canada to the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference and sponsored by a cross-regional group of 17 States, which proposed specific decisions aimed at further strengthening the review process and making it more responsive to States parties. His delegation would welcome further sponsors and hoped that the decisions proposed therein would be reflected in the outcome document of the Review Conference.

72. The numerous challenges that faced the Conference should not be a cause for pessimism or lack of ambition, but rather an incentive to each State party to display the political will and flexibility necessary to arrive at a strong and balanced outcome that would reinforce the Treaty. The Conference was taking place at a time of challenge, but also of renewed optimism and great opportunity. That opportunity should be seized.

73. **Mr. Smith** (Australia) reaffirmed his Government’s commitment to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and its belief that the Treaty, as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes, delivered tangible security dividends for all States parties. The fundamental bargain that underpinned the Treaty — the pledge by non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire such weapons; the commitment by nuclear-weapon States to pursue disarmament; and guaranteed access to peaceful nuclear energy for all States parties — was as valid as it had been in 1970. The fact that no nuclear weapon had been used in anger since the end of the Second World War owed much to the Treaty.

74. The Review Conference must reaffirm the States parties’ shared commitment to the Treaty’s core principles and must achieve outcomes that strengthened non-proliferation and disarmament and facilitated access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The goal of a world without nuclear weapons could not be achieved without commitment to action by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. The former must commit themselves to that goal, exercise leadership and chart the course to the abolition of nuclear weapons, while the latter must comply with their Treaty obligations and IAEA safeguards agreements and work to strengthen the Treaty’s non-proliferation regime. His Government supported the right of States parties to participate in the development of peaceful nuclear energy within a framework that reduced proliferation risk and adhered to the highest international safeguards standards.

75. His Government’s commitment to a successful Review Conference was reflected by its accomplishments in the lead-up to the event. In 2008, Australia and Japan had established the independent International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The Commission’s report, released in December 2009, contained thoughtful analysis and recommendations for action on the critical issues. Together with Japan, Australia had also submitted to the Conference a working paper entitled “New package of practical nuclear disarmament and non-

proliferation measures for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.9).

76. The Conference was taking place at a time of growing momentum towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. He congratulated the United States and the Russian Federation on the signing of their new Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and commended France and the United Kingdom on the unilateral steps that they had taken in order to reduce their nuclear arsenals from cold war heights. The Nuclear Posture Review recently released by the United States also sent a clear signal of commitment to progress on disarmament and non-proliferation.

77. The Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010 had highlighted the need to secure nuclear materials and prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and proliferation. His Government hoped that that momentum could be sustained and accelerated and would like to see further, deeper, verifiable and irreversible cuts in all nuclear arsenals and a continuing reduction of their role in national security strategies. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would be a major step forward for disarmament. He urged States that had not yet signed and ratified that Treaty to do so and welcomed the Secretary-General’s strong commitment, expressed in his opening address to the Conference, to its entry into force. He also encouraged all States to support the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

78. Despite that positive momentum, however, there were also troubling developments. His Government remained deeply concerned at Iran’s nuclear programme and called on that State to cooperate fully with IAEA and to abide by IAEA and Security Council resolutions. It also called on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which claimed to have withdrawn from the Treaty, to resume international negotiations and return to full compliance with that instrument and the associated safeguards agreement.

79. The best way to bolster compliance was to ensure that IAEA had the means to provide credible assurances that a State party had no undeclared or covert facilities and that its nuclear programme was implemented for peaceful purposes. A comprehensive safeguards agreement, combined with an additional protocol, should be recognized as the basic standard of verification. His Government had made adherence to the Additional Protocol a condition of supply for Australian uranium and encouraged other States parties to take a similar approach. It believed that the issues of non-compliance and withdrawal must be adequately addressed, if necessary by the Security Council, in accordance with the Council’s role under the Charter of the United Nations. He reiterated his Government’s commitment to a universal Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and called on those States that were not yet parties to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible as non-nuclear-weapon States and without preconditions.

80. His Government recognized the importance of implementing the 1995 resolution on a verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and regretted that there had been no movement on that issue. It stood ready to support constructive efforts by States parties with a view to implementation of the resolution.

81. The enduring health of the Treaty and its contribution to collective security could be maintained only if States parties displayed the necessary political will and took concrete action to meet all their obligations and commitments. The participants owed current and future generations a world free from nuclear weapons.

82. **Mr. Fihri** (Morocco) said that while there had been significant challenges to the Treaty during the preceding decade, recent developments such as the United States President's landmark speech in Prague, the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, and several other non-proliferation initiatives had created a climate favourable to reinvigoration of the international nuclear regime. His country believed that the States parties to the Treaty should rise above disputes over the interpretation of particular provisions and focus on the spirit of the Treaty's objectives. He urged States to fulfil obligations deriving from the Treaty and the review conferences, and, in particular, called for effective implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed on at the 2000 Review Conference.

83. As one of the coordinators, along with France, of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, his country called on annex II countries to ratify that Treaty without delay. It was regrettable that, 15 years after its adoption by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had yet to be implemented. The establishment of such a zone in the Middle East would be an important confidence-building measure for the countries of the region and therefore an important step towards strengthening international peace and security. The international community should not tolerate any attempts to violate the Treaty, and should also act to strengthen the IAEA safeguards regime.

84. Given the rise in global energy demand combined with the problems associated with fossil fuels, alternative energy sources such as nuclear energy were of increasing strategic and economic importance. The non-proliferation regime should not infringe on the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as provided for in article IV of the Treaty. He called on the international community to build on the outcome of the International Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Energy, held in Paris in March 2010, and to make full use of the potential contribution of peaceful uses of nuclear technology to economic and social development. He welcomed the statements made by the United States Secretary of State, and expressed the hope that a positive outcome to the Conference would restore credibility to the Treaty.

85. **Mr. Baconschi** (Romania) paid tribute to the many States parties that were implementing the provisions of, and meeting their obligations under the Treaty. He recognized that it was difficult to meet the disarmament commitments of the past while seeking to strengthen global security and stressed the need to improve the nuclear technology capable of ensuring public and environmental safety. In the light of such challenges, States parties must work together to strengthen support for the Treaty, which, while it had one of the highest accession rates of any international instrument, was vulnerable and often put to the test. Multilateral diplomacy and international cooperation were the key to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The world expected States parties to keep their promises and the participants must make every effort to avoid another failure.

86. His Government viewed the Treaty as an essential instrument of collective security. Its three interrelated pillars were the appropriate framework for preserving and strengthening international peace and security while benefiting from the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. It was in all States' interest to support the Treaty, preserve its integrity and validity, and further strengthen it.

87. His Government was of the opinion that nuclear energy had the potential to be a reliable, sustainable and environmentally friendly energy source, provided that its use was beneficial, responsible and sustainable. The safeguards system was the instrument by which Romania accepted IAEA control over all nuclear raw materials and special fissionable materials. Those materials were used in all peaceful nuclear-related activities on Romania's territory or under its jurisdiction or control. The sole purpose of the safeguards system was to verify that those materials were not diverted to nuclear weapons or related activities.

88. International cooperation with and technical assistance from IAEA was and would continue to be instrumental for developing Romania's nuclear programme. His country had benefited from international support and had undertaken fully to implement the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the IAEA Additional Protocol. It was in the interest of all States that a safeguards agreement coupled with an additional protocol should become the Agency's verification standard.

89. As noted in the working paper on the repatriation of all Russian-origin fresh highly enriched uranium as well as spent fuel from Romania (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.3), submitted by Romania and the Russian Federation, all highly enriched uranium of Russian origin had been removed from Romanian territory in 2009 in a joint operation conducted with the help of the United States of America, the Russian Federation and IAEA. Under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, all the spent highly enriched uranium fuel from the Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics (TRIGA) research reactor had been returned to the United States, its country of origin, in 2009.

90. He appealed to all States parties to show flexibility, look beyond national and regional interests and make way for a larger picture of peace, security and prosperity for present and future generations. Differences of opinion should not be feared, but it should be borne in mind that a positive outcome of the Conference would show the parties' political will to deal successfully with nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

91. **Mr. Mladenov** (Bulgaria) said that halting the spread of nuclear weapons was a mission that transcended politics and diplomacy, national ambitions and personal egos. It was a universal obligation and a joint commitment assumed by States parties to the Treaty, which, at a critical juncture for the future of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, must either seize the opportunity to reverse the spread of nuclear weapons and build momentum for their ultimate elimination, or prolong the period of indecision during which those who sought to challenge the Treaty would grow stronger and more dangerous.

92. The current Review Conference could not be seen as "business as usual"; the 2005 Conference had closed without substantive agreement on the tough challenges facing the Treaty. Every nation must put a strengthened Treaty at the centre of its national diplomacy and take steps to help achieve the goals of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear technology in the knowledge that

no country could achieve them on its own. The disagreements and procedural wrangling that had too often led to gridlock must be set aside. Failure was not an option; universal adherence to the Treaty must be a universal priority and States that were not parties should be invited to apply comprehensive IAEA safeguards to all their civilian nuclear activities and to cease manufacturing nuclear weapons and related materials.

93. A new sense of urgency had emerged since the 2005 Review Conference; the uncovering of clandestine nuclear networks had raised the spectre of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear non-proliferation regime would be undermined if violators were allowed to act with impunity. For the first time, a signatory had announced its withdrawal from the Treaty and had renewed its programme for producing highly enriched uranium. All States parties, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, were bound by their Treaty obligations and withdrawal could not be without consequences. He therefore urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with all its international obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and IAEA standards and to resume negotiations with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

94. There were justified concerns about the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which should comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions and IAEA standards and safeguards fully, unconditionally, unequivocally and without delay. Anything short of full compliance should be unacceptable. The international community had made important efforts to reach out to Iran, and he joined other members of the European Union which had called on its Government to respond positively. Ratification and application of the additional protocol already signed by Iran would be a major step in that direction. States parties should also reaffirm their commitment to creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, building on the successful establishment of such zones in Africa and Central Asia.

95. It was crucial to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. States parties should therefore call for full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2005) and should reaffirm that expert controls were an essential instrument of non-proliferation while rejecting the false assumption that they impeded cooperation and the transfer of technology. The Conference should also welcome the supporting role of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in upholding the non-proliferation regime.

96. Nuclear security was absolutely necessary to the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. Hundreds of tons of weapons-usable fissile material that could be potential targets for sabotage, misuse, or diversion and millions of radioactive sources scattered across the globe were not tightly protected. The Conference should therefore call for the securing of the world's vulnerable fissile material.

97. All States must recognize that strengthening the Treaty was a joint endeavour to be backed by specific action. He welcomed the recent release of the Nuclear Posture Review by the United States Government and the latter's commitment to seeking ways to reduce the role of nuclear weapons while maintaining a safe and secure deterrent capability; the signing of the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and Russia; the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, at which measures to reduce the threat of nuclear attack had been discussed; the

renewed commitment by the United States President to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and his efforts to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; and the announcement by the United States Secretary of State, at the current meeting, of greater transparency with respect to her country's nuclear stockpile.

98. In order for the 2010 Review Conference to succeed, States parties must not shy away from their most important goals: to strengthen the IAEA verification instruments, enhance the enforcement measures of the non-proliferation regime and tighten the withdrawal provisions of the Treaty so that it could not be abused by non-compliant States. His Government believed that a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol were key to the current IAEA verification standard. In view of modern security challenges and the danger of terrorist organizations acquiring nuclear devices, strengthening the Treaty's principles and safeguards constituted a precious tool for countering nuclear terrorism. The States parties had gathered at the Conference in good faith and with a shared conviction to work towards "global zero", and he urged them to take advantage of that historic opportunity to reverse the spread of nuclear weapons and build momentum for their ultimate elimination.

99. **Mr. Natalagawa** (Indonesia) said that failure to achieve progress towards disarmament was due to the failure of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to live up to their commitments. All parties needed to abandon the intransigent positions of the past and focus on bridging differences. There had been some positive developments, including the new treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation and recent Nuclear Posture Review issued by the United States. The Conference provided an opportunity to build on such developments. He was pleased to inform the Conference that his country was initiating the procedure for ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

100. It was crucial for nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitments under the Treaty and, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Proliferation threats needed to be addressed without a double standard. In particular, Israel needed to be prevailed upon to join the Treaty and a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be established in the Middle East in accordance with the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Existing nuclear-weapon-free zones should be supported, and there could be no justification for any nuclear energy cooperation with States that were adding to proliferation momentum. On the other hand, the inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as provided for in article IV of the Treaty, should be respected, and IAEA should be strengthened in order to be able to fulfil its mandate in that regard. All three pillars of the Treaty should be approached in a balanced, comprehensive and non-discriminatory fashion. Ultimately, a universal convention with a specific timeline for full disarmament should be adopted, because the only guarantee that nuclear weapons would never be used was their complete elimination.

101. **The Chairman** welcomed the announcement by Indonesia that it was initiating the ratification process for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

102. **Ms. Calmy-Rey** (Switzerland) said that the Treaty was at a crossroads. The new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation and the Washington Nuclear Security Summit had been positive developments. But recent

adjustments to the nuclear postures of the two biggest nuclear States had still failed to address the fundamental question of why, two decades after the end of the cold war, nuclear deterrence still remained part of their military doctrines at all. Nuclear weapons were as useless against nuclear-armed States that possessed second-strike capability as they were against terrorist groups that would not be deterred by the threat of nuclear reprisal. They were also immoral because of the indiscriminate harm they could cause to human beings and the environment, and illegal under international humanitarian law.

103. Her country hoped that the Conference would adopt an action plan to rekindle momentum for disarmament by building on the achievements of previous conferences, and in particular by updating the 13 practical steps agreed on at the 2000 Review Conference along the lines proposed by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Disarmament should no longer be treated as the “poor relation” of the Treaty’s other two pillars, and action should be taken to dispel doubts about the ability of IAEA to prevent proliferation. The expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the coming decades was inevitable, and the Conference needed to adopt clear language reaffirming the link between the inalienable right of all States to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes and the obligation to ensure nuclear security and safety.

104. Beyond achieving a successful resolution of the issues immediately at hand, the Conference needed to move forward to a vision of a world where the use of nuclear weapons had no place whatsoever in the military doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States. For Switzerland it was important to uphold a humanitarian perspective in the current discussion of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons should be banned completely by a new convention along the lines proposed by the Secretary-General. Switzerland had prepared a study on delegitimizing nuclear weapons, which it would present in an upcoming side event.

105. States and civil society alike had a role to play in translating into reality the vision of a world where nuclear weapons did not exist and where nuclear energy was used responsibly. The Conference must foster a dialogue leading beyond the current crossroad for the NPT.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

7 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 3rd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 4 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)
later: Mr. Benmehidi (Vice-President) (Algeria)
later: Mr. Woolcott (Vice-President) (Australia)
later: Mr. de Macedo Soares (Vice-President) (Brazil)
later: Mr. Cabactulan (President) (Philippines)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Gryshchenko** (Ukraine) said that 16 years earlier, Ukraine had made an unprecedented move by voluntarily renouncing its inherited nuclear arsenal, which had been the world's third largest at that time. In 1994 it had joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon State and since then had consistently promoted nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Government of Ukraine was deeply convinced that nuclear weapons did not strengthen security but rather created more tensions and risks for States who strove to acquire them.

2. Ukraine's decision had been made with the understanding that security assurances, which it had received through the Budapest Memorandum, constituted an integral part of its nuclear disarmament policy. Security assurances must be reflected in a legally binding international document. States had a basic right to choose the means for providing for their national security and interests, and that right should be taken into account in the elaboration of international and regional security structures.

3. Ukraine had announced in April 2010 that it would eliminate all its stocks of highly enriched uranium by 2012, provided it received sufficient international assistance. Its voluntary step showed that it took nuclear non-proliferation seriously and was proof of its commitment to implement Security Council resolution 1887 (2009).

4. Because of the Treaty, much progress towards nuclear disarmament had been achieved during the past 40 years. However, existing nuclear arsenals and the many gaps in the non-proliferation regime remained as threats to world peace and security.

5. Recent events gave reason to hope that States realized the seriousness of those threats and were committed to addressing them. The Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the signing in April 2010 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms were two milestones that set the tone for further actions. Ukraine also welcomed the decision of the United States to provide legally binding security assurances to the countries belonging to the nuclear-weapon-free zones established in Africa and the South Pacific.

6. Ukraine strongly advocated comprehensive, universal disarmament and strict compliance with the Treaty. There was an urgent need to build on the results of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. It was necessary not only to reaffirm the validity of the 13 practical steps of nuclear disarmament but also to review them thoroughly and, if necessary, to update and extend them. The Treaty system had been under severe strain in recent years and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had been struggling with verification, enforcement and compliance challenges. The Review Conference should pay proper attention to the implementation of non-proliferation commitments.

7. The Treaty required a more efficient mechanism to respond to current challenges and would be strengthened by the elaboration of modalities under which States could implement its article X. Moreover, strict compliance with Security Council resolutions on the prevention of trafficking and acquisition of nuclear

materials by non-State actors needed to be enforced. Additionally, due to the increased risk of terrorism, physical protection of nuclear material and facilities must be strengthened.

8. Ukraine regretted the continuing deadlock concerning a fissile material cut-off treaty. In addition, it hoped that the renewed commitment of key States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would finally allow it to enter into force.

9. Access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology was vital to sustainable development, provided that such uses were subject to IAEA full-scope safeguards. His delegation welcomed the recent agreement between IAEA and the Russian Federation to establish a reserve of low-enriched uranium for supply to IAEA, which could facilitate the supply of nuclear fuel and services while minimizing the risk of proliferation.

10. Strengthening the safety and security of nuclear material and facilities was of even greater importance, as demonstrated by the accident that occurred in Ukraine 24 years earlier at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. An international conference would be convened in April 2011, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the accident, to mark progress towards the goal of a return to normal life and to address the issue of the safe use of nuclear energy.

11. To ensure a successful 2010 Review Conference, decisions must be implemented, requiring key players to plan beyond 2010, develop effective action plans and allocate resources to meet proliferation challenges.

12. **Mr. Jeremić** (Serbia) said that his delegation supported the full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and stressed that concerted efforts were required by the international community to achieve its universality.

13. The first of the Treaty's three core objectives, non-proliferation, was the most immediate challenge to be addressed. Since the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty could play a complementary role in that regard, the Secretary-General's initiative to host a ministerial meeting to bring that instrument into force as soon as possible was particularly welcome. However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself needed to provide greater protection against the threat posed by non-State actors acquiring weapons-grade material through more stringent accountability and transparency mechanisms, including agreed modalities to enhance IAEA verification activities. At the same time, special care must be taken to ensure that IAEA technical cooperation activities were not subject to undue politicization.

14. The Treaty's second core objective was disarmament. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed recently by the United States and the Russian Federation. However, it stressed that negotiations still needed to be intensified with a view to the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

15. The Treaty's third core objective concerned the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As part of its commitment to peaceful nuclear applications, his Government had recently signed an additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Furthermore, in May 2009, the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia had adopted a law on ionizing radiation protection and nuclear safety in order to bring domestic legislation into line with the strictest international standards. The same law had also

led to the establishment of an independent national nuclear agency that would become operational in mid-2010.

16. For several years, Serbia had been working closely with IAEA to transfer 48 kilograms of irradiated highly enriched uranium from Serbia to the Russian Federation for safe storage under the Vinča Institute Nuclear Decommissioning (VIND) project — a model for multilateral cooperation in three crucial fields: spent fuel removal; low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste management; and large-scale facility decommissioning. Serbia was prepared to share its expertise under the VIND project with other interested countries.

17. Lastly, he stressed that only courageous leadership, a global vision and strategic foresight would eliminate the ongoing threat of collective annihilation posed by nuclear weapons. Action must be taken today to make the world a safer place tomorrow.

18. **Ms. Moni** (Bangladesh) said that while her Government welcomed several recent positive developments, it was not convinced that enough was being done to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. It continued to call for the implementation of the consensus decisions adopted by the Review Conferences in 1995 and 2000, particularly the 13 practical steps.

19. Her country, which had an impeccable non-proliferation record, had unconditionally opted to remain non-nuclear and was committed to full compliance with both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Test-Ban Treaty. Indeed, Bangladesh not only had an additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, it was also the first annex 2 State from South Asia to have ratified the Test-Ban Treaty.

20. Bangladesh was constitutionally committed to achieving general and complete disarmament and her Government had steadfastly supported a multilateral approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Accordingly, the Parliament of Bangladesh had recently adopted a resolution supporting the 2010 Review Conference; emphasizing the need to implement all three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; expressing concern about the multiple threats and challenges posed by nuclear weapons; and considering nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to be mutually reinforcing processes.

21. IAEA could help developing countries to achieve sustainable development through its technical cooperation activities. Undue restrictions on such activities, which were contrary to the spirit of the Treaty, must be removed. To that end, her delegation called for a constructive dialogue with all stakeholders during the Review Conference with a view to implementing the provisions of articles I, II and IV of the Treaty in an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence.

22. Lastly, she noted that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty also had a legitimate right to receive negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. It was a matter of concern that the latter were not only adding more precision capability to their existing nuclear weapons stockpiles, but also developing new types of weapons. Renewed and vigorous efforts must therefore be pursued to develop a legally binding framework for the provision of such negative security assurances.

23. *Mr. Benmehidi (Algeria), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

24. **Mr. Alkalaj** (Bosnia and Herzegovina) said that, despite the setbacks witnessed over the past decade, recent initiatives had given a new impetus to the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, particularly Security Council resolution 1887 (2009), the outcome of the Nuclear Security Summit held recently in Washington and the successful conclusion of the new treaty on strategic arms reduction between the United States and the Russian Federation.

25. The current Review Conference provided an invaluable opportunity for States parties to renew their commitments to the main principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States parties should work together in a spirit of compromise and flexibility so that a constructive outcome could be reached on the Treaty's three mutually reinforcing and equally important main pillars.

26. His delegation particularly wished to emphasize the importance of nuclear disarmament and thus its support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which represented a positive step towards the goal of attaining global nuclear disarmament.

27. While all States parties to the Treaty had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, they also needed to comply with the legally binding instruments established to ensure its safe and responsible use, particularly IAEA safeguards agreements. The Agency had shown itself to be a reliable, impartial and efficient international supervisor of nuclear safeguards.

28. **Mr. Medelci** (Algeria) said that while the ultimate goal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was global disarmament, there was general agreement that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation helped to build confidence and maintain international peace and security, and that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were increasingly essential for development and progress. On that basis, participants at the current Review Conference should seek to build consensus by adopting balanced decisions that met the expectations of all States parties without discrimination.

29. Accordingly, the participants should recognize that a selective and discriminatory approach had led to the failure of the 2005 Review Conference; reiterate that the rights and obligations of States were based on the Treaty's three fundamental, complementary and indivisible pillars; and seek to rehabilitate the Treaty by ensuring the effective implementation of all its articles without discrimination. Their starting point should be the implementation of the decisions and resolutions adopted at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

30. Lastly, his delegation particularly wished to draw attention to the need for nuclear-weapon States to provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; the Algerian proposal for article I of the Treaty to be reinforced to ensure that nuclear-weapon States refrained from cooperating in the civilian nuclear field with States not parties to the Treaty; and Algeria's full support for the IAEA mandate to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

31. **Ms. Espersen** (Denmark) said that while the Treaty had made a significant contribution to global security since its entry into force, shortcomings and uncertainties persisted. Recent developments nevertheless indicated that positive momentum was building. She expressed her Government's support for a balanced Conference outcome that would facilitate progress on the three interdependent pillars of the Treaty, the success of which was a matter of concern both for nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States like Denmark.

32. Differences in States' priorities and perspectives with respect to the Treaty, while legitimate, must not be exploited selectively to neglect issues or block consensus. It was her hope that States parties at the Conference would confirm the basic principles of the Treaty; agree on a set of concrete, effective and consensual measures along the lines of the working paper submitted by the European Union to the Preparatory Committee in 2009; and consider ways of improving upon Treaty implementation procedures.

33. Denmark supported efforts to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It also welcomed the signing of the new treaty on strategic arms reduction by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010 and encouraged the parties to negotiate additional reductions. Noting the commitments undertaken at the recent Nuclear Security Summit, she called on the international community to make every effort to bring about the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to begin negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty.

34. The objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty could not be fully achieved without universal adherence; to that end, non-States parties must be persuaded to accede to the Treaty. In addition, it would be necessary to consider what specific measures might be appropriate in the event of a withdrawal from the Treaty — a potential threat to international peace and security, particularly if the State party in question was in breach of Treaty obligations. Withdrawal did not exempt a country from those obligations.

35. As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Denmark strongly supported the Agency's safeguards system and would work to promote recognition of the additional protocol to safeguards agreements as the verification standard.

36. *Mr. Woolcott (Australia), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

37. **Mr. Judeh** (Jordan) said that the Treaty struck a delicate balance between security and development in the context of international consensus. The recent signing by the United States of America and the Russian Federation of a treaty on strategic arms reduction, while a step in the right direction, needed to be consolidated by further action, broadening the initiative to facilitate accession by other States. Universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be achieved first and foremost. While awaiting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which must be achieved at the earliest possible date, Jordan urged States to refrain from conducting nuclear tests of any kind, as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. General Assembly resolution 64/35, which declared 29 August the international day against nuclear tests, might be used to raise awareness of the need to abolish nuclear testing.

38. The climate of détente and the sense of responsibility demonstrated by the two major nuclear-weapon States would certainly help the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to expedite the conclusion of a comprehensive fissile material cut-off treaty. While a review of the level of commitment to article IV of the Treaty would demonstrate it to be excellent overall, the sole situation that deviated from that general rule was cause for serious concern.

39. Given that IAEA was the competent organ for verifying compliance with the non-proliferation regime, it must be given full support in the conduct of its duties and its powers must not be diminished. Moreover, voluntary implementation of the

additional protocol would bolster confidence in the Agency's safeguards system. However, none of those steps should in any way affect the inalienable right of States parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses without discrimination.

40. Jordan would cooperate with all States parties and IAEA to ensure that its peaceful nuclear programme was fully compliant with the Treaty and all other relevant international instruments. At the Nuclear Security Summit held in April 2010, Jordan had affirmed its commitment to cooperation on nuclear issues and to preventing nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations or other irresponsible parties, possibly through the establishment of an international mechanism for the exchange of information on their activities.

41. President Obama's renewed commitment to multilateral diplomacy and his vision of a world free of weapons of mass destruction had helped to dispel the mistrust surrounding the non-proliferation regime in past years, and, in view of the positive response of his Russian counterpart, there was cause for optimism about the Conference's prospects for success.

42. The indefinite extension of the Treaty was being questioned due to the inexplicable inertia in implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Furthermore, reluctance to give non-nuclear-weapon States negative assurances and to implement the 13 practical steps were matters for debate. Israel's failure to accede to the Treaty and to submit its nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards system undermined the credibility of the Treaty and made it a source of instability in the Middle East. Tensions in the region underscored the need for States parties to intensify efforts to implement the resolution. Doing so would salvage the credibility of the review process and contribute to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region, as well as to the establishment of an independent Palestinian State.

43. **Mr. Al Nahyan** (United Arab Emirates) said that despite the significant gains made under the Treaty regime in the previous 40 years, major challenges to its implementation persisted. In support of global non-proliferation efforts, the United Arab Emirates had acceded to the Treaty in 1995 and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2000. His Government had also concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in 2003 and was in the process of ratifying an additional protocol. Other tangible steps included the decision to renounce enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and the recent adoption of a national policy on the evaluation and potential development of peaceful nuclear energy.

44. The United Arab Emirates supported the right of all States parties to the Treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, in a world where nuclear proliferation was a source of worry, States seeking to do so should abide by IAEA verification and safeguards and address any concerns the international community might have regarding the nature of their nuclear programmes. It was equally incumbent upon technologically advanced States possessing nuclear capabilities to assist non-nuclear-weapon States in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

45. In order to address the challenges facing the Treaty, it would be necessary to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, the efficacy of which was crucial to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. States having ratified an additional protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement should receive priority for the export of nuclear technology. Moreover, States parties should revisit

the Treaty's withdrawal provision, particularly as it pertained to States that had benefited from the transfer of nuclear knowledge and technology under the Treaty.

46. As the only way to guarantee the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was to eliminate them altogether, he welcomed the recent signing of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction by the United States of America and the Russian Federation and urged nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitments to disarm. He once again called on non-States parties to accede to the Treaty, and pointed out that fulfilling the commitment to create a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, a matter of utmost priority, would attest to the effectiveness of the Treaty.

47. Through its own nuclear programme, his country sought to establish a model for the transparent and safe use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by non-nuclear-weapon States. Despite the challenges of the review process, he hoped that States parties at the Conference would work together constructively to produce a positive outcome.

48. **Mr. Smith** (Australia), speaking on behalf of the States members of the Pacific Islands Forum with Permanent Missions in New York, said that Forum members would strive to ensure that discussions at the Conference bore fruit. States parties must make a concerted effort to achieve balanced progress on the three pillars of the Treaty and to reinforce the Treaty regime that for 40 years had provided clear global security benefits. A repeat of the 2005 Review Conference would be unacceptable.

49. In 2000, Pacific Islands Forum leaders had called on nuclear-weapon States to take the steps leading to disarmament agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, also welcoming the identification of measures to reinforce the international non-proliferation regime. In 2005, Forum members had encouraged nuclear-weapon States to provide updates on the steps taken. Noting with pleasure the progress made by some nuclear-weapon States on their Treaty obligations and commitments, he called upon them to continue those efforts. Forum members welcomed the long-standing ratification by the United Kingdom, France, China and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty as well as the United States of America's recent declaration of intent to ratify.

50. Having faced the devastating effects of nuclear testing first-hand, Forum members attached particular importance to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and urged countries, in particular those States mentioned in its annex 2, to ratify it, also welcoming the commitment by some States to do so.

51. Forum members also gave priority to nuclear safety issues, including the application of IAEA safety requirements and guidelines. The 2000 Review Conference had taken note of the concerns of small island developing States and other coastal States with regard to the transport of radioactive material by sea, calling on States parties to work bilaterally and through the relevant international organizations to improve existing safety measures and regulations. Hailing the progress made over the past decade, he encouraged further efforts to enhance communication between shipping and coastal States on transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.

52. Forum members fully supported the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy within a framework that reduced proliferation risk and adhered to international safety standards. In that connection,

he endorsed the principles set out in the objectives of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. Strengthened non-proliferation measures helped foster an environment conducive to sharing and enhancing the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, thereby facilitating its development.

53. The Pacific Islands Forum stood ready to work towards real and practical outcomes across the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, the attainment of which required political will, a spirit of cooperation, and a genuine commitment to implementation of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

54. **Ms. Heuheu** (New Zealand) said that in the 40 years since its entry into force, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been at the heart of collective efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. New Zealand, which had long maintained an independent and principled voice on nuclear issues, recognized the need to implement fully its three pillars; although they had not gained the necessary universal acceptance, they offered a vehicle for a global solution. Her country was committed to all aspects of the Treaty, including the decisions and outcomes agreed at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, and would continue to work with all other States parties towards the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. However, the only realistic option in that endeavour was an incremental approach: systematic and progressive steps must be taken and periodically evaluated.

55. New Zealand continued to call for nuclear arms reduction leading to the elimination of nuclear arsenals, the negotiation of a fissile material treaty, lowered operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems, security assurances and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. She urged all States that had not yet ratified that Treaty to do so as a matter of priority, particularly annex 2 States, following the recent example of Indonesia.

56. Accountability, through the NPT safeguards system, was a key element in an effective non-proliferation regime and entailed the obligation for all States parties to provide assurances that nuclear activities undertaken by them were purely for peaceful purposes. New Zealand called on Iran to meet its international obligations. In the same spirit, her country supported robust safeguards agreements, including the Additional Protocol, as well as strong export controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear material, equipment and technology. Nuclear technology should be accessible to all, provided that it was managed safely and securely and did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The physical protection of nuclear material and facilities must be effectively ensured and efforts must be made to combat illicit trade in nuclear materials and other radioactive substances.

57. New Zealand welcomed several recent landmark developments, including the vision outlined by President Obama in Prague, the new treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010 and the decision of the United States Administration to seek Senate consent to ratification of the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zones established by the Treaties of Rarotonga and Penlindaba, as well as its intention to improve the transparency of its nuclear arsenal. Together with the Secretary-General's five-point plan, those developments lent significant momentum to the work of the Review Conference.

58. **Mr. Ajumogobia** (Nigeria) said that his country was firmly committed to the ideals and objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remained the key

bulwark against nuclear insecurity in the world. Nigeria had continued to demonstrate that commitment and would remain ever supportive of initiatives to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones; they helped to advance the twin pillars of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. While there had been positive developments in that connection, including the signing by the United States and the Russian Federation of the new treaty on strategic arms reduction, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review of the United States Department of Defense and the recent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., an urgent need remained for other measures. Non-ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty by annex 2 States remained a barrier to its entry into force. In the meantime, it was important to maintain the moratorium on nuclear testing, establish a legally binding instrument to prohibit the production of nuclear materials and explosive devices and lower the operational readiness of existing nuclear weapon systems. Non-nuclear States such as Nigeria had a particular interest in a legally binding framework to protect them from such weapons.

59. He accordingly reiterated Nigeria's endorsement of the 13 practical interim steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, while recalling its desire for international cooperation in the application of nuclear technology for peaceful uses. His country looked to the Review Conference for an endorsement of practical measures to preserve its and other countries' right to exercise their entitlement under the NPT framework to use nuclear energy for development purposes. In conclusion, he stressed the need for all States parties to agree to the full implementation of the appropriate international safeguards.

60. *Mr. de Macedo Soares (Brazil), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

61. **Mr. Nujoma** (Namibia) said that important global developments should be turned to account in order to sustain the momentum towards implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. The current level of nuclear arsenals was unacceptable. It was illogical to assert that the possession of nuclear weapons was good for some but bad for others; those who possessed them should destroy them. In the meantime, universal legally binding measures must be put in place to prevent their use and greater attention should be given to disarmament and non-proliferation education. The best means of promoting non-proliferation was the Test-Ban Treaty. Namibia therefore urged all annex 2 States that had not yet ratified it to do so. Namibia welcomed the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, which it was in the process of ratifying. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world was an important step towards complete nuclear disarmament. The Review Conference should accordingly renew the commitment of all States parties to implementing the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference calling for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. The NPT pillars were interdependent and the balance among them must be upheld at all times. All signatory States without comprehensive safeguards agreements should therefore conclude such agreements without further delay; indeed, the IAEA safeguards should be an obligation for all nuclear-weapon States.

62. Every country had an inalienable right to develop its nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It was essential in that regard to implement article IV of the Treaty without discrimination, and IAEA was to be commended for assisting developing countries in gaining access to nuclear technology for nuclear energy. That Agency was also making a welcome effort to the fight against cancer, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and should receive greater support to

strengthen its technical cooperation. The efforts of IAEA to assist Member States in developing their national nuclear power programmes were also highly appreciated, particularly by Namibia which would continue to seek the Agency's help in that area in order to draw the maximum benefits from its uranium. Namibia supported the multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle, provided that it did not lead to attempts to concentrate nuclear technology in the hands of a few; a consensus must continue to be sought among IAEA member States in that regard. Moreover, national security challenges had increased the responsibilities of the Agency, which should accordingly be strengthened.

63. **Mr. Gaye** (Gambia) said that Africa's support for the nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Pelindaba Treaty was anchored in its commitment to international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The Gambia looked forward to the establishment of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy as an additional means of encouraging such uses in the continent. His country also looked forward to stronger cooperation with IAEA as it expanded its technical cooperation programmes with African countries in the fields of education, health, medicine and agriculture. Greater support was required in particular for the Agency's Education for Cancer in Africa project and its Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy. Nuclear technology could play a significant role in developing improved soil, water and nutrient management practices in developing countries, thereby greatly increasing food security in areas like sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, a reduction in the production of nuclear weapons could liberate substantial resources for peaceful uses. He called on nuclear-weapon States to enhance the non-proliferation regime established by the Treaty so as to ensure that other States parties could benefit from nuclear technology accordingly. He concluded by encouraging the Director General of IAEA to redouble his efforts to follow up on resolutions for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East with a view to the achievement of a lasting peace in the region.

64. **Ms. Heuheu** (New Zealand), speaking on behalf of Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria and Switzerland, (the De-alerting Group), said that there was an urgent need to decrease the current high operational readiness of significant numbers of nuclear weapons systems. That would be an important interim step towards the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world and would reflect the marked improvements in the international security climate since the end of the cold war. It would also demonstrate a palpable commitment to a diminishing role for nuclear weapons and minimize the risk of unintended use or use in error. Those benefits had been recognized by all States parties at the 2000 Review Conference. The group of countries she represented had therefore submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.10) with a view to achieving an outcome on operational readiness that would build on that result.

65. **Mr. Pham** Binh Minh (Socialist Republic of Viet Nam), speaking on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), said that the run-up to the current Review Conference had been marked by positive developments, including the Secretary-General's five-point action plan, the signing of the new strategic arms reduction treaty by the United States and the Russian Federation, and the Nuclear Posture Review recently concluded by the United States. The ASEAN countries urged nuclear-weapon States to take further measures to give effect to their commitments on complete nuclear disarmament and, to that end, to propose actions with timelines that would effectively advance their implementation of the Treaty.

The current proliferation of nuclear materials remained a matter of global concern. Nuclear energy for peaceful purposes could be used by developing countries for the betterment of their peoples. To that end, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike must undertake to abide by their Treaty obligations, which could not be dissociated from their rights under that same Treaty. The Review Conference offered a critical opportunity to shore up its provisions.

66. In accordance with their Charter, the ASEAN countries fully supported nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the abolition of all weapons of mass destruction; they were therefore committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the balanced, comprehensive and non-discriminatory implementation of its three pillars. They urged all nuclear-weapon States to carry out the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive implementation of article VI in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Pending the achievement of full nuclear disarmament, they urged all such States to declare a moratorium on nuclear testing, lower the operational readiness of their nuclear-weapon systems, adopt a “no first use” policy and provide legally binding negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States. They called on nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike to consolidate efforts to prevent the spread and proliferation of nuclear materials and support the strengthening of the work of the IAEA and urged States not yet parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States.

67. The ASEAN countries were all signatories to the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ Treaty) and had undertaken to intensify their efforts to promote it under the related Plan of Action. They welcomed the recent entry into force of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty and supported the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, in accordance with relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

68. Viet Nam continued to call for the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and their total elimination. It had acceded to all major multilateral treaties on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and, since the last Review Conference, had ratified the Test-Ban Treaty and signed the Additional Protocol. Furthermore, the Vietnamese Government had recently decided to accede to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and endorse the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. His country recognized both the benefits and requirements of safety and security in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and supported efforts for their promotion, including the measures put forward at the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., while at the same time attaching great importance to the expansion of assistance to developing countries in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

69. *Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines), President, resumed the Chair.*

70. **Mr. Ryabkov** (Russian Federation) said that he would begin by reading out the message of greeting from the President of the Russian Federation to the participants at the Review Conference. President Medvedev wanted participants to know that further strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime on the basis of its three fundamental pillars was of the utmost importance for strategic stability and security. The international community needed to work together to counter emerging proliferation threats and challenges on the basis of the Treaty. Against that background, the current Review Conference took on particular relevance.

71. The Russian Federation had consistently complied with the provisions of the Treaty and sought to make a substantive contribution to its noble goals, as demonstrated most recently by the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation. That instrument showed the international community the benefits of constructive cooperation as well as opportunities for further disarmament.

72. The “peaceful atom” now played an increasing role in meeting global energy needs: nuclear power plants were instrumental for economic growth and higher living standards. Nevertheless, the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty needed to find an appropriate response to the proliferation risks associated with the exercise by States of their right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The initiatives proposed during the current Review Conference should therefore help to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

73. The determination of the international community to improve nuclear security mechanisms had been demonstrated by the Nuclear Security Summit held recently in Washington, D.C. In line with the Summit communiqué of 13 April 2010, the Russian Federation intended to share its extensive nuclear security experience with other States. It would also cooperate closely with the international community to establish a modern proliferation-resistant architecture for the peaceful use of nuclear energy on the basis of IAEA safeguards and multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

74. Turning to his statement, the speaker then said that his delegation was firmly convinced that it was in the interests of all States to abide by and contribute towards the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The recent positive developments noted by President Medvedev augured well for the ability of the Review Conference to address such pressing concerns as the need to comprehensively strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime; the danger of nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists; the emergence of clandestine proliferation networks and the growth of black markets in nuclear materials; and the need to build an international architecture for cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that would prevent the spread of sensitive technologies while also meeting States parties’ legitimate energy needs.

75. Current challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be addressed on the basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the inviolability of its provisions, in strict compliance with the norms of international law and with due regard for the legitimate security and development interests of States.

76. The 2009 Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the recently held Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., had been important milestones for strengthening the Treaty. As a part of that process, the 2010 Review Conference should, inter alia: reaffirm the Treaty as the appropriate basis for addressing current proliferation threats and challenges; identify instruments to improve and universalize IAEA safeguards; facilitate the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; provide an impetus to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the Conference on Disarmament; and address the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

77. The States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should seek to further disarmament in all States without exception. For its part, the Government of the Russian Federation stood ready to work towards expanding nuclear-weapon-free zones, strengthening the non-proliferation regime in the Middle East and enhancing the effectiveness of mechanisms designed to combat nuclear terrorism.

78. Lastly, his delegation wished to stress that the final documents of the Conference should outline the best ways to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Delegations could familiarize themselves with the many steps taken by his country over the past five years in its national report, which, together with the specific proposals of the Russian Federation for further strengthening the Treaty contained in its various statements and working papers, would also be submitted during the 2010 Review Conference.

79. **Mr. Badr** (Egypt), speaking also on behalf of Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, members of the New Agenda Coalition, noted the Coalition's firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It had been working for over a decade to advance nuclear disarmament. The total elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they would never be produced again was the only absolute guarantee against their use or threatened use.

80. The Coalition called on all States parties to fulfil all their Treaty commitments and obligations. Moreover, it called on China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States to comply with their disarmament commitments and obligations under article VI. Universal accession to the Treaty was of paramount importance. In that regard, the Coalition called on India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty promptly and without any conditions as non-nuclear-weapon States and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms. Furthermore, it urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to rescind its announced withdrawal from the Treaty.

81. The Coalition welcomed the signing in April 2010 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, thereby significantly reducing their deployed nuclear arsenals, and looked forward to its early entry into force. As a next step, further deep cuts should be agreed on, including in the area of non-deployed and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Moreover, weapons reductions must be irreversible, transparent and internationally verifiable.

82. The Coalition also welcomed moves towards reducing the role and potential uses of nuclear weapons in the security strategies of some nuclear-weapon States, most recently as announced by the United States. However, further significant doctrinal shifts by all nuclear-weapon States were urgently needed to make progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

83. The Coalition had serious concerns regarding the continued existence of nuclear weapons so long after the entry into force of the Treaty. Furthermore, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had yet to enter into force, a treaty on fissile materials had still not been concluded, and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East remained unrealized. Those matters deserved urgent attention.

84. The increased global momentum to advance nuclear disarmament was a signal that the political will necessary to achieve shared nuclear-disarmament objectives

might be forthcoming, and the Review Conference was a critical opportunity to turn rhetoric into action and herald a new era of progress on global disarmament. However, given the disappointing outcome of the 2005 Review Conference, it was necessary to look further back for a reference point from which to move forward. For the Coalition, those reference points were the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the three decisions and the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference.

85. It was hoped that, in 2015, the basis from which to move forward would be the successes of the 2010 Review Conference; in the absence of such progress, the credibility and viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be in serious jeopardy. The Coalition was committed to working with all delegations to ensure that the Treaty was respected, strengthened and adhered to. That could only be achieved if the balance between all three pillars of the Treaty were respected. Further progress was therefore urgently needed on the disarmament pillar.

86. The Review Conference must move beyond mere words and political posturing and get to the heart of matters quickly and directly if success were to be achieved. It was critical that the outcome include a reaffirmation of the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. It must also include a call upon all States parties to the Treaty to accelerate the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament that were agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as a call for them to pursue policies that were fully compatible with the objective of achieving a world free from nuclear weapons.

87. States parties must also agree on an action plan that provided a clear framework and measurable benchmarks with which to evaluate the success of their upcoming work. With that in mind, the Coalition had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.8) to the 2010 Review Conference that contained a wide range of concrete and practical measures to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons. The fact that the working paper encompassed the views of a cross-regional grouping of countries should also help foster consensus around the elements and language it contained.

88. The Review Conference should welcome the entry into force of the treaties of Semipalatinsk and Pelindaba, and encourage the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones. In addition, the Coalition urged all concerned States to take all necessary measures to bring about the entry into force of the relevant protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that were incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties.

89. The resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference was a matter of paramount importance. Since then, no progress had been achieved on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. The Review Conference should renew its support for the establishment of such a zone and should also renew its call to Israel, as the only State of the region not yet a party to the Treaty, to accede to it as a non-nuclear-weapon State promptly and without conditions, and to place all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

90. **Mr. Askarov** (Uzbekistan), speaking also on behalf of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, said that the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones had gained increasing international support, which was reflected in a number of multilateral instruments, including the outcome of the Review Conferences, the General Assembly special sessions on disarmament and other forums. Initiatives establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones had strengthened the movement towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

91. The promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones had been announced as one of the main priorities of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. During the preparatory process for the 2010 Review Conference, the States parties had attached great importance to regional aspects of implementing the Treaty, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

92. Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) had supported the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and had reaffirmed the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones enhanced global and regional peace and security, strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and contributed towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

93. From the first years of their independence, the five Central Asian States had begun to implement article VII of the Treaty, which provided for the conclusion of regional treaties and agreements on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In order to strengthen the Treaty regime and ensure regional security, those States had agreed to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

94. The initiative to establish the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone had been further developed in the Almaty Declaration of the Heads of State of the Central Asian States, the statement adopted at Tashkent by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five States of the region and in the Communiqué of the Consultative Meeting of the Experts of the Central Asian Countries, the Nuclear-Weapon States and the United Nations, adopted at Bishkek. A number of General Assembly resolutions and previous Review Conference documents had also demonstrated the broad international support for the determination of the Central Asian States to achieve their goal.

95. The five Central Asian States and the five nuclear-weapon States had held expert-level consultative meetings on the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and its Protocol. The international community had provided considerable support to their efforts. The financial assistance extended by Japan had been particularly generous. The Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty had been signed in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan in 2006. That location held symbolic importance because the Semipalatinsk site, which had been officially closed by Kazakhstan in 1991, had been one of the largest nuclear test sites in the world. The Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty had been ratified by all five Central Asian States and had entered into force in March 2009. Later that same year, the first consultative meeting of the States parties to that Treaty had been held.

96. In April 2010, the Government of the United States had hosted the Washington Nuclear Security Summit with the participation of more than 40 states that had pledged to work together to ensure the security of nuclear materials and strengthen cooperation in the sphere of non-proliferation. Later that same month, the Second

Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones and Mongolia had been held in New York.

97. It must be stressed that the current stage in the process of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world was not final. The States parties to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty called on other States and regions of the world, including those of the Middle East, to follow their example. In order to promote the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Central Asian States suggested that nuclear-weapon States should provide existing zones with negative security assurances.

98. The Central Asian States were pleased to introduce a working document they had collectively prepared on the establishment of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, reflecting the progress made since the signing of the Treaty in 2006 and reaffirming the strong commitment of the parties to continue their efforts to implement it effectively.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2010/SR.4

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

7 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 4 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)
later: Mr. Manfredi (Vice-President) (Italy)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Fukuyama** (Japan) said that he welcomed the landmark speech recently delivered in Prague by the President of the United States of America, as well as the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, and the five benchmarks proposed by the Secretary-General at the opening meeting of the Conference. He read a message from Yukio Hatoyama, Prime Minister of Japan, stating that as the only country that had actually experienced nuclear attack, in which as few as two atomic bombs had claimed the lives of 200,000 civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan felt a special responsibility to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In that message, Prime Minister Hatoyama urged all parties to the Treaty to bridge their differences in order to pave the way for a world without nuclear weapons in which atomic energy was used only for peaceful purposes.

2. As co-chair, with Australia, of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and co-author, with Australia, of a working paper submitted to the Conference, containing a package of practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures, his country called on all nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and on all States possessing nuclear weapons to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament. He applauded the announcement made by the United States at the Conference's opening session that it would make public the number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile. He also called on the nuclear-weapon States and on all other States possessing nuclear weapons to commit themselves to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies and to provide stronger negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, he welcomed the recent Nuclear Posture Review issued by the United States. He called for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and welcomed the announcement by Indonesia at the Conference's opening session that it would initiate the ratification process for that Treaty. He also called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. With regard to the statement made by Iran at the opening session of the Conference about military bases in Japan, he stressed that his country would continue to adhere to its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

3. The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards were the most effective means of preventing nuclear proliferation, and assistance should be extended to developing countries that accepted IAEA safeguard standards including the Additional Protocol. The nuclear activities that had been conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were unacceptable, and he urged that country to take steps to abandon all nuclear weapons in accordance with the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks of September 2005 and the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. He also urged Iran to cooperate fully with IAEA and comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

4. He reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. His country had reaped great benefits from the

peaceful use of nuclear energy while maintaining the highest standards of safety and security, and would be happy to share its experiences with other States parties. He expressed support for the IAEA Director General's priority focus on using nuclear energy to benefit human health and resource management. He called for universalization of the Treaty, and noted that the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of Eight had agreed to take practical steps towards the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

5. Because of its experience at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, his country felt a special obligation to alert the world to the dangers of nuclear weapons and work for disarmament, and supported civil society initiatives such as the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol. He called on the Conference to display the political will necessary to restore confidence in the Treaty.

6. **Mr. Kmoníček** (Czech Republic) said that the previous year had seen renewed momentum for the nuclear agenda, including United Nations Security Council resolution 1887 (2009), on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, the new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation that had been signed in his country's capital, and the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. He appealed to States possessing nuclear weapons to continue to work towards global disarmament, and called on all States to comply with existing rules and work for comprehensive bans on nuclear testing and the production of fissile materials for military purposes. Countries should not be allowed to use the withdrawal provision of the Treaty to evade sanctions and penalties for violations committed prior to withdrawal.

7. He applauded the expertise and impartiality displayed by IAEA in its handling of the crises precipitated by the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and urged that the Agency should be shielded from political pressure and equipped with the resources it needed to carry out its tasks. His country was a strong advocate of universal acceptance of the Additional Protocol in conjunction with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, which together comprised an efficient mechanism for deterring proliferation and verifying compliance.

8. **Mr. Phiri** (Zambia) said that recent progress made by the United States and the Russian Federation in reducing their nuclear arsenals had set an example that other nuclear-weapon States should follow. The cessation by France and the United Kingdom of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was also an encouraging development. But the ultimate goal remained the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

9. All the African States were parties to the Treaty and had declared their continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Pelindaba Treaty, which his country was in the final stages of ratifying. He looked forward to a nuclear-weapon-free zone also being established in the Middle East. His country supported international efforts to prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons. It also supported the right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and was eager to establish regional and international partnerships to assist it in the safe and secure exploitation of its own potential uranium reserves. His country had signed the IAEA Additional Protocol on 13 May 2009. He urged Annex 2 States to accede

to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and called for universalization of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

10. **Mr. Cho** Hyun (Republic of Korea) said that there were many promising signs for a positive outcome of the Review Conference. Some nuclear-weapon States had been more forthcoming in fulfilling their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines. There was also widespread support for the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and for strengthening all three pillars of the Treaty.

11. However, the Treaty was facing unprecedented challenges, the most serious of which was nuclear proliferation involving States that were developing nuclear materials for military purposes under the guise of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The nuclear activities undertaken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and that country's subsequent announcement that it had withdrawn from the Treaty posed a serious threat to regional peace and security and to the NPT regime. The international community had responded to that challenge, through Security Council resolutions and sanctions, by insisting that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea denuclearize, cooperate with the international community and return to the Treaty. The Republic of Korea urged its neighbour to resume dialogue through the Six-Party Talks process and implement its denuclearization commitments. The nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran raised similar concerns regarding the true purpose of its nuclear programme. The Republic of Korea urged Iran to respond positively to international calls for openness, dialogue and cooperation with IAEA.

12. The Republic of Korea welcomed the new strategic arms reduction agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America and called for the entry into force soon of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Action should also be taken to strengthen the IAEA nuclear safeguards and verification regime, including by universalizing the additional protocol system, as envisaged at the recent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The peaceful use of nuclear energy was an important pillar of the Treaty and the Republic of Korea was particularly interested in multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and innovative nuclear reactors.

13. The Republic of Korea was fully committed to the success of the 2010 Review Conference, which provided a unique opportunity to revitalize the Treaty and the global non-proliferation regime.

14. **Mr. Mitsialis** (Greece) said that Greece had been one of the first States to sign the Treaty, as well as other agreements furthering its goals, and placed many of its hopes for a more secure world on that instrument. The review process continued to provide a solid foundation for the three pillars of the Treaty — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — which could be reached gradually in a balanced and mutually reinforcing manner.

15. It was to be hoped that the 2010 Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms would pave the way for deeper reductions in the future. He also welcomed the recent Nuclear Posture Review by the United States that

would facilitate progress towards a world without nuclear weapons. Other necessary steps towards nuclear disarmament included the commencement of substantive negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty; the provision of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States; the promotion of additional confidence-building measures, including the strengthening of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the establishment of new ones; and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. He urged the nine States whose ratification of that instrument was still required to increase their efforts to complete the requirements.

16. The recently adopted Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament reaffirmed a comprehensive basis for disarmament and non-proliferation with the Treaty and IAEA as the cornerstone of international understanding on nuclear issues. The nuclear safeguards implemented by IAEA were the best way to deter, detect and prevent proliferation; all States should assist IAEA in its work and play their part in strengthening the safeguards system by concluding and implementing additional protocols to their comprehensive safeguards agreements. Strengthened safeguards, combined with implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), provided a strong basis for a robust non-proliferation regime and for countering the threat of nuclear terrorism.

17. The current proliferation challenges constituted a serious threat to international security and destabilized the institutional foundations of transparency and mutual trust. His delegation was deeply concerned at the increasing number of activities related to nuclear materials and ballistic missiles, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. It supported all efforts to promote universalization of the Treaty and of all multilateral agreements related to weapons of mass destruction. The IAEA Additional Protocol should be the safeguards verification standard.

18. Article X of the Treaty gave States parties the right to withdraw from the Treaty in extreme cases of threats to their national security. However, the consequences of withdrawal had serious implications for regional and international stability, particularly when the right was exercised mala fide by a State in non-compliance with its Treaty obligations, and the Conference should consider modalities for addressing that risk. Special attention must be given to the legal instruments, guidelines and the best practices that IAEA was promoting in order to bolster nuclear safety and nuclear security features in all kinds of peaceful nuclear activities as a sine qua non for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His Government supported the cautious, peaceful use of such energy in strict conformity with the obligations established in the Treaty and in States' safeguards agreements. It attached particular importance to nuclear waste management and the environmental effects of radiation and viewed as promising opportunities the disposal or downgrading of weapons-grade material, conversion of reactors, gradual securing or elimination of highly enriched uranium stockpiles and promotion of a multilateral, cost-effective, politically neutral fuel cycle.

19. His delegation supported the European Union's commitment to implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the commitment of all members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to pursue a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems.

20. **Ms. Larsen** (Norway) said that the international atmosphere had never been more favourable for making progress towards a safer world without nuclear weapons. Norway welcomed the new strategic arms reduction agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation, the new United States Nuclear Posture Review and the outcome of the recent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. There were also encouraging signs that a consensus was forming that the best way to address the dangers posed by nuclear weapons was to abolish them.

21. There were, however, worrying signs, namely, the proliferation concerns raised by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the continuing impasse in multilateral disarmament bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament and the inability of the international community to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force.

22. The non-governmental organization (NGO) community in Norway, concerned that the 2010 Review Conference might, like the 2005 Review Conference, fail to produce meaningful results, had communicated to the Government their expectations for the Conference. Her Government found itself largely in agreement with their views.

23. In Norway's view, the final document should reaffirm the underlying compact of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, set a forward-looking agenda reaffirming the overall political objective of a world without nuclear weapons, and establish a programme for the next review cycle that included clear and binding commitments on all three pillars.

24. The new Russian-United States agreement should be seen as merely a first step in a broader and deeper arms reduction process involving all categories of weapons and all nuclear-weapon States, based on the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility. There should be significant reductions in the role of nuclear weapons in security policy and a strengthening of negative security assurances. The regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone process should also be strengthened. Determined efforts were needed to achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to resume negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. IAEA and its system of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols should be strengthened through greater international cooperation on nuclear fuel cycles, greater security for sensitive nuclear materials and the substitution of low-enriched uranium for high-enriched uranium in research reactors. Finally, the right to peaceful nuclear applications, many of which could bring economic and social benefits, should be reaffirmed.

25. Norway had worked with various partners in recent years on numerous projects to support disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the elimination of tactical weapons in Europe, modalities of nuclear disarmament verification and regional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

26. **Mr. Hoyer** (Germany) said that, during its 40 years of existence, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been instrumental in halting the spread of nuclear weapons, thus strengthening world security. Germany favoured the balanced enhancement of all three pillars of the Treaty and hoped that the 2010 Review Conference would revive the Treaty's "grand bargain" between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States through specific proposals by the former aimed at strengthening the

international non-proliferation regime. The Review Conference should send out a strong signal of unity calling for more cooperation and arms control and less weaponry.

27. There had been major positive events in recent weeks, for example the new strategic arms reduction agreement signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, the new United States Nuclear Posture Review and the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The common aim must be a world without nuclear weapons. Germany welcomed the announcement by the United States Secretary of State that her country would reveal the size of its existing nuclear potential, which was a concrete step towards strengthening transparency.

28. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons, still not subject to any kind of arms control mechanism, must also be included in the ongoing disarmament process, as had been agreed in principle at the 2000 Review Conference. Confidence-building measures and efforts to create transparency could help reduce and finally eliminate such outdated weapons, which served no military purpose and did not create security. The German Government intended to negotiate the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Germany and to urge further scaling down of the role of nuclear weapons in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Strategic Concept.

29. It was unacceptable that the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament had been inactive for years, that the ban on the production of further weapons-grade fissile material had made no progress, and that the continuing refusal by a number of countries to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was preventing it from entering into force. Germany also called for progress on the 1995 mandate to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and proposed in that connection that the European Union should sponsor a conference to bring all sides to the negotiating table as soon as possible. Further progress in conventional arms control would also play a vital role in confidence-building and would remove the pretext that disparities in conventional weapons justified maintenance of nuclear potentials.

30. It was essential to strengthen the IAEA control options through the system of additional protocols as an integral part of verification standards. It was also necessary for States parties to the Treaty to agree on rules governing withdrawal from the Treaty and their reaction to Treaty violations. A balanced approach was needed that would fully guarantee the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy while preventing misuse for military purposes. In that connection multilateral solutions to the nuclear fuel cycle provided an interesting option.

31. There was a real danger that proliferation cases like those of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's breakaway and the Islamic Republic of Iran could erode the Treaty and lead to a new nuclear arms race. The German Government would continue to work with other States parties towards a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear programme. Further sanctions must make it clear to that country that its refusal to heed the international community bore a price. The States parties must send a strong signal that they all stood by the rights and duties imposed by the Treaty.

32. Disarmament and arms control were the keystone of a global security architecture. Much time had already been lost in the first decade of the century, and Germany therefore called for a new decade of active disarmament. The Review

Conference must provide the necessary stimulus by making forward-looking, specific agreements and recommendations.

33. **Mr. Danon** (France) said that his delegation welcomed the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. The progress of nuclear disarmament, the current proliferation crises and the increased civilian use of nuclear energy were proof that the Treaty was, more than ever, the cornerstone of collective nuclear security. He hoped that all States parties would strongly reaffirm their support for the Treaty and their determination to preserve its integrity, and that they would find common ground for concrete and realistic solutions designed to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

34. France was committed to meeting its obligations under the Treaty and the commitments made at previous review conferences. Over the past 15 years, it had halved the number of its nuclear warheads and announced a ceiling of 300 warheads for its total arsenal, totally dismantled its ground-to-ground component and reduced its airborne and submarine components by 30 per cent, ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, dismantled its test centres, halted production of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium and dismantled related facilities at a total cost of 6 billion euros. Its national policy limited the use of nuclear weapons to deterrence in extreme cases of self-defence. Similar action on the part of all States would enhance international security.

35. His delegation stressed the importance of strengthening the non-proliferation regime by bringing the Test-Ban Treaty into force and starting negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. It therefore welcomed Indonesia's announcement on the previous day of its intention to initiate the process of ratifying that instrument and recalled that since September 2009, France and Morocco had chaired the so-called "Article XIV conference" aimed at promoting the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty. Similar efforts should be made with respect to biological, chemical and conventional weapons, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and space-launched vehicles in order to enhance international security and ensure that nuclear disarmament was not offset by a new arms race in those areas.

36. It should, however, be borne in mind that the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France had made headway on disarmament solely because the strategic context had changed with the end of the cold war and the unification of Europe. Tangible progress towards disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons could be achieved in the long run not by emphatic statements of good intentions, but through a comprehensive strategy that included the resolution of regional tensions, enhancement of collective security mechanisms and implementation of the action plans for which the European Union had called.

37. A response to the growing demand for the civilian use of nuclear energy must also be found. France, which had opted resolutely for nuclear energy, stood ready to cooperate with any country that met its international obligations. A State's respect for such obligations did not mean renouncing its inalienable rights, but simply exercising them responsibly in a world where the issue of energy could only be addressed through solidarity and with a view to sustainable development. Nuclear energy should be used in a climate of confidence and with application of the highest standards of security, safety, non-proliferation and environmental protection. The challenges relating to the increased use of such energy — proliferation risks, the safety and security of nuclear facilities, prevention of trafficking in nuclear and

radioactive materials for terrorist or criminal purposes, addressing training needs, ensuring the security of supply, financing the development of nuclear energy and taking environmental issues into account — should be addressed collectively within the framework of a new global governance. Such an approach would require strengthening the IAEA system and preventing uncontrolled dissemination of sensitive technologies, guaranteeing the supply of nuclear fuel, considering jointly the question of radioactive waste, focusing on training and examining innovative financing of nuclear infrastructures. His delegation hoped that the Review Conference would provide an opportunity to enter into that essential discussion and to reaffirm the major principles for guiding and facilitating the development of nuclear energy; it planned to put forward proposals to that end.

38. Disarmament and the development of civilian uses of nuclear energy could be pursued only if nuclear proliferation was halted. North Korea had shown what happened when the international community let time pass and resigned itself to faits accomplis; that scenario must not be repeated with other countries. France, together with its five partners in negotiations with Iran, had worked ceaselessly to arrive at a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that would both meet Iran's needs and address the international community's serious concerns about the purpose of its nuclear programme. But dialogue was not an end in itself; it must produce results. The defiant attitude of the Iranian Government and the ensuing concern on the part of IAEA, other countries in the region and the international community as a whole, had forced the Security Council to consider new sanctions in the effort to persuade Iran to negotiate.

39. His delegation understood the frustration felt by many countries over the slow implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference. States parties must do their utmost to speed up its implementation; he hoped that the 2010 Conference would make it possible to agree on realistic courses of action.

40. In order to strengthen efforts to prevent proliferation, it was essential to give IAEA the authority and the means to fulfil its crucial verification mission. To date, 128 countries had signed additional protocols allowing for enhanced verification of their nuclear programmes and it was to be hoped that the remaining countries would join them as the development of nuclear energy could prosper only with mutual trust. Strengthening the non-proliferation regime also required ceaseless efforts to achieve the universality of the Treaty, including by encouraging States that were not parties to that instrument to adhere to its terms and to accede to other non-proliferation and disarmament instruments.

41. The ultimate goal in the coming years was to develop a comprehensive nuclear strategy for a safer world in which all States would work resolutely to advance disarmament; in which the doctrines of nuclear Powers would restrict the role of nuclear weapons to extreme circumstances of self-defence where their vital interests were under threat and their arsenals would be scaled down to a level of strict sufficiency in light of the international strategic context; in which proliferation was combated firmly, since history had shown the price to be paid for failing to react in time; in which civilian uses of nuclear energy could develop under conditions of optimum safety, security and non-proliferation; in which nuclear and radioactive materials were even better protected; in which States not parties to the Treaty took a keener interest in the non-proliferation regime by making new commitments; and in

which nuclear energy could become a symbol of effective international cooperation and solidarity within the framework of worldwide sustainable development. His delegation hoped that the Review Conference would lay the foundations of that new nuclear order by adopting an ambitious, pragmatic road map that could be implemented by 2015.

42. **Mr. Li Baodong** (China) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had played a major and irreplaceable role in preventing nuclear proliferation, advancing nuclear disarmament and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The international community should further enhance the universality, authority and effectiveness of the Treaty in order to safeguard international and regional peace and stability in the interest of all countries.

43. There was a growing consensus in favour of non-proliferation and the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons, as well as interest in the atom as a source of renewable and clean energy. It is the shared responsibility of all States parties and the international community to make the 2010 Review Conference a success. All nuclear-weapon States should fulfil in good faith their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and publicly undertake to eliminate their nuclear weapons. China welcomed the recent signing of the new bilateral nuclear disarmament treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. Drastic, verifiable and irreversible reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two biggest nuclear Powers would contribute to the ultimate realization of complete nuclear disarmament. Similarly, China called for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at an early date and the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. When conditions were ripe, other nuclear-weapon States should also join the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The international community should, at an appropriate time, develop a viable long-term plan of phased nuclear disarmament actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States should undertake unequivocally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

44. Nuclear disarmament must follow the principle of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. The development of missile defence systems, which disrupted global strategic stability, should be abandoned, as should efforts to mount an arms race in outer space. China adhered to the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and had made an unequivocal commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China supported the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the opening of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and would continue to keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security.

45. All countries should seek to foster an international security environment of cooperation and trust, and respect the security concerns of other countries. In that connection it was necessary to consolidate the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, strengthen the safeguards function of IAEA and promote the universality of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Practices based on expediency and double standards must be discarded. All States should strictly fulfil their non-proliferation obligations, strengthen their export

control systems and pursue peaceful solutions to regional nuclear issues through dialogue and negotiations.

46. China had participated actively in all relevant international non-proliferation activities and had put in place a complete legislative and regulatory framework of export control. With a view to safeguarding the international non-proliferation regime and maintaining world and regional peace and security, China was committed to promoting diplomatic solutions of the Korean Peninsula and Iranian nuclear issues. It should be noted that peaceful uses of nuclear energy were the legitimate rights of all States parties, which should be fully respected and safeguarded. The international community, in particular the developed countries, had the obligation to provide all necessary assistance to developing countries in that connection. IAEA should continue to play an active role in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and related international cooperation. China had actively engaged in cooperation and exchanges with relevant countries and IAEA on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, subject to the prerequisite that those countries strictly abide by NPT non-proliferation obligations.

47. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was of great significance to promoting nuclear disarmament and preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, and nuclear-weapon States should vigorously support efforts by States to that end. In that connection China welcomed the entry into force of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, and called on the parties concerned to work together to implement the relevant General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East and, especially, the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

48. The Chinese delegation sincerely hoped that all parties would seize the major opportunity provided by the 2010 Review Conference and work together to advance in a balanced way the three objectives of the Treaty, namely nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

49. **Mr. Čekuolis** (Lithuania) said that his country welcomed the new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, and also the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. His country had played an active role in the Proliferation Security Initiative and supported the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the extension of the control regimes to include the European Union. The elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons through compliance with the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of the early 1990s should also be a priority.

50. His country supported efforts to improve the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system through universal acceptance of the Additional Protocol alongside the comprehensive safeguards agreements, which would both prevent proliferation and increase confidence in the security measures necessary for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He hoped that the trend towards increasing participation in international instruments such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources would continue.

51. Nuclear energy projects should only be undertaken in transparent consultation with neighbouring countries. He urged all countries to make use of the full range of

IAEA assistance in ensuring the safety and security of such projects. He also encouraged the Conference to acknowledge the indispensable contribution made by civil society to promoting the objectives of the Treaty.

52. **Mr. Scotti** (Italy) said that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were now once again prominent on the international agenda. He hoped that the personal commitment of the President of the United States of America would help to encourage a successful outcome for the Conference. The L'Aquila Statement on Non-Proliferation adopted by the Group of Eight in 2009 had highlighted a commitment to creating the necessary conditions for that objective. The current Review Conference should focus equally on all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Italy welcomed the new treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010, and encouraged all States to take strategic and security measures to promote a world without nuclear weapons.

53. The Treaty was concerned primarily with non-proliferation. The existence of efforts to establish clandestine programmes therefore posed an unacceptable threat. In view of the challenges posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and by the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the ultimate aim must be to ensure compliance with the Treaty, which was further weakened by its lack of universality.

54. There was a risk that nuclear weapons could be used by non-State actors. He therefore commended the President of the United States for successfully hosting the first Nuclear Security Summit. At the same time, Italy strongly reaffirmed its commitment to the inalienable right of all States parties to develop, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. A nuclear renaissance was now taking place, as States sought new methods to generate power while reducing carbon emissions. IAEA had a key role to play in ensuring compliance with the Treaty in order to facilitate that process.

55. In order to strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must formally enter into force. He urged those States that had not yet signed or ratified it to reassess their position. In addition, an effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty was needed. By putting an end to the production of weapons-grade fissile materials and encouraging the conversion of manufacturing plants to civilian uses, such a treaty would eliminate the supply of the main components of nuclear warheads, thereby making disarmament irreversible. He hoped that the Conference would break the deadlock and allow negotiations on that treaty to begin.

56. Italy called on all States that had not yet done so to promptly accede to the Additional Protocol, thereby strengthening IAEA safeguards. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle were an important tool to address the growing need for nuclear fuel while minimizing the risk of proliferation.

57. The Conference should examine ways to make progress in achieving the objectives of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference. It should also address the issue of withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty; although States had a right to withdraw, they could not be allowed to do so in order to escape from their obligations. Specific mechanisms should be established, including the involvement of the Security Council and IAEA,

in order to ensure the fulfilment of safeguards obligations. In a more general sense, the operations and procedures of the Treaty should be reviewed in order to enhance its effectiveness, allow a swifter response to events and enable States parties to better demonstrate their political will.

58. **Mr. Valero Briceño** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that the world was seeking a new global balance founded on the principles of equality, solidarity, international cooperation, multilateralism and the peaceful coexistence of States. Practices incompatible with the juridical equality of States had no place in the contemporary world. It would be discriminatory to hold certain States to their international obligations while exempting others. The States parties to the Treaty should cooperate to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and to uphold the authority and credibility of IAEA.

59. The very existence of nuclear weapons constituted a threat to humanity. His country hoped that the treaty signed recently by the United States of America and the Russian Federation in April 2010 would become part of a more wide-ranging initiative extending to non-strategic nuclear weapons. Although the new treaty focused primarily on monitoring rather than reduction, it might encourage both States to take measures to reduce their arsenals.

60. The current environment should encourage States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to break the deadlock caused by persistent unilateral positions. Nuclear-weapon States bore primary responsibility for implementing measures to reduce and eliminate nuclear arsenals. Unfortunately, certain nuclear Powers had not shown the political will to comply with their international commitments. The Conference constituted an opportunity to reaffirm those commitments. The adoption of a nuclear disarmament plan would act as a road map to create a world without nuclear weapons.

61. The priorities determined in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, remained particularly relevant in view of the continuing modernization of nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament should fulfil its responsibility as the only forum for negotiation on that issue.

62. A binding international instrument should be negotiated in order for nuclear-weapon States to commit to refrain from using, or threatening to use, such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. A fissile material cut-off treaty must be concluded, with specific provisions for verification. His country welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world, and strongly supported the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. Israel, the only country in the region that had not become a party to the Treaty or expressed an intention to do so, should renounce the possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. It was worrying that the Prime Minister of Israel had acknowledged that his country possessed nuclear weapons, which had negative consequences for peace and security in the region.

63. In accordance with Articles I and II of the Treaty, all States had a right to develop nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela rejected any attempt to restrict that right through actions jeopardizing the integrity of the Treaty. Certain States were exerting pressure on the Islamic Republic

of Iran in order to compel it to renounce its legitimate right to develop its nuclear industry. Such pressure must cease in order to facilitate a negotiated political solution, which should take into consideration the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of IAEA. The politicization of that issue had damaged the authority of the Conference, drawing the focus away from the technical character of the safeguards system.

64. **Mr. Medina Morel** (Dominican Republic) said that the Dominican Republic was a nuclear-weapon-free State and supported any multilateral initiative that would contribute to world peace and progress. It was a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

65. Nuclear technology could contribute to the welfare and progress of mankind or produce the most destructive of weapons. One of the basic principles of radiological protection was that the benefits derived from the use of nuclear technology must be greater than the damage that it might cause. As a State party to the Treaty since 1971, the Dominican Republic remained committed to the principles, rights and obligations enshrined therein. His Government believed that the implementation of its three pillars — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy — would help give future generations a world free of nuclear weapons.

66. As a founding member of IAEA, his Government paid tribute to the Agency's efforts to promote the peaceful, safe and reliable uses of nuclear energy by all countries and to its technical cooperation programme. The Dominican Republic had signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement in 1973 and had accepted the amendments to the small quantities protocol approved by the Board of Governors of IAEA in 2005; the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement had been promulgated by the President of the Republic on 18 March 2010. He urged States parties that had not yet signed such agreements and protocols to do so in order to strengthen implementation of the Treaty.

67. His Government supported unconditionally the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a key disarmament, peace and non-proliferation measure. It welcomed the positive steps taken by the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the agreement by the Governments of the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce their arsenals of strategic weapons, and encouraged the strengthening and gradual expansion of such agreements.

68. His Government attached great importance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. He commended the efforts of the Preparatory Commission for that Treaty and its Provisional Technical Secretariat for promoting the early entry into force of the instrument and for setting up the verification regime envisaged therein.

69. Lastly, he reiterated his Government's support for the Review Conference and its hope that the event would contribute to the strengthening of the Treaty, a valuable international instrument, and enhance implementation of the commitments arising therefrom.

70. **Mr. Acharya** (Nepal) said that the international community was far from achieving the goals of the Treaty. Both horizontal and vertical proliferation continued unabated and his delegation was not convinced that nuclear weapons had made the planet any safer than in the past. In the modern world, the concept of security went well beyond the accumulation of armaments; the compelling security challenges emanating from climate change, poverty and underdevelopment, pandemic disease and terrorism threatened the very existence of a large part of the world's population.

71. Disarmament must be viewed both as a moral imperative and as justice for all. While millions of people around the world were reeling under the grinding, dehumanizing conditions of poverty and hunger, billions of dollars were being spent on weapons designed to kill and maim indiscriminately on a massive scale. In the light of the significant challenges to the mobilization of financial resources for achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in the wake of the global economic and financial crisis, the availability of a "disarmament dividend" would send a positive message across the globe.

72. The possession of weapons, whether nuclear, chemical or bacteriological, was bound to generate tension rather than security. The three pillars of the Treaty — disarmament, non-proliferation and the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes — were an integral whole and could not be pursued selectively. While nuclear disarmament was a long and difficult process, it was not unattainable if the nuclear-weapon States would lead the way. States that had not yet become parties to the Treaty should be encouraged to do so as the instrument's universality would enhance its legitimacy.

73. His delegation welcomed the signing of the new strategic arms limitation treaty by the United States and the Russian Federation and hoped that equally vigorous initiatives would follow. States parties should agree to prepare a road map in order to achieve nuclear disarmament in a time-bound manner and to establish a nuclear-weapon-free world within a reasonable period of time. Pending the complete elimination of such weapons, the nuclear-weapon States must provide unequivocal negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States through a legally binding instrument.

74. The international community must reject the policy of nuclear deterrence and place a permanent ban on nuclear weapon testing; the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty with an international monitoring mechanism would be another crucial step. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions could serve as building blocks for complete disarmament at the global level. Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference would be another major contributor to non-proliferation; his delegation also called for effective implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference.

75. In order to ensure that the nuclear facilities permitted under article IV of the Treaty were not diverted for military purposes, the monitoring, supervisory and verification capacities of IAEA must be enhanced substantially. Equally important was an active, effective technical cooperation programme that facilitated the scientific use of nuclear technology for industry, health, agriculture and other useful purposes. That issue should be given due priority in the deliberations of States parties and in the outcome document of the Review Conference.

76. **Mr. Al-Nasser** (Qatar) said that certain nuclear-weapon States recognized as such under the Treaty continued to develop their nuclear arsenals, thereby contravening the most important provisions of the Treaty. Other nuclear-weapon States had not become parties, or had concluded agreements outside the framework of the Treaty. The review process should take into consideration the resolutions adopted at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Although bilateral agreements had been made between certain nuclear-weapon States, the objective of the Treaty remained full nuclear disarmament. The Conference should adopt the proposals formulated by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and work towards the prompt granting of negative security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States.

77. Qatar was committed to promoting the three pillars of the Treaty. In particular, it was important not to hinder the inalienable right of all States parties to the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. His country also supported the early implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in accordance with the position of the League of Arab States. Qatar had established a committee to monitor compliance with the Treaty, and had held numerous workshops and activities on implementation of international instruments concerning nuclear weapons, the combating of nuclear terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. He hoped that international consultations would ultimately lead to an international convention on the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Summary record of the 5th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 5 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)
later: Mr. Cancela (Vice-President) (Uruguay)
later: Ms. Štiglic (Vice-President) (Slovenia)
later: Mr. Cabactulan (President) (Philippines)

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General debate (*continued*)
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 (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee (*continued*)
 Organization of work
 General debate (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Paet** (Estonia) said that his Government supported all international arms control agreements, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. He welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010 as an important milestone towards nuclear disarmament. Emphasizing the need to further strengthen nuclear security, he hailed the renewed engagement expressed by participants at the Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C., especially the commitment to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within four years, and acknowledged the efforts of countries seeking early ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which would help to prevent development of new weapons. He urged States, particularly those whose accession was necessary for the Treaty to enter into force, to sign and ratify it without delay and without conditions. Another positive step would be the ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes; in that connection, the declaration by certain countries of a unilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material was encouraging.

2. States must take joint action to effectively address breaches of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and must agree on measures to discourage States parties from withdrawing from it. He strongly urged States that had not yet ratified the Treaty to do so, as non-nuclear-weapon States, without delay. In addition to reducing the spread of nuclear arms, it was imperative to pursue verifiability, transparency and other confidence-building measures. In that regard, he recognized the indispensable role of the safeguards system established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was crucial to facilitate lasting multilateral strategies to deal with the growing interest in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the establishment of a low-enriched uranium bank under IAEA control. In developing multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, it was essential not only to ensure States' right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but also to avoid market distortions.

3. **Mr. Cravinho** (Portugal) said that it was time to seize the opportunity to further advance the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the fortieth anniversary of which was being commemorated in 2010. To that end, the Review Conference must seize on the new momentum created by the recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic arms reduction treaty. Building on that positive impetus, the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must work towards strengthening and revalidating it, both in letter and in spirit.

4. As the world changed, negotiations over long-standing treaties, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, assumed new significance and were enveloped by new dynamics. The States parties to the Treaty must avoid being dragged into futile and negative divisions. Progress on each of the three pillars was the key to making the Treaty vitally relevant for the twenty-first century.

5. The States parties must break new ground in important areas while implementing disarmament instruments already at their disposal. Two cases stood out where further advancement was needed: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a fissile material cut-off treaty.

6. Portugal was a strong supporter of the rapid entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty and welcomed the commitment by the United States Government to pursue its ratification. Portugal called on all annex 2 countries which had not yet ratified it to do so without further delay. Pending the entry into force of that Treaty, Portugal further called on all States to observe a moratorium on nuclear test explosions and warmly welcomed the work of the Preparatory Commission, particularly concerning the international monitoring system, which included three stations strategically located in the Portuguese islands of the Azores.

7. The early entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty might also help to create the momentum and the political confidence needed to progress in the drafting of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Portugal favoured an early start for the negotiation of such a treaty, which should include an international verification mechanism. Pending the conclusion of the treaty, States concerned should observe an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. Portugal welcomed the commitments made in that regard by the five nuclear-weapon States. A moratorium would not only contribute to a safer world, but would also help to create conditions conducive to the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

8. Progress on the aforementioned objectives, among others, would contribute substantially to the achievement of the objectives of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

9. The pursuit of non-proliferation required multilateralization of the nuclear cycle. That was why Portugal supported the creation of a nuclear fuel bank under the auspices of IAEA, for the benefit of all States parties to the Treaty that had signed IAEA safeguards agreements.

10. IAEA must also be strengthened in its role with respect to verification of compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself, including by the further consolidation and universalization of its safeguards agreements and additional protocols. That necessitated providing IAEA with the necessary means to continue responding efficiently to proliferation challenges.

11. Renewed and unequivocal negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States should be provided to all States that were in compliance with the Treaty. Similar assurances should be provided to all nuclear-weapon-free zones.

12. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, taking into account the interests of all States in the region, would enhance non-proliferation efforts in an area of the world that had a critical influence on international peace and security.

13. With regard to the Iranian nuclear programme, history taught that only negotiations held in good faith could bring about lasting peace and security. Portugal therefore called on Iran to engage in serious negotiations concerning its nuclear programme and to comply with all Security Council and IAEA obligations.

14. As to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Portugal urged the Government of that country to renounce its nuclear programme, to return to the six-party talks and to comply forthwith with Security Council and IAEA obligations.

15. Portugal strongly favoured a strengthening of the Treaty regime, including its institutional dimension, in particular the provisions concerning withdrawal from the

Treaty. Conditions under which a State party might withdraw should be clarified and should be absolutely exceptional. A revision of article X of the Treaty should provide for clear consequences for withdrawal from the Treaty, such that international peace and security would not be endangered.

16. Portugal had come to the current negotiations as a non-nuclear and peace-loving State with a constructive mindset, determined to do its utmost to ensure a successful outcome. The current juncture in history might be regarded by future historians as the moment when a safer world came into being. Alternatively, future historians might see missed opportunities and unsuccessful negotiations as having condemned humanity to a more precarious existence. Everyone had a duty to ensure a better future.

17. **Ms. Algayerová** (Slovakia) said that while her Government attached great importance to the principle of multilateralism in international efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it welcomed any initiative that resulted in further reduction of existing nuclear arsenals. In that connection, she welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation.

18. States' non-compliance with their non-proliferation obligations was unacceptable: the international community must be prepared to address firmly any breaches of the Treaty. She furthermore called on all States parties that had not yet signed and ratified an additional protocol to do so, as such protocols were an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system. While recognizing States parties' inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a vital component of the Treaty, she stressed that that right must be accompanied by compliance with all other elements of the Treaty. IAEA and its Technical Cooperation Programme played a central role in facilitating the responsible development of nuclear energy and mutual trust in its exclusively peaceful application. Her Government was committed to complying with the highest safety and security standards while developing and using nuclear energy, which was essential to meeting Slovakia's energy needs.

19. **Mr. Rybakov** (Belarus) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the fundamental key not only to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but also to the maintenance of international security as a whole. The successful implementation of the Treaty required that an appropriate balance be maintained between its three complementary and mutually reinforcing pillars.

20. Belarus, which had made a historic decision in the 1990s to renounce its nuclear weapons, remained convinced that the main strategic goal of the Treaty was the achievement of comprehensive global nuclear disarmament. It supported a realistic, balanced and gradual approach in the pursuit of that goal.

21. His Government welcomed the signing of a new arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation as a step that would make a significant contribution towards strengthening global security and stability. However, the disarmament process under way should provide for more than just the destruction of obsolete nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles; it should also require both parties to cease the further nuclear weapons development.

22. Nuclear non-proliferation efforts would be significantly strengthened by the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the

Conference on Disarmament. A prerequisite for enhancing the authority and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the provision of unequivocal and unconditional negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States by nuclear-weapon States. Compliance with the Treaty regime was an important part of efforts to combat international terrorism, together with such multilateral instruments as Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

23. His Government strongly supported initiatives aimed at strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and the conclusion of additional protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements. It also stressed the importance of the non-discriminatory implementation of the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the Treaty.

24. **Mr. Salam** (Lebanon), speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, said that in order to restore confidence in multilateral diplomacy the recent steps taken by some nuclear-weapon States towards dismantling their arsenals must be consolidated by concrete actions within a clear, time-bound programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In that connection, the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States of America and the Russian Federation was a step in the right direction. However, failure to make progress towards establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East might bring about the collapse of the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime.

25. The Group attached great importance to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. To that end, it had submitted four working papers setting forth its position. The Group was gravely concerned at the failure to implement the resolution on the Middle East since its adoption at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which had undermined the credibility of the resolution and of the Treaty itself. It considered that Israel's persistent refusal to accede to the Treaty and to accept relevant international resolutions posed a security threat to Arab States, all of which had become parties to the NPT and which, doubtful of the Treaty's capacity to bring about peace, might be forced to revisit their approaches in the future. It maintained that establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would constitute a fundamental step towards universality of the Treaty.

26. The Treaty struck a balance between strengthening international peace and security through nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and facilitating the exercise by non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty of their right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without exception. However, having become aware of double standards in the transfer of materials and technology to non-States parties, and faced with the international failure to implement the Arab initiative for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, Arab States had considered appropriate alternatives and adopted a strategy for the peaceful use of nuclear energy at recent summits.

27. Noting the Arab States' demonstrated commitment over the years to the non-proliferation regime and to improving relations with IAEA, he expressed regret at comments made by the Agency's Director General regarding Syria — one of the first countries to accede to the Treaty — language that could be misinterpreted as accusing that country of refusing to abide by its legal obligations under the Treaty and the comprehensive safeguards agreement it had concluded with IAEA in 1992. Syria had also spearheaded the initiative by the Group of Arab States in the Security Council in 2003 to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction. In the

interest of objectivity, he pointed out Israel's dangerous refusal to accede to the Treaty, along with its attacks on neighbouring countries and occupation of their land, effectively impeding the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

28. The comprehensive safeguards agreement was the Agency's sole legal framework for verifying the peaceful use of nuclear energy, whereas the additional protocol was a strictly voluntary, non-binding mechanism. No new obligations should be imposed on non-nuclear-weapon States until genuine progress towards universality of the Treaty was achieved and outstanding commitments were met, in particular the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Group of Arab States therefore called upon States parties to demand that Israel accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State without delay and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. To that end, the Agency must implement all its resolutions concerning the Israeli nuclear question and submit periodic reports on their implementation to the Board of Governors and the General Conference. Lastly, States parties must intensify efforts to bring about universality of the NPT and refrain from transferring nuclear materials and technology to non-States parties, as doing so would encourage them to remain outside the Treaty, thus undermining the non-proliferation regime and international peace and security.

29. Speaking on behalf of his own country, he said that despite a number of positive steps seen in the area of nuclear disarmament, many nuclear threats had yet to be addressed. Noting that some 23,000 nuclear warheads remained in existence, he urged Member States to implement General Assembly resolution 63/241 on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems. It was also of the utmost importance to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference, which required Israel's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. With its 200 nuclear warheads, Israel continued to pose a threat to regional and international security.

30. It was crucial to implement the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. He welcomed the Secretary-General's proposal for greater accountability and transparency in that area: achieving a world free of nuclear weapons was possible only if the total number of nuclear weapons was known and if nuclear-weapon States made their disarmament efforts public. It was also important to further strengthen the international legal system. In that connection, he urged States parties to work towards the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to start negotiations on other international instruments such as the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention and a fissile material cut-off treaty. Appropriate mechanisms were also needed to address the fact that a few States that rejected the Non-Proliferation Treaty continued to reap the benefits of nuclear cooperation with complacent countries. Lastly, measures should be taken internationally to provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, such as universal commitment to the "no-first-use" principle, the gradual departure from reliance on nuclear weapons in military doctrines, and the relinquishing of the threat of use of nuclear weapons as a means to advance strategic interests.

31. His Government reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and supported IAEA in its efforts to foster technical cooperation in that area.

32. *Mr. Cancela (Uruguay), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

33. **Mr. Abdelaziz** (Egypt), while noting a number of positive developments in respect of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, said that attempts to change the delicate balance upon which the Treaty had been founded, or to change the course or nature of the review process, must cease. Nuclear-weapon States' compliance with their obligations in the field of nuclear disarmament did not create for non-nuclear-weapon States any obligations additional to those stipulated by the Treaty in the areas of non-proliferation or peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The growing interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties in the development-related benefits of nuclear energy was a legitimate right under article IV of the Treaty, and should not be used as grounds to impose additional restrictions on those States under the pretext of proliferation prevention, or to impose new restrictions on the exercise by States parties of their inalienable right to withdraw from the Treaty.

34. The verifications system agreed under the Treaty and implemented by IAEA should be based on material evidence, without politicization, selectivity or double standards, and should respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It was regrettable that the three sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference had made no progress in its implementation. In that regard, he would welcome any constructive effort to promote negotiations on the proposals his delegation had made at the past three sessions of the Preparatory Committee aimed at beginning implementation of the resolution. He hoped that the final document of the current Review Conference would reflect progress on that issue.

35. A number of challenges continued to face States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. One such challenge was the insufficient progress made towards achieving the objectives of the Treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament and implementing the 13 practical steps. Noting that nuclear disarmament needed to be addressed within the international multilateral framework, he said that States parties must not settle for direct negotiations with nuclear-weapon States alone. It was crucial to conclude an international, legally binding convention to eliminate nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

36. Regretting that nuclear-weapon States continued to rely on nuclear deterrence and to place nuclear weapons at the service of non-nuclear-weapon States, he said that such practices must cease and that every effort must be made to put an end to discriminatory implementation of the Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States, furthermore, must receive legally binding assurances that neither nuclear weapons nor nuclear threats would be used against them, pending the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament. Another issue of concern was the Security Council's intervention in the implementation by States parties of their obligations under the Treaty. The Treaty was a legally binding framework established by the Governments concerned and it could be altered only by the States parties themselves. Lastly, there was a need for an institutional framework for the Treaty as well as a clear mandate for following up on its work during the intersessional periods, similar to that which existed for other instruments, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

37. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that the 2010 Review Conference should build on recent positive developments by strengthening all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirming the commitments agreed upon by consensus at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, particularly the unequivocal undertakings

of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. While the many positive signs from those States were welcome, concrete measures to implement the 13 practical steps agreed upon in 2000 were long overdue.

38. To that end, a framework for consensus among participants at the current Review Conference could be based on the following points: nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing and complementary processes; the safeguards system was an essential part of collective efforts to address the threat posed by nuclear proliferation; IAEA additional protocols, while voluntary, were important as a confidence-building measure; non-proliferation efforts should not impede access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly for developing countries; the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference should be urgently implemented and additional nuclear-weapon-free zones established; nuclear-weapon States should provide non-nuclear-weapon States with legally binding security assurances; the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remained essential; negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty should commence as soon as possible; and concerns related to withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be effectively addressed.

39. His delegation supported a strengthened review process that would enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty in a cost-effective manner without duplicating existing efforts. However, care must be taken to ensure that undue emphasis on procedural matters did not detract from issues of substance.

40. **Mr. Alotaibi** (Kuwait) recalled that despite the international community's optimism over recent developments in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Israel remained the sole State in the Middle East region that refused to comply with the nuclear non-proliferation regime, thereby impeding universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, leading neighbouring countries to use the leniency shown Israel as justification for acquiring or developing nuclear weapons of their own and single-handedly preventing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In a resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities adopted at its session in 2009, the IAEA General Conference had called on Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place its facilities under IAEA safeguards. Until such time as Israel did so, nuclear-weapon States must undertake to refrain from providing Israel with direct or indirect assistance of any kind that would enable it to strengthen its nuclear capabilities, given the threat to regional and international peace and security and to the non-proliferation regime posed by such assistance. He urged IAEA to suspend its Technical Cooperation Programme with Israel until that country acceded to the Treaty.

41. Out of a firm belief in the importance of halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Kuwait had acceded to the Treaty in 1989 and ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, in addition to ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

42. Achieving full compliance with and unconditional universal accession to the Treaty, the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, were matters of utmost priority. In that connection, his delegation called for the creation of clear plans of action and mechanisms to ensure fulfilment of commitments made

under the Treaty and at past review conferences, in particular the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The 2010 Conference must adopt a resolution on banning the development and production of new nuclear weapons and urge countries that had yet to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so, in order to expedite its entry into force.

43. In the context of its cooperation with IAEA, his Government's initiative to establish a national programme for the peaceful use of atomic energy would equip Kuwait to undertake electricity production and water desalination, effectively transforming national development efforts. In that connection, Kuwait fully supported the creation of a nuclear fuel bank to guarantee fuel supply to States seeking access to it, an initiative to which it had pledged 10 million dollars in 2009.

44. With respect to the Iranian nuclear question, his country affirmed the right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under IAEA supervision. He hoped that the parties involved in resolving the Iranian question would redouble their efforts to reach a satisfactory outcome, and called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate with those efforts so as to allay the international community's concerns regarding the nature of its nuclear programme and help make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

45. **Ms. Štiglic** (Slovenia) said that, since the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of international peace, security and stability, States parties to the Treaty must do their utmost to preserve its integrity and to strengthen its future role with a view to the universal acceptance and implementation of all its objectives.

46. Her delegation welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction between the United States and the Russian Federation, the United States Nuclear Posture Review report of April 2010 and the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C. Those positive developments should pave the way for further concrete non-proliferation and disarmament steps, particularly the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and increased efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Conversely, such negative developments as unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty and non-compliance with IAEA safeguards obligations would also need to be effectively addressed.

47. While nuclear energy could serve as an important factor for economic growth and development, sensitive nuclear technologies posed an additional proliferation risk and must therefore be subject to appropriate controls in order to prevent misuse. Her Government fully supported the relevant IAEA verification activities in that regard. Recalling that Slovenia had recently ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, she called upon all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do the same.

48. *Ms. Štiglic (Slovenia), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

49. **Mr. Jomaa** (Tunisia) welcomed recent encouraging signs of increased political will to address non-proliferation and disarmament challenges, including the 2009 programme of work agreed upon by the Conference on Disarmament and the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation. While the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were still far from being attained, there was now hope that the international community might take advantage of the current favourable climate to make considerable strides forward.

50. The States parties to the Treaty must find the proper balance between their respective obligations and responsibilities under its provisions. In that context, his delegation reiterated the calls for the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil the unequivocal commitments they had made at the 2000 Review Conference to begin eliminating their arsenals. Tunisia hoped that they would honour their promise by speeding up negotiations on the 13 practical steps agreed upon in 2000. In the meantime, effective assurances were needed to prohibit the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Another imperative was the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, where Israel was the only State not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

51. Lastly, his delegation stressed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be applied in its entirety in a fair and balanced manner. It was a particular matter of concern that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which had been conceived as a complementary instrument, had not yet entered into force.

52. **Ms. Ochir** (Mongolia) said that her Government welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, and looked forward to its speedy ratification and to further cuts in both countries' enormous arsenals. Her Government also took note of other important initiatives, including the Washington Nuclear Security Summit held the previous month.

53. The Secretary-General's five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament was a balanced, realistic and promising initiative which her delegation supported fully. The entry into force of the Central Asian and African nuclear-weapon-free zones was another positive development that contributed to the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation. Her delegation was also encouraged by the announcement by the United States that it would embark upon the process of ratifying the protocols to the treaties establishing the African and South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zones and that it would support the third pillar of the Treaty by providing additional support for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

54. Her delegation called on all States parties to seize the present opportunity to make tangible progress towards the strengthening of all three pillars of the Treaty. To that end, the States parties already had a basis for their negotiations, namely: the decisions reached by the States parties at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and at the 2000 Review Conference. Those decisions contained important agreements which needed follow-up action, especially implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed on in 2000. The Test-Ban Treaty had still not entered into force and her delegation called on all remaining Annex 2 States to speedily ratify it. Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had yet to start. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was still not universal and her delegation called on the States that had not acceded to the Treaty to do so at the earliest date.

55. Other concerns included the lack of universality in the acceptance of the comprehensive safeguards agreements of IAEA and the still low acceptance of the additional protocol; the lack of progress on the issue of providing legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty; and a lack of progress in the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference.

56. Mongolia was a strong supporter of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-

Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia had reaffirmed the conviction that the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. The conference had adopted an outcome document, the implementation of which could substantially contribute to promoting the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and creating a world without nuclear weapons.

57. In April 2009, Mongolia had hosted a meeting of focal points from nuclear-weapon-free zones in order to promote an exchange of views and further cooperation among them. That meeting had produced the first joint statement on issues of common interest, which had been communicated to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference by her delegation.

58. Mongolia believed that a comprehensive study on nuclear-weapon-free zones would need to be carried out to take stock of the progress made since the first such study by the United Nations in 1975, and to plan ways of supporting such zones as practical regional measures to promote the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

59. Mongolia strongly believed that every country could and should further the goals of nuclear non-proliferation, and its status as a nuclear-weapon-free State enjoyed wide international support. However, to be more credible, that status must be clearly defined. Since 2005, Mongolia had continued to promote the institutionalization of its unique status at the international level, which was reflected in the memorandum that its Government had submitted to the Conference, as contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/12. The goal of institutionalization was to clearly define, together with Mongolia's immediate neighbours, the international aspects of Mongolia's status and duly reflect it in a trilateral treaty, while seeking commitments from them and from the other three permanent members of the Security Council to respect Mongolia's status as a unique form of nuclear-weapon-free zone that reflected its geographical and geopolitical location.

60. With such institutionalization in mind, in 2007 Mongolia had presented to its neighbours a draft treaty that could serve as a basis for negotiation. Last year, Mongolia had held two rounds of talks with the Russian Federation and China regarding the content and format of the treaty. It was hoped that at some stage the other three permanent members of the Security Council would take part in finalizing a consensus regarding the content of the status.

61. Civil society organizations were natural partners of Governments in promoting the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and Governments must work more closely with them to inform the public about the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the dangers of their proliferation. Her delegation therefore supported Japan's proposal on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

62. **Mr. Al-Humaimidi** (Iraq) said that Iraq was striving to create a world free of nuclear weapons and it considered the 2010 Review Conference to be an important step towards nuclear non-proliferation. Iraq also welcomed the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, as well as the recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic arms reduction treaty.

63. The Government of Iraq reaffirmed its commitment to and respect for international treaties, conventions and arrangements pertaining to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, and it had taken legislative and executive measures to translate its obligations and commitments into reality.

64. Universal adherence to international agreements on weapons of mass destruction and global compliance with those agreements, together with the complete elimination of those weapons, would provide the international community with a certain guarantee against the use or the threat of use of those weapons. Iraq had affirmed that it would be free of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery, and had confirmed its commitment to the conventions and treaties on disarmament and non-proliferation following the harsh experience that the Iraqi people had experienced as a result of the policies of the former regime. That regime had obtained and used weapons of mass destruction leading to the destruction and devastation of Iraq and its people, wealth and infrastructure.

65. The Conference was being held at a crucial time for Iraq, which was endeavouring to obtain a review by the Security Council of the remaining disarmament restrictions previously imposed on it by Security Council resolutions, especially resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). The new Iraq had adopted the policy of discarding the legacy of the previous regime and the Iraqi Constitution required the Iraqi Government to respect and implement Iraq's international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production and non-use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In addition, it prohibited associated equipment, materiel, technologies and delivery systems.

66. In implementing that policy, Iraq had fulfilled all its obligations under the Security Council resolutions relating to disarmament. That, in turn, had led to Security Council resolution 1762 (2007) terminating the mandate of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and that of the special IAEA team in Iraq. Despite Iraq's efforts to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and to implement the Security Council resolutions relating to disarmament, there were still some constraints that prevented Iraq from benefiting from scientific and technological progress. That limited Iraq's potential to be an active member of the international community and its right to benefit from that progress in accordance with the statute of IAEA.

67. In that regard, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs had addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council and to the Director General of IAEA, stating the steps that Iraq had taken and was committed to take in the area of disarmament. The Iraqi authorities had achieved notable progress, including the accession of Iraq to the Convention on Chemical Weapons. It had also signed an additional protocol to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, which had been submitted to the Iraqi parliament for ratification. Pending such ratification, Iraq had officially declared that it would voluntarily implement the Additional Protocol with effect from 17 February 2010, pursuant to article 17 of the Protocol. In 2008, Iraq had also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

68. IAEA's Director General had sent a letter to the Security Council, in which he had noted the excellent cooperation of Iraq with the Agency. It was to be hoped that the Security Council would recommend the adoption of a resolution lifting the remaining disarmament-related restrictions imposed on Iraq.

69. The Middle East differed from all other regions of the world in that it was the most sensitive region of strategic importance and was economically unique. Consequently, any weapons escalation in the region would have far-reaching implications for international peace and security. At the same time, the Middle East continued to witness one of the longest-lasting conflicts in the world — the Arab-

Israeli conflict — as well as other military conflicts and political unrest. Therefore, a failure to implement the 1995 resolution, which had called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, would perpetuate instability and tension in the region.

70. Security and stability in the Middle East region required the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction — especially nuclear weapons, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), to relevant General Assembly resolutions and to the resolution of the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

71. Tight security measures were needed to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear material on the black market.

72. The Non-Proliferation Treaty guaranteed the right to all member States to conduct nuclear energy research for peaceful purposes and to produce, develop and cooperate in the development of nuclear energy. However, in addressing the dual-use nature of nuclear energy, permanent arrangements should be adopted to reconcile the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the need for non-proliferation. Transparency and cooperation with IAEA, the application of the safeguards system and other relevant measures must be emphasized in addition to compliance with international conventions. IAEA had proposed a potential international initiative to provide low-enriched uranium. That initiative contained assurances whereby member States would retain the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to obtain advanced technology, to uranium enrichment and to obtain enriched uranium at fair prices and without discrimination.

73. *Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines), President, resumed the Chair.*

74. **Mr. Muburi-Muita** (Kenya) said that his delegation associated itself with the statements made by both the Group of African States and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. He noted that total nuclear disarmament must remain the ultimate goal. In the light of new threats, especially those posed by terrorists, there was a need to quicken the pace of disarmament negotiations. The Conference on Disarmament was therefore urged to embark on substantive work as a matter of urgency.

75. Rather than decrying the outcome of the 2005 Review Conference, the States parties should build on the 2000 agreements to achieve the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. His delegation underscored the merits of the 13 practical steps agreed on in 2000.

76. There was a need to commence early negotiations leading to the conclusion of an international convention for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

77. The current positive atmosphere in global nuclear disarmament presented an opportunity that must be seized. The Washington Nuclear Security Summit held the previous month was a major advance in that regard and should be followed up with concrete multilateral disarmament steps.

78. Universal adherence to the Treaty was imperative. Similarly, it was important for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to enter into force as soon as possible.

79. In order to strengthen the Treaty regime, a delicate balance must be maintained between its three pillars. It must not be forgotten that, in relinquishing their sovereign right to receive, produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear-weapon States had always understood that there would be a corresponding commitment from nuclear-weapon States to disarm. It was therefore a matter of concern to non-nuclear-weapon States that disarmament appeared to have become a secondary priority.

80. The Kenyan delegation welcomed the signing, in April 2010, of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

81. IAEA played a vital role, especially in the area of verification. The Agency should be strengthened and encouraged to carry out its mandate to ensure that professional and independent verification exercises were undertaken.

82. The Pelindaba Treaty was a strong indicator of Africa's commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Those regions that had not established nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially the Middle East, were encouraged to give the matter their serious consideration and to engage in discussions towards that end.

83. Peaceful uses of nuclear technology could be of tremendous benefit, especially for developing countries. It was therefore important to recognize States parties' inalienable right to determine their energy needs and to make arrangements to meet those needs. IAEA could be an important partner in ensuring a non-discriminatory approach to nuclear fuel and in fostering an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between suppliers and consumers.

84. The goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world was feasible if the States parties worked together and took bold political decisions at the Review Conference.

85. **Mr. Rugunda** (Uganda) said that the proliferation of nuclear weapons posed a serious threat to international peace and security and that as long as some countries possessed such weapons, others might aspire to obtain them. Uganda therefore remained committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of multilateral efforts to contain that threat and as a framework for nuclear disarmament. It supported a package of proposals that would recognize past commitments and advance its three pillars, which should be implemented in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. Nuclear-weapon States should comply with their Treaty obligations and work towards the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, while States not parties to the Treaty should be encouraged to accede to it. Uganda fully supported the banning of all nuclear explosions: the Test-Ban Treaty usefully complemented the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His country welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, South-East Asia, Central Asia, Africa and Mongolia and called on other regions to follow suit.

86. As a developing country, and one with potentially useful uranium deposits, Uganda could benefit from further international cooperation in promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It was important to support non-nuclear-weapon States in that regard. Nuclear energy could provide an indispensable, cost-effective and clean source of energy and was also useful in other areas, including medicine, agriculture, water management and research.

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (*continued*)**(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee** (*continued*)

87. **The President** recalled that, at its first meeting, the Conference, in accordance with rule 3 of the rules of procedure, had appointed the Czech Republic, Mauritius, Republic of Moldova and Uganda as members of the Credentials Committee, leaving two members yet to be appointed. Accordingly, he proposed Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as the remaining two members of that Committee.

88. *Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland were elected as members of the Credentials Committee.*

Organization of work**Establishment of subsidiary bodies**

89. **The President** said that, following consultations, he had prepared a draft decision on the establishment of subsidiary bodies (NPT/CONF.2010/CRP.1) which, following its adoption, would be issued as an official document of the Conference. The following would serve as the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, each of which would hold at least four meetings: for subsidiary body 1 (Main Committee I), Mr. Marschik (Austria); for subsidiary body 2 (Main Committee II), Ms. Kelly (Ireland); for subsidiary body 3 (Main Committee III), Mr. Cancela (Uruguay).

90. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft decision on the subsidiary bodies (NPT/CONF.2010/CRP.1), as orally revised to include the names of the Chairmen of those bodies and with the addition of the words “at least four” in the penultimate sentence of subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), respectively, which would therefore read: “It will hold at least four meetings within the overall time allocated to the Main Committee”.

91. *The draft decision, as orally revised, was adopted.*

Requests for observer status

92. **The President**, speaking with reference to rule 44, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure, said that a further request for observer status had been received from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. He took it that the Conference wished to accede to that request.

93. *It was so decided.*

Requests from intergovernmental organizations to make a statement

94. **The President** said that requests to make a statement during the general debate had been received from representatives of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the League of Arab States, respectively. He took it that the Conference, in accordance with the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee, wished to accede to those requests.

95. *It was so decided.*

General debate (*continued*)

96. **Mr. Al-Ja'afari** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country had been among the first to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as it saw nuclear weapons as a destabilizing influence in the region and the world. The current Review Conference would have to address a number of outstanding issues, namely, whether States parties had managed to make the Treaty a balanced and non-discriminatory instrument; whether a time-bound programme to eradicate nuclear weapons had been defined; whether States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, intended to hold Israel accountable for its refusal to implement any of the numerous international resolutions calling for its accession to the Treaty; and finally, whether States parties could achieve universality of the NPT while preserving its credibility and authority as a legally binding international instrument.

97. The Syrian Arab Republic affirmed the importance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and called on States parties to implement article IV of the Treaty, which granted all States parties the inalienable right to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful ends. Moreover, the imposition of discriminatory restrictions on certain States for well-known political reasons must be avoided. The activities of IAEA in support of the peaceful use of nuclear technology were of particular importance to developing States.

98. In fulfilment of its Treaty obligations, his country continued to cooperate fully with the Agency, having concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with it in 1992 and submitted its nuclear activities to international inspection. Pursuant to that agreement, it had also established a national system for the monitoring of nuclear materials and made available to IAEA inspectors all facilities needed for the conduct of their tasks.

99. In 2007, Israel had destroyed a Syrian military facility with absolutely no links to nuclear activities, in flagrant violation of international law and Syrian sovereignty. Following that unilateral act which deserved unequivocal condemnation, IAEA had found that the attack had effectively prevented it from ascertaining the nature of the facility, about which politically motivated, baseless allegations had been made months after the strike. Those claiming to be concerned about the Agency's conduct of its activities should have provided pertinent information on the facility before the Israeli strike, not months after the fact.

100. Syria had granted the IAEA team unrestricted access to the Deir-ez-zor site and supplied all information requested. According to the report of the IAEA Director General to the Board of Governors, no nuclear activity had been conducted at the site.

101. Stressing the role of IAEA as the sole international authority for verification and compliance through its comprehensive safeguards system — an authority far removed from politicization or pressures exerted by some for political ends — his delegation called on States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to strive to achieve the universality of the Treaty and to avoid the imposition of any additional restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States, which had adhered to the non-proliferation regime and renounced the nuclear option.

102. The Conference must make a clear distinction between activities undertaken by States parties in fulfilment of legally binding obligations under the Treaty and strictly voluntary confidence-building measures that States might take. The

unilateral or multilateral assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty by nuclear-weapon States were conditional and non-binding and therefore failed to adequately address the concerns and needs of the former; hence the importance of implementing the resolution on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which called for the negotiation of a legally binding instrument on security assurances.

103. The current Conference must address the grave concern of non-nuclear-weapon States, including Syria, regarding the failure of past review conferences and preparatory committees to set forth a time-bound, binding, unconditional programme for nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their arsenals, namely, by calling on the Conference on Disarmament to establish a subcommittee to undertake negotiation of such a programme.

104. Syria affirmed the need to protect the sovereign right of States parties to withdraw from the Treaty, particularly if a State considered its national interests to be placed at risk by unexpected events.

105. The 2010 Review Conference must identify a series of effective practical steps for the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as that resolution constituted an integral part of the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, all nuclear facilities in the Middle East must be placed under IAEA safeguards. The Conference should also take into account the Arab States' legitimate security concerns. States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, must press Israel to accede unconditionally to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, in addition to refraining from providing it with nuclear assistance or technology. The 2010 Conference should also adopt a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, specifically urging Israel to help achieve universality of the Treaty by acceding to it and submitting all its nuclear facilities to international inspection by IAEA.

106. It was regrettable that nuclear-weapon States, after securing the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference — at which they had undertaken to considering the concerns of States parties in the Middle East — had since extended support to Israel in the nuclear sphere, in utter disregard for the concerns expressed by States in the region. The time had come to establish a time frame for implementation of that resolution.

107. **Ms. Blum** (Colombia) said that the world could not be freed from the threat of nuclear destruction until nuclear arsenals had been completely eliminated. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, as the only multilateral instrument that required nuclear-weapon States to take measures to that end, was therefore important; there remained, however, an urgent need for a legally binding international instrument prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.

108. Colombia remained committed to the universalization and effective implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; it called on nuclear-weapon States to honour their commitment to eliminating their nuclear arsenals, with the goal of achieving general and complete nuclear disarmament. In the meantime, those States must undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States: a legally binding instrument needed to be put in place to provide negative security guarantees. Moreover, since the nuclear threat also lay in the

possible development of new weapons, it was important to negotiate a multilateral, non-discriminatory and verifiable treaty prohibiting the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices and to arrive at a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests. Colombia, which was itself a party to the Test-Ban Treaty, urged all Annex 2 States that had not yet ratified it to do so and called for a moratorium on all such tests pending that Treaty's entry into force.

109. The production, import and use of weapons of mass destruction was prohibited in the territory of Colombia, which was a party to the main international instruments on the subject, including the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It was also involved in other political initiatives to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the Proliferation Security Initiative. She called on nuclear-weapon States to respect unconditionally the denuclearization status of the States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and to withdraw the interpretative declarations made upon signature or ratification of its Protocols I and II. Nuclear-weapon-free zones made a leading contribution to the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and were a positive factor in international peace and security. She drew attention in that connection to the usefulness of disarmament and non-proliferation education, as a means of creating a culture of peace.

110. All States had an inalienable right, under articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; that required international cooperation to promote the exchange of equipment and materials and training in nuclear science. IAEA could play an important role in that respect and thereby contribute to the socio-economic development of States. Colombia, for its part, along with other States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was committed to using nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. IAEA safeguards were currently applied in the country, for which an additional protocol to the safeguards agreement had entered into force in early 2009.

111. In conclusion, she emphasized the risk of the acquisition and possible use of nuclear weapons by terrorists and armed illegal non-State actors. In order to combat that risk, it was essential to comply strictly with all the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to apply all the relevant IAEA standards and mechanisms.

112. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation), speaking on behalf of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America) with reference to their joint statement to the Review Conference, said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the bedrock of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the collective pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was therefore important for all States parties to implement it fully and to build on it so that it could effectively address the pressing challenges currently facing the world.

113. The permanent members of the Security Council welcomed the constructive spirit of the 2010 Review Conference, to which the Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament had made an important contribution, in particular through its unanimous adoption of resolution 1887 (2009). Other important recent events included the conclusion of the new arms reduction agreement between the United States and his country, the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and the Paris Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Energy.

114. As nuclear-weapon States, the permanent members reaffirmed their enduring commitment to the fulfilment of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and their responsibility to take concrete and credible steps towards irreversible disarmament. In their joint statement, they recalled the unprecedented progress and efforts made by nuclear-weapon States in nuclear arms reduction, disarmament, confidence-building and transparency, and noted with satisfaction that stocks of nuclear weapons were currently at far lower levels than at any time in the previous half-century. The permanent members were determined to abide by their respective moratoriums on nuclear test explosions before the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty, bearing in mind that such moratoriums could not be a substitute for legally binding commitments under that Treaty. They recognized that one key element in the effective implementation of article VI and in the prevention of nuclear proliferation was the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. They called for early commencement of negotiations on that proposed treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

115. The permanent members underlined the fundamental importance of an effective IAEA safeguards system to prevent nuclear proliferation and facilitate cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They welcomed the fact that 131 States had signed an additional protocol and that 98 States had an additional protocol in force. They called on all non-nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement, as provided for in article III of the Treaty. They welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with article VII of the Treaty and the Guidelines from the United Nations Disarmament Commission's 1999 session. They supported enhanced consultation and cooperation among the parties to existing zones and called for the consideration of the establishment of new zones where appropriate and in conformity with the wishes of regional States. In particular, they were committed to full implementation of the 1995 Review Conference's resolution on the Middle East and supported all ongoing efforts to that end. They were ready to consider all relevant proposals in the course of the current Review Conference. They noted the importance of security assurances and were ready to engage in substantive discussions on that issue.

116. The permanent members recognized the inalienable right, reflected in article IV, of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and noted the increasing demand for nuclear energy. They were ready to work further with States parties to the Treaty in that connection.

117. They recognized the inalienable right to withdraw from the Treaty under article X, it being understood that State parties remained responsible for violations of the Treaty committed prior to their withdrawal and that any decision taken in relation to withdrawal should not lead to the revision of article X or to reopening the text of the Treaty.

118. The joint statement of the permanent members of the Security Council had been submitted to the Secretariat of the Conference to be issued as an official document. They hoped that it would serve as a valuable input for the Final Document.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

8 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 6th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on 5 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)
later: Mr. Puja (Vice-President) (Indonesia)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Tommo Monthe** (Cameroon), speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, called on nuclear-weapon States to implement their obligations under the Treaty in good faith. While there had been some promising recent unilateral and bilateral initiatives, he believed that multilateral negotiations were the most effective means of bringing about disarmament. There should be renewed commitment to the 13 practical steps agreed on at the 2000 Review Conference, including diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies of the nuclear-weapon States to minimize the risk that those weapons would ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. An early entry into force and eventual universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would also be concrete and meaningful steps towards disarmament. He reaffirmed that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was the sole competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with Treaty obligations.

2. The Group saluted existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, and called on the nuclear-weapon States and the other remaining States that had not yet signed the Pelindaba Treaty creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa to do so without delay. It reiterated its support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and in particular called on the three sponsors of that resolution to support regional efforts towards the establishment of such a zone. He stressed the need for technology transfer to assist developing countries to benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

3. **Ms. Gallardo Hernández** (El Salvador) said that her Government's commitment to eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons was based on moral and political principles and on the imminent threat that such weapons posed to international peace and security and to life itself. Even the nuclear-weapon States had expressed concern at the possibility of their use; in fact, their possession placed those States at greater risk of attack by other States which, feeling themselves threatened, had embarked on their own nuclear weapons programmes.

4. Such arm races were costly and diverted resources that could otherwise be used in pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals. The nuclear-weapon States should therefore abandon their counterproductive deterrence policies and should recognize that it was they who had the most to gain from nuclear disarmament dialogue and agreements with verification provisions and that they could best preserve their own security by fostering a climate of confidence based on respect for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in international law. She called on those States to comply with the legal provisions of the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and of the relevant international instruments.

5. She hoped that the Treaty would achieve universal accession and stressed that its three pillars must be implemented in a balanced, transparent and non-selective manner. The Review Conference offered an opportunity to examine the legitimate application of the Treaty and to make specific commitments regarding article VI thereof. The nuclear-weapon States must also implement the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, including by placing themselves under

the IAEA monitoring and verification regime through the negotiation of safeguards agreements.

6. She reiterated the importance of the confidence-building measures that could promote a sustainable, transparent bilateral and multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation framework with a view to international peace, stability and security. Her delegation rejected the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent in military strategies and welcomed the signing of the 2010 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the unilateral measures adopted by France and the United Kingdom. It hoped that those initiatives would lead to additional disarmament commitments and was in favour of a verifiable nuclear disarmament process, particularly with a view to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

7. El Salvador was a party to the relevant international instruments and would welcome the adoption of a universal, legally binding instrument in which the nuclear-weapon States would provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with unconditional negative security assurances. In that respect, she drew attention to the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and endorsed the Court's remarks concerning the existence of an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

8. Her country's experience had shown that peace, security and development were intrinsically linked. She hoped that the States parties, and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, would demonstrate the political will and flexibility of position necessary to the success of the 2010 Review Conference.

9. **Mr. Núñez Mosquera** (Cuba) said that the recent agreement among the principal nuclear-weapon States for the reduction of their arsenals, although insufficient, should encourage further steps towards the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of all nuclear weapons. Cuba had fully complied with all of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Inspections conducted under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement had proved positive. Cuba was a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the other relevant instruments. His country was also a participant in the Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database, and no incidents of nuclear trafficking had been reported.

10. His delegation was concerned at the lack of progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It was well known that there were plans for the deployment of new anti-missile defence systems. Nuclear weapons continued to be enhanced, and military alliances were being consolidated. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, action should be taken to obtain universal, unconditional and binding security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. All nuclear-weapon States must undertake not to be the first to use such weapons. The 13 practical steps approved at the 2000 Review Conference must be fully implemented.

11. Cuba was concerned that nuclear deterrence continued to be a core part of defence and security doctrines. It was unacceptable that global military expenditure

was now higher than at any time during the so-called cold war; a single nuclear Power accounted for nearly half of that expenditure. At the same time, the statistics for global poverty remained alarming. In such an unjust economic order, disarmament and development were closely interrelated. States that had no nuclear weapons and no interest in possessing them were denied the opportunity of serious, objective multilateral negotiations towards disarmament. The Conference must adopt a clear plan of action to implement all of the provisions of the Treaty, and establish a well-defined schedule for the irreversible, verifiable and binding elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2025 at the latest.

12. The most recent Nuclear Posture Review issued by one of the principal nuclear Powers indicated significant changes since the previous review, in particular with regard to the granting of negative security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. However, such changes were cosmetic, and the conditionalities attached to those guarantees remained in place. The document focused on countering proliferation and nuclear terrorism, but did not make a firm commitment to disarmament or the convening of multilateral negotiations on the topic. In contrast with its purported approach, it stressed the modernization of nuclear arsenals, the preservation of nuclear deterrence and anti-missile defence systems.

13. Cuba was concerned at the imposition of unilateral solutions and the interference of other bodies, such as the Security Council, in decisions for which IAEA had sole responsibility under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such issues could not be addressed through the imposition of non-transparent and discriminatory mechanisms which had a selective membership and acted on the fringes of the United Nations. Instead, the relevant mechanisms should be universal, comprehensive, transparent, non-discriminatory and open to all States.

14. Cuba hoped to see the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones. No serious effort had been made to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference, despite numerous resolutions of the Security Council, General Assembly, IAEA and other bodies. The Conference should adopt a mechanism to achieve that objective. Cuba supported the idea of convening an international conference on the topic in 2011. Israel, the only State in the region that had not acceded to the Treaty or expressed an intention to do so, should become a party without further delay, place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and comply with the Treaty. Transfers to Israel of nuclear equipment, information, materials, facilities, resources and devices should cease, as should any assistance to that country on nuclear matters.

15. All States had a right to develop, produce and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Nuclear technologies made a significant contribution to key sectors of Cuba's economy. For that reason, it attached great importance to technical cooperation with IAEA. However, certain States continued to impose excessive restrictions on the export of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. Any such interference should be prevented.

16. **Mr. Gutiérrez** (Peru) said that the success of the 2010 Review Conference would require political will on the part of all States to maintain the current momentum in disarmament affairs through the adoption of a balanced consensus document with specific objectives promoting each of the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). There were two well-defined positions on disarmament and non-proliferation: one group of States sought to

justify its possession of nuclear weapons by referring to its security needs and tended to stress strict compliance with the non-proliferation regime established by the Treaty; the other group, much larger, called for the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons. Those two groups had to work out a joint position at the 2010 Review Conference.

17. Peru was convinced that reductions in nuclear arsenals would strengthen the Treaty and, in that connection, welcomed the recent signing of an arms reduction agreement by the United States of America and the Russian Federation and the announcement of a new Nuclear Posture Review by the United States. Peru called for universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and welcomed the announcements by the United States and Indonesia of their intention to ratify that Treaty. It was hoped that other States that had not yet ratified the Test Ban Treaty, especially those listed in its annex 2, would soon do so and that, even pending that Treaty's entry into force, all States would refrain from nuclear tests. Peru supported the Secretary-General's efforts to move the opening of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty forward and hoped that all nuclear-weapon States would place their fissile materials under IAEA control.

18. Peru shared the concern of many that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had no specific provisions relating to the role played by non-State actors in nuclear proliferation, with potentially dangerous consequences. It supported proposals aimed at strengthening the security of nuclear materials and facilities through machinery established under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), at developing capacities for detection and investigation, at improving the sharing of information between States and at establishing an effective verification mechanism. In that connection, Peru welcomed the outcome of the recent Washington Nuclear Security Summit, which would strengthen efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. The Iranian nuclear problem was quite troubling, and Peru urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to open its facilities to IAEA inspection and heed with the Security Council resolutions addressed to it.

19. Peru benefited from IAEA cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which played a valuable role in the national food, health, environment and energy sectors, and was interested in various IAEA proposals regarding the security of nuclear fuel supply and multilaterally managed fuel banks. He therefore urged the 2010 Review Conference to recommend that IAEA should continue to hold regular meetings to prepare specific proposals on fuel supply issues.

20. As a member of the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, Peru encouraged consultation and cooperation between such zones and called for progress on implementing the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, including through the convocation of a conference on the subject as proposed by the Secretary-General.

21. Although the right of States parties to withdraw from treaties was guaranteed under international law, it was problematic when a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons developed suspicious nuclear technology, supposedly in exercise of its right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and then sought to withdraw from the Treaty in order to avoid verification of its compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. Peru was open to all constructive proposals to deal with that problem. The increasingly acute problems facing the Treaty demonstrated the need for a permanent support unit and more frequent

preparatory meetings. Peru supported the proposal submitted by Canada and others as a possible basis for dealing with that need.

22. **Mr. Taiana** (Argentina) stressed the need to make substantial progress in a balanced manner on the three pillars of the Treaty: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. His Government was fully committed to that instrument's objectives and provisions; it called for a world free of nuclear weapons, regretted the addition of new nuclear-weapon States and was disheartened by the continuing expansion of some States parties' nuclear arsenals. It was, however, encouraged by the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation and hoped that the two countries would continue to negotiate with a view to expanding that instrument to include all the nuclear-weapon States. It also welcomed the unilateral declaration by the United States that it would not produce new nuclear weapons or conduct nuclear tests.

23. Those initiatives should be complemented by the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without further delay and with negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. It was also urgent to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty and a negative security assurances instrument; the recent announcement by the Government of the United States of America that it would not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against other States parties to the Treaty was a step in the right direction. In that context, he called on the nuclear-weapon States that had ratified the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) with reservations and unilateral interpretative declarations to withdraw them; the commitment represented by nuclear-weapon-free zones should not be plagued by uncertainty regarding the presence, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the regions concerned.

24. He paid tribute to the work of IAEA and its new Director General and reiterated his delegation's confidence in the Agency's ability to fulfil its mandate and the importance of strengthening all other technical areas related to the development of nuclear energy and to international cooperation.

25. The past 60 years of peaceful nuclear activities had been of benefit to the Argentine people and to the other peoples of the world that had used the technology developed, produced and exported by his country in accordance with international law. The recent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., was a clear indication of the importance of the safe, responsible processing of nuclear material and equipment under the current international circumstances. Argentina had successfully reduced the use of highly enriched uranium in its nuclear research reactors, thus becoming the first country to rely entirely on low-enriched uranium for its total production of radioisotopes.

26. It was important to strengthen international cooperation in making scientific and practical knowledge relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy available to all States. His Government stood ready to work bilaterally or within the framework of IAEA to share the benefits of such use, particularly as new applications emerged. The growth anticipated in that area in the coming years made it important to foster international trade and to avoid irresponsible attitudes that could hinder it; transparent trade strengthened all the objectives of the Treaty.

27. Argentina had learned by experience the advantages of non-proliferation. Together with Brazil, it had removed the spectre of nuclear competition that would have diverted resources needed for the well-being of their peoples and fostered mutual distrust; the Brazilian-Argentine Agency on Accountability and Control monitored the safeguards on their nuclear installations and material. The South American countries' progress towards regional integration through the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) would have been impossible without the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America.

28. The proliferation of nuclear weapons must be avoided in a clear, verifiable manner. The international community should show no hesitation in condemning non-compliance with the Treaty and its provisions; it was unacceptable for a State to attempt or threaten to withdraw from that instrument. He stressed the need to prevent non-State actors from acquiring nuclear weapons, welcomed the commitment to the work of IAEA that had been expressed by the participants in the recent Nuclear Security Summit and noted that expert-level follow-up to that event in preparation for the 2012 Summit, to be held in Seoul, would take place in Buenos Aires.

29. **Mr. Urbina** (Costa Rica) said that the Conference could not afford to have another failure. Neglecting any one of the three pillars of the Treaty threatened the entire regime. It was urgent to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, improve IAEA safeguards and protocols, create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, promote new disarmament initiatives for the nuclear-weapon States, and initiate negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

30. Although the immorality of nuclear weapons was universally recognized and their illegality under international law had been confirmed by an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, there were still a handful of Governments that clung to military justifications for maintaining nuclear stockpiles that in themselves were a greater threat than any they were intended to confront. His country supported strengthening all the basic principles of the Treaty, including transparency, irreversibility, objective verification, non-militarization of outer space, inclusion of non-strategic weapons, and promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

31. The adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1887 in September 2009, the agreement by the two largest nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals and the recent Nuclear Security Summit were all milestones. It was important, however, to restore the momentum for disarmament that had existed when the Treaty was adopted in 1968, particularly since nuclear weapons had become so much more numerous, widespread and destructive in the intervening four decades. In that spirit, his country had submitted to the 2007 session of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference an updated version of the framework nuclear weapons convention it had first presented along with Malaysia over a decade earlier, which it hoped would serve as a model for a robust international instrument. His country had also co-chaired the conference where the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missiles was launched, chaired the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) concerning weapons of mass destruction, and cast its vote in favour of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) as an elected member of the Security Council. He

called on States to rise above their narrow national interests to create a world free of nuclear weapons in the interest of all humanity.

32. **Mr. Kafando** (Burkina Faso) said that in a world where nuclear weapons were more numerous and destructive than ever before, balancing the Treaty's three pillars was a task as urgent as it was delicate. Although there had been a number of hopeful signs in the preceding year, including the signature of a new arms reduction treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States, the nuclear-weapon States needed to do more to reassure the non-nuclear-weapon States of their good faith. At the same time, States that wished to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes needed to be more transparent. The capacities of IAEA should be strengthened, and acceptance of the Additional Protocol alongside comprehensive safeguards agreements should become universal. As long as the security provisions of the Treaty were complied with, nuclear energy had great potential to contribute to socio-economic development.

33. States should work for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and needed to move beyond the goal of reduction to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear stockpiles. There was no place in military doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons; in that connection he hoped that the nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so would sign Protocol I of the Pelindaba Treaty as soon as possible. All necessary measures should be taken to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material, with IAEA taking the lead role, while technology transfer for development should continue to be promoted. All parties needed to make the compromises necessary to restore integrity and credibility to the Treaty.

* Subsequently issued as document NPT/CONF.2010/41.

34. **Mr. Labbé** (Chile), speaking on behalf of the States parties and signatories to treaties that established nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia, recalled that the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia had been held in New York on 30 April 2010, preceded by a meeting organized by representatives of civil society. He requested that the final document of that Conference, which included in an annex the conclusions of the meeting of civil society, should be circulated as an official document of the 2010 Review Conference.*

35. The message contained in that document was sent from a position of political and moral force by members of the international community that had succeeded in making nuclear disarmament, the ultimate and most lofty goal of the Treaty, a reality. He noted with satisfaction that in light of the geographical coverage of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, that goal was more than half-way achieved; those zones, including Antarctica, occupied almost all of the southern hemisphere and were moving steadily northward. The States represented in the final document hoped that new nuclear-weapon-free zones would be established, particularly in the Middle East, and that other States would follow the example set by Mongolia in declaring its territory as a single-State nuclear-weapon-free zone. They hoped to act as friends of the President at the 2010 Review Conference.

36. **Mr. Wenaweser** (Liechtenstein) said that the failure of the 2005 Review Conference to achieve a concrete outcome underscored the perceived lack of balance in the implementation of the Treaty. The 2010 Review Conference provided a unique opportunity to restore the delicate balance between the three pillars of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For its part, Liechtenstein supported the complete disarmament of nuclear weapons in accordance with article IV of the Treaty and the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference.

37. Recent developments in the disarmament field gave the international community some reason for optimism. The new strategic arms reduction agreement concluded between the United States of America and the Russian Federation severely limited the number of nuclear warheads deployed by the two largest nuclear Powers, and it was hoped that both parties would pursue further arms reduction and disarmament initiatives. Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) also underscored the world's commitment to non-proliferation. The Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in April had also advanced efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors.

38. However, much remained to be done. Liechtenstein supported the long-term goal of a nuclear weapons convention in line with the Secretary-General's five-point plan and he urged the Review Conference to prepare the ground for such a project by adopting a programme of action with concrete goals and deadlines. He also called for the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, which, by lengthening nuclear launch procedures, would reduce the risk of error and further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in military strategy.

39. Liechtenstein applauded the recent entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, which established such a zone in Central Asia, and continued to support the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in accordance with the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

40. A number of practical steps could be taken to improve safety and security immediately, as had been outlined in the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. It was essential to prevent the misuse of civilian nuclear programmes for military or even terrorist purposes. Energy demand was surging all over the globe, which increased the interest in nuclear power. In that connection, it was more important than ever to address the risks posed by the nuclear fuel cycle. Some of those risks could be dealt with by making the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol the verification standard. Liechtenstein also supported the proposal for an international fuel bank under the auspices of the Agency, which would guarantee supply and significantly reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.

41. States should fully comply with and implement the mechanisms established under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which sought to reduce the risk of terrorists gaining access to nuclear materials. While respecting the right of States parties to the Treaty to research and produce nuclear energy, in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty, the international community needed to ensure that such sensitive technology was used responsibly and did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The activities undertaken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the recent past were

cause for grave concern in that regard and were seriously testing the resolve of the international community.

42. Liechtenstein was a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and believed that putting an end to nuclear testing would contribute to peace and security and provide a stepping stone towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. His delegation welcomed the United States announcement that it would pursue ratification of that Treaty, and urged other non-States parties, especially those listed in annex 2 of that Treaty, to do the same. The utter lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament was of great concern. Negotiations should be started in that body on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Until such a treaty was completed, Liechtenstein joined others in calling on all States concerned to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of such fissile material.

43. The common immediate goal remained to bring all non-States parties into the NPT regime as non-nuclear-weapon States and to ensure the universal adherence to and application of the Treaty. Liechtenstein supported proposals to strengthen the review process of the Treaty by replacing the current series of Preparatory Committees with shorter, more frequent annual meetings of both a procedural and substantive nature, and creating a small support unit. The review process should also clarify the meaning and consequences of a withdrawal from the Treaty. Legally, it was clear that States found to be in violation of their treaty obligations should not be able to abdicate their responsibility by simply withdrawing from the Treaty.

44. **Mr. Borg** (Malta) said that Malta was convinced that the strengthening of the Treaty regime was achievable through a balanced and gradual approach to its three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that connection the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference provided guidance for the way forward. However, the 2010 Review Conference needed to deal seriously and comprehensively with the issues of non-compliance and enforcement, as well as the problems posed by non-State actors who sought to gain possession of weapons of mass destruction. Malta urged countries that had not yet become parties to the various international conventions on counter-terrorism to do so as soon as possible and to adhere to the provisions of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

45. Malta continued to support all efforts and measures aimed at consolidating and strengthening the Treaty and called on the non-States parties to reconsider their position and accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States without any conditions. Malta also fully supported the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as long as the interested States effectively adhered to the applicable provisions and obligations specified in the Treaty and by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Malta also encouraged the universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol as the standard safeguards and verification regime.

46. In order to achieve the overall objective of a world free from nuclear weapons, Malta encouraged the inclusion of tactical and non-strategic nuclear weapons in verifiable and irreversible disarmament initiatives, a drastic reduction of operationally deployed warheads, and the marginalization by nuclear States of the role of nuclear weapons in their strategic postures. Malta also supported the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and urged all States, pending that Treaty's entry into force, to maintain a moratorium on nuclear test

explosions and to refrain from any actions that were contrary to the obligations and provisions of that Treaty. Malta also attached priority to the early commencement in the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations without preconditions on a fissile material cut-off treaty including verification provisions.

47. Noting that security in the Mediterranean region was closely linked to European security as well as to international peace and security, Malta urged all the Mediterranean countries to work to strengthen confidence-building measures in the region, including in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. In that context, Malta also called for concrete and practical measures for the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which had urged the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. Pending the establishment of such a zone, it was of vital importance that all nuclear activities and facilities in the region be placed under IAEA safeguards. Malta supported all of the already established nuclear-weapon-free zones and encouraged other countries to establish similar zones in other regions of the world on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned.

48. Malta welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and the communiqué adopted by the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in April 2010, as they renewed the critical momentum in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and in global arms control and disarmament.

49. Like many countries, especially the small countries, Malta's security lay in the United Nations and its treaty bodies, including those that provided arms control machinery covering weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. Multilateral cooperation based on disarmament regimes and non-proliferation agreements served the interests of all States, large and small, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. It was the responsibility of all States to maintain and even step up the momentum in the global effort to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

50. **Mr. Shalgham** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that disarmament efforts continued to lack balance and objectivity, and were marred by selective and unjust policies. Vast nuclear arsenals remained in place, and a number of States continued to develop nuclear weapons. There had been little progress in implementing the decisions adopted at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, and in particular the resolution on the Middle East. Certain Powers had sought to connect the implementation of that resolution to other conditions which, owing to Israel's intransigence, might not be realized even in the long term.

51. In 2003, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had taken practical steps to renounce voluntarily all of its nuclear and chemical weapons programmes. The non-proliferation regime could be preserved only through such actions, which should take place in a transparent and verifiable manner, according to a well-defined schedule.

52. The mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency focused on non-proliferation, but not on verifying that nuclear-weapon States were complying with their disarmament obligations. In order to be truly international, the Agency should monitor all States without distinction. It should inspect the Israeli nuclear facilities in Dimona; failing that all of the States of the Middle East would have the right to

possess nuclear weapons. All States should place their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. An international agreement should be concluded, in accordance with the Treaty and the Statute of IAEA, in order to verify the compliance of nuclear-weapon States with their disarmament commitments. That initiative would prevent the use of nuclear resources for military purposes and their transfer to non-parties.

53. The positive statements made by the Heads of State of certain nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the President of the United States of America, gave cause for hope. The signing in April 2010 of a new treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation was another welcome sign. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, a universal, unconditional and binding instrument should be adopted in order to provide security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. His delegation supported the establishment of a subsidiary committee within the Review Conferences to work towards that objective.

54. It was essential to ensure a balance between the three pillars of the Treaty by upholding the inalienable right of all States parties to the use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, without limitations or preconditions. The Agency had sole responsibility for verifying compliance with the Treaty. Any nuclear cooperation with non-parties, whether for peaceful or military purposes, contravened the letter, spirit and objectives of the Treaty, and prevented it from becoming universal.

55. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world and welcomed the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty. It called for the implementation of the resolution of the General Conference of IAEA entitled "Israeli nuclear capabilities", adopted at its 53rd session in September 2009. Israel was the only State in the region that had neither acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty nor expressed its intention to do so. It should become a party without delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State and place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, thereby avoiding an arms race in the region. The working paper submitted by the League of Arab States (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.29) outlined practical steps to ensure the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference.

56. **Mr. Mohamad** (Sudan) said that four decades after its adoption, the Treaty remained far from achieving its objectives. Certain States continued to interpret its provisions selectively, developing their own nuclear weapons while restricting the access of developing States to nuclear materials for peaceful medical, agricultural and industrial uses that had become all the more important given the recent global energy crisis.

57. He hoped that recent positive bilateral initiatives and changes in military doctrines would lead to tangible progress towards specific timetables and clear benchmarks for disarmament, and that rapid progress could be made on negotiation of the fissile material cut-off treaty, negative security guarantees, and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy was a central principle of the Treaty, and he hoped that IAEA, unlike the United Nations Security Council, would maintain its impartiality in that regard.

58. Even though nuclear-weapon-free zones covered over half the globe, the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East continued to be obstructed by Israel. The Conference should establish a technical committee to set a specific timetable for implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and the three depository States should bring pressure to bear on Israel to accede to the Treaty and to submit its nuclear programme to IAEA safeguards. In the meantime, nuclear-weapon States should refrain from transferring nuclear-weapon technology to Israel, and States parties with information on Israel's nuclear programme should make it public. The Conference should also adopt effective measures to guarantee non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

59. With the signing of the Pelindaba Treaty in July 2009, Africa had become the largest nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world. He called on those States that had not yet done so to ratify that Treaty. His country had been an early signatory to numerous disarmament instruments, and his capital had been host to the first Regional Meeting of National Authorities of African States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, which had produced important recommendations for making Africa a chemical-weapon-free zone. He hoped that the Conference would advance the purposes and principles of the Treaty and thereby contribute to global security and stability.

60. **Mr. Ali** (Malaysia) said that in order to create a world without nuclear weapons, it was essential to comply with all three pillars of the Treaty. The statement made by the President of the United States in April 2009 in Prague, the conclusion in April 2010 of a new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, and the issuance by the United States of America of a new Nuclear Posture Review all gave cause for hope. At the same time, nuclear-weapon States must take further action towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. A few States continued to pursue nuclear weapons programmes, and some insisted on remaining outside the Treaty. Progress in reducing weapons arsenals, increasing transparency and reversing the high alert status of nuclear weapons had been slow.

61. In order to promote transparency, efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons must be balanced and verifiable. Such action should build on the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and on the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. An incremental and comprehensive approach should be adopted, incorporating step-by-step measures within a time-bound plan. States parties fully compliant with IAEA safeguards should receive preferential treatment for the establishment of peaceful nuclear programmes.

62. Malaysia had regularly submitted to the General Assembly a draft resolution concerning follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat of use of nuclear weapons, reaffirming nuclear-weapon States' disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty. He called on all States to begin preparations for multilateral negotiations towards a nuclear-weapons convention. National legislation had been enacted to supervise and control all strategic items or activities that could facilitate the development or production of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. Malaysia supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and urged that

nuclear weapons should be taken off high alert as one practical step to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

63. **Ms. Aitimova** (Kazakhstan), noting that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of international security, said that it was generally recognized that there was no greater threat to security than the existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan shared the view that States needed urgently to strengthen control over nuclear activities on their territories and prevent terrorist acts involving nuclear weapons and materials. In that connection, she welcomed the recent revival in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament activities, in particular the new United States Nuclear Posture Review, the new strategic arms reduction agreement signed between the Russian Federation and the United States of America and the recent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The Secretary-General had visited the former nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan in April 2010 and had commended the decision to shut down that site as a powerful symbol of hope for a world free of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly had adopted a resolution (64/35) declaring 29 August — the day when the huge nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk had been shut down — as the International Day against Nuclear Tests.

64. Despite some positive steps, the international community had not been able to advance the main goals of disarmament within the NPT framework or to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the emergence of the new nuclear-weapon countries. It was absolutely essential to achieve unconditional compliance on the part of States parties with their Treaty obligations, embodied in the three pillars of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Furthermore, nuclear-weapon States should step up their efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty by reducing their nuclear arsenals.

65. Kazakhstan supported the conclusion of an international legally binding instrument on security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States by the nuclear-weapon States. She urged nuclear-weapon States to revise their military doctrines so as to exclude all possible use of nuclear weapons. She hoped that the announcements by the United States and Indonesia of their intention to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would serve as an example to other States and facilitate that Treaty's entry into force. Kazakhstan also supported the inalienable right of every State party to develop the use of peaceful nuclear energy in accordance with IAEA requirements, without monopolies or double standards. All States parties that had not yet concluded IAEA comprehensive safeguard agreements and additional protocols should do so as soon as possible. The IAEA role in inspecting and verifying the transfer and use of fissile materials should also be strengthened.

66. As a major uranium producer with experience in and capacity for refining highly enriched uranium into its low-enriched form, Kazakhstan had presented to IAEA a proposal to host an international nuclear fuel bank. That would help to eliminate some of the gaps in the international legal arena with regard to the development of national peaceful nuclear programmes.

67. Last year, the Central Asian region had become the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the northern hemisphere, bordering on two nuclear-weapon States. It was hoped that the new zone would receive negative security assurances, which would demonstrate the genuine interest of the nuclear-weapon States in achieving a nuclear-free world. In that regard, Kazakhstan welcomed the willingness of the United States to assist in resolving the issue of signing the additional protocol.

Kazakhstan also welcomed the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty establishing the African nuclear-weapon-free zone and urged the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. Inspired by a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan urged States parties to consider adopting a “Universal Declaration of a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World”. Similarly, Kazakhstan called for the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which would be a significant step towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

68. **Mr. Elisaia** (Samoa), recalling that the Pacific Ocean had witnessed numerous nuclear tests and the only hostile use of nuclear weapons, said that the very existence of nuclear weapons posed a threat. Although the Treaty had played a deterrent and restraining role, to rely on it for the prevention of nuclear war would be to invest too much faith and trust in humanity, as though it were infallible and therefore immortal. Aware of the fickleness and unpredictability of human nature, many States parties believed that a world without nuclear weapons would be safer and more prosperous.

69. Samoa was not a member of any military grouping, and had no aspiration to become one. It had no army, and its police force was unarmed. A friend to all Member States of the United Nations and an enemy to none, Samoa believed that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. The three pillars of the Treaty were mutually reinforcing, and must be implemented.

70. The Review Conference provided an opportunity for small island States such as Samoa to contribute views on how to make the Treaty more effective. His country had consistently called for the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons represented the greatest contemporary paradox; nations desired peace, but greater sums were being spent on nuclear weapons than ever before.

71. Samoa was party to a number of relevant agreements, and commended the Treaty of Pelindaba, the new treaty signed in April 2010 between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, the United States Nuclear Posture Review, and the announcement that the United States Government was moving towards ratification of the Treaty of Rarotonga.

72. **Mr. Almansoor** (Bahrain) said that while both the recent Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the new arms reduction treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation were positive developments, the Treaty faced a number of major challenges. The resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had been the basis for the Arab States’ agreement to the indefinite extension of the Treaty. But 15 years later, a nuclear-weapon-free zone along the lines of those established in Africa, Latin America, South-East Asia and Central Asia had yet to be established in the Middle East. Continued international silence in the face of Israel’s nuclear programme and that country’s refusal to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and submit its nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards system cast doubt on the credibility of the review conferences and the future of the Treaty. He called for an international conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and also stressed the importance to development of the right of States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2010/SR.7

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

8 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 7th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 6 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)

Contents

Organization of work

General debate (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Organization of work

Requests from intergovernmental organizations to make a statement

1. **The President** said that he had received an additional request to make a statement during the general debate from the representative of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. He took it that the Conference, in accordance with the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee, wished to accede to that request.

2. *It was so decided.*

General debate (continued)

3. **Mr. Labbe** (Chile) said that the current Review Conference was opening in a much more propitious climate than the preceding one, thanks in particular to the proactive leadership role assumed by the countries with major responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Important recent developments had been the conclusion by the United States and the Russian Federation of a new arms reduction treaty and the latest United States Nuclear Posture Review; they had also included the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., whose results would promote more flexible exercise of the inalienable right of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

4. Considering that international security was indivisible, Chile held that all States were responsible for its preservation, irrespective of their size and power. All States parties to the Treaty, which remained the cornerstone of the system of collective security, likewise had a share of responsibility for the success of the Conference.

5. To that end, Chile proposed that the States parties should respect all prior agreements and decisions relating to the Treaty review process and, rather than renegotiate such earlier agreements as the 13 practical steps, find updated arrangements for their implementation, as appropriate. They should: realistically agree on plausible actions towards disarmament, including the new package of measures proposed by Australia and Japan; support the Secretary-General's five-point plan and, in particular, lay the foundations for preliminary discussion of a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons; give particular attention to practical ways forward, particularly a reduction in the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, as proposed by New Zealand; swiftly launch negotiations on the treaty for the prohibition of the production of fissile material for military purposes; reaffirm the need for the speedy entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty; forcefully proclaim the practical importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as an intermediate stage towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, urging their expansion to the northern hemisphere; highlight the importance of Mongolia's self-proclamation as a nuclear-weapon-free State; as a matter of priority, seek ways of advancing implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, including intersessional monitoring mechanisms; identify and firmly condemn existing risks of proliferation, seeking effective prevention mechanisms; strengthen the international safeguards system through universalization of the IAEA additional protocol; reaffirm the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in full compliance with the provisions of

articles I, II and III of the Treaty; establish an institutional base for the Treaty, taking as a starting-point the proposal made by Canada and co-sponsored by Chile, with significant civil society participation; regulate exercise of the right to withdraw from the Treaty under article X, particularly by States not in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations; and raise public awareness of the need to abolish nuclear weapons, through disarmament education programmes, and, in the meantime, prevent their proliferation.

6. He drew the participants' attention to document NPT/CONF.2010/2, which set out, article by article, Chile's views of the Treaty and the best ways of strengthening it.

7. **Mr. Sobków** (Poland) said it was paradoxical that, despite the collapse of the bipolar world order, nuclear weapons continued to play a significant role. The proliferation of nuclear weapons remained one of the greatest challenges not only to the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime but to international security as a whole.

8. The recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic arms reduction treaty strengthened non-proliferation while building on agreements reached in the early 1990s. It built confidence and promoted transparency, thus contributing to international security. Disarmament efforts also made nuclear weapons less attractive to potential proliferators.

9. The announcement by the United States that it would release information on its stockpile of nuclear weapons was welcomed by Poland. It was expected that other nuclear-weapon States would follow the example of the United States.

10. Those positive developments had already launched the debate on a future arms-reduction treaty, which should set new limitations not only on strategic weapons but also on other types of nuclear weaponry, especially those designated as tactical or sub-strategic. The reduction and elimination of those weapons had not yet been the subject of any legally binding international agreement. The goal of a world without nuclear weapons could not be met without addressing that issue directly. Large arsenals of sub-strategic nuclear weapons seemed anachronistic in the post-cold-war world and increased the risk of proliferation by non-State actors. Instead of enhancing international security, they made it more volatile. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Poland and Norway had therefore undertaken a joint initiative whereby sub-strategic nuclear arsenals would be included in the arms-control framework.

11. They suggested an incremental approach without deadlines, which would be flexible and realistic. That process would aim to accomplish objectives in three stages. The first two, which should be given the highest priority, would be the enhancement of transparency and the introduction of confidence-building measures. The third stage proposed the reduction and elimination of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in conjunction with a general disarmament process. They hoped that their initiative would contribute significantly to the debate on nuclear disarmament.

12. The risk of proliferation was also related to the security of sensitive nuclear and radiological materials, and in that regard international terrorism and the uncontrolled spread of sensitive technologies posed an even greater threat. Poland, as a transit country, had a direct interest in strengthening the international norms relating to the control of those risks. It had therefore attended the Washington Nuclear Security Summit held in April 2010. One of the issues discussed at that

Summit had been the important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in promoting nuclear security and non-proliferation. Poland strongly supported all initiatives aimed at providing IAEA with the instruments it needed to carry out its important mandate. It called on all States to cooperate with IAEA and introduce full transparency with regard to their sensitive nuclear activities. That meant universalization of the IAEA additional protocol as a safeguards standard.

13. Poland was not advocating that any State should take steps which Poland had not already taken itself. In January 2009, the Polish Government had decided to develop a nuclear power programme. It hoped to set a positive example by complying with international non-proliferation and transparency norms as it expanded its nuclear facilities. Poland had implemented an IAEA additional protocol and since 2006 had been covered by the integrated safeguards system.

14. **Mr. Heller** (Mexico) said that the possession of nuclear weapons was a threat to international peace and security and that their use would be a crime against humanity. Mexico, having complied with all its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and taken every possible step towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world, could legitimately demand that other States comply with those obligations. The fact that the Treaty had been extended indefinitely in 1995 did not imply acceptance of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the five States concerned.

15. His delegation welcomed recent positive developments, in particular the conclusion of a new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, and called for efforts not only to lower the operational readiness of nuclear weapons but also to move towards their irreversible, transparent and verifiable destruction. A new window of opportunity had been created for bilateral and multilateral negotiations to strengthen the three pillars of the Treaty, especially in the present economic context, since huge spending on nuclear weapons was detrimental to the economic and social development of peoples. While it was true that the possession of nuclear weapons could act as a deterrent to the use of such weapons, a false assumption was thereby created that individual and collective security was not possible without them: their mere existence spawned a need to possess them.

16. It was not possible to disregard the challenges facing the Treaty. India and Pakistan had declared themselves to be nuclear powers outside the Treaty; Israel was presumed to have nuclear capacity; and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had announced its withdrawal from the Treaty and carried out two nuclear tests. It was unacceptable and indeed contrary to the goal of the Treaty that an increasing number of States should acquire nuclear capacity for military purposes.

17. Mexico, as one of the architects of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, while recognizing that, in the Middle East, such a zone could be contemplated only as part of a comprehensive political arrangement that would address all related security issues. Mexico continued nevertheless to support the establishment of such a zone and called on all the parties concerned to undertake negotiations to that end.

18. As for Iran, its nuclear policy could not be dissociated from its foreign policy, which appeared to reveal intentions incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. That country was required, in a fully transparent

spirit, to comply with IAEA decisions, respond to requests for information about its nuclear programme and give verifiable assurances, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions that it would not seek to possess nuclear weapons.

19. Mexico called on Israel, India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the universalization of which was the responsibility of all States parties and militated against the conclusions of agreements with States outside the Treaty that ran counter to commitments assumed in the context of the Review Conferences. Mexico agreed that nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from the territory of the European allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in accordance with articles I and II of the Treaty. It supported the establishment of a multilateral nuclear-fuel mechanism, provided that it involved IAEA and did not limit the inalienable right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

20. Mexico hoped that, in addition to progress on the 13 practical steps, the Conference would result in: a commitment by nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to declare publicly the number of nuclear warheads in their arsenals and their alert levels; the establishment of a nuclear arsenal accounting system within the United Nations; a no-first-use pledge by nuclear-weapon States; an undertaking to negotiate a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances; and a reaffirmation of the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to destroy their nuclear arsenals and negotiate a convention on their prohibition. In conclusion, his delegation stressed the importance of civil society participation in the promotion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

21. **Mr. Carrión-Mena** (Ecuador) said that in Ecuador, under its new Constitution, nuclear weapons were banned and no foreign military installations were allowed. Ecuador had long been an advocate of the prohibition of such weapons and, accordingly, as a signatory to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, hoped that nuclear-weapon-free zones would be established in all regions of the world where they did not already exist. Such zones were a fundamental contribution to the disarmament process, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The only way to remove the threat of the use of nuclear weapons lay in their complete elimination, in particular through the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

22. Ecuador welcomed the recent positive and complementary developments in the international security climate, notably the new arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation; they should form part of increased multilateral efforts leading to further such reductions, which must be irreversible, transparent and verifiable by IAEA. To that end, his delegation supported the speedy implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted by the 2000 Review Conference and the five-point plan proposed by the Secretary-General. His country urged nuclear-weapon States to negotiate a binding universal treaty whereby they would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and, in the meantime, to comply with their negative security assurances. It called on all IAEA Member States to accede to the Agency's nuclear safeguards agreement and allow full access by inspectors to all nuclear installations. Israel, the only country in the Middle East that was not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, should change that situation and place all its nuclear installations under the IAEA safeguards regime; it would then be possible to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Ecuador similarly called on India and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-

nuclear-weapon States and join the IAEA safeguards regime. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should also become a party to the Treaty and place its nuclear installations under that regime with the ultimate aim of achieving the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

23. Ecuador looked forward to the early entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty; in the meantime, it supported a continuing moratorium on all nuclear tests. It also looked forward to the opening of negotiations towards a verifiable treaty banning the production of weapons-grade fissile materials. His country recognized that each State had an inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and that the only restrictions thereto must be for reasons of non-proliferation under the Treaty. It supported all initiatives for cooperation in the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a means of speeding up the advent of a nuclear-weapon-free world, which would be achieved only on a gradual step-by-step basis. Most people aspired to such a world, in which the resources swallowed up by nuclear weapons would be used for the economic and social development of present and future generations.

24. **Mr. Christian** (Ghana), while recognizing the sovereign right of each State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to determine its own security agenda, said that such an agenda must respect the provisions of the non-proliferation regime. He welcomed the entry into force of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and urged the United States and the Russian Federation to sign and ratify the respective protocols of that Treaty and to work with other signatories to ensure that Africa remained a nuclear-weapon-free zone. As a developing country, Ghana attached immense importance to the right of States parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the indispensable role played by IAEA in assisting the developing world. Since establishing the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission several decades ago, his Government had actively promoted the development and utilization of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, while complying with necessary inspections.

25. He welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, as well as the commitments made by countries attending the Nuclear Security Summit recently held in Washington, D.C. In order to give effective meaning to global efforts aimed at eliminating all weapons of mass destruction, all States must sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and other related treaties to facilitate and accelerate nuclear disarmament. It was only through universal accession to the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes that the spread of nuclear weapons could be curbed and the preservation of mankind, guaranteed.

26. **Mr. Ščepanović** (Montenegro) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. He welcomed the positive steps taken by nuclear-weapon States towards disarmament and urged States to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. As a contracting party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, his Government welcomed its ratification by three States in 2009 and the announcement by the United States of its intention to ratify it as well.

27. Only a multilateral approach to disarmament and security issues would lead to long-term peace and stability. His Government was committed to further strengthening its national security system and contributing to international mechanisms and cooperation to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive

materials. Preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups required a comprehensive approach to international challenges such as poverty, poor governance and conflict.

28. The verification capabilities of IAEA should be strengthened and expanded. The ratification and full implementation of additional protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements should be recognized as a standard for verifying States' compliance with obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Montenegro had taken steps to develop its institutional and legislative framework for the verification and protection of nuclear and radiological material from misuse, including through several agreements with IAEA and a number of other international instruments. He reiterated his Government's support of diplomatic efforts towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue in a peaceful manner.

29. Access to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy could not be denied to States that complied with their non-proliferation obligations in good faith. It was important to link the use of nuclear energy with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; that objective could be achieved by securing access to nuclear fuel cycle products and services for interested countries through a multilateral mechanism. All stakeholders, including developing countries that were launching nuclear energy projects, should be encouraged to participate in the definition of multilateral approaches to the securing of such access.

30. **Mr. Nobile** (Croatia) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. He welcomed the outcome of the recent Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., as well as the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010. The Non-Proliferation Treaty remained of vital importance in the international community's efforts towards nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and he welcomed the strong involvement of civil society organizations in the Review Conference.

31. The three pillars of the Treaty were mutually reinforcing. Current proliferation threats, including not only States' non-compliance with their obligations under Security Council and IAEA resolutions but also non-State actors' attempts to obtain nuclear material, should be dealt with effectively. Furthermore, the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should not be a privilege of the few, but a right of all countries, provided they exercised transparency and responsibility in respect of international non-proliferation and safeguards instruments. IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and their additional protocols offered the proper standards of verification. He advocated strengthening that system and called upon all States parties to conclude and bring into force such agreements. The Government of Croatia also supported the work of IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear supply, as an effective means of addressing the growing need for nuclear fuel.

32. He called upon those States that had not yet done so to consider ratifying the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. It was also important to discuss in greater detail the procedures and consequences of withdrawal from the Treaty. The suspected proliferation of nuclear weapons by some countries, regardless of their status under the Treaty, was a matter of great concern, not least because it helped to

fuel the arms race. Welcoming the announcement made by the Government of the United States of its intention to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as similar statements made by other States listed in annex 2 of that Treaty, he urged all States that had not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty. Noting with satisfaction the adoption of the programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament, he called for an early conclusion of the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. He welcomed the steps taken to conclude treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones, which enhanced regional and global security.

33. Croatia continued to support the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and had actively participated in the recent comprehensive review of the resolution's implementation. His Government had devoted particular efforts to combating non-proliferation and enhancing the institutional network of relevant institutions in south-eastern Europe. It continued to be active in sharing its expertise with countries in the region, especially with regard to export controls. Croatia had established legislative and operational procedures relating to non-proliferation, export controls and nuclear safety. It had adopted legislation on nuclear safety and security in accordance with European Union legislation and had established a national office for nuclear safety. Croatia was, moreover, a party to all the major international nuclear non-proliferation agreements, and had concluded an IAEA additional protocol. He invited all States that were not already members of the relevant arms control and non-proliferation regimes to utilize the related standards and procedures. Croatia also participated in non-proliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

34. **Mr. Menon** (Singapore) said that it was important to convince all States that nuclear weapons reduced rather than increased security and did not enhance prestige. The nuclear-weapon States must take the lead in that regard, lest the failure to make progress on article VI should cause the Treaty as a whole to lose credibility. He welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation as a significant step forward and urged all nuclear-weapon States to use the momentum created to address other critical issues, for instance, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in strategic defence doctrines, providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and continuing to significantly reduce nuclear weapons in a transparent and verifiable manner. All nuclear-weapon States should furthermore commit to ending testing and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Welcoming the decision of the Indonesian Government to initiate the process of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, he urged the nuclear-weapon States and all States listed in annex 2 of that Treaty that had not yet ratified it to do so without delay. It was imperative to involve in the discussion of such issues States that had not signed the Treaty but had nuclear weapons capabilities.

35. As long as some countries had nuclear weapons and others did not, a sense of international imbalance and insecurity would prevail. He therefore welcomed steps taken towards fulfilling the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. A pragmatic, rather than purist or ideological, approach to such zones should be encouraged, in order to give all stakeholders the confidence that their vital security interests would not be compromised. He expressed support for the efforts by the Group of Arab States towards achieving a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, but stressed that

the broader geopolitical context of that region must not be ignored: a number of conditions, including a just and sustainable two-State solution to the Palestine question and the recognition of Israel by all States in the region, were necessary to make a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone a realistic objective.

36. While supporting the renewed interest of many States in the development of nuclear power to meet energy needs, it was important to recognize that such development entailed risks, as it inevitably hastened the spread of nuclear technology, including capabilities and knowledge that could be used for nuclear weapons programmes. It was therefore imperative that all countries that chose to exercise their right under article IV of the Treaty should spare no effort in reassuring the international community through actions as well as words, of the peacefulness of their intentions. In that connection, all States that had not yet signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with IAEA should do so without delay. The international community urgently needed to strengthen nuclear safety and security while enabling States that were abiding by their international obligations to reap the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All States should adopt higher standards of safety and security with regard to nuclear materials and facilities. The mandate and capacity of IAEA in setting such standards should be strengthened. Regional arrangements could play a useful role in supporting the Agency's activities. A more robust universal global export control regime should be established to guard against the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, while not hampering legitimate trade. The creation of a multilateral fuel assurance mechanism could help prevent the transfer of sensitive nuclear know-how, yet provide countries interested in pursuing nuclear technology with the means to do so.

37. A mechanism was urgently needed to encourage countries with nuclear weapon capabilities that were not parties to the Treaty to abide by the same international rules and safeguards. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must be given incentives to rejoin the global non-proliferation regime. As for Iran, it was in its own interest to do all it could to restore international confidence, particularly by fully cooperating with IAEA. States parties should agree on concrete, time-bound and verifiable actions in order to prevent the Treaty from becoming irrelevant. If the current Review Conference ended in the same way as the previous one, he feared that the decline of the non-proliferation regime might become irreversible.

38. **Mr. Badji** (Senegal) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been the cornerstone of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime for the past 40 years. Despite the slow pace of progress over that period, his delegation was firmly convinced that the Treaty could enable the international community to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, particularly in the light of recent positive developments such as the 2009 Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the new treaty on strategic arms reduction between the United States and the Russian Federation.

39. In the area of nuclear disarmament, the 2010 Review Conference should work to strengthen the authority of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by promoting universal adherence to the Treaty and compliance with previously agreed commitments. To that end, the Conference should, inter alia: reaffirm and implement as a matter of urgency the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference; draw up a list of the specific actions needed to implement article IV of the Treaty on the basis

of an agreed timetable; and decide on the modalities for a treaty on general and complete disarmament pursuant to article VI of the Treaty. In that connection, his country remained convinced that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty would make a decisive contribution towards the objectives of article VI. Furthermore, while the provision of unilateral security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was welcome, the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be further strengthened if such assurances were provided through a legally binding instrument.

40. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were interrelated and equally important goals under the Non-Proliferation Treaty: nuclear non-proliferation was essential to prevent non-nuclear-weapon States, or worse, still terrorists or non-State actors, from acquiring nuclear weapons. Since IAEA had a leading role to play in that regard, sufficient resources must be provided to enable the Agency to strengthen its verification and monitoring capacities. The current non-proliferation regime was far from credible and the time had come to implement the relevant decisions of previous Review Conferences in that regard. The nuclear-weapon States should also ensure strict compliance with articles I, II and III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty when cooperating with States not parties to the Treaty.

41. Efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime should reinforce the security of all States and must not impede the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty. Access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy was crucial for the development of a country such as Senegal, which complied fully with its obligations under the Treaty.

42. Lastly, Senegal welcomed the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty and launched an urgent appeal for a similar nuclear-weapon-free zone to be established in the Middle East, pursuant to the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

43. **Mr. Sinirlioğlu** (Turkey) said that Turkey remained committed to the full implementation, further strengthening and universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The three pillars of the Treaty were inseparable and mutually reinforcing, and required equal and balanced treatment.

44. The inconclusive outcome of the 2005 Review Conference had been a stark manifestation of the challenges facing the Treaty. The States parties could counter those challenges by reaffirming and reinforcing their prior commitments. Indeed, past achievements, such as those of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, including the 13 practical steps of 2000, were testimony to States parties' ability to achieve unanimity during difficult times.

45. The Turkish delegation believed that all treaty-based nuclear-arms control and disarmament accords played distinctive roles in meeting article VI obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It commended the steps already taken by nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty towards further reductions and transparency, and hoped that the momentum thus created would be maintained. In that context, Turkey welcomed the recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic arms reduction treaty. It also welcomed the renewed commitment of the permanent members of the Security Council to the principles of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

46. Turkey would continue to encourage further positive steps by all nuclear-weapon States to enhance global security. It attached particular importance to the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in those efforts.

47. Turkey also continued to support the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. In that regard, it was encouraged by the announcement by Indonesia that it would begin to ratify the Treaty. Turkey called on all States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty — particularly those whose ratification was required for its entry into force — to do so as soon as possible. In the meantime, States should continue to observe a moratorium and refrain from any acts contrary to the provisions of the Test-Ban Treaty. Likewise, Turkey supported the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. That could pave the way for parallel advances in related fields, including further progress on nuclear-weapon-free zones, negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

48. IAEA was the sole legitimate body to determine compliance within the non-proliferation system. Turkey recognized the need for further strengthening and universalization of the Agency's verification authority and its promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It called on all States that had not yet done so to sign, ratify and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement as well as an IAEA additional protocol as soon as possible.

49. Turkey supported the establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, wherever feasible. In particular, it supported the establishment in the Middle East of an effectively verifiable zone free of such weapons and their means of delivery. It encouraged all efforts for developing a common regional understanding on that project, with the participation of all parties concerned.

50. Turkey believed that the States parties to the Treaty had the right to withdraw from it under conditions stipulated by the Treaty itself. Turkey nonetheless believed that the States parties should establish procedures and consequences applying to those States that chose to exercise that right of withdrawal while found in non-compliance with their Treaty obligations by IAEA.

51. The risk of terrorists and other non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery should not be underestimated. The first and most important step towards eliminating the risk of nuclear terrorism was to further nuclear disarmament efforts and decrease the role of nuclear weapons in national security policies. The balanced and carefully crafted outcome of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit held in April 2010 demonstrated a common will to enhance nuclear security. The international community must redouble its efforts to ensure the effective and universal implementation of all non-proliferation instruments, including Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009) and the Proliferation Security Initiative. The contributions made by other multilateral arrangements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee were also valuable.

52. Turkey supported the greatest possible enjoyment of the benefits of nuclear energy by States parties that were in full compliance with their Treaty obligations. At the same time, it believed that all necessary steps must be taken in order to

ensure that there would be no increased risk of proliferation associated with the expansion of nuclear energy.

53. IAEA played an essential role in helping developing States parties gain access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Turkey had been closely following the efforts to establish a new multilateral framework for the supply of nuclear fuel. Provision of nuclear fuel in a predictable, stable and cost-effective manner over the long term without undue interference, as well as ownership of those mechanisms under modalities agreed to by the wider membership of the Agency, were essential for a broader basis for their implementation.

54. **Mr. Beck** (Solomon Islands) said that changing global military postures were creating uncertainty within the international system. Those postures guaranteed security for some and insecurity for others. Militarization and threats by non-State actors to use their arsenals were on the rise.

55. The Review Conference must arrive at practical steps for the systematic and progressive elimination of nuclear weapons through a legally binding international instrument and provide unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. That could only be achieved through genuine dialogue and cooperation.

56. Accelerated negotiations were needed in order to produce a time-bound plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons. His country had no objection to the proposed establishment of a standing committee to review, monitor and verify disarmament undertaken unilaterally and bilaterally. Such a plan should comprise three phases, including full implementation of the nuclear-free-zone treaties by the nuclear-weapon States by 2015; conclusion of negotiations on the further reduction of nuclear arsenals and the transfer of nuclear weapons to secure storage sites under international supervision between 2015 and 2020; and the elimination of all nuclear weapons and the application of safeguards for nuclear facilities on a universal basis.

57. The Solomon Islands delegation was saddened by the divisive actions taken by some States parties during the course of past week. All States parties must cooperate in order for the Review Conference to succeed.

58. The continued existence of nuclear weapons represented a significant threat to humanity. Solomon Islands had experienced atmospheric as well as underground nuclear testing by a number of nuclear-weapon States. The people of Solomon Islands continued to suffer from the impact of those tests.

59. The Solomon Islands delegation commended the recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce their nuclear arsenals. However, the principles of transparency, verification and irreversible dismantlement of nuclear arsenals must be woven into such arrangements. In that regard, IAEA was the sole competent authority. Confidence in the impartiality of the Agency's work and programme must be restored and upheld, and any politicization of its work must be avoided.

60. Solomon Islands was in a region that had established a nuclear-weapon-free zone pursuant to the Rarotonga Treaty. It joined others in welcoming the entry into force of similar zones in Africa and Central Asia and would welcome the establishment of such zones globally, including in the Middle East.

61. Lastly, Solomon Islands reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee it was seeking and it called for the full

implementation by nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament commitments under the Treaty.

62. **Mr. Pálsson** (Iceland) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the most widely adhered to multilateral disarmament agreement in history. Among other things, the Treaty provided the basis for the work of IAEA, exemplified by the thousands of extensive inspections carried out by the Agency in a great number of countries every year. Thanks to the Treaty, non-proliferation had become a global norm.

63. The Treaty had nonetheless been under critical stress for a number of years. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the capabilities to deliver them over long distances was one of the key challenges confronting the international community and one of the most difficult to solve.

64. The purpose of the Review Conference was to chart a course for the next five years or more. Recent developments, including the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic arms reduction treaty, Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) and the Nuclear Security Summit held the preceding month in Washington, D.C., together with the renewed commitment of the United States in seeking to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and initiate negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, had set the stage for progress to be made.

65. It was now necessary to move beyond the stalemate reached at the 2005 Review Conference. The outcome of the present Conference must demonstrate that the States parties as a whole were willing to assume their full responsibility in upholding the Treaty for the benefit of all. Progress must be achieved on a balanced review of each of the Treaty's three pillars. The aim should be to strengthen and reaffirm the Treaty, as part of the broader non-proliferation regime.

66. To realize that goal, strict compliance with existing non-proliferation obligations was essential. Iceland shared the concerns that many had expressed in that regard concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and called on both States to meet their obligations consistent with Security Council resolutions and IAEA agreements. Iran's nuclear activities were also a matter of regional security. Iceland supported efforts by States to make progress towards a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in conformity with the resolution of the 1995 Review Conference.

67. The Non-Proliferation Treaty clearly stated the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Reliable supplies of energy were vital for sustainable development and more and more countries were considering nuclear energy as a means of meeting their energy requirements.

68. Everyone was aware of an inherent weakness in the Treaty, namely, that it gave scope for countries to acquire technologies that brought them to the very brink of nuclear weapons capability without explicitly violating the agreement. A common position must be sought on how to respond to a State's withdrawal from the Treaty, which must not be without consequences for the State concerned.

69. Iceland was confident that the momentum created by the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and other recent developments in the area of nuclear disarmament

would help achieve the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, as envisaged in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That would be the greatest service the Conference could render to the cause of international peace and security.

70. **Mr. Kohona** (Sri Lanka) said that the recent Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the bilateral agreements between nuclear-weapon States were welcome signs. Those signs of political will must lead to action. There was reason to hope that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons could be achieved.

71. Sri Lanka was fully committed to discharging its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It called, however, for a balanced approach to the three pillars of the Treaty. It supported the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. Sri Lanka was also committed to the Test-Ban Treaty and its early entry into force. A fissile material cut-off treaty would help counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Sri Lanka strongly supported nuclear-capability verification under the framework of the IAEA Statute and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nuclear disarmament required comprehensive and verifiable steps, as well as a precise and realistic timetable, and IAEA played a valuable role in that regard.

72. His delegation agreed with Japan that comprehensive safeguards measures together with an additional protocol should be the current IAEA safeguards standard. In order for the application of additional protocols to become universal, assistance should be provided to developing countries that were willing to accept such a safeguards standard.

73. While Sri Lanka supported non-discriminatory efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it also recognized, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty, the fundamental right of the States parties to develop research, production and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty. Sri Lanka also agreed with the Secretary-General that the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should not have unintended consequences. In that regard, Sri Lanka fully supported any international initiative to enhance and strengthen technical cooperation related to nuclear energy development within and outside of the IAEA framework. It was hoped that technological advances would include new safety measures applying to nuclear energy and the disposal of nuclear waste.

74. The establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements entered into freely by the States of each zone strengthened world and regional peace and security, reinforced the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributed to nuclear disarmament.

75. Stringent controls and greater cooperation were urgently required to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear materials. In that regard, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was a useful instrument.

76. There was a need for an institutional mechanism to guide the Treaty process. The views of all delegations on the structure and duties of a permanent secretariat must be taken into account.

77. All States, particularly nuclear-weapon States, must recognize that a holistic concept of security could only be realized if there were a serious commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament, while pursuing nuclear non-proliferation measures.

The implementation of the decisions taken at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences should be evaluated and the Treaty-review process should be streamlined. The 2010 Review Conference would be successful only if the decisions that were adopted were duly implemented.

78. Lastly, his delegation believed that a genuine commitment to non-proliferation could be ensured only by creating confidence where there was insecurity. As the Treaty process moved forward, the broader context of global peace and security must be taken into consideration.

79. **Ms. Nyamudeza** (Zimbabwe) said that the Review Conference should strengthen the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty without discrimination. The selective implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty would not advance the objectives thereof.

80. Zimbabwe welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation. However, positive steps must be followed up in order to move closer to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. The Review Conference must agree on clear, transparent, irreversible and verifiable action plans and a time frame for the implementation of article VI by nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear-weapon States should implement the 13 practical steps to eliminate nuclear weapons, as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, there was an urgent need for a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

81. The universality of the Treaty was critical to the success of any nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process. The fact that some States were not party to the Treaty severely undermined its viability.

82. Zimbabwe fully supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world as an important measure in achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It was regrettable that 15 years after the adoption of the resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review Conference, a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region was still not a reality. It was therefore important for the current Review Conference to adopt practical action plans for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. Zimbabwe welcomed the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, which it had ratified, and called on nuclear-weapon States that had not yet ratified the protocols to that Treaty to do so unconditionally and without delay. It welcomed the announcement by the United States of its intention to initiate the ratification process.

83. The promotion of the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was enshrined in article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as an inalienable right of all States. It was also the main statutory objective of IAEA. Any restrictions of that right constituted a violation of the letter and spirit of the Treaty. The peaceful use of nuclear technology could benefit African countries tremendously in their development efforts and Zimbabwe therefore called for increased international cooperation in that area.

84. Raising awareness of the tragic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons through education was very important and public support was needed to move forward the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.

85. **Mr. Sinhaseni** (Thailand) said that the international community must pursue its efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remained the cornerstone of international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Meanwhile, a balanced and non-discriminatory approach must be maintained to the implementation of the Treaty's three pillars. The 2010 Review Conference should therefore reaffirm the relevant commitments undertaken by States parties to strengthen disarmament, non-proliferation and the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In that connection, his delegation supported the Secretary-General's five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament of 24 October 2008 and the five benchmarks for success also put forward by him in his opening statement to the 2010 Review Conference.

86. In the field of nuclear disarmament, Thailand welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010 and called for the early commencement of negotiations on a nuclear material cut-off treaty by the Conference on Disarmament, whose programme of work should be adopted and implemented as soon as possible.

87. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were important confidence-building measures which played a pivotal role in safeguarding regional peace and security. Furthermore, the negative security assurances enshrined in the treaties establishing such zones were an essential guarantee for the global non-proliferation regime. Thailand therefore supported the establishment of such zones and encouraged greater coordination among them to advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

88. In view of the increasing importance of the various applications of nuclear technology, IAEA technical cooperation programmes should be strengthened and the rights of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be upheld in conformity with article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle would also need to be addressed within the framework of IAEA in order to secure the global supply network for nuclear fuel and to guarantee long-term energy security.

89. **Mr. Cancela** (Uruguay) reaffirmed his Government's commitment to full and strict compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the need to strengthen all three of its pillars. While recent positive developments were welcome, particularly the new treaty on strategic arms reduction between the United States and the Russian Federation, the opportunity provided by the 2010 Review Conference must be seized to make tangible progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A world free of nuclear weapons remained remote but it could still be achieved with sufficient political will. The current Conference should therefore be a starting point towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons on the basis of good-faith negotiations.

90. His country reiterated its call for all States to sign or ratify additional protocols to their safeguards agreements as soon as possible. Furthermore, reservations or unilateral interpretations by nuclear-weapon States which adversely affected the status of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be amended or withdrawn.

91. Uruguay shared the legitimate concerns of others that the nuclear-weapon States must provide genuine negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon

States, including through a legally binding instrument to that effect. The 2010 Review Conference was the appropriate forum to begin discussions on that issue.

92. A robust safeguards system would help the international community to effectively combat the threat of nuclear proliferation. Uruguay was fully committed to making IAEA as efficient and effective as possible in its efforts to combat nuclear proliferation.

93. Lastly, the 2010 Review Conference should provide effective support for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, which was not only a vital development tool but also the third pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

94. **Mr. Cujba** (Republic of Moldova) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a key instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. The progress achieved as a result of recent positive developments provided a unique opportunity for the 2010 Review Conference to strengthen the credibility of the Treaty by addressing its three pillars in a constructive and balanced manner, and by adopting a realistic and focused programme of action.

95. The recent entry into force of the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Asia and Africa was welcome because it promoted the maintenance of both international and regional peace and security. The establishment of such a zone in the Middle East would significantly help to strengthen collective security in that part of the world and should therefore be encouraged.

96. IAEA safeguards played a central role in providing assurances that States were pursuing peaceful nuclear activities. The Republic of Moldova had demonstrated its commitment to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime by concluding a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA and by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In addition, his Government had recently deposited its instrument of ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and would shortly ensure the timely signature of an additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.

97. The Republic of Moldova, which had enjoyed fruitful cooperation with IAEA through its technical cooperation programmes for the past 15 years, was also committed to the responsible development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy pursuant to article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

98. His Government firmly supported the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which played a critical role in preventing non-State actors from acquiring nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. It had also signed and ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2008 with a view to addressing the unlawful possession or use of nuclear devices or materials by non-State actors.

99. The timely entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was an essential part of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, should be a top priority for all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His delegation welcomed the commitments made by the United States and Indonesia to ratify the Test-Ban Treaty, which should encourage the remaining annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty.

100. Progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should be complemented by reductions in conventional arms. The control of conventional weapons was of particular importance to the Republic of Moldova because of the separatist regime in its Transnistrian region. An international fact-finding mission to assess the huge stockpiles of weapons and ammunition in that breakaway region was imperative.

101. **Mr. Hoxha** (Albania) said that his country was committed to further strengthening the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remained the cornerstone of international peace and security. The 2010 Review Conference must agree on a stronger Treaty regime that would reinforce security while guaranteeing peace and stability in the world.

102. Recognizing the growing momentum created by the nuclear-weapon States towards a world free of nuclear weapons, his delegation welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, together with the commitment of the United States to work towards the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy. Those positive developments should be built upon during the current Review Conference in order to produce a successful and balanced outcome.

103. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would make a major contribution towards the promotion of world peace and security. His delegation called upon all States that had not yet done so to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. It also hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would be able to overcome the current deadlock in order to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

104. IAEA comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols were integral parts of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA verification instruments needed to be strictly observed and further strengthened, particularly in view of their importance in combating nuclear terrorism. In that connection, while Albania attached great importance to the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, that right was contingent upon strict compliance with the obligations enshrined in articles I, II and III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

105. Albania had taken a number of practical steps to combat illegal trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials, including improvements to the national legal framework for export controls of arms and dual-use items, and upgrades to the infrastructure at border checkpoints.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

7 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 8th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 6 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)
later: Mr. Marschik (Vice-President) (Austria)
later: Mr. Cabactulan (Chairman) (Philippines)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. António** (Mozambique) said that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was now closer to universality than ever before. Progress had been achieved in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba, establishing such a zone in Africa, was of particular importance for that continent. His delegation congratulated Mongolia on becoming a nuclear-weapon-free State, and welcomed the new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation signed in April 2010. He also commended the efforts of certain nuclear-weapon States to share information on steps taken or envisaged with a view to reducing the number of nuclear weapons.

2. Mozambique remained prepared to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on programmes to ensure technology transfer and national capacity-building. His country was fully committed to working towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and supported international efforts to combat poverty, address climate change and promote sustainable development.

3. **Mr. Solón-Romero** (Plurinational State of Bolivia) said that nuclear weapons were the most inhuman form of armament ever invented. According to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, at least 23,000 nuclear warheads still existed. Some 22,000 were in the possession of the United States of America and the Russian Federation; the remainder were owned by France, the United Kingdom, China, India, Pakistan and Israel. Some 2,000 nuclear weapons were in a state of high alert and could be deployed within four to eight minutes. So long as any such weapons existed, it was inconceivable that they would never be used. The new treaty signed in April 2010 between the United States and the Russian Federation constituted a positive step, which should be followed by further action.

4. It was indefensible to argue that certain States needed nuclear weapons in order to guarantee their security, whereas other States had no right to acquire them. The current Review Conference should seek a new consensus on the basis of the 13 steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. The Plurinational State of Bolivia believed that the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation should each be reduced to 500 warheads by 2015. The remaining nuclear-weapon States should reduce their arsenals by half during that period. Those measures would leave a total of only 1,500 nuclear warheads. All nuclear-weapon States should give firm security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Those assurances should be supported by a resolution of the Security Council. A world without nuclear weapons should become a reality by 2020.

5. His delegation welcomed all efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular in the Middle East. The inalienable right of States to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be upheld as one of the three pillars of the Treaty. Greater resources should be made available for such activities through the Technical Cooperation Programme of IAEA. All States should take effective measures to strengthen the security of their nuclear materials and facilities, in particular through the adoption and implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Nuclear disarmament was essential in order to preserve Mother Earth.

6. **Mr. Bauwens** (Belgium) said that the Treaty was now at a crossroads: it could be either strengthened or unravelled. Belgium believed that it offered a well-balanced and comprehensive platform with clear commitments in all relevant fields. It was not a static document, but provided stability in a constantly evolving process of checks and balances. Belgium called on India, Pakistan and Israel to accede to and comply with the Treaty, and called on other States to remain indefinitely committed to it. The Treaty was the yardstick for issues regarding nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. An effective, multilateral and multifaceted approach was needed in order to address the complex root causes of proliferation and confront the challenge of non-State actors.

7. Belgium welcomed Security Council resolution 1887 (2009), which supported the work of IAEA and other relevant bodies. That resolution called for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, for the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a treaty banning the production of all material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, and for the early commencement of substantive work by the Conference on Disarmament.

8. The Security Council was united in emphasizing that any failure to comply with non-proliferation obligations should be brought to its attention. Belgium called on the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with the provisions of the Treaty. His country called on all States to sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol. A comprehensive safeguards agreement coupled with an additional protocol constituted the current verification standard.

9. The new treaty signed between the United States of America and the Russian Federation in April 2010 on further measures for strategic arms reduction should encourage all nuclear-weapon States to support the zero option. Achievement of that objective would require a gradual and realistic approach. Belgium hoped that the two Powers would hold further discussions as soon as possible.

10. His country had raised the issue of nuclear weapons and disarmament within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon offered a unique opportunity for the European Union to promote the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The working papers submitted on behalf of the European Union reflected that commitment.

11. **Mr. Dos Santos** (Paraguay) said that the renewal and strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) must be built on an ambitious, substantive and realistic agenda setting nuclear disarmament as the ultimate goal and leading to a regime that strengthened security in the peaceful use of nuclear energy based on greater diversity and transparency in the regime of inspections and checks.

12. Paraguay urged States that were not yet party to the Treaty to adhere promptly and unreservedly to it. His delegation also called for the prompt implementation of the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review Conference to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Paraguay welcomed the entry into force of the Treaty establishing a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia in March 2009 and the Pelindaba Treaty establishing Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in July 2009, as well as the adoption of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) and other new initiatives in bilateral nuclear disarmament, such as the agreement signed in April 2010 between the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

13. The second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held at United Nations Headquarters in April 2010, had showed that more than 110 States had become members of such zones, nearly two thirds of the membership of the Organization, which clearly indicated the growing commitment of the great majority of the international community to the goal of denuclearization.

14. Paraguay was a party to all conventions and international treaties on disarmament in its various aspects, but was fully aware that the risks inherent in the proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and their possible use by non-State actors remained a threat to international peace and security, as recognized recently at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. In that connection, Paraguay urged full adherence to the highest international safeguards standards in terms of facilities and nuclear materials and full compliance with the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

15. Paraguay also called for the early commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. In that connection, he cited the resolution adopted by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in November 2009, reaffirming that South America remained a zone free of nuclear weapons under the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that nuclear technology was to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

16. Paraguay also welcomed the role played by IAEA in verifying the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, while reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to research, develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The work of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) helped to achieve the various objectives set out in international nuclear non-proliferation treaties.

17. Paraguay called for the 2010 Review Conference to adopt a plan of action to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and provide the technological and financial means needed to prevent military use of nuclear technologies.

18. **Archbishop Migliore** (Observer for the Holy See) read out a short message to the 2010 Review Conference from Pope Benedict XVI encouraging initiatives that sought progressive disarmament and the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He recalled that nuclear-weapon States had yet to engage seriously in negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons, as called for in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, or to take the steps called for in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

19. The Holy See strongly advocated for transparent, verifiable, global and irreversible nuclear disarmament and for seriously addressing the issues and dangers posed by nuclear strategic and tactical arms and their means of delivery. In that context, it welcomed the new strategic arms reduction agreement signed by the United States of America and the Russian Federation and called for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and the ratification of existing nuclear-free-zone treaties and the establishment of new such zones, especially in the Middle East.

20. Every step in pursuit of the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda should be geared towards ensuring the security and survival of humanity and build on the principles of the inherent value of human dignity, which was the basis for international humanitarian law.

21. **Mr. Balé** (Democratic Republic of the Congo) welcomed recent events that served to strengthen a climate of confidence for dialogue and negotiation in the field of disarmament, including the high-level meeting of the Security Council on nuclear disarmament in September 2009, the recent Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., the recent signing of a strategic arms reduction agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, and the announcement by the United States that it intended to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. There seemed to be evidence that the international community was moving towards negotiations on effective measures to bring the nuclear arms race to an end.

22. The Treaty remained the cornerstone of the international regime of nuclear disarmament and proliferation, but it was weakened by its discriminatory nature. Furthermore, the emergence of a new group of nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the Treaty weakened its effectiveness. The Treaty provided an ideal platform for multilateral cooperation and could serve as a universal legal instrument, if all States became parties. The Democratic Republic of the Congo called for universal adherence to the Treaty and urged States that had not yet adhered to the Treaty to do so and to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

23. Nuclear-weapon States must respect their commitments to implement the recommendations adopted by the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences and the 13 practical steps adopted by the 2000 Conference. The dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons must be transparent, progressive and irreversible.

24. The Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., last April had stressed the growing danger of the proliferation of illicit nuclear materials in recent years, including into the hands of non-State actors, and had called for preventive measures and for strengthening of the security of fissile material. The conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials and other nuclear explosive materials for military purposes would contribute to strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and negotiations to that end must be opened. His delegation also attached great importance to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and therefore called on all States, in particular the annex 2 States, to ratify that Treaty.

25. Given the problem of global warming, nuclear energy seemed to have an important future, especially in view of its many applications in the fields of medicine, agriculture and animal husbandry. The right to engage in research, production and utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be ensured for all States without discrimination or restriction. However, it must be recognized that the IAEA safeguards system remained the core monitoring mechanism for preventing diversion of nuclear material for military purposes.

26. His delegation also called for technical cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear States based on the appropriate international obligations. IAEA should be provided with adequate resources to strengthen its role as the competent authority

responsible for verifying and ensuring compliance with agreements including the Additional Protocol.

27. Nuclear-weapon-free zones contributed significantly to the goals of disarmament and international security. The entry into force in 2009 of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Asia and Africa strengthened the international peace and security architecture. His delegation supported the efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, in accordance with relevant General Assembly resolutions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review Conference. It also encouraged efforts to adopt an internationally binding instrument granting security assurances to non-nuclear States. The goals of non-proliferation and the elimination of all nuclear arsenals required cooperation and the strengthening of the system established by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on weapons of mass destruction and other relevant international legal instruments. Such cooperation should be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations and in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner.

28. **Mr. Jeenbaev** (Kyrgyzstan) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) faced extraordinary challenges, despite positive new developments that included the signing of the new strategic arms reduction agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation. Furthermore, two new nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties had entered into force, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States, including one in Central Asia. As had been highlighted recently at the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, such zones now covered the entire southern hemisphere, and parts of the northern hemisphere, including territory in which nuclear weapons had previously been based. The Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia included provisions that called for efforts to remedy the environmental damage to the region resulting from prior nuclear-weapons activity and the requirement that parties adhere to the IAEA Additional Protocol.

29. His country continued to regard the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but had to recognize that the world had changed significantly in recent years. New proliferation challenges had emerged. The Treaty and the broader non-proliferation regime had to adapt to changing circumstances, which included the growing risk of nuclear terrorism. International safeguards and the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities were the first line of defence against nuclear terrorism. It was crucial to boost support for the efforts of IAEA to strengthen the international safeguards system, including through the adoption of the Additional Protocol as the safeguards standard.

30. His country also supported efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Similarly, machinery established by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) sought to address the new proliferation challenges posed by non-State actors.

31. His country attached great importance to the issue of mitigating the environmental consequences of uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. It reiterated its call for all Governments and international organizations that had expertise in the clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance.

Meetings on the problems associated with radioactive waste disposal and uranium tailings had been held in Bishkek in April 2009 and in Geneva in June 2009.

32. Education and training played a vital role in promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. In that connection he cited the recommendations of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on the subject (A/57/124) and General Assembly resolution 57/60. Japan and other States parties continued to raise the issue in the NPT context, and he urged delegations to join in efforts to develop practical steps to implement the measures called for by the United Nations study.

33. **Mr. Muller** (Marshall Islands) recalled the fact that islands of his country had been used in the 1950s, while it had been a United Nations Trust Territory, as a test site for more than 65 large-scale surface tests of nuclear weapons, which had led to the displacement of people and serious health hazards. Furthermore, a large nuclear waste facility had been constructed on one of the islands within metres of the ocean. The issues of safe resettlement, restoration of economic productivity and assistance with remediation and disposal following nuclear testing had been raised at recent Review Conferences, and the responsibility of the former United Nations Trust Territories had been recognized by States parties. The former Administering Power, which had conducted the tests, had undertaken to address some of those issues, but much remained to be done. He reminded States parties that United Nations Member States bore some responsibility as well, as those tests had been conducted with the authorization of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, despite the protests of Marshallese petitioners.

34. The Marshall Islands had ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and hoped that it would soon enter into force. His delegation was alarmed that there remained a few States, some of them parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that continued to violate the rules of the Test-Ban Treaty, seemingly attempting to build and test nuclear weapons. The Marshall Islands was examining its position with regard to the Rarotonga Treaty on the establishment of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone. His country welcomed the new strategic arms reduction agreement signed by the United States of America and the Russian Federation and the new Nuclear Posture Review issued by the United States, as well as the recent Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C.

35. **Mr. Aisi** (Papua New Guinea) expressed his appreciation to the President for his tireless efforts over the past year, through far-reaching global consultations with States parties, to generate the consensus needed to ensure the preservation of the integrity of the non-proliferation regime established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Since the previous Review Conference in 2005, various measures had been taken that strengthened the Treaty, in particular actions covered by the disarmament provisions of article VI, which included the recent signing of an arms reduction agreement by the United States and the Russian Federation.

36. With regard to article IV issues, he cited cooperation offered by IAEA in the fields of health and food production. Pacific Island Forum members, including Papua New Guinea, supported the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, but that use had to be conducted within a framework that minimized proliferation risks and adhered to the highest international standards of safety, security and safeguards.

37. As a State within the South Pacific region, Papua New Guinea enjoyed the protection of being in the nuclear-weapon-free zone established under the Rarotonga Treaty. He welcomed the announcement by the United States Secretary of State that her country intended to ratify that Treaty, which might induce other Pacific States to do so as well.

38. He expressed the hope that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would soon receive the ratifications needed for it to enter into force. He welcomed Indonesia's announcement that it intended to ratify that Treaty and said that Papua New Guinea was currently engaged in the ratification process.

39. **Mr. Mahiga** (United Republic of Tanzania) said that his delegation fully endorsed the Secretary-General's five-point benchmarks for the success of the 2010 Review Conference. In that connection, he urged the Conference to build on the 13 practical steps to nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. There was an unprecedented positive trend towards nuclear disarmament, as reflected in the new strategic arms reduction agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation to reduce significantly their respective nuclear stockpiles and United States President Obama's articulation of a vision of a world without nuclear weapons, both of which augured, it was hoped, an irreversible universal commitment to disarmament by the nuclear States and the international community as a whole.

40. In that connection, his country had initially hesitated to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, because it saw the reduction and elimination of existing nuclear stockpiles and the abandonment of nuclear deterrence doctrines as a necessary precondition for serious nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As the cold war had come to an end and the nuclear super-Powers began reducing their nuclear weapon stockpiles, it had adhered to the Treaty and supported universal adherence.

41. On the negative side, his delegation was concerned by the spread of nuclear weapons in recent years, and the related problems that had arisen in connection with the peaceful use of nuclear energy, all of which should be addressed collectively and in a transparent manner through the NPT framework. Unilateral action could only engender regional and international suspicions and tension, and a variety of confidence-building measures were called for. As a developing country, Tanzania saw the immense importance of nuclear energy as a source of power and the value of nuclear technologies to development in areas such as food production, addressing the adverse impacts of climate change and applications in medicine and related sciences.

42. Tanzania had vast proven resources of uranium and would continue to work with IAEA to develop nuclear technologies. Africa continued its collective efforts to strengthen the NPT regime through regional approaches and initiatives, such as the Treaty of Pelindaba establishing the African nuclear-weapon-free zone, which strengthened the non-proliferation regime and promoted cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament. The African Union was proceeding to establish the African Commission on Nuclear Energy for peaceful uses in the development of its member States. Tanzania encouraged the establishment and effective operation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other areas, including the perennially volatile region of the Middle East.

43. **Mr. Al-Saadi** (Yemen) said that multilateralism, transparency and dialogue constituted the best way to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The three pillars of the Treaty were all necessary and mutually reinforcing. Yemen remained committed to the objectives of the Treaty, and ensured that such weapons and their components did not cross its borders.

44. It was a source of concern that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence remained in place, and that new nuclear weapons continued to be developed. Security strategies founded on the possession and use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime. Pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, their use and the threat of their use should be prohibited, and non-nuclear-weapon States should receive security assurances. Recent developments on the issue of non-proliferation and disarmament were welcome, and should lead to further practical steps. His country urged all nuclear-weapon States to seek bilateral or multilateral negotiations towards disarmament.

45. Israel's nuclear policy could trigger an arms race across the region. The silence of the international community had allowed Israel to persist in its refusal to accede to the Treaty and defiance of the relevant international resolutions. Israel's nuclear facilities should be placed under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Security Council should take action in order to ensure implementation of the relevant IAEA resolutions, not to mention its own resolutions on nuclear disarmament, including resolution 687 (1991).

46. In order to preserve the credibility of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the nuclear-weapon States that had supported the resolution on the Middle East should reiterate their full commitment to its objectives. Practical mechanisms should be developed in order to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

47. States parties to the Treaty had a right to possess and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without hindrance. Such activities should take place in a spirit of transparency and full cooperation with IAEA. Developed States should provide technical assistance to developing States for the development of peaceful nuclear energy.

48. *Mr. Cabactulan (Chairman) resumed the Chair.*

49. **Mr. Ba-Omar** (Oman) said that the Treaty constituted the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and must therefore be preserved. However, the failure of the 2005 Review Conference had led to a stalemate in the international community's efforts to address nuclear weapons issues. The extension of the Treaty in 1995 had been made possible by the adoption of the resolution on the Middle East. Most States in the region had argued that Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty would place them at risk of nuclear attack. That situation had remained unchanged. The Treaty had thus become a cause of instability for all States in the Middle East except Israel, thereby creating the risk of a regional arms race. The silence of the international community had made possible Israel's continued refusal to become a party to the Treaty.

50. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference had confirmed the relevance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The 2010 Review Conference should build on both by determining immediate practical steps to establish a

nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Failure to do so would indicate a considerable erosion in the legal, political and practical foundations of the Treaty. It was important to reaffirm the objective of the universality of the Treaty. It would be difficult for States parties to accept any further commitments while non-parties continued to develop nuclear facilities and to benefit from international cooperation. The inalienable right of States parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must also be upheld.

51. His delegation welcomed the signing in April 2010 of a new strategic arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. It hoped that the positive spirit demonstrated by the President of the United States would facilitate the objectives of the Conference, thereby enabling it to make progress on the resolution on the Middle East, move towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, and conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty.

52. **Ms. Brown** (Jamaica) said that misuse of nuclear technology, the threat of non-State actors gaining access to nuclear weapons, covert dissemination of nuclear expertise, and non-compliance with Treaty obligations had all thrown the legitimacy of the Treaty into question. The Conference was an opportunity to renew international resolve to achieve the Treaty's goals and to build on recent positive developments, including the United States President's landmark speech in Prague in April 2009, the new treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a programme of work after a decade of stalemate, the United Nations Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and the recent Washington Nuclear Security Summit. There were many challenges remaining, including universalizing the Treaty, bringing about the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

53. By focusing on non-proliferation at the expense of the other two pillars of the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States were failing to hold up their end of the "grand bargain" and they needed to demonstrate good faith in discussions on a treaty on general and complete disarmament as provided for in article VI of the Treaty. More stockpiling only encouraged the fabrication of more pretexts for possessing nuclear weapons.

54. As one of the earliest signatories to the Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, her country welcomed the entry into force of nuclear-weapon-free zones in both Africa and Central Asia in 2009, and expressed its support for Mongolia's institutionalization of its nuclear-weapon-free status. Given its proximity to international shipping lanes, her country laid particular stress on shielding nuclear-weapon-free zones from the threat of accidents resulting from trans-shipment of nuclear waste and other hazardous materials. The recent fuel crisis had made the peaceful use of nuclear energy all the more important, and States that complied with IAEA safeguard mechanisms should have unfettered access to its benefits.

55. **Mr. Gaumakwe** (Botswana) said that his country placed great importance on peaceful applications of nuclear energy in agriculture, medicine and resource management, and supported the call by the IAEA Director General for sufficient funding for the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme. His country was a signatory to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Revised

Supplementary Agreement concerning the Provision of Technical Assistance by IAEA. It had signed an IAEA safeguards agreement along with the Additional Protocol, and in 2006 had enacted a national Radiation Protection Act to incorporate into domestic law the provisions of relevant international agreements. He expressed support for the Secretary-General's call for a conference to review implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. His country was a signatory to the Pelindaba Treaty that established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. It had acceded to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and hoped for a speedy entry into force of that Treaty. He expressed optimism that the current Review Conference would not repeat the setbacks of 2005.

56. **Mr. Briz Gutiérrez** (Guatemala) called for universal adherence to the Treaty and fulfilment of commitments made at previous review conferences. The current Conference was an important opportunity to make progress towards objective mechanisms to verify compliance with all three pillars of the Treaty. The positive rhetoric coming from the nuclear-weapon States needed to be backed up by action. In that connection, the recent treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation and the Nuclear Posture Review conducted by the United States were both steps in the right direction.

57. The 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference were a good starting point for further progress. The Conference on Disarmament should begin immediate negotiations on both a treaty on fissile materials and an instrument on negative security guarantees, and, pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the moratorium on nuclear tests should be maintained. Disarmament needed to be treated on an equal footing with non-proliferation. He underscored the importance of a transparent and non-discriminatory approach by IAEA to verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear energy programmes. He urged the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission to remove financial obstacles that prevented developing countries like his own from ratifying the Treaty.

58. His country was a proud signatory to the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, and a participant in the Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, the final declaration of which was an important contribution to the Conference. He regretted that the resolution on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had yet to be implemented. The Conference offered an opportunity for States parties to restore credibility to the Treaty by making good on the commitments that were the basis of the original "grand bargain" between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

59. **Mr. Al-Sudairy** (Saudi Arabia) said that the continued failure of the international community to bring pressure to bear on Israel to accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards threatened to involve the entire Middle East in a regional nuclear arms race. His country had previously submitted a report to the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference on steps to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The United Nations General Assembly had adopted a resolution supporting such a zone every year since 1974. He urged the Conference to call on the Director General of IAEA to follow up on the resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities

adopted at that Agency's General Conference in September 2009, and to reduce the Agency's technological cooperation with Israel until that country acceded to the Treaty.

60. His country had submitted its national report to the Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and planned to conduct a regional workshop on implementation of that resolution. It had recently concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA and was ready to exercise its right to develop a peaceful nuclear programme under the auspices of the soon-to-be-established King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy.

61. He expressed concern at the obstacles encountered by negotiations on the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and encouraged that country to cooperate with IAEA with the aim of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. He commended the success of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. He urged nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and implement the 13 steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, bearing in mind that the surest guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their complete elimination.

62. **Mr. Woolcott** (Australia), speaking on behalf of the Vienna Group of Ten (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden) said that the Group's focus, in seeking to strengthen the role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been on reviewing articles III and IV of the Treaty, namely, the pillars of non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To that end, the Group had prepared and submitted working papers on seven topics, namely, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, compliance and verification, export controls, nuclear safety, physical protection and illicit trafficking, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.15-21). Each paper proposed specific language for the 2010 Review Conference final document. A separate working paper had been prepared containing elements for a forward-looking action plan to be adopted by the Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.38).

63. **Mr. Boding** (San Marino) welcomed the enthusiasm and determination of States parties to improve the Non-Proliferation Treaty and ultimately to eliminate all nuclear weapons. The Treaty was a unique instrument for the maintenance of world peace and international security, and the international community must be resolute in reconfirming its commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. San Marino, like so many small countries, sought to have the international non-proliferation regime strengthened and, in that connection, applauded the commitment of United States President Obama and Russian President Medvedev to substantially reduce their nations' nuclear arsenals.

64. San Marino urged all countries that had not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so and praised those countries that had decided to establish and maintain nuclear-weapon-free zones. The demand for nuclear energy was rising but that technology should be used only for peaceful purposes to further develop economic and social growth. New technology would provide the means for the safe development of future nuclear plants and many other peaceful applications. San Marino urged all States parties to support the efforts of IAEA by reaffirming its authority and providing it with new resources to carry out its mission.

65. **Mr. Tóth** (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization) said that, despite the many challenges to its authority, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty now enjoyed nearly universal support, with 182 signatories and 151 ratifying States, but ratification by 9 annex 2 countries was still needed for the Treaty to enter into force, which would be a clear expression of global confidence in the wider non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The September 2009 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in New York had issued a strongly worded Final Declaration calling on the remaining States to sign and ratify the Treaty.

66. The Test-Ban Treaty provided a firm legal barrier against nuclear testing, thereby curbing the development of new types and designs of nuclear weapons by possessors, and would-be possessors, and served as a strong confidence and security-building measure. The Treaty verification regime was nearing completion: 80 per cent of the system's global monitoring stations had already sent data to the headquarters in Vienna. The Treaty was equally important as an instrument for nuclear non-proliferation. Making the de facto international norm against nuclear testing legally binding through the entry into force of the Treaty would close one avenue for proliferation once and for all. While the IAEA safeguards system remained the critical legal criterion in verifying a State's peaceful nuclear activities, that "upstream" compliance mechanism had come under significant pressure in recent years. With the resurgence of nuclear energy in many States capable of mastering the nuclear fuel cycle technology, the differentiation between technologies for peaceful and military purposes was increasingly a political and legal issue rather than a technological one.

67. Once the Test-Ban Treaty's verification regime was fully operational, non-compliance could be addressed in a predetermined and pre-agreed manner. In the light of increased concerns over non-compliance in other quarters of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the compliance mechanisms built into the Test-Ban Treaty were of great importance in strengthening the overall objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

68. The purely NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime was being challenged on many fronts. Unless States parties confronted the difficult issues before them with the aim of strengthening the overall non-proliferation and disarmament regime, differences would grow and some would seek opportunities to break consensus, leading to a failed or weak outcome.

69. Progress towards the goal of achieving the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty could bridge the divide between NPT parties on each of the three pillars. The Test-Ban Treaty was an integral part of the comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It had near universal membership, its verification regime was close to completion, and it had been tried and tested by two nuclear test explosions conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

70. **Ms. Wagner** (Inter-Parliamentary Union) said that nuclear disarmament and the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world were matters that concerned people everywhere in the most direct way. In April 2009, the Inter-Parliamentary Union had adopted a resolution on the role of parliaments in advancing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and securing the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which had included a series of practical recommendations on what parliaments should do to ensure universal ratification of

the Test-Ban Treaty, promote the United Nations Secretary-General's five-point plan for nuclear disarmament and work in favour of reductions in nuclear stockpiles, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty.

71. One year later, parliaments were reporting back on their action in follow-up to the resolution, which ranged from criminalizing domestic nuclear weapons activities to developing legislation that divested Government pension funds from corporations involved in the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. At the regional level, parliamentarians were working with partners on proposals for regional denuclearization and non-proliferation and efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

72. In February 2010, the United Nations Secretary-General had sent a letter highlighting the importance of the 2010 Review Conference and efforts by parliamentarians to advance the proposal for a nuclear weapons convention — one of the principal parts in his five-point plan — and had encouraged parliamentarians to make further efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. Parliamentary resolutions supporting a nuclear-weapons convention, or the more comprehensive five-point plan of the Secretary-General, had been adopted in a number of parliaments.

73. During the first week of the 2010 Review Conference, the Inter-Parliamentary Union had held, in collaboration with the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, a parliamentary dialogue at United Nations Headquarters on the role of parliamentarians in advancing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Key themes that had emerged included the need to recognize and act on the growing momentum towards nuclear disarmament; the role that nuclear-weapon-free zones and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty could play in developing the institutional and technical components for a nuclear-weapon-free world; the role that parliamentarians could play in supporting nuclear disarmament through the phasing out of nuclear weapons in their countries' security doctrines; exploring the legal, technical, institutional and political requirements for a nuclear-weapon-free world; the benefits for development gained from nuclear disarmament by releasing resources for meeting Millennium Development Goals; the importance of collaboration between legislators, Governments and civil society; and the importance of disarmament and peace education in building political constituencies to support action by parliaments and Governments for nuclear disarmament.

74. **Mr. Al Assad** (Observer for the League of Arab States), speaking on behalf of the League of Arab States, said that although the Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the strategic arms reduction agreement recently signed between the United States and the Russian Federation were both promising developments, the major issues that stood in the way of a world free of nuclear weapons remained unaddressed. There continued to be an imbalance between disarmament, which was treated as a long-term goal to be achieved by the nuclear-weapon States in the distant future, and non-proliferation, with respect to which non-nuclear-weapon States were expected to take immediate action in the present.

75. The positions of the League of Arab States had been declared at the Arab Summit held in Sert in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in March 2009, and were further elaborated in the working papers submitted to the Review Conference by various Arab States. He called on the conference to adopt decisions banning the

development and production of new nuclear weapons and banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Additional obligations should not be imposed on non-nuclear-weapon States before pledges already made at previous conferences were fulfilled. Universalization of the Treaty should not be a long-term rhetorical goal but rather an urgent priority, and the three States that persisted in refusing to accede should be made to pay a price for that refusal. He stressed the primacy of the right to nuclear energy for peaceful uses, and expressed disagreement with those who had urged that the Additional Protocol be made mandatory.

76. The Arab States attached particular importance to the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. That resolution had been an important impetus for Arab States to accede to the Treaty and a basic element of the agreement to extend it indefinitely. But in the 15 years since the adoption of that resolution, not a single step had been taken towards its implementation. He called on the Conference to take concrete action towards implementation of that resolution, and urged IAEA to follow up the resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities adopted at its September 2009 General Conference. The argument made by certain countries that action on Israel's nuclear programme should be linked to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict only encouraged other countries to believe that possession of nuclear weapons was essential to their security. The submission of Israeli nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would spare that region from an unneeded arms race. The 2010 Review Conference was an important opportunity to strengthen implementation of decisions from previous conferences, in particular those of 1995 and 2000, and to restore the balance between the three pillars of the Treaty.

77. **Mr. Do Canto** (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) said that the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials was the result of a bilateral approach to non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While recognizing the sovereign right of every nation to have access to nuclear technology for the scientific, technological, economic and social development of their inhabitants, Brazil and Argentina had signed an agreement for joint management of the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy in each country, which had established a common system for accounting and control of nuclear materials managed by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency. The agreement implied a clear and definite commitment to the use of all the materials and nuclear facilities under national jurisdiction or control exclusively for peaceful purposes.

78. For the past 18 years, nuclear activities had been conducted in the two countries under a quadripartite agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency and IAEA for the application of safeguards. Under the quadripartite agreement, both States had committed themselves to accept the application of safeguards to all nuclear activities carried out under their jurisdictions and control, with a single objective, namely, to ensure that such materials would not be diverted for nuclear weapons purposes.

79. Since the Agency's founding, more than 1,000 inspections had been carried out in the two countries. The system established by Argentina and Brazil was unique and presented clear advantages in comparison to safeguards agreements in general.

The quadripartite agreement went beyond the standard safeguard regime linking a State party and IAEA. It involved two neighbouring States parties and an agency created by them and IAEA, which formed a much more comprehensive safeguards regime.

80. Nuclear energy was expected to play a leading role in meeting rising energy demand. However, political instability had also led to concerns with regard to the possibilities of diversion of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes. One task was to make nuclear power generation both economically feasible and inherently safe, which required, inter alia, understanding and cooperation among nations. Argentina and Brazil had decided to reactivate their respective nuclear energy programmes, which added significance to the role of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency in its activities of inspection, accounting and control. He urged States parties to consider the establishment of independent and reliable regional safeguards systems working with IAEA while making good use of local resources.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

7 October 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 10th meeting*

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 12 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)

Contents

Organization of work

* No summary record was prepared for the 9th meeting. The presentations made by non-governmental organizations at that meeting are available through the website of the Review Conference at <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/ngopresentations.shtml>.

The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

Organization of work (NPT/CONF.2010/DEC.1)

1. **The President** suggested that the Conference should adopt the following proposal: “The Conference, notwithstanding its previous decision on the allocation of items to Main Committees, agrees that institutional issues would be dealt with in the subsidiary body established under Main Committee III and in accordance with the decision adopted on 5 May 2010 on subsidiary bodies and contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/DEC.1.”

2. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 10.05 a.m.

NPT/CONF.2010/SR.11

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

Distr.: General
10 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 11th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 14 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)

Contents

- Reports of the Main Committees
- Credentials of representatives to the Conference
 - Report of the Credentials Committee

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Reports of the Main Committees

Progress reports of the Main Committees

1. **The President** said that the purpose of the current plenary meeting was to take stock of the progress made to date by the Main Committees and their respective subsidiary bodies as well as by the Credentials Committee. He invited the Chairmen of the three Main Committees to inform the Conference of the progress of their work.

2. **Mr. Chidyausiku** (Zimbabwe), speaking as Chairman of Main Committee I, said that the Committee had held three meetings, during which a number of general statements had been heard and specific issues debated. The Committee was in a position to submit a report to the President, as was its subsidiary body, which had held three meetings on the issues of nuclear disarmament and security assurances. The distribution of both documents would be announced shortly.

3. **Mr. Yelchenko** (Ukraine), speaking as Chairman of Main Committee II, said that the Committee had held four plenary sessions, while the subsidiary body to the Committee had held two closed meetings. Following a discussion of the items allocated to it, the Committee had engaged in an interactive discussion on various items, particularly the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system and nuclear security. The draft reports of the Committee and its subsidiary body had been submitted to the President and would be considered the following week, in accordance with the programme of work to be distributed shortly.

4. **Mr. Nakane** (Japan), speaking as Chairman of Main Committee III, said that the Committee had held four meetings to address the agenda items allocated to it. In addition to a general exchange of views, focused discussions had dealt with specific issues, including peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear safety, technical cooperation and multilateral nuclear arrangements, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply. The Committee would continue its constructive discussion that afternoon, with a focus on nuclear supply. The draft report would be submitted to the President shortly. The subsidiary body had held its first meeting on 11 May, at which 16 delegations had made statements to address issues under articles 9 and 10 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It, too, had produced a report, which would be submitted to the President shortly. The subsidiary body planned to meet twice during the following week in order to consider the draft report; it was hoped that the report would be adopted by consensus for inclusion in the Committee's report.

5. **The President** said that the Main Committees' reports had already been submitted to him in writing. Additional elements based on discussions at meetings to be held that day would be included in the reports to the extent possible. He took it that the Conference wished to take note of the progress reports of the Main Committees.

6. *It was so decided.*

Credentials of representatives to the Conference

Report of the Credentials Committee (NPT/CONF.2010/CC/L.1)

7. **The President** invited the Chairman of the Credentials Committee to inform the Conference of the progress of its work.

8. **Mr. Momen** (Bangladesh), speaking as Chairman of the Credentials Committee, introduced the interim report of the Committee (NPT/CONF.2010/CC/L.1), which contained information on the status of credentials received as of 13 May 2010. The Committee had met twice to examine the credentials of representatives participating in the Conference. On the basis of the information received from the Secretary-General of the Conference, the Committee had decided to accept the credentials of 165 States parties participating in the Conference, on the understanding that those delegations which had not presented their credentials in the form required by rule 2 of the rules of procedure would do so as soon as possible. The Committee was tentatively scheduled to meet on 26 May 2010 to review the situation.

9. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the interim report of the Credentials Committee.

10. *It was so decided.*

11. **The President**, recalling the documentation guidelines communicated to delegations prior to the Conference, said that while many delegations had submitted documents by the deadline, the number of documents thus far exceeded the total number submitted at any previous Review Conference. According to a communication from the Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly and Conference Management, documents submitted after 4 May would be issued in due course and it might not be possible for them to be issued in all the official languages during the remainder of the Conference. The Secretariat had informed him that documents not already issued in all the official languages would be made available in their original language to all delegations without delay. Copies of the reports of the Main Committees would be made available at 3 p.m. in conference room 2 to enable Committees to begin their work.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

Distr.: General
15 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 12th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 19 May 2010, at 5 p.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)

Contents

Reports of the Main Committees (*continued*)

General debate (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 5.20 p.m.

Reports of the Main Committees *(continued)*

Progress reports of the Main Committees (continued)

1. **The President** invited the Chairmen of the three Main Committees to inform the Conference how their work was progressing.

2. **Mr. Yelchenko** (Ukraine), Chairman of Main Committee II, recalled that the Committee had submitted its first draft report, contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/MC.II/CRP.1, for review by all delegations on Friday, 14 May 2010. The Committee had convened a plenary meeting to consider the draft report on Monday, 17 May. On that occasion, he had invited all delegations to provide comments on the draft and to continue working constructively towards achieving consensus on the text during the current week so that the Committee could convey the results of its deliberations to the Conference on Friday, 21 May. During the following plenary meeting, held on 18 May, delegations had had an opportunity to comment on the text and to propose amendments to it. He noted that the subsidiary body was also expected to make a relevant contribution to the Committee's draft report.

3. In the coming days the Committee would continue its efforts to address all proposals made by delegations and groups of States. However, some mutually exclusive proposals would need to be reconciled in a revised draft in order to forge a consensus. He would therefore circulate the revised draft report of Main Committee II on Thursday, 20 May, and had arranged for the Committee to continue its deliberations in a plenary meeting to be held on Friday, 21 May. In that connection, he called on all delegations to work together constructively to facilitate the successful completion of the Committee's work within the time remaining.

4. **Mr. Nakane** (Japan), Chairman of Main Committee III, said that, since delivering his previous progress report on Friday, 14 May 2010, the Committee had held three meetings, during which focused discussions had continued on the remaining two items, namely technical cooperation and multilateral nuclear approaches, including nuclear fuel supply assurances.

5. Furthermore, on Monday, 17 May, the Committee had begun consideration of its draft report contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/MC.III/CRP.2, which had been distributed to all delegations on Friday, 14 May. It had also just begun negotiations on the text of the draft report section by section. To date, the Committee had received comments on some 30 paragraphs, as well as a large number of proposed amendments. It would therefore need at least one more meeting to complete the first round of consideration of the draft. On the basis of the comments and proposals received, he intended to submit a revised text to the Committee shortly. In that connection, he stressed that the States parties should be given ample time to bring their negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion.

6. The Committee's subsidiary body had also held three meetings since he had submitted his first progress report. During those meetings the subsidiary body had discussed the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and withdrawal from the Treaty, under agenda item 16 (e), as well as institutional issues pursuant to the decision to include those issues in agenda item 17. Discussions on institutional

issues indicated that there remained different views on the proposals put forward by Canada regarding official institutional support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Chairman of the subsidiary body had therefore asked delegations to complete bilateral consultations in order to produce an agreed text for inclusion in the Committee's draft report.

7. Furthermore, following consideration by the subsidiary body of the text of its draft report, the Chairman had arranged for interested parties to engage in informal consultations with a view to reaching consensus on an agreed text.

8. *The meeting was suspended at 5.25 p.m. and resumed at 5.30 p.m.*

9. **Mr. Chidyausiku** (Zimbabwe), Chairman of Main Committee I, said that the Committee had held two meetings since Friday, 14 May 2010, to look at its first draft report, contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/MC.I/CRP.2. During the course of those meetings, individual delegations and Groups of States had submitted their oral and written observations for further consideration. On the basis of the views expressed, he hoped to complete a revised report shortly that would contain consensus language acceptable to all States parties.

10. **The President**, summing up, said that it was clear that the draft texts by the Chairmen of the Main Committees had been generally well received and that their initial consideration had resulted in a considerable number of proposals for amendments from individual delegations and groups of States. He was encouraged by the serious efforts under way and urged all three Main Committees to finalize the agreed language in their reports so that the Drafting Committee could begin its work.

General debate (*continued*)

11. **Mr. Duncan** (United Kingdom), explaining that the formation of a new national Government had prevented his delegation from taking the floor earlier, recalled that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference had outlined 13 practical steps which the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had agreed to implement in order to meet their commitments under article VI of the Treaty. With the exception of steps 7 and 8, which were not applicable to the United Kingdom, his delegation wished to provide an update on the progress made by his country in implementing each of the steps.

12. With regard to steps 1 and 2, he said that the United Kingdom had signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 and had ratified the Treaty in 1998. It had a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing in place and had not carried out any nuclear test explosions since 1991.

13. In line with step 3, the United Kingdom had repeatedly called for the immediate start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Furthermore, it had put in place a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and had not produced such material since 1995.

14. With respect to step 4, he said that the United Kingdom supported the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament as part of the programme of work adopted by consensus at the Conference on Disarmament in 2009 and he

called on the Conference on Disarmament to approve a programme of work for 2010 on that basis.

15. Concerning the principle of irreversibility reflected in step 5, he noted that the United Kingdom had not reversed any of its nuclear disarmament measures. Moreover, it had adopted a single delivery system with a single warhead design and a single launch platform.

16. With regard to step 6, the United Kingdom had set out its unequivocal commitment to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons in its national statements and multilateral declarations.

17. In accordance with step 9, the United Kingdom had hosted a conference in September 2009 for the five nuclear-weapon States to discuss confidence-building measures towards nuclear disarmament. The conference had brought together for the first time nuclear scientists and senior policymakers from the nuclear-weapon States to consider the confidence-building, verification and compliance challenges associated with achieving further progress towards disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as the steps to address those challenges. The United Kingdom had also sponsored independent academic research on the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons and global security in a world with low numbers of nuclear weapons.

18. Also in line with step 9, the United Kingdom had reduced the number of its operationally available warheads to fewer than 160 and had also reduced the explosive power of its nuclear arsenal by around 75 per cent since the end of the cold war. It was transparent about its fissile materials holdings and operationally available warhead numbers and had produced historical records of its defence holdings of both plutonium and highly enriched uranium. It did not possess any non-strategic nuclear weapons and had significantly reduced the operational status of its nuclear-weapon system, which did not target any State. The United Kingdom had publicly stated its policy on negative security assurances; had signed and ratified the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba; and stood ready to include its nuclear arsenal in broader multilateral disarmament negotiations.

19. Pursuant to step 10, the United Kingdom had placed 4.4 tons of its excess military fissile material under European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) safeguards and had made that material subject to inspection by IAEA. The United Kingdom had also announced in 1998 that it would cease exercising its right to withdraw fissile material from safeguarded stocks for nuclear weapons.

20. The United Kingdom subscribed to the principle, embodied in step 11, of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. His country had a strong record of fulfilling its non-nuclear and general disarmament commitments.

21. With regard to step 12, he recalled that the Government White Paper entitled "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent", dated December 2006, set out his country's nuclear doctrine and current posture. The United Kingdom also provided regular reports in its national statements to the NPT Preparatory Committees and Review Conferences.

22. Lastly, with respect to step 13, he said that the United Kingdom was conducting research on the technical and non-technical aspects of verifying nuclear

warhead dismantlement through a trilateral project with Norway and VERTIC, a non-governmental verification organization. Their work included authenticating warheads, monitoring storage facilities and providing access to nuclear sites without compromising national security.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2010/SR.13

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

Distr.: General
15 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 13th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 21 May 2010, at 5 p.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)

Contents

Reports of the Main Committees

The meeting was called to order at 5.30 p.m.

Reports of the Main Committees

1. **The President** said that although the Main Committees and their subsidiary bodies had made significant progress, a number of areas required further consideration. He suggested that the Main Committees should conclude their work on Monday, 24 May 2010. He would then prepare a consolidated text for consideration by the plenary Conference on the following day.

2. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2010/SR.14

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

22 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 14th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 25 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)

Contents

Consideration and adoption of Final Document(s)

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Consideration and adoption of Final Document(s) (NPT/CONF.2010/CRP.2/Rev.1)

1. **The President** said that, in accordance with the agreement reached by the Review Conference at its previous plenary meeting held on Friday, 21 May 2010, he had released a consolidated text of the Chairmen's draft reports on the work of the Main Committees, which included the work of their respective subsidiary bodies. With the assistance of his team, he had brought that consolidated text into line with the format used in the Final Declarations or Documents of the Review Conferences held since 1975. The slightly revised version just released, contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/CRP.2/Rev.1, included an index that was intended to help delegations understand the source of the paragraphs.

2. Delegations would notice that the document closely followed the structure of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, which contained a review of the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as action measures, such as the 13 practical steps. That approach was consistent with decision 1 on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed at the 2000 Review Conference. He also noted that the document had been named a "Final Declaration" to capture the spirit of the consensus agreements reached by the Review Conferences held from 1975 to 1995.

3. He said that the meeting would be adjourned and would resume as an informal closed meeting later in the day.

The meeting rose at 10.45 a.m.

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

Distr.: General
9 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 15th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 27 May 2010, at 4.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)

Contents

- Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference
- Credentials of representatives to the Conference (*continued*)
- (b) Report of the Credentials Committee
- Consideration and adoption of Final Document(s) (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 5.25 p.m.

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference

(NPT/CONF.2010/47)

1. **The President** drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2010/47 containing the division of costs based on the actual participation of States parties in the Conference. He said that the document should be seen in conjunction with rule 12 of, and the appendix to, the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference on 3 May 2010.

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (*continued*)

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee (NPT/CONF.2010/CC/1)

2. **The President** drew attention to the final report of the Credentials Committee contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/CC/1.

Consideration and adoption of Final Document(s) (*continued*)

(NPT/CONF.2010/L.1 and L.2)

3. **The President** drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2010/L.1, relating to the organization and work of the Conference, and to document NPT/CONF.2010/L.2, containing the draft Final Document of the Conference. The latter was the product of arduous efforts to arrive at a consensus and that any subsequent changes to it could endanger the successful outcome of the Review Conference. He therefore hoped that, following its consideration by all delegations, the draft Final Document would meet with their approval.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

28 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 16th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 28 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines)

Contents

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference (*continued*)

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (*continued*)

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

Consideration and adoption of Final Document(s) (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference (*continued*)

(NPT/CONF.2010/47)

1. **The President** drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2010/47 containing the schedule of division of costs based on the actual participation of States parties in the Conference. The document should be seen in conjunction with rule 12 of, and the appendix to, the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference on 3 May 2010. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the schedule of division of costs as contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/47.

2. *It was so decided.*

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (*continued*)

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee (*continued*) (NPT/CONF.2010/CC/1)

3. **Mr. Momen** (Bangladesh), Chairman of the Credentials Committee, introduced the final report of the Credentials Committee (NPT/CONF.2010/CC/1), which indicated that 98 States parties had submitted formal credentials, 74 had submitted provisional credentials and 18 had not submitted their credentials or any written notice that they would attend the Conference. Since the preparation of the report, formal credentials had been received from Belgium, the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the Republic of Mozambique, and an addendum would be issued to that effect. The Committee had decided to accept the credentials of all States parties participating in the Conference on the understanding that original credentials in the form required by rule 2 of the rules of procedure would be forwarded to the Secretary-General of the Conference as soon as possible.

4. **The President** took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of the Credentials Committee.

5. *It was so decided.*

Consideration and adoption of Final Document(s) (*continued*)

(NPT/CONF.2010/L.1 and L.2)

6. **The President** drew attention to the draft Final Document of the Conference, contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/L.2. He took it that the Conference first wished to take note of the section entitled “Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference”, which was recorded in the footnote as the President’s reflection to the best of his knowledge of what transpired with regard to the matters of review. He also took it that the Conference wished to adopt the section entitled “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions”.

7. *It was so decided.*

8. **The President** took it that the Conference next wished to adopt the draft Final Document, as contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/L.1, section by section.

9. *It was so decided.*

10. *The section entitled "Introduction" was adopted.*
11. *The section entitled "Organization of the Conference" was adopted.*
12. *The section entitled "Participation in the Conference" was adopted.*
13. *The section entitled "Financial arrangements" was adopted.*
14. *The section entitled "Work of the Conference" was adopted.*
15. *The section entitled "Documentation" was adopted.*
16. **The President** suggested that the wording of the section entitled "Conclusions of the Conference" should read as follows:

"At its 16th and final plenary meeting, on 28 May 2010, the Conference considered the draft Final Document. The Conference took note of the 'Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference', which is recorded in the footnote as the President's reflection to the best of his knowledge of what transpired with regard to matters of review. The Conference adopted the 'Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions'."

17. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the section entitled "Conclusions of the Conference".

18. *It was so decided.*

19. **The President** took it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft Final Document as a whole, as contained in documents NPT/CONF.2010/L.1 and L.2.

20. *It was so decided.*

21. **Mr. Abdelaziz** (Egypt), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, welcomed the adoption of the Final Document as an important step towards achieving the goals of the Treaty. The negotiations held during the Review Conference had covered a wide range of issues that were critically important both for the credibility of the Treaty and for the security of its States parties.

22. Among the issues of vital importance for the full implementation of the Treaty, delegations had agreed on three forward-looking action plans; had reaffirmed the critical importance of the universality of the Treaty and the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference; and had examined the need for a nuclear weapons convention for the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, as well as a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

23. The Final Document just adopted provided a sound basis for continued cooperation among all States parties with a view to the early achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. However, the outcome had not benefited greatly from the proposals submitted to the Conference by the Group in its relevant working papers, namely documents NPT/CONF.2010/WP.46 and WP.47. In that context, the Group would vigorously pursue the following goals in cooperation with all States parties: full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament commitments, with a view to the elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2025;

universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its objectives; and prompt commencement of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention and a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances. The Group would also continue to reaffirm the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without undue restrictions. In that respect, any voluntary arrangements and confidence-building measures entered into by States parties must not be confused with legally binding obligations under the Treaty.

24. The Group intended to work constructively with all concerned parties to promote a plan of action for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The Final Document, which reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and called on Israel to place all of its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards, confirmed the States parties' continued resolve to pursue the commitments given in 1995 and 2000 in that respect.

25. The adoption of the forward-looking outcome document clearly demonstrated that the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty had shown a maximum degree of flexibility throughout the Conference negotiations. Though imperfect, the agreed package could be built upon and further enhanced in the near future. He invited all other States parties to join the Group in that important work.

26. **Mr. Salam** (Lebanon), speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, welcomed the adoption of the Final Document, which the Group had approved without amendments in order to ensure the successful outcome of the Conference. Section IV of the document, in particular, provided a clear mechanism for Israel to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to rid the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction. He called on all delegations to move beyond narrow political views and to work together to build a better future for the Middle East.

27. **Mr. Aguirre de Cárcer** (Spain), speaking on behalf of the European Union, welcomed the adoption of the Final Document by the Conference and underlined the willingness of the European Union to work towards the full implementation of the forward-looking action plans adopted pursuant to the three pillars of the Treaty and the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

28. **Ms. Tauscher** (United States of America) said that over the past four weeks the parties to the Treaty had worked tirelessly to review its implementation and reaffirm the international consensus it embodied. Under the leadership of President Obama, the United States had reaffirmed its commitments to make progress towards nuclear disarmament and guarantee access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to all those abiding by their non-proliferation commitments. The Treaty mattered because it was the principal international instrument holding parties accountable, discouraging proliferation and bringing the benefits of nuclear energy to all corners of the world.

29. The Final Document just adopted reflected the collective commitment to uphold and strengthen that cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime and demonstrated the resolve to strengthen the Treaty's three pillars with the inclusion of recommendations for follow-on actions. It committed parties to work to achieve the vision to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons and recognized the steps the United States and others had taken to advance

disarmament. It recognized the new agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation and reflected the shared interest in achieving deeper reductions of all types of nuclear weapons and their reduced role in the international system. It also encouraged the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and recognized the urgent need to get on with long-delayed talks on a fissile material cut-off treaty. It affirmed that the Additional Protocol and IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements represented the standard for verification.

30. The Final Document emphasized that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be made available to all parties in conformity with non-proliferation provisions, and recognized the importance of multilateral mechanisms for assurance of the nuclear fuel supply. It also highlighted the view of most that parties were to be held responsible for violations of the Treaty committed prior to withdrawal, and that consultations and actions by nuclear suppliers were needed to discourage abuse of the withdrawal provisions.

31. The Final Document also called on States to comply fully with the Treaty in order to uphold its integrity and the authority of its safeguards system. In that regard, Iran, the only country that had been found by the IAEA Board of Governors not to be in compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations, had done nothing to enhance the confidence of the international community by its performance at the Review Conference.

32. The Final Document also included an agreement to hold a regional conference in 2012 to discuss issues relevant to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. Her Government had long supported such a zone, but recognized that essential precursors must be in place for its achievement. It would work with the countries in the region to create conditions for a successful conference, but its ability to do so had been seriously jeopardized because the final document singled out Israel in the section on the Middle East, a fact that the United States deeply regretted.

33. She also drew attention to the text concerning North Korea. The United States deplored North Korea's repeated defiance of international law and its international obligations and commitments. It should understand that it would never achieve security or acceptance by the international community without the complete and verified abandonment of its nuclear weapons programme. Its failure to implement its commitments under the Six-Party Talks to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards at an early date called into question the utility of negotiations. The Six-Party Talks could be an effective mechanism only if North Korea took early and irreversible steps to return to compliance with the Treaty and took action to establish its credibility as a negotiating partner.

34. Her delegation remained deeply grateful for the contributions that had resulted in a constructive outcome to the Review Conference. The hard work had just begun, however, as all parties were now charged with carrying out the commitments made.

35. **Mr. Danon** (France) said that his delegation welcomed the adoption of the Final Document, which included an ambitious road map for the revitalization of that essential Treaty. The adoption of the Final Document was a collective success for non-proliferation, disarmament and collective security, and demonstrated the attachment of the international community to the Treaty. While the plan of action

was concrete and balanced, it was the view of his delegation that it should have gone further in respect of proliferation activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Words were not sufficient; the time had come for action on responsible civilian uses of nuclear energy and mobilization for disarmament.

36. **Mr. Cheng** Jingye (China) said that after 10 years, the 2010 Review Conference had once again achieved a substantial result that would strengthen the effectiveness, authority and universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He expressed the hope that the Final Document would be implemented effectively.

37. His delegation wished to emphasize the need for thorough and complete destruction of nuclear weapons and its support for a treaty on that subject. It also supported the negotiation of an internationally binding agreement on negative security assurances and, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, the early negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty as the only effective way to control such material. It would also promote the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its early entry into force. China supported the recommendations contained in the Final Document, especially those pertaining to the Middle East.

38. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) said that despite doubts about a positive outcome, the 2010 Review Conference had added a page to the history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by adopting a clear, future-oriented plan of action for non-proliferation, disarmament and development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For the first time in the 15 years since the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the Review Conference had set forth concrete measures for joint efforts on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East.

39. Four weeks of discussion had shown that the Treaty continued to be a cornerstone of the international security system and a key element in halting proliferation and advancing disarmament. Next steps included ratification of the new agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on strategic arms reduction and its implementation, as well as the implementation of the decisions taken at the Review Conference. Progress in disarmament would lead to increased stability and security. The security of all countries was indivisible; only together could a world free of nuclear weapons be achieved.

40. **Mr. van den IJssel** (Netherlands) said that his delegation wished to align itself with the statement made by the representative of Spain on behalf of the European Union. With regard to the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, his delegation would have preferred a more balanced text regarding the challenges in the region. It hoped to contribute to the efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

41. **Mr. Benmehidi** (Algeria) said that the 2010 Review Conference had taken place at a time when the international climate had been conducive to producing an agreement and new momentum. Nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike had gathered to renew their partnership for a more secure world. The agreement regarding the 1995 resolution on the Middle East after 15 years of inaction was a major achievement, and he commended the Arab Group for the constructive spirit it had brought to the negotiations. Nuclear weapons were the

most dangerous threat to the world, and their total elimination was the main objective of the Treaty.

42. **Mr. Suda** (Japan) said that the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Final Document had been difficult, but flexibility and cooperation had been shown by all delegations. Initiatives by the United States and other nuclear-weapon States had paved the way to agreement. Agreement on action plans on all three pillars of the Treaty was unprecedented. The emphasis on transparency and IAEA additional protocols and safeguards agreements was welcome.

43. The Final Document did not meet expectations in one area, however. Unfortunately, there was no mention of a moratorium on production and testing of fissile material. A group of survivors of the nuclear explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been following the deliberations at the Conference with interest; that outcome was not satisfactory to them.

44. **Mr. Duncan** (United Kingdom), welcomed the breakthrough achieved by the Review Conference after a decade of stalemate. The adoption of the Final Document, particularly the unprecedented agreement on all three pillars of the Treaty, demonstrated the international community's continued commitment to overcome traditional divisions in a spirit of shared interest, cooperation and partnership. In that context, he encouraged all sides to make further progress to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

45. On a separate matter, he noted that paragraph 118 of document NPT/CONF.2010/L.2 was unfortunately an inaccurate reference to paragraph 12 of decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. He also noted that paragraph 118 should be interpreted without prejudice to the rights of States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy pursuant to article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

46. **Mr. Benítez Versón** (Cuba) said that the Review Conference had been an ideal opportunity for the international community to move forward after many years of inaction. However, the final outcome of the Conference was mixed: the conclusions and recommendations adopted included modest progress but far from what was required. An enormous gap remained between the good intentions expressed repeatedly by the nuclear-weapon States and the concrete steps that they were actually willing to take.

47. He regretted the fact that a consensus document had not been adopted aimed at reviewing the implementation of the Treaty, since the language adopted in that respect reflected only the views of the President of the Conference. His delegation wished to stress that the procedure adopted at the Conference with regard to the review process must not set a precedent for future practice.

48. While the adopted plan of action on nuclear disarmament contained positive elements, it was nevertheless limited and inadequate. Many of the specific proposals put forward by Cuba and the Group of Non-Aligned States parties, including a clearly defined timetable for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by 2025, had been reflected in the Final Document only as vague aspirations. Other shortcomings in the document included its failure to refer to the need for immediate negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention; the lack of a clear commitment by nuclear-weapon States to cease the development of nuclear weapons; the failure to call for the immediate removal of nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear-

weapon States; and the omission of clear commitments from the nuclear-weapon States to provide legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

49. The step-by-step approach promoted by some, which had been used to dilute much of the language of the Final Document, should not serve as a pretext for preserving the status quo. The results of the Conference had shown that much progress remained to be achieved in order to implement all of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To that end, he called on the international community to work together to finally rid the world of all nuclear weapons.

50. **Mr. Spindelegger** (Austria) said that his delegation had joined the consensus on the Final Document because it considered the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and wished to make a positive contribution to the current momentum towards disarmament. It welcomed the progress made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and also welcomed the action plan on nuclear disarmament, which contained a strong package of concrete goals and measures that could be used to monitor further progress over the next review cycle.

51. He also wished to point out paragraph 56 and actions 37, 38, 49, 57 and 63 of document NPT/CONF.2010/L.2 would be implemented in accordance with the Federal Constitution of Austria. Like many other States, Austria had no interest in nuclear power applications and thus would not be involved in the development of new nuclear reactors.

52. **Mr. Soltanieh** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that nuclear weapons posed the most immediate danger to humanity and should be prohibited under international humanitarian law. Moreover, the possession of such destructive and indiscriminate weapons should be condemned by the international community rather than condoned. Accordingly, any increase in nuclear weapons capability should equal a reduction in political credibility.

53. There had been high expectations among the international community that, following the missed opportunities of the past decade, the 2010 Review Conference would adopt urgent practical steps to eliminate nuclear weapons within a specific timeline. However, certain nuclear-weapon States had unfortunately remained unwilling even to reaffirm their previous undertakings agreed at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. It was regrettable that the Final Document had failed to incorporate some of the fundamental principles established at the previous Review Conferences.

54. For example, the text of the Final Document had significantly watered down the commitments for nuclear-weapon States to reduce the operational status of their arsenals and to cease the development and qualitative improvement of their nuclear weapons; it did not oblige the nuclear-weapon States to abolish the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines or to accept a legally binding instrument for the prohibition of nuclear weapons; it did not call for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States; it did not include the specific timeline for the total elimination of nuclear weapons called for by the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty; and, in particular, it failed to call upon Israel, the only obstacle to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, to

cease the development of nuclear weapons and to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty without preconditions.

55. While numerous other examples could be cited to demonstrate the shortcomings of the Final Document, the limited achievements of the 2010 Review Conference could nevertheless be seen as a step forward on the path towards total nuclear disarmament. Thus, the Islamic Republic of Iran, which had joined the consensus to show political goodwill and its respect for the views of others, was determined to work actively alongside the other non-nuclear-weapon States not only for the full implementation of the decisions agreed at the 2010 Review Conference, but also for the adoption of further practical steps commensurate with the high expectations of the international community.

56. **Mr. Woolcott** (Australia) welcomed the adoption by the 2010 Review Conference of a substantive final outcome document, which contained a wide-ranging and forward-looking plan of action across the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that built upon the results of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. All delegations had shown a commendable spirit of cooperation and a readiness to compromise, which had been crucial to the success of the Conference. At the same time, his delegation would have liked the nuclear-weapon States to observe an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and had also hoped that those States would enhance the transparency of their nuclear disarmament efforts. It had also expected a stronger outcome on measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system and would therefore continue to work to build greater consensus on that issue in the coming years.

57. **Mr. Garcia Moritán** (Argentina) said that the flexibility shown by all States parties in the negotiations which had permitted the adoption of the Final Document was to be commended. It represented significant progress over the final document of the 2000 Review Conference and provided a concrete and constructive plan to guide States parties in their work towards implementation of the commitments assumed. The role of IAEA had been strengthened and action on peaceful uses of nuclear energy could also be expected in coming years. The conference on the zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, to be held in 2012 with the United Nations Secretary-General as the facilitator, was also a major step forward.

58. **Mr. Dabbashi** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that despite its reservations, his delegation could live with the Final Document adopted by the Review Conference. It would have hoped that the text would deal with the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States under article VI of the Treaty by setting timelines for disarmament and the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, as well as a mechanism to verify reductions in nuclear arsenals, but those proposals had been strongly opposed by the nuclear-weapon States. Unfortunately, lack of action in those areas would delay the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the primary objective of the Treaty. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya would be looking at ways to amend the Treaty to provide for verification in nuclear-weapon States.

59. It was regrettable that the major Powers applied double standards to suit their national agendas. There was no mention of certain countries, while others were singled out. No country was above the law and immune to criticism, however. His delegation had joined the consensus despite the way the Final Document addressed Israel. He hoped that Israel would be encouraged to join the Treaty and attend the 2012 conference as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

60. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that his delegation saw a need for the 2010 Review Conference to build towards a new consensus that balanced the three pillars of the Treaty. Essential elements of such a consensus would include an undertaking on nuclear disarmament, transparency, implementation of the “13 practical steps” from the 2000 Conference, negative security assurances, a fissile material cut-off treaty and strengthened IAEA safeguards. The Final Document fell short of expectations, but his delegation had joined consensus in order to strengthen the Treaty after the limited progress made during the past decade. The 2010 Review Conference would only be judged a success, however, if the commitments made were implemented.

61. **Mr. Labbé** (Chile) said that the adoption of the Final Document reaffirmed the Treaty and sent a positive signal to the entire multilateral system. Although the content of the Final Document was far from perfect, it kept alive the hope of a world free of nuclear weapons. The regions where nuclear-weapon-free zones had been established were pleased that their message had been heard and incorporated into the fabric of the review process. He also acknowledged the active presence of civil society and the dedication and conviction of the men and women representing the many organizations participating in the Conference.

62. **Mr. Grinius** (Canada), noting that the President had described the Final Document just adopted as the best that could be offered and as offering the seeds of hope, said that his delegation expressed its full support for that document. Its conclusions and recommendations went further towards the strengthening of the three pillars of the Treaty than ever before. There had also been progress in strengthening the Treaty review process. His delegation had hoped to see a substantive outcome and to start to build a Treaty support system to help the Treaty achieve its aims, but full consensus had not been possible. He expected that States would continue to do what they could to strengthen the reform of the Treaty review process. Despite the setback with respect to reform, Canada understood that there were larger forces at play, and would work to support the entire Final Document and follow-on actions and to move reform forward.

63. **Mr. Macedo** (Mexico) said that the text adopted, while it did not represent perfection, would move the world further away from nuclear war. He noted in particular the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to discuss disarmament among themselves and to inform the parties of measures they planned to take to rid the world of such weapons. The Review Conference had been able to send a united message to the international community regarding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

64. **Mr. Kleib** (Indonesia) said that the disappointments of past Review Conferences had not held back progress at the 2010 Conference because of the political courage displayed by many States parties. The Final Document was a new beginning and offered enough balance to bring all groups on board to a consensus. The international community must seize the moment and work to implement all the commitments it contained.

65. **Mr. Pham** Vinh Quang (Viet Nam), speaking on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), associated himself with the statement made by the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and welcomed the adoption of the Final Document.

66. **Mr. de Macedo Soares** (Brazil) said that the balanced Final Document adopted by the Conference provided a good basis to move forward. The international community must build on the favourable international environment and the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference to pursue disarmament efforts in all other relevant bodies, starting with the adoption of a programme of work by the Conference on Disarmament.

67. Speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, he expressed the Coalition's belief that its efforts since the preparatory work for the Conference had yielded tangible results in the area of nuclear disarmament.

68. **Mr. Reyes Rodríguez** (Colombia) said that, following 10 years of paralysis, the adoption of the Final Document by the Conference was extremely welcome. His delegation also wished to stress that actions 36, 44 and 45 clearly set forth the responsibilities of States with respect to those individuals and entities engaged in terrorist activities.

69. **Mr. Hart** (Nigeria) said that the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference had been influenced by the favourable international environment, which demonstrated what could be achieved with sufficient political will, shared values and common interests. The international community should now capitalize on that unity to further promote and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

70. **Mr. Kongstad** (Norway) welcomed the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference, which had been essential for the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While his delegation had hoped for more ambitious action on all three pillars, including specific timelines for disarmament and stronger non-proliferation efforts, it recognized that the best possible action plan had been adopted at the current juncture. All delegations should be commended for their considerable willingness to compromise, especially in view of the consensus achieved on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

71. **Mr. Im Han-taek** (Republic of Korea) said that the significant outcome of the current Review Conference would dispel any lingering doubts about the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and would pave the way for a world free of nuclear weapons. His delegation particularly welcomed the unified stance of the Conference with regard to the nuclear issue in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which posed a serious threat to the international community.

72. **Ms. Ancidey** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) welcomed the adoption of the Final Document, which represented an important step towards the long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In that connection, her delegation hoped to see further progress in 2012 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

73. While the States parties had achieved practical results at the 2010 Review Conference, their work remained incomplete, particularly since the nuclear-weapon States had not agreed to a specific timetable for complete nuclear disarmament or to provide legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. She particularly regretted the fact that agreement had not been reached to review the implementation of the Treaty and hoped that subsequent Review Conferences would be more successful in that respect.

74. **Mr. Hassan** (Sudan) said that the adoption of the Final Document by consensus represented progress towards the implementation of the Treaty. He hoped that the successful outcome of the Conference would be an incentive for the swift implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, and that the coming five years would see progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

75. **Mr. Seruhere** (United Republic of Tanzania) reiterated his delegation's support for the three pillars of the Treaty and expressed the hope that momentum for its implementation would be maintained. States parties must continue their dialogue on the Secretary-General's five-point plan. South Africa stood as a good example of a country that had eliminated its nuclear arsenal, and the international community should make use of its experience.

76. **Mr. Duarte** (United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs) read out a message from the Secretary-General, who welcomed the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference, which had adopted an action plan to advance nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy over the next five years. A strong spirit of compromise and cooperation had delivered a significant agreement to build a safer and more secure world.

77. He congratulated the President of the Conference and commended the States parties for finding common ground to further strengthen the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation towards nuclear disarmament.

78. The action plan laid a solid foundation to further strengthen the Treaty and address the challenges ahead. The agreement on concrete actions would advance all three pillars of the Treaty — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. He welcomed the firm commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to advance their efforts to eliminate all nuclear weapons and the strong commitment of the States parties to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

79. The Secretary-General looked forward to the cooperation of the States parties as he followed through on the initiatives outlined in the Final Document. In that regard, he particularly welcomed the agreement on a process leading to full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

80. The Secretary-General encouraged States parties to translate all of their commitments into concrete action. He looked forward to working with the international community towards realizing the common goal of a world without nuclear weapons and would spare no effort to assist the States parties in implementing their agreement.

81. **The President** said that the States parties had agreed on a Final Document, and over the four weeks of negotiations had achieved a better understanding of each other's positions and a clear appreciation of the need to strengthen further the main pillars of the Treaty. The potent spirit of cooperation and the desire of all participants for success had sustained and increased the global momentum towards one day freeing humanity from the scourge of nuclear weapons.

82. *The President declared the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons closed.*

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

B. Main Committee I

Summary records of the 1st to 2nd and 7th plenary meetings

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

9 June 2010

Original: English

Main Committee

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 7 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Chidyausiku..... (Zimbabwe)

Contents

Organization of work

General exchange of views

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Organization of work

1. **The Chairman** said that Main Committee I had the task of dealing with agenda items 16 (a) and (b) and 17 (NPT/CONF.2010/1). In addition, the plenary Conference had established a subsidiary body which would focus on nuclear disarmament and security assurances. He drew attention to the proposed programme of work for the Committee and its subsidiary body, contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/MC.I/INF/1.

2. *The programme of work was adopted.*

3. **Mr. Marschik** (Austria), speaking as Chairman of Subsidiary Body I, said that the subsidiary body would elaborate a forward-looking action plan on nuclear disarmament for inclusion in the report of Main Committee I to be submitted to the Conference.

General exchange of views

4. **Mr. Badr** (Egypt), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, noted that the wording of agenda item 16 made it clear that Main Committee I should not only review the Treaty but also take into account the decisions and resolutions agreed upon at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

5. The Group of Non-Aligned States, which remained fully committed to the ultimate goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament, viewed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation as a step in the right direction. However, such reductions remained below the expectations of the international community. The Group therefore encouraged the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their disarmament obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty transparently, irreversibly and verifiably at a significantly faster pace.

6. The Group intended to work with Main Committee I with a view to reaching agreement on a strong and coherent plan of action for nuclear disarmament within a specified time frame. To that end, it would shortly be proposing to the subsidiary body a three-phase action plan.

7. Furthermore, the Group believed that the final document of the 2010 Review Conference should, inter alia: note with deep concern the security doctrines of nuclear-weapon States, including the Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); reaffirm that every effort should be made to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty in all its aspects without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty; emphasize, in that context, the particular importance attached to the strict observance of articles I and II of the Treaty; and stress the importance of the reaffirmation by nuclear-weapon States of their obligations to fully implement articles I and II of the Treaty.

8. Second, in the area of nuclear disarmament, the final document should reconfirm that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would be conducted in accordance with the mandates of the Shannon report; reaffirm the importance of the application of the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility by

nuclear-weapon States in all measures relating to nuclear disarmament; voice concern about the potential for an arms race in outer space; and agree that the development of new types of nuclear weapons undermined disarmament commitments and contravened the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

9. Third, with regard to nuclear testing, the final report should reaffirm that the only way to rid the world of the threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination; support the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and stress the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to take the lead in that endeavour.

10. Lastly, the final report of the 2010 Review Conference should recall that States parties to the Treaty had agreed by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference that the nuclear non-proliferation regime would be strengthened by the provision of legally binding security assurances from the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States; reiterate that improvements to existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons contravened the security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violated the commitments undertaken by them at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute safeguard against the use of such weapons. Accordingly, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument providing security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority.

11. **Mr. Garcia** (Philippines) said that the 2010 Review Conference must reinforce the undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and to implement the 13 practical steps by reaching agreement on specific benchmarks and timelines for action, including a nuclear-weapons convention or a series of mutually reinforcing legal instruments.

12. In particular, the nuclear-weapon-States should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; provide unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States; and become parties to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

13. Lastly, his Government supported initiatives to strengthen the work of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly with a view to the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty; called on all States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accede to the Treaty; and strongly urged States not to withdraw from the Treaty.

14. **Mr. Badr** (Egypt), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that while the Coalition remained fully committed to the implementation of all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, its primary focus was on nuclear disarmament.

15. The Coalition had been instrumental to the successful adoption of the 13 practical steps at the 2000 Review Conference, which had sadly not been carried forward to the 2005 Review Conference. While the Group was encouraged by recent positive developments, particularly the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, all nuclear-weapon States

should work towards further substantial reductions with a view to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

16. Greater progress was therefore required to implement the Treaty's disarmament obligations under article VI, particularly the implementation of the commitments agreed upon previously at the 2000 Review Conference relating to the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; the upgrading of existing nuclear weapons or the development of new types of nuclear weapons; and the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty by the Conference on Disarmament.

17. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, all nuclear-weapon States should put in place the necessary verification arrangements and legally binding instruments. Furthermore, the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability must apply to all disarmament efforts to ensure their success.

18. **Mr. Lauber** (Switzerland) said that the 2010 Review Conference provided a unique opportunity to build on the current positive momentum towards nuclear disarmament. The final document of the Conference should be balanced and must reaffirm the previously agreed commitments, recognize the results obtained to date, request further progress and explain how it would be achieved. With regard to the latter point, the Review Conference should adopt a plan of action to move the nuclear disarmament process forward in a specific, progressive and pragmatic way. The 13 practical steps could be updated for that purpose, together with a specific time frame for implementation.

19. Such an action plan, in order to be successful, should include both quantitative and qualitative elements. In that regard, Switzerland encouraged all nuclear-weapon States to engage fully in the arms reduction process; to put an end to nuclear weapons development programmes; to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines.

20. Furthermore, the action plan adopted should call on all States to begin negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty, the provision of legally binding negative security assurances and the swift ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

21. **Mr. Quinlan** (Australia), welcoming the current momentum towards nuclear disarmament created by recent positive developments, called for the 2010 Review Conference to reaffirm the unequivocal undertakings made by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. In that connection, Australia and Japan had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.9) which contained a new package of practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures for the 2010 Review Conference.

22. The outcome document of the current Conference should, in particular, reflect the irreversibility and verifiability of the nuclear disarmament process; reaffirm the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies; and provide strengthened negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The Review Conference should also demonstrate clear support for nuclear-weapon-free zones and work with the nuclear-weapon States to resolve any outstanding issues currently preventing them from granting negative security assurances to the members of those zones.

23. Lastly, the Conference should affirm that the nuclear-weapon States must take all reasonable steps to reduce the risk of the accidental or unauthorized launch of their weapons; support the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and express disappointment that the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to implement its agreed programme of work for 2009. In that context, the Review Conference should reaffirm the urgent need for negotiations, without preconditions, on a fissile material cut-off treaty. In the meantime, it should call on all nuclear-weapon States to declare or maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

24. **Mr. Matjila** (South Africa) said that States parties needed to undertake an accelerated process of negotiations, as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, in order to give real content to their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. Notwithstanding commendable measures to reduce nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons continued to be relied on in strategic doctrines; such measures must be distinguished from steps towards nuclear disarmament: they would not automatically translate into a nuclear-weapon-free world. South Africa welcomed recent positive signs of a renewed commitment to the arms control process, which called, however, for deeper cuts in both strategic and non-strategic weapons on a basis of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability. It was clear that, regardless of their legal obligations and political commitments, some nuclear-weapon States wished to retain their nuclear weapons indefinitely. It was inadmissible that some States should assume their responsibilities only selectively: the fundamental principles of the Treaty and the outcomes of previous Review Conferences must be fully respected, including the unequivocal commitment of nuclear-weapon States to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. He expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of tangible evidence of that commitment, which called for further progress in implementing the necessary step-by-step approach. His delegation appreciated the willingness of some nuclear-weapon States to share information about their nuclear arsenals and disarmament objectives; it called on all those States to do more to enhance transparency and confidence-building.

25. South Africa was concerned about the stalemate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, which should make every effort to launch negotiations towards a verifiable universal ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, in the interests of disarmament and non-proliferation alike. The Test-Ban Treaty was a further important contribution to those objectives. His delegation welcomed the intention of China and the United States to pursue ratification of that instrument, especially since the non-ratification of certain States was blocking its entry into force.

26. As the only country to date that had voluntarily and unilaterally destroyed its nuclear weapons capacity, South Africa remained concerned about States that retained such weapons, including some outside the Treaty with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. It would continue to support all nuclear disarmament measures in order to achieve a world free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

27. **Mr. Shushlebin** (Russian Federation) said that, aware as a nuclear power of its special responsibilities under article VI of the Treaty, his country was continuing deep, irreversible and verifiable reductions of its nuclear potential. The new arms reductions treaty it had signed with the United States of America was an important

step in that process and part of the Russian Federation's growing contribution to the cause of nuclear disarmament. The new treaty had replaced one of the most historically significant disarmament agreements, the treaty of 31 July 1991 (START I), which had made the world safer and more stable and ushered in a period of partnership and cooperation. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had been parties to that treaty, along with the Russian Federation and the United States; it would not have played such a historic role had those three countries not agreed to remove nuclear weapons from their territories and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States: that had strengthened their security and enhanced their strategic stability.

28. The new treaty, besides limiting aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms within seven years of its entry into force, had brought deployed and non-deployed launchers as well as heavy bombers within its legal scope and provided an additional impetus for the elimination or conversion of such arms. The parties had agreed to reduce by one third the aggregate number of warheads, from the previous ceiling of 2,200, and by more than half the aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles, from the previous ceiling of 1,600. Nuclear disarmament could not be achieved without taking into account developments in the field of strategic defensive arms and the need for limits on the deployment of strategic missile defence systems. The Russian Federation remained committed to that goal, which should be pursued on a multilateral basis under the auspices of the United Nations. He recalled in that context the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, submitted by the Russian Federation and China for the consideration of the Conference on Disarmament, and his country's proposal to universalize the treaty between the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Similarly, the earliest possible entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty would be an essential step towards nuclear disarmament; a voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests, though significant, could be no substitute for the relevant legal obligations.

29. The ultimate goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament must entail a strengthening of strategic stability and compliance with the principle of equal security for all. In addition, all nuclear-weapon States should be involved in the arms reduction efforts already undertaken by the Russian Federation and the United States; steps should be taken to prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space; and there should be a halt to the build-up of conventional weapons, underpinned by efforts for the settlement of regional conflicts.

30. *Ms. Barbulescu (Romania), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

31. **Mr. Grinius** (Canada) said that the three pillars of the Treaty were bound to grow more interdependent as further progress was made towards the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Recent positive developments in that regard should be followed by others: transparent disarmament measures by all nuclear-weapon States were needed in support of commitments under article VI. He recalled the call by the Group of Eight major industrialized countries for the adoption by the Conference of a balanced and concrete outcome document containing a follow-up action plan. Since assuming the presidency of that Group, Canada had been urging countries that had not yet ratified the Test-Ban Treaty to do so; its entry into force was a key task for the international community. His country, through the Global Partnership against

the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction led by the Group of Eight, had also been making substantial efforts to secure and, where possible, destroy such weapons in several regions of the world. It had also been pushing for negotiations towards a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; formal work on such a treaty should begin immediately, no matter how unsure its final outcome: lack of consensus must not be an obstacle to the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

32. Canada's longstanding commitment to nuclear disarmament was pursued with all due regard for its membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; it remained firmly committed to a common nuclear policy within that organization and would continue accordingly to seek to advance discussions on such issues as nuclear posture and sub-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of its Strategic Concept Review. That did not, however, prejudge future developments, including consideration of practical disarmament measures. He called for detailed reporting by nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike in order to increase transparency and build confidence in their shared commitment to the implementation of the Treaty. Lastly, he stressed the need to build on the positive changes in the international security climate, the new package proposed by Australia and Japan and the working paper of the New Agenda Coalition in order to develop and agree on a disarmament action plan that would give renewed impetus to the 13 practical steps.

33. **Mr. Shushlebin** (Russian Federation), speaking on behalf of the delegations of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, said that the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Prague on 8 April 2010, was an important step on the path towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. By signing the Treaty, both countries had once again demonstrated their unwavering commitment to fulfilling their obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The verifiable and irreversible cuts agreed to by the parties would reduce their nuclear arsenals to levels last seen 50 years ago. Those reductions would have a positive impact on international stability and security, thereby benefiting the entire world community. In that context, the delegations of the Russian Federation and the United States of America called on all nuclear-weapon States to make an active contribution towards reducing and limiting their nuclear arms with a view to strengthening international stability and ensuring equal and indivisible security for all.

34. **Mr. Danon** (France) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a linchpin of collective security and must for that reason be strengthened. Attached as it was to the implementation of all its obligations under the Treaty, in particular under article VI, France had sought to set an example to other States by assuming its responsibilities to the full. It could not advance alone, however: progress towards the ultimate goal of the Treaty required the concerted efforts of all, although that should not be a pretext for inaction.

35. France had accordingly proposed a number of measures to usher in a nuclear-weapon-free world marked by peace and stability. Those measures, which had been taken up by the European Union, included an immediate halt to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; the dismantlement of nuclear installations and test sites, but also of decommissioned nuclear warheads; a reduction of all nuclear

arsenals, in the spirit of the new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation; a limiting of the role of nuclear weapons in defence doctrines to extreme cases of self-defence; greater transparency as to the number of nuclear weapons held by each State, following the example of France and the United States; prompt ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty by all States, particularly annex II States, that were not yet parties to that instrument; and immediate negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

36. It was also essential to take into account the political and strategic conditions for progress towards nuclear disarmament. That entailed, first and foremost, a halt to proliferation, with particular reference to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran. If the Iranian question was not settled, there was a risk of nuclear anarchy in the region and in the world; that would put an end to all hopes of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and, in the long term, gravely jeopardize any prospect of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, efforts were called for in every field, in order to reduce regional tensions and promote collective security.

37. Part of the work of the Conference should also be devoted to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. France's doctrine of nuclear dissuasion was one such assurance. His country had also granted unilaterally both positive and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. More than a hundred States enjoyed such assurances from his country within a regional framework under nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. France was thus a party to the relevant protocols of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba and looked forward to a resumption of the constructive dialogue with all concerned parties to resolve outstanding difficulties presented by other such treaties. He called, in conclusion, for the Review Conference to recommend practical disarmament measures that could be implemented within a short time frame in order to make tangible progress towards the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.

38. **Mr. Suda** (Japan) said that the tragic experience of the Japanese people had created in them an unwavering resolve to realize a safe world free from nuclear weapons, a goal that was shared by the whole world. Leadership by the two States possessing the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons was important in that regard, and Japan thus welcomed the signing of the new treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. In addition to those bilateral reductions, his delegation commended the unilateral measures taken by France and the United Kingdom to reduce their nuclear arsenals and increase transparency. Japan also attached importance to the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and called on States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions.

39. Japan, in cooperation with Australia, had submitted a joint policy proposal outlining a new package of practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures, which was intended to build on the current positive developments in the area of disarmament and the agreements and accomplishments of the 1995 and 2000 review conferences while looking to a future without nuclear weapons. A first measure proposed in that package was for States parties to reaffirm the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

40. The package also included an appeal for the hitherto bilateral disarmament initiative between the Russian Federation and the United States to be expanded to

involve the other States possessing nuclear weapons. It called on all States possessing nuclear weapons to reduce their nuclear arsenals, and on those that were increasing and expanding their arsenals to reduce, or at the least, hold them at the current level. All nuclear-weapon States were also to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies and to provide stronger negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. The package also contained a proposal calling on nuclear-weapon States to take measures to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized launch. The principles of irreversibility and verifiability must be applied to the process of reducing arsenals. Increased transparency regarding nuclear weapon capabilities, for example through regular reporting to the NPT States parties, was also called for. Another essential measure for global nuclear disarmament, the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, was of prime concern to States parties.

41. It was regrettable that despite some positive developments the Conference on Disarmament remained deadlocked and that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had not yet begun. Japan called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of that treaty, while urging all States possessing nuclear weapons to declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

42. With the failure of the last Review Conference in 2005, another failure would be a devastating blow to the NPT regime and a major setback in the collective effort to free the world from nuclear armaments. States parties must recognize past agreements and to seek new measures that reflected current circumstances. In that regard, Japan hoped that the proposals it had submitted in cooperation with Australia would contribute to a balance and forward-looking final document.

43. **Ms. Kennedy** (United States of America) said that the Review Conference provided an opportunity for all States parties to rededicate themselves to the central purpose of the Treaty: to prevent the devastating effects of nuclear war. Her Government's recent Nuclear Posture Review had stressed the importance, not just to the United States of America but to all nations, of extending forever the 65-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear war was not something that any nation could accomplish alone, however. Every nation — indeed every person on the planet — benefited from efforts to confront global nuclear dangers, and every nation could contribute to their success. There were three areas where the international community needed to work together to reduce nuclear dangers: disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security.

44. On disarmament, her Government had reaffirmed its commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a vision that would require patience and persistence to achieve. Specific steps towards that goal included the signing of the Treaty with the Russian Federation on nuclear arms reductions and efforts towards the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The United States had also redoubled its efforts to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty.

45. On non-proliferation, the United States was committed to strengthening the Treaty as the basis for international cooperation to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The key bargain for non-nuclear-weapon States was that, in exchange for their commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, they gained a commitment from the nuclear-weapon States to disarm. The bargain worked both

ways: the non-proliferation undertakings by non-nuclear-weapon States helped to create a stable and secure international environment that made it possible to work towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. Those efforts could not succeed, however, if violators were allowed to act with impunity, and effective, internationally supported mechanisms for discouraging and reversing non-compliance would need to be established. The international community must also work together to resolve regional disputes that might motivate rival States to acquire and maintain nuclear weapons, in order to reduce mistrust and build momentum for their further reduction and eventual elimination.

46. To extend the security benefits of the Treaty as broadly as possible, her Government remained committed to the goal of universal adherence. It called on those States that had yet to sign the Treaty to adopt the standards and practices embodied in the Treaty and the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the one State that had announced its withdrawal, to return to compliance with the Treaty and with IAEA safeguards.

47. IAEA verification provided an important connection between the non-proliferation and disarmament goals of the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States could choose to place under IAEA verification material they identified as no longer needed for weapons purposes. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States had down-blended nearly 118 tons of highly enriched uranium removed from defence programmes to produce low-enriched reactor fuel, much of it under IAEA safeguards and inspection. Together with the Russian Federation, it was working to dispose of at least 68 tons of plutonium from weapons programmes, and IAEA would play a critical verification role in that effort. The Agency should also be given the responsibility to verify that States were not producing new fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

48. The third element of the agenda was nuclear security. The use of nuclear weapons not just by States but by violent non-State actors must be prevented. The potential availability of weapons-grade materials and the widespread knowledge of how to manufacture a simple nuclear explosive made that a real and pressing threat. President Obama had thus established the goal of securing the most sensitive nuclear materials in the world within four years. Nuclear security was an essential part of efforts to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.

49. The three pillars of the Treaty provided a solid architecture for broader efforts to confront nuclear dangers worldwide, but the structure could not endure if some parts rather than others received support. The choice was clear: the world must work together to reinforce all three pillars of the Treaty to ensure that its benefits endured for future generations.

50. **Mr. Puja** (Indonesia) said that the lack of progress on the global disarmament agenda in the past must not be allowed to detract from emerging signs of optimism. Indonesia was proud of its status as a non-nuclear-weapon State; it had recently initiated the ratification process for the Test-Ban Treaty.

51. It was his delegation's conviction that there was no place for security doctrines based on nuclear weapons. The international community instead should collaborate to achieve peace and prosperity based on the principles of multilateralism and international law. As long as one nuclear weapon existed, the risk that it could be

used by design or by accident would remain. Member States must therefore work together to conclude a universal nuclear weapons convention containing a specific time frame for complete nuclear disarmament.

52. Security assurances had been extended by nuclear-weapon States through protocols to some of the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Although a welcome development, that was only a partial solution, as not all non-nuclear-weapon States were covered by such zones. The decision by the Conference on Disarmament to find common ground to begin negotiations would provide a good opportunity to deal with security assurances in a transparent and comprehensive fashion. Global civil society also played an important role in advocacy for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

53. Any threat of proliferation, whatever its source, should be addressed squarely, but without discrimination and double standards. Cooperation in nuclear energy with the States not party to the Treaty, however, did not help its credibility and sent a discouraging signal to the parties. It was vitally important for Israel to come into the fold of the Treaty and place all its nuclear-related facilities under IAEA safeguards. He urged the remaining States outside the Treaty to join as soon as possible.

54. **Mr. de Macedo Soares** (Brazil) said that a decade earlier, Brazil and its partners in the New Agenda Coalition had participated in negotiations on a forward-looking, pragmatic programme of action which had come to be known as the “13 practical steps to disarmament”. That had served as a crucial first test for the strengthened review process after the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

55. It was inconceivable that, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the concept of nuclear deterrence, with all its strategic implications, was still in use. Nuclear weapons were not needed to deter non-nuclear-weapon States and were still less useful to deter terrorist threats. The only logical conclusion was that deterrence and corresponding doctrines applied only to nuclear-weapon States in their relations among themselves. Sophisticated strategic doctrines that purportedly justified the possession of nuclear weapons had a more basic meaning: to enhance a sense of power and dominance for those who possessed them. The principle of undiminished security for all was not for all if it was based on nuclear weapons.

56. A successful outcome of the work of the Committee would require (a) an undertaking by nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals; (b) a commitment to the goal of concluding a nuclear weapons convention outlawing such weapons entirely; (c) a commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in the strategic doctrines of military alliances; (d) further action by nuclear-weapon States towards full transparency and accountability regarding their nuclear arsenals; (e) reversal of the maintenance of thousands of nuclear weapons in high-alert status and an immediate start to irreversible demobilization; (f) resumption of the work in the Conference on Disarmament, in particular towards a fissile material cut-off treaty; (g) immediate steps to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; and (h) withdrawal of any reservations or unilateral interpretive declarations by nuclear-weapon States that were incompatible with the object and purpose of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

57. Brazil and its partners in the New Agenda Coalition had presented a working paper with 22 recommendations on nuclear disarmament, building on the 13 practical steps. The vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States had never put their non-proliferation duties on hold, conditioning their fulfilment on indefinite, more favourable international conditions. A similar attitude was expected from the nuclear-weapon States regarding disarmament.

58. **Mr. Aguirre de Cárcer** (Spain), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the candidate countries Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the stabilization and association process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine, aligned themselves with that statement.

59. The European Union reaffirmed its commitment to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. It welcomed the nuclear disarmament measures and initiatives taken by the two nuclear-weapon States members of the European Union. In a recent decision, the Council of the European Union had stressed the need for concrete advances in the nuclear disarmament process, especially through an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons in accordance with article VI of the Treaty and for the rapid entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty and the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

60. It welcomed the considerable nuclear arms reductions which had taken place since the end of the Cold War, including by the two nuclear-weapon States which were members of the European Union, and the significant new agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on strategic arms reduction. That was an essential step forward, as those countries still retained about 95 per cent of the world's nuclear weapon stockpiles. It recalled the continued existence of significant deployed and stockpiled non-strategic arsenals which were not covered by formal arms control agreements and the commitment contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Their reduction and final elimination were an integral part of the disarmament process under article VI of the Treaty.

61. The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the launch of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would develop a global cap on nuclear arsenals crucial for further progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Pending its entry into force, the European Union called on States to abide by a moratorium on nuclear tests, to refrain from actions contrary to the Treaty and to dismantle as soon as possible all nuclear testing facilities in a transparent and open manner. The European Union would continue to offer practical support for the universalization of the Test-Ban Treaty and the credibility of its verification regime. It commended the progress achieved through the International Monitoring System, which had demonstrated its efficiency in detecting clandestine nuclear tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

62. A fissile material cut-off treaty would be an important complement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Test-Ban Treaty, and the Review Conference must urge States to commence negotiations without further delay. Pending the entry into force of such a treaty, the European Union called on all States to uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear devices and welcomed the actions in that regard of the five nuclear-weapon States.

63. The European Union would pursue the issue of legally binding security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, and called on all States to take appropriate practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.

64. Lastly, the question of the proliferation of missiles that could be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction was also a matter of concern in the context of international security, a concern that had been deepened by recently conducted tests outside all existing notification schemes. A collective response to missile proliferation was required, which should begin with consultations on a multilateral treaty banning short- and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles. The enhancement of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation could significantly strengthen global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts by increasing confidence and transparency.

65. **Mr. Manfredi** (Italy) said that the twofold task before the Committee consisted of assessing progress achieved towards nuclear disarmament and drafting a plan of action for the future. The assessment should focus on actual goals met and proceed in as impartial a manner as possible, avoiding value judgments and political posturing. The plan of action — to be drafted in Subsidiary Body I — should be based on the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. It should be ambitious but not overly so, in order to avoid repeating past failures to implement those steps. Moreover, the principles of irreversibility and verifiability of nuclear disarmament must be enshrined in the action plan as the constants in State party efforts to achieve the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

66. Nuclear disarmament was a complicated process that would entail several elements, namely, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the conclusion of a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty, the granting of negative security assurances, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and a consensus on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

67. The recent signing of a new strategic arms reduction treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, Powers that held over 90 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons between them, was a remarkable success that must be built upon rather than minimized, and that would facilitate the work of Main Committee I.

68. The world was at a critical juncture; as the five major nuclear-weapon States were realizing that the atomic deterrent was increasingly irrelevant to national defence and adapting their nuclear doctrines accordingly, some countries, still convinced of the indispensable nature of those weapons, were spending enormous sums of money to expand their already substantial arsenals, out of the erroneous belief that, failing such expansion, their national existence would be threatened or their voice would go unheard in the international arena. It was essential to ensure that the former view prevailed.

69. **Mr. García Moritán** (Argentina) said that despite such positive developments as the signing of a new strategic arms reduction treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, States parties must redouble their efforts to fully implement the Treaty, in particular articles I and VI. Since the reduction of arsenals, though certainly important, did not in and of itself constitute an effort to disarm, the new bilateral treaty should be considered in the context of a broader, ongoing

process of consistent reduction that would ultimately expand to include all nuclear-weapon States, with a view to the total elimination of their arsenals.

70. It should be acknowledged that the Review Conference was not in a position to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear disarmament programme, a task that fell to the Conference on Disarmament. Main Committee I should instead produce a road map that outlined specific priorities, namely, a sustained nuclear disarmament process involving all nuclear-weapon States; multilateral activity, with particular emphasis on the immediate negotiation by the Conference on Disarmament of a fissile material cut-off treaty; entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and other instruments already negotiated; and full compliance with treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the withdrawal or modification of interpretive declarations thereto. His delegation would cooperate fully in preparing such a road map.

71. **Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that nuclear disarmament and security assurances had been among the main elements in the package of decisions leading to the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. The adoption of the 13 practical steps by the 2000 Review Conference had renewed hopes for the implementation of the Treaty pillar of nuclear disarmament. Regrettably, subsequent developments in that area had not been promising. Despite the obligations of nuclear-weapon States under article VI of the Treaty and the commitments made by those States at review conferences, the ongoing development, deployment and maintenance of thousands of nuclear warheads in their stockpiles continued to threaten international peace and security.

72. Notwithstanding the recent rhetoric concerning reduction of nuclear arsenals, a lack of practical action in that area and continued efforts to expand missile defence after abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were among the obstacles to implementation of the agreements made at the 2000 Review Conference, the Final Document of which called on nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material from their decommissioned weapons under IAEA safeguards. The new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in April 2010 provided only for the decommissioning of the parties' nuclear weapons, the actual destruction of which remained optional. As it lacked a verification mechanism, the treaty did not incorporate the principles of increased transparency, a diminishing role for nuclear weapons or irreversibility agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference. In addition, nuclear-weapon States had failed to take practical steps towards reducing tactical nuclear weapons, thus breaking another commitment made at the 2000 Conference.

73. The Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believed that the current Conference should establish a standing committee to ensure and verify fulfilment of nuclear-disarmament obligations, given the absence of a mechanism for that purpose. The international community rightly expected statements on the reduction of nuclear arsenals to be acted on in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Despite pledges by the current Government of the United States of America, its new Nuclear Posture Review, which provided for the development and modernization of that country's nuclear arsenal, along with its failure to take concrete measures towards ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, provided clear indications of its continued policy of evading its nuclear-disarmament obligations. The Review also stipulated the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

against non-nuclear-weapon States, in contravention of the assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States in 1968 and 1995. Other distressing developments included the United Kingdom's Trident programme and France's addition of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine to its nuclear arsenals, as well as the latter country's silence on the underground Israeli nuclear programme.

74. The current Conference must urgently address the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their means of delivery by considering a decision prohibiting research, development, modernization and production thereof as well as a ban on the construction of any facilities for that purpose. It must also attend to the avowed violation of article I of the Treaty contained in the new Nuclear Posture Review by the United States of America, which provided for deployment of nuclear weapons in European Union territory. Nuclear-weapon States should likewise refrain from nuclear sharing under any pretext, including security arrangements or military alliances.

75. The policy of inaction of the United States of America and other nuclear-weapon States regarding the genuine threats posed by the nuclear arsenal of the Zionist regime to regional and international peace and security demonstrated a clear double standard and constituted an act of horizontal proliferation. While the potential role of non-State actors in nuclear proliferation must be dealt with, it was unfortunate that such issues were used by some nuclear-weapon States as pretexts to retain nuclear weapons and neglect their own disarmament obligations.

76. As the international community could not wait indefinitely for the total elimination of nuclear weapons to come to pass, the Conference should adopt a clear time frame for the full implementation of article VI. In that connection, his country firmly supported the proposal made by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to set 2025 as the deadline for total elimination of nuclear weapons. He reiterated his country's call for the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee for the negotiation of a convention on nuclear weapons. Until such a convention was concluded, nuclear-weapon States must refrain from development and research on nuclear weapons; threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities; deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries; and maintaining their nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.

77. Turning to the issue of security assurances, he recalled that in the early 1980s all five nuclear-weapon States had, with some qualifications, undertaken to refrain from using nuclear weapons against States parties to the Treaty and those who had renounced production and acquisition of such weapons, a pledge taken note of in the package of decisions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and enshrined in Security Council resolution 984 (1995). The international community should not await the deployment or even the threat of use of such weapons to react. That abhorrent doctrine, officially proclaimed by the United States of America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, indicated that no lesson had been learned from the nightmare of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

78. The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that nuclear weapons should not confer political clout or capability to influence world events or to change the decisions of sovereign States. Certain nuclear-weapon States, such as France, had tried to create smokescreens in the Treaty review process, making baseless allegations against non-

nuclear-weapon States in order to deflect attention from their own abysmal records and policies.

79. The current Conference must concretely address the failure of past review conferences to produce recommendations on the non-discriminatory provision of unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty. Any proposal that made such assurances conditional, using non-proliferation concerns as a pretext, was doomed to fail. To that end, his Government proposed the establishment of an ad hoc committee that would draft a legally binding instrument on the illegality of nuclear weapons and the provision of unconditional security assurances, to be submitted to the Conference for consideration and adoption. The Conference should also adopt a decision prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

80. Iran had also held an International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in April 2010 in Tehran. The conference had examined current challenges to the implementation of nuclear-disarmament commitments. In a message addressed to the Tehran conference, the Supreme Leader of the country had stressed that it was incumbent upon all to protect humankind from the grave threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction. Maintaining the delicate balance between the three pillars of the Treaty was vital to preserving its credibility and integrity. Non-nuclear-weapon States could not accept any new obligations as long as those undertaken by nuclear-weapon States remained unfulfilled.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

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Main Committee I

Summary record (partial)* of the 2nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 11 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe)
later: Ms. Barbulescu (Romania)
later: Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe)

Contents

General exchange of views (*continued*)

* No summary record was prepared for the rest of the meeting.

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

General exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. van den IJssel** (Netherlands) said that many developments and initiatives came together at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, each with the potential to reinforce the other. The conclusion of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction by the United States of America and the Russian Federation reflected the commitment of both countries to reducing their nuclear arsenals. He also welcomed the steps taken by some nuclear-weapon States to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, in line with obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and commitments made, in particular, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

2. Disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing. The existence of nuclear-weapon States should not be an excuse for further nuclear proliferation. Intensified efforts to disarm would strengthen non-proliferation standards in the interest of all: the risks of a world with nuclear weapons were the same for all States. Furthermore, the fact that nuclear-weapon States were primarily responsible for disarmament did not relieve non-nuclear-weapon States of their responsibility to contribute to the process.

3. Parliaments and public opinion were urging States parties to make progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons. To that end, bringing about the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and initiating negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty would be imperative.

4. The Review Conference should confirm and strengthen the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility of disarmament. In that connection, his country welcomed the disclosure by the United States of America of the number of nuclear weapons in its possession. States parties should also apply those guiding principles in committing themselves to the reduction and final elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, a commitment that the Conference must reaffirm. It was promising that the Russian Federation and the United States of America had indicated their willingness to include non-strategic nuclear weapons in future disarmament negotiations.

5. **Mr. Benítez Versón** (Cuba) said that, rather than limit itself to reaffirming past commitments, the Conference must adopt concrete measures that would contribute to nuclear disarmament, an objective that could no longer be postponed indefinitely. It was incumbent upon nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations leading to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, in fulfilment of their Treaty obligations under article VI. In that respect, the signing of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, while a step in the right direction, must neither breed complacency nor divert attention from the fundamental goal of total elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons. The existence of security doctrines based on so-called “nuclear deterrence” and on the modernization of nuclear arsenals was unacceptable. Likewise, Cuba called for an immediate halt in nuclear-weapon States’ deployment of nuclear weapons within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States. It was also high time to put an end to the policy of double standards and selectivity favoured by certain States, which singled out developing States’ alleged

failure to comply with non-proliferation obligations while enhancing their own nuclear arsenals.

6. The Committee and its subsidiary body must therefore consider, as a matter of priority, the following measures. An in-depth examination of the status of implementation of commitments agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, including the 13 practical steps, must be undertaken in order to determine the reasons behind the failure to implement those commitments and to agree on a corrective course of action. It would also be necessary to initiate negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, before 2025, and for the adoption of a nuclear-weapons convention. In the interim, States parties must conclude a legally binding international instrument under which nuclear-weapon States committed to refrain from the use or threat of use of such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, States must begin negotiating a non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

7. **Ms. Higgie** (New Zealand), speaking in her national capacity, said that her country had been heartened by several positive developments in the context of overall progress towards nuclear disarmament since the previous Review Conference. While the Nuclear Posture Review recently announced by the United States of America could have gone further in such areas as operational readiness, it was a significant step in the right direction, as was that country's renewed commitment to reducing the size and role of its nuclear arsenal. She also welcomed the conclusion by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction, and in particular both countries' recognition that the treaty marked the beginning of a process leading to further reductions. She urged both nuclear Powers to recall the agreement in 2000 that the principle of irreversibility must apply to nuclear disarmament measures. In addition, other nuclear-weapon States had taken steps to implement their article VI obligations, and the Secretary-General had issued a five-point plan for progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

8. Despite those positive developments, the world continued to live in the shadow of nuclear weapons, 40 years after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Review Conference provided an excellent opportunity to pursue tangible progress towards both reducing the number of nuclear weapons and diminishing their role in security strategies. One way to diminish that role would be to lower their operational readiness.

9. New Zealand continued to call on States that had not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so without delay. In that respect, it welcomed the declarations of intent to consider ratification recently made by the United States of America and Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea's announcement that it would ratify shortly. Her country shared the frustration expressed at the lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament towards the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, and stood ready to work towards achieving consensus on starting negotiations, though its patience was not infinite.

10. Despite the encouraging willingness of some nuclear-weapon States to increase the transparency of their nuclear arsenals by providing information about their nuclear holdings, the current ad hoc approach to reporting did not serve the Non-Proliferation Treaty well. In that connection, New Zealand was pleased to join

with Australia to promote an initiative on a more systematic approach to article VI reporting, which it strongly believed would foster a climate conducive to further progress on disarmament.

11. Speaking on behalf of Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria and Switzerland, the members of a cross-regional initiative on lowering the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems known as the De-Alerting Group, she said that the issue had first been given clear expression in one of the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. In accepting that step, the nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to institute concrete agreed measures to that end.

12. The Group had made the issue of operational readiness the subject of a series of General Assembly resolutions. It had also pursued a constructive dialogue with the nuclear-weapon States at the ministerial level and tabled a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.10) through which it sought to ensure that the final product of the Conference would contain a commitment by those countries to take concrete steps to de-alert their nuclear weapons. The working paper urged States parties to call on the nuclear-weapon States to report regularly on those steps.

13. While mindful of the varying levels of operational readiness among nuclear-weapon States and of the fact that imbalances in military arsenals might hinder progress towards widespread de-alerting, the Group insisted that nuclear-weapon States must find ways to overcome those issues if they were serious in seeking a safer world.

14. **Mr. Badr** (Egypt), speaking in his national capacity, said that nuclear disarmament was one of his country's main foreign policy objectives, out of its conviction that international peace and security could never be fully attained as long as nuclear weapons existed. In accordance with article VI of the Treaty and the 13 practical steps, nuclear-weapon States must undertake time-bound, irreversible measures to achieve nuclear disarmament.

15. Welcoming the signing of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, he looked forward to ratification of the treaty and hoped that it would be followed by further steps towards arms reduction on the part of all nuclear-weapon States. However, unilateral and bilateral efforts alone would leave thousands of nuclear weapons deployed and could therefore not replace collective measures by those States to fully implement NPT obligations within the multilateral framework. Furthermore, retaining a deterrent role for nuclear weapons was especially counterproductive to non-proliferation objectives, as were nuclear sharing and basing nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, in contravention of article I of the Treaty.

16. Egypt viewed with alarm attempts to link nuclear disarmament efforts to preconditions, such as the establishment of a certain political situation or the implementation of additional non-proliferation-related commitments by non-nuclear-weapon States. Such requirements illogically placed the onus of nuclear disarmament on those States. His country reiterated its call on the nuclear-weapon States to comply fully with their legal obligations under the Treaty and to initiate multilateral negotiation of a nuclear-weapons convention.

17. The Review Conference should reaffirm the urgent need to implement the 13 practical steps, which represented an internationally endorsed plan to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In the interim, nuclear-weapon States must

give non-nuclear-weapon States comprehensive, unequivocal, unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, in line with the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and decision 2 on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. There was a need to initiate negotiation of an international instrument to provide such assurances as soon as possible, with a view to furthering non-proliferation objectives and bolstering the Treaty's credibility. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States should also undertake measures to de-alert their nuclear arsenals, refrain from increasing the yield of their nuclear warheads and avoid developing new types of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear warheads.

18. Speaking on behalf of the members of the New Agenda Coalition, namely, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, he introduced the Coalition's working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.8), which drew on all previous working papers submitted during the current review cycle. The working paper contained a wide range of practical recommendations for achieving nuclear disarmament. The fact that it encompassed the views of a cross-regional group of countries should increase the likelihood of reaching consensus on the elements contained therein.

19. **Mr. Ali** (Malaysia) said that despite the positive developments of the previous few months, States parties had collectively failed to make the progress towards nuclear disarmament envisaged by the Treaty and by previous review conferences. Therefore, it would be necessary to revitalize the Treaty by reaffirming and implementing past commitments.

20. Nuclear disarmament remained his country's highest priority, given its conviction that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only way to avoid their use or threat of use. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had agreed that the indefinite extension of the Treaty did not accord nuclear-weapon States the privilege of possessing nuclear weapons in perpetuity. The benchmarks for nuclear disarmament contained in the 13 practical steps had yet to be met. Nuclear-weapon States should therefore take the lead by fulfilling all relevant commitments within a specific time frame and working towards the conclusion of a convention on nuclear weapons. In that context, while the treaty on strategic arms reduction recently concluded by the Russian Federation and the United States of America was a welcome development, Malaysia viewed it as part of the fulfilment of nuclear-weapon States' long overdue disarmament obligations. Cuts in deployments were no substitute for irreversible reductions aimed at the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

21. Noting the tendency to place non-proliferation compliance above disarmament compliance — evidence of the selectivity and double standards that had weakened the Treaty — he stressed that tangible progress within Main Committee I hinged on placing equal emphasis on both pillars as mutually reinforcing aims.

22. Malaysia remained gravely concerned at the ongoing deployment of nuclear weapons at high levels of readiness, and strongly believed that taking nuclear weapons off alert was a practical qualitative step that complemented the quantitative step of reduction. In addition, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States

must be undertaken as a matter of priority. In that regard, he welcomed the pledge by the United States of America in its Nuclear Posture Review to refrain from use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that were in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, and expressed the hope that that declaration of intent would motivate other nuclear-weapon States to follow suit and renew discussions of negative security assurances at the Review Conference.

23. The 2010 Conference should provide an example to other disarmament forums, in particular the Conference on Disarmament, which he hoped would make progress towards starting negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Malaysia also endorsed the decision to re-establish an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances with a mandate to negotiate in the Conference on Disarmament. Moreover, it supported efforts to bring into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as the continuation of the nuclear-weapon States' moratorium on nuclear testing.

24. *Ms. Barbulescu (Romania), Vice-Chairman, took the chair.*

25. **Mr. Belaoura** (Algeria) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as the proper framework for efforts to contain the gravest threat facing humanity, required the full implementation of all its provisions, together with all the related commitments assumed at the previous Review Conferences. The current Conference, held in the context of renewed interest in the nuclear weapons zero option, should draw on that momentum to adopt recommendations and a plan of action on all the issues before it, while maintaining the necessary balance between the three pillars of the Treaty and without discriminating between the interests of the States parties.

26. He welcomed the new arms reduction treaty concluded between the United States and the Russian Federation; it would, however, have a greater impact if it formed part of an effort to achieve nuclear disarmament rather than merely manage the nuclear threat. He called on other nuclear-weapon States to take similar steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals, noting their special responsibility in that regard. Ultimately, however, nothing short of the complete elimination of such weapons would be acceptable.

27. He called on the Conference to adopt a robust plan to that effect, including practical, gradual, complementary measures, with short, medium and long timelines, and to provide for a follow-up mechanism in order to monitor implementation of commitments. The plan of action should give priority to the conclusion of a treaty banning fissile material for weapons purposes through the commencement of substantive discussions in the Conference on Disarmament within a reasonable time frame; it should also urge the rapid entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Ratification by nine annex 2 countries was holding it hostage; his delegation welcomed the undertakings given by two of them, Indonesia and the United States, to ratify that instrument and called on the others to follow suit.

28. Pending complete disarmament, nuclear-weapon States should seek to reduce and eventually eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their defence and security strategies and give security assurances to other States; the scope and content of such assurances should be unchanging and they should not be subject to geographical limits. The Conference should accordingly reiterate the request for the conclusion of an international instrument to that effect.

29. *Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe), Chairman, resumed the Chair.*

30. **Ms. Laose** (Nigeria) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the key barrier against nuclear disorder and, for that reason, was the most widely accepted multilateral disarmament agreement in history. Nigeria remained committed to its objectives and welcomed the recent positive developments in the international security climate. Recalling her country's arguments against the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995, she said that it had become clear that a set time frame needed to be established so that what had been achieved over the 40 previous years would not be lost. The 2010 Conference should build on the recent progress towards nuclear disarmament and adopt concrete measures for a realistic international agenda in that area within a reasonable time frame. The only way to sustain the momentum created by the recent positive actions by the United States and the Russian Federation was to set timelines and benchmarks for targets to be attained.

31. **Mr. Tajouri** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that one concern of his country, reiterated during the general debate and in its working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.12) and which his delegation wished to see reflected in the final document of the Conference, was that all nuclear-weapon States should place their nuclear installations under the IAEA safeguards regime as part of a negotiated agreement with that Agency. It would thereby be possible to verify their compliance with their commitment to general and complete disarmament under article VI of the Treaty. He called on those States to follow the example set by his country, which had discontinued its nuclear weapons programme in 2003.

32. **Mr. Wang Qun** (China) said that the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons was one of the main aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the common aspiration of all peace-loving peoples. Broad progress in its implementation depended on a stable international security environment through efforts by all States to address the security concerns of other States within an appropriate international legal framework; transparent, irreversible and verifiable reductions in the nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapon States; early entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty and the rapid commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for the purposes of weapons; adoption of a legally binding instrument to ensure the adoption of a no-first-use policy by nuclear-weapon States, which should also reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies; implementation of the commitment of those States not to target their nuclear weapons against any country; withdrawal by the States concerned of their nuclear installations in other countries; and a multilateral discussion on a verifiable, long-term plan of phased action for disarmament, including a binding instrument on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and a multilateral treaty to ban the arms race in outer space.

33. China was unique among nuclear-weapon States in that it had always implemented its obligations under the Treaty in good faith and in a transparent manner. It applied a no-first-use policy, thereby ensuring that its weapons, which it kept to the minimum required for its own security, presented no threat to other countries; it did not deploy those weapons in other countries and it would not use them against non-nuclear-weapon States or in nuclear-weapon free zones. China supported the early entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty and, until then, continuation of the moratorium on nuclear tests; it likewise supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In conclusion, he drew attention to his

country's working paper on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.64) and expressed the hope that its content would be duly reflected in the final document.

34. **Mr. Valero** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that, as a traditionally peaceful country committed to a nuclear-free world, Venezuela called for an open and transparent exchange of ideas on ways of containing the nuclear threat. Despite their binding Treaty obligations, some States continued to develop their nuclear arsenals as part of their strategic security policies and even to consider using them against other States. Nuclear-weapon States bore the main responsibility for the reduction and elimination of such weapons: good-faith negotiations to that end were an essential means of building peace. Owing to a lack of the political will on the part of some of those States, indefinite extension of the Treaty had not had the expected result of bringing disarmament closer or of advancing implementation of the 13 practical steps. The current Review Conference therefore offered a welcome opportunity to reaffirm the States parties' commitment to the objectives of the Treaty through the adoption of a plan of action for nuclear disarmament, as proposed by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, setting out measurable and achievable stages to that end within a set time frame. There was an immediate need for a legally binding instrument that would provide non-nuclear-weapon States with negative security assurances: such an instrument would not only contribute to non-proliferation but also advance the universalization of the Treaty.

35. **Mr. Kongstad** (Norway) said that the Treaty was as much about disarmament as non-proliferation. Its indefinite extension in 1995 and the subsequent adoption, in 2000, of 13 practical steps had served to strengthen States parties' disarmament obligations. The sixth step, in particular, entailed an unequivocal commitment by nuclear-weapon States to the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Accordingly, for the 2010 Review Conference to be successful, it needed both to build on and go beyond the compact from 1995 and 2000. That meant remedying the absence of timelines for the establishment of a robust and credible disarmament and non-proliferation regime beyond the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty and the conclusion within five years of a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which were still pending. An action plan for nuclear disarmament was called for, with clear benchmarks and deadlines. The Conference must reconfirm the States parties' determination to take practical steps to achieve a nuclear-free world and agree on a concrete programme of work covering all three pillars of the Treaty up to 2015.

36. Norway welcomed reductions in nuclear arsenals, whether decided unilaterally or, as recently, between two States, the United States and the Russian Federation, which his delegation called on to continue their talks with a view to the inclusion of all categories of nuclear weapons, including tactical ones, in the nuclear arms control and disarmament processes. His country had joined a number of such initiatives. All nuclear-weapon States should be similarly involved, since all were equally subject to the obligation of disarmament; likewise, they should follow the recent welcome example of the United States in ensuring full transparency.

37. In order to build confidence that disarmament was taking place, verification was important; non-nuclear-weapon States should also be part of that process, in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty. Moreover, progress towards disarmament implied a halt to the development of new categories of nuclear weapons: there must be no new nuclear arms race. It was therefore imperative to

secure the early entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty. As for the projected fissile material cut-off treaty, long considered the next step in the multilateral nuclear disarmament process and which should also address the issue of existing stocks, the current impasse in the related work of the Conference on Disarmament called into question the usefulness of that forum.

38. Pending full elimination of nuclear weapons, it was important to reduce their role in security policies and to build on the current encouraging trend towards a further strengthening of negative security assurances. More also needed to be done to lower the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, which was a matter of concern to everyone and could not be left to nuclear-weapon States alone to deal with. One last topic that was of increasing relevance was that of an additional legal instrument to regulate the nuclear-weapon-free world to which all the States parties to the Treaty aspired, as the ultimate expression of their commitments under article VI. To that end, thought would also need to be given to nuclear weapons in the context of international humanitarian law.

The discussion covered in the summary record ended at 11.40 a.m.

NPT/CONF.2010/MC.I/SR.7

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

Distr.: General
22 June 2010

Original: English

Summary record of the 7th meeting*

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 24 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe)

Contents

Report of Main Committee I

* No summary records were issued for the 3rd to 6th meetings.

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Report of Main Committee I

1. **The Chairman** suggested that paragraph 9 of the draft report of Main Committee I (NPT/CONF.2010/ MC.I/CRP.4/Rev.1) should be replaced with the following text: “At the sixth meeting of Main Committee I, on 21 May 2010, the Chairman of Subsidiary Body I, Alexander Marschik (Austria), presented an oral report on the work of the Body and submitted a revised Chairman’s draft action plan (NPT/CONF.2010/MC.I/SB.I/CRP.1/Rev.1). At the seventh meeting of Main Committee I, on 24 May 2010, the Chairman concluded that the Committee had not reached consensus to attach the revised Chairman’s draft on substantive elements (NPT/CONF.2010/ MC.I/CRP.3/Rev.1) and the revised Chairman’s draft action plan of Subsidiary Body I (NPT/CONF.2010/ MC.I/SB.I/CRP.1/Rev.1) to the final report of Main Committee I and to forward it to the Conference for further consideration. The Committee took note of the Chairman’s statement.” The amended document would be forwarded to the plenary Conference.

2. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

C. Main Committee II

Summary records of the 1st to 4th and 10th plenary meetings

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

Distr.: General
10 June 2010

Original: English

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 10 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine)

Contents

Organization of work

General exchange of views

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Organization of work

1. **The Chairman** said that Main Committee II had the task of dealing with agenda items 16 (c) and 17 (NPT/CONF.2010/1). In addition, the plenary Conference had established a subsidiary body to examine regional issues and the Middle East, including the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. He drew attention to the proposed programme of work for the Committee and its subsidiary body, contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/MC.II/INF/1, and noted that the Committee had been allocated seven meetings, including two meetings for the subsidiary body. He intended to submit a draft report on the work of the Committee for its consideration as soon as possible.

2. *The programme of work was adopted.*

General exchange of views

3. **Mr. Abdelaziz** (Egypt), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, noted that the wording of agenda item 16 made it clear that Main Committee II should not only review the Treaty but also take into account the decisions and resolutions agreed upon at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. The Group intended to work with the Committee to agree on a strong and coherent outcome. To that end, he drew attention to the Group's comprehensive working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/ WP.46) and, in particular, to the specific proposals contained in the paragraphs relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Middle East, and safeguards and verification.

4. **Mr. Woolcott** (Australia) said that the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had a common interest in an effective, strengthened and universal safeguards system within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To that end, all States that were not parties should accede to the Treaty as soon as possible, without preconditions, and all States should sign and ratify additional protocols to their safeguards agreements, especially those with significant nuclear activities. In that connection, the 2010 Review Conference should unequivocally declare that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols now represented the verification standard pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty.

5. The Conference must also underline the importance of strict compliance by States with their safeguards obligations. In that context, Australia was concerned that Iran continued to act in violation of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and called for it to cooperate fully with IAEA to address existing concerns about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme. The continued non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its safeguards obligations presented another serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. He therefore called upon that country to meet its commitments with respect to the Six-Party Talks and to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions and its safeguards obligations.

6. All States should ensure that their export controls were strictly enforced in line with the major nuclear export control regimes. Australia's policy was to sell

uranium only to States parties with additional protocols in place and he encouraged other nuclear suppliers to adopt the same approach.

7. The Conference should urge States to take further measures to strengthen the security of nuclear material and facilities in order to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. For its part, Australia was using its network of bilateral agreements to ensure high standards of security for its uranium worldwide; it was engaging strongly with IAEA on nuclear security; and it was collaborating on capacity-building efforts in the South-East Asia and Pacific region.

8. Lastly, he said that his delegation would like to see the Committee's report reflect the elements contained in paragraphs 10, 11 and 16 of the joint working paper submitted by Australia and Japan (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.9), which contained a new package of practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures. He also hoped that the Committee's work would be facilitated by the draft language contained in its other joint working papers on export controls (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.17), physical protection and illicit trafficking (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.20) and compliance and verification (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.21).

9. **Mr. Abdelaziz** (Egypt) said that comprehensive safeguards agreements were the only verification mechanism established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Egypt, unlike other States that were not parties to the Treaty, including Israel, was firmly committed to complying with its agreement. However, in the light of the continued existence of facilities not subject to such safeguards in the Middle East, it was extremely surprising that States in the region in compliance with their safeguards commitments were now being asked to enter into additional verification obligations through the conclusion of IAEA additional protocols.

10. Such attempts to redefine existing obligations under article IV of the Treaty undermined efforts to achieve the universality of IAEA comprehensive safeguards, thereby detracting from the credibility of the Treaty. The 2010 Review Conference must succeed in addressing that challenge in order to strengthen and ensure the continued effectiveness of the Treaty.

11. **Mr. Gumbi** (South Africa) said that the international community must redouble its efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, strengthen the multilateral institutions responsible for disarmament and non-proliferation, and be vigilant against any steps that could undermine progress in those areas. In that context, all States should conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols as part of their collective efforts to address the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

12. In particular, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should fully and verifiably terminate any nuclear-weapons programmes, return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and place all of its nuclear facilities and materials under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Iran should also cooperate fully with IAEA to clarify all outstanding issues and fully implement an additional protocol pending its ratification.

13. IAEA must be fully involved in all discussions on nuclear fuel supply arrangements, which should be agreed on the basis of consensus and should not impose unwarranted restrictions or controls on the legitimate use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

14. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were an integral part of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. His delegation therefore welcomed the entry into force of such zones, urged the relevant States to sign and ratify the protocols to the treaties establishing them, and supported the establishment of additional zones. In that connection, the 2010 Review Conference should agree on measures to implement, as a matter of urgency, the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

15. **Mr. Domingo** (Philippines) said that his delegation wished to emphasize that the Review Conference must strike a balance between the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

16. The resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference had provided for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. That provision must be implemented as soon as possible and an international conference on the Middle East should be held at the earliest possible date. Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established in other regions and all States in each region should accede to any treaty establishing such a zone.

17. The IAEA non-proliferation framework should be further developed through the conclusion of additional comprehensive safeguards agreements and the universal adoption of additional protocols. The nuclear-verification capabilities of IAEA should be strengthened through the provision of appropriate legal tools and operational resources.

18. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must enter into force as soon as possible and, pending its entry into force, a moratorium on nuclear testing should be observed. In addition, work on a fissile material cut-off treaty must commence at the earliest opportunity.

19. The institutional implementation and continuity framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime must be improved. The President of the Review Conference could help ensure continuity between Review Conferences. Also, the operational management of the Treaty regime must be enhanced through the establishment of a dedicated implementation support mechanism.

20. **Mr. Danon** (France) said that in 2005 the Board of Governors of IAEA had found Iran to be in violation of its safeguards agreement, five Security Council resolutions and 10 resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors. Iran continued to accumulate low-enriched uranium and had begun enriching it up to 20 per cent, which was not justified for civilian purposes. Iran had refused the offers of dialogue and cooperation made by the six nations involved in talks with it (the Group of Six) and had been limiting its cooperation with IAEA in relation to various issues, including the possible military dimensions of its nuclear activities. An energetic response by the international community was therefore necessary. With its partners in the Group of Six, France had been redoubling its efforts to find a negotiated solution that addressed both Iran's needs and the grave concerns of the international community. Iran would isolate itself even further if it failed to meet the demands of IAEA and the Security Council.

21. Since 2005, North Korea had conducted two nuclear tests and had also tested a number of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. The Security Council, in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), had demanded the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programmes.

The European Union strengthened sanctions through a stricter embargo and heightened financial vigilance towards North Korean entities. The message sent to Pyongyang had been clear: neither its headlong pursuit of a nuclear-weapons programme nor its proliferation activities would be tolerated. France called on all other countries under investigation by IAEA to cooperate fully, which was the only way to dispel suspicions concerning their present or past activities.

22. The Review Conference must call for the universalization and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system. In addition, if a State party had not acceded to an additional protocol, IAEA could not carry out its mission in a credible manner. An additional protocol was the only way to provide credible assurances to the international community that a civilian nuclear programme was being used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Therefore, France encouraged the international community, IAEA and all States parties to continue promoting safeguards. France would continue to assist IAEA, specifically through its safeguards support programme, by making its expertise available and by helping to develop technologies for the detection of clandestine nuclear activities.

23. IAEA investigations had revealed the existence of a vast network that trafficked in sensitive technologies. The export of sensitive nuclear technology, equipment and materials must therefore be subject to rigorous and universally applied controls.

24. Prevention and non-proliferation efforts must also be strengthened in order to better control exports and access to training involving sensitive information, to counter proliferation caused by trafficking, to criminalize proliferation activities and to eliminate their sources of funding. Both France and the European Union were stepping up their efforts in that regard and in 2008 had adopted a new series of strategies to counter proliferation.

25. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) must also be fully implemented. The efforts of France in that regard had been unsparing and had included the organization of regional seminars.

26. **Mr. Abe** (Japan) said that the working paper submitted by Japan (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.5/Rev.1) underscored the importance of strengthening the non-proliferation regime through enhanced IAEA safeguards. Implementing an additional protocol facilitated rather than constrained the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan called on all States that had not yet concluded either a comprehensive safeguards agreement or an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible and it also called on States concerned to work further for the universalization of additional protocols by providing, for example, technical assistance to the States that required it.

27. Japan considered it especially important to provide developing countries with assistance for the establishment and maintenance of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material so that they could implement safeguards and develop peaceful nuclear activities without proliferation concerns.

28. Japan fully supported the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference and its provision to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Further, Japan once again called on India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions. It also called on all the Middle East States to participate in the

disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, including the Test-Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

29. In view of the threat posed by the nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Review Conference should condemn that country's nuclear tests. That country should abide by the relevant Security Council resolutions, retract its announced withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and comply with IAEA safeguards. It should also abandon all nuclear weapons and programmes, in accordance with the September 2005 joint statement of the Six-Party Talks. The final document of the Review Conference must refer to that situation so that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not mistake the will of the States parties.

30. IAEA had reported that Iran had not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in the country was being used in peaceful activities. Japan expressed concern that Iran had been continuing to expand its enrichment activities. In order to arrive at a peaceful and diplomatic solution, Iran should make determined efforts to restore the confidence of the international community and comply fully and without delay with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors. Japan also supported the impartial and professional efforts by IAEA to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme. The Conference should consider how it could deliver a strong message on that issue.

31. Japan had co-sponsored a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.4) on the strengthening of the review process. The paper suggested that a general conference be held annually to take both procedural and substantive decisions in order to make the review process more sustainable and responsive.

32. **Mr. Kleib** (Indonesia) said that Indonesia was one of the first countries to accede to an additional protocol with IAEA. The informal mechanism referred to as "Friends of the Additional Protocol" should be used to generate greater support for the Model Additional Protocol. Proposals relating to the Additional Protocol could also be put forward in the relevant multilateral disarmament forums, such as the First Committee of the General Assembly. States should also work together to increase outreach relating to the Additional Protocol, including through IAEA-coordinated seminars, workshops and training courses.

33. The confidentiality of safeguards information must be enhanced so that confidentiality concerns could no longer serve as a pretext for countries not to provide information requested by IAEA inspectors.

34. Indonesia hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would continue to cooperate with the signatories of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone to resolve pending issues and would accede to the Protocol to the Treaty without delay.

35. The Review Conference could recommend that negotiations be held at the earliest possible date among all the States of the Middle East to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone there. To expedite that process, a standing committee under the Non-Proliferation Treaty could be established to initiate contacts with Israel and the other States in the region. That committee could be composed of the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee, the Bureau of the Review Conference and the sponsors

of the resolution on the Middle East that had been adopted at the 1995 Review Conference.

36. **Mr. Guerreiro** (Brazil) said that his country had been a leading advocate of balance between the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Balance was especially crucial in the case of disarmament and non-proliferation, since they were closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing processes, for better or for worse, and because the non-proliferation obligations set forth in the Treaty were verifiable and objective whereas the obligation to disarm was open-ended.

37. Notwithstanding that dangerous asymmetry, which in the long run was unsustainable, the Treaty had proven highly successful in preventing proliferation. That was due in no small part to the credibility and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system. The universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements was urgently needed.

38. The balance of obligations on which the Treaty had been founded also extended the manner in which its commitments were to be verified. The Additional Protocol was not a part of that bargain. It was not fair to expect non-nuclear-weapon States, which had already undertaken unequivocal, credible and verifiable commitments to forswear nuclear weapons, to implement further enhanced verification measures, while the international community had yet to be presented with a time frame for achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. Enhanced verification mechanisms should be incorporated into a future convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. That would level the playing field by making zero nuclear weapons the norm for all States.

39. With regard to the arrangements known as nuclear sharing, Brazil recalled that each article of the Treaty was binding on the respective States parties at all times and in all circumstances and that all States parties should be held fully accountable for strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.

40. Brazil strongly supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the Middle East. It hoped that recent changes in the strategic doctrine of one nuclear-weapon State might pave the way for the withdrawal of reservations made by that State and other nuclear-weapon States in ratifying Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, so that the negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean would become straightforward and unequivocal. However, achieving negative security assurances was not an end unto itself but rather a temporary measure pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

41. Brazil called on all States to sign and ratify the Test-Ban Treaty without delay, in particular the remaining nine annex 2 States whose ratification was still needed for its entry into force. Instead of being held hostage to other issues or used as a bargaining chip, that Treaty should be seen in the light of its own merits, since its entry into force would clearly contribute to international security and stability at all levels.

42. **Mr. Grinius** (Canada) said that the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of Eight had recently met in Canada and had made public a statement on non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That statement was explicitly intended to contribute to the work of the Review Conference and its Main Committee II, which was why it addressed a number of

issues specifically related to the mandate of the Committee. He recommended that all the Committee participants read it in order to inform their discussions.

43. During consultations with the Vienna Group of 10, the representatives of Canada had helped to craft language for possible inclusion in the final document of the Review Conference. The results of those consultations related directly to the work of Main Committee II and could be found in working papers 15 to 21 (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.15 to NPT/CONF.2010/ WP.21).

44. States parties must conclude and bring into force a safeguards agreement with IAEA. The Conference must urge the 21 States parties that had not yet met that obligation to do so. The Conference must also reaffirm the importance of full compliance with article III and all the other articles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference should affirm that a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol were the verification standard necessary to provide credible assurance that a State was in compliance with its peaceful-use commitments under the Treaty. The Conference should also support the continued evolution of IAEA safeguards to a more information-driven system in which evaluation and implementation were based on all relevant information about a State.

45. The Conference should recognize the importance of effective national export control systems and should encourage States parties that had such systems to provide assistance to those that required it. In implementing their obligations under the Treaty, all States parties should take into account multilaterally agreed guidance on what constituted effective export control measures.

46. In addition, the Conference should highlight the importance of maintaining effective measures for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. Canada believed that the Conference should support IAEA assistance to States in their efforts to prevent trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, by underscoring the importance of regular contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. The Conference should also urge all States parties to ratify the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

47. Over the past year, Canada had discussed proposals on institutional reform with a cross-regional group of States and had refined those proposals into a series of draft decisions set out in working paper 4 (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.4). None of the proposed decisions would require an amendment to the Treaty nor would they affect the existing responsibilities and relationships between the Treaty and the Security Council or IAEA. Furthermore, all of the proposals were modular to the extent that each was presented individually for consideration rather than as a package.

48. Lastly, Canada welcomed the establishment in Main Committee II of a subsidiary body to address regional issues.

49. **Mr. Aguirre de Cárcer** (Spain), speaking on behalf of the European Union; the candidate countries Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the stabilization and association process countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro; and, in addition, Iceland, Liechtenstein, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that all States should work to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In order to preserve the central role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in promoting collective security, the Review Conference must reaffirm that all States should take concerted action to ensure strict compliance with their non-proliferation

obligations, and that the international community must respond quickly and effectively to instances of non-compliance.

50. In a recent decision, the Council of the European Union had stressed that the Review Conference should strengthen the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime by making the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols the verification standard under article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and by reaching a common understanding among States parties on how to respond effectively to a State's withdrawal from the Treaty and cases of non-compliance. The final document of the 2010 Review Conference should effectively address those issues.

51. The collective capacity to strengthen the non-proliferation regime would also be significantly improved by incorporating the forward-looking proposals of the European Union on all three pillars of the Treaty, contained in paragraph 5 of its working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.26).

52. The European Union remained gravely concerned at the major proliferation challenges posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which had both continued to violate their international obligations. Such defiance warranted a clear and firm response from the international community to bring those countries back into compliance with their non-proliferation and safeguards obligations, including strengthening the role of the Security Council so that it could take appropriate action. The lessons learned from the proliferation crises should also be reflected in the outcome documents of the 2010 Review Conference.

53. Effective international efforts to combat proliferation must be based on resolute cooperation to prevent and disrupt illicit transfers, control exports, counter illegal networks, secure sensitive material and prevent the financing of terrorism. In that respect, the European Union was committed to strong nationally and internationally coordinated export controls; appropriate surveillance and control measures; the highest non-proliferation, safety and security standards for enrichment and reprocessing technologies; and all measures to address the threat of nuclear terrorism, particularly Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

54. The European Union also reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening nuclear security, particularly through such efforts as the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; called on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the Amendment to the Convention in order to expedite its entry into force; and welcomed the relevant undertakings endorsed at the recent Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington.

55. The European Union continued to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones; hoped that the outstanding concerns about some of those zones could be resolved through consultations with all the parties involved; and reiterated its firm commitment to the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. It would also deliver a specific statement to the Committee's subsidiary body on the issue of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

56 **Mr. Davies** (United States of America) said that his Government would work to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to ensure that the rights and

responsibilities enshrined in all three pillars of the Treaty were upheld. It strongly believed that the IAEA safeguards system must be improved to respond not only to known and emerging threats, but also to unanticipated future challenges. To enable the Agency to fulfil its statutory mandate, the United States would work to build support for an increase in the IAEA regular budget and would also increase its own extrabudgetary contributions.

57. Comprehensive safeguards, bolstered by additional protocols, provided the Agency with the essential tools required to detect both declared and undeclared nuclear activities. The Review Conference should therefore affirm that the combination of the two instruments best fulfilled the objectives of article III of the Treaty; urge all States parties to conclude and bring them into force as soon as possible; and endorse steps to further strengthen and enforce strong export controls by making additional protocols the verification standard for nuclear supply arrangements.

58. Specifically, IAEA must develop a robust and flexible safeguards regime that took into account all information available to inspectors and was supported by an adaptive international technology base for advanced safeguards. In that context, the Conference should call upon IAEA to assess and implement measures to promote the highest standards for international safeguards, urge States parties to provide IAEA with the necessary resources to fulfil its mandate and confer due authority upon the Agency to that end.

59. For its part, the United States stood ready, inter alia: to provide assistance to States parties to help them implement their safeguards agreements and additional protocols in an effective and efficient manner; to contribute to a voluntary fund to help countries build capacity to meet their obligations pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004); to support realistic measures for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; to sign the protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones on a case-by-case basis, and to work actively with international partners to secure or eliminate excess stocks of proliferation-sensitive nuclear material worldwide, among other initiatives.

60. A strengthened non-proliferation regime would ultimately require not only an effective detection mechanism, but also an effective response from the international community to ensure that all States in violation of the Treaty came into full compliance. His Government therefore hoped that by the time of the next Review Conference all States parties would be in full compliance with the Treaty and that the IAEA safeguards system would be stronger, more resilient and universally accepted.

61. **Mr. Kruse** (Australia), speaking also on behalf of the Vienna Group of 10 (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden), said that it was important for Main Committee II to achieve common understandings on strengthening the effectiveness of the safeguards system of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on dealing effectively with non-compliance and proliferation issues, and on the risk posed by non-State actors seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, material or related items. Those challenges must be met firmly in a way that upheld the integrity of the Treaty and the authority of the IAEA safeguards system.

62. With such challenges in mind, the Group had prepared several papers of direct relevance to the Committee's work, which had been circulated as working papers (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.17, 20, 21 and 38).

63. **Ms. Mosley** (New Zealand) said that an additional protocol, in addition to a comprehensive safeguards agreement, should always feature as a condition in any new supply arrangement. New Zealand strongly urged all States parties that had not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol without delay.

64. While appreciating the efforts of IAEA to clarify all outstanding issues regarding Iran's past nuclear programme, New Zealand continued to have concerns about the nature of that programme and its possible military dimension.

65. New Zealand noted that the nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained a serious challenge to the non-proliferation regime as well as to peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and beyond. It had condemned the nuclear tests carried out by that country in 2006 and 2009 and it supported calls that the country comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions, return to the Six-Party Talks, honour the commitments it had already made in those talks and recommit itself to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

66. It was up to all States to ensure that export control regimes continued to work effectively and that they continued to support the international non-proliferation framework. Transparency in export controls should continue to be promoted within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty. New Zealand also urged all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports did not assist the development of nuclear weapons and that they were in conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty.

67. New Zealand looked forward to the day when there would be comprehensive nuclear-weapon-free zones in all parts of the world, including the Middle East.

68. Lastly, New Zealand had sponsored a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.4), which contained useful proposals to strengthen the institutional framework of the Treaty.

69. **Mr. Soltanieh** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that non-proliferation and disarmament were two complementary pillars, the implementation of which would promote safety and security. The third pillar, namely the peaceful use of nuclear energy, also played an essential role in fostering development, peace and prosperity.

70. Non-proliferation, along with the two other pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, faced serious challenges owing mainly to the non-compliance of some nuclear-weapon States with their obligations under articles I, II and IV of the Treaty. By maintaining their nuclear arsenals and their horizontal proliferation through the transfer of nuclear technologies and weapons-grade materials to non-parties to the Treaty, those nuclear-weapon States had also contributed to the emergence of new nuclear-weapon possessors. That was in clear violation of their obligations under article I.

71. In the past few years, efforts had been made to change the Treaty into one with a single goal. Nuclear-disarmament obligations had been completely overlooked and access to nuclear materials and technologies for peaceful use had been denied. At the same time, the non-proliferation obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States had been overemphasized as if the Treaty had no other provisions. Certain countries had

tried to impose more extreme and deeper restrictions on access to peaceful nuclear technology and sought to limit such technology only to nuclear-weapon States and a few staunch allies, some of whom were not even parties to the Treaty. In addition, nuclear-weapon States had imposed restrictions on other States parties who believed nuclear energy should not be used as a weapon. Clear examples included the growth of nuclear cooperation between Israel and the United States and a recent decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group that had demonstrated that non-parties to the Treaty enjoyed special privileges and were even being rewarded by Western countries.

72. The member States of IAEA were not treated in an equal, non-discriminatory manner as far as the safeguards regime was concerned. While non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty were subject to robust verification, surveillance and controls, non-parties and nuclear-weapon States were exempted from comprehensive safeguards. As long as the comprehensive safeguards agreement was not universally applied and nuclear-weapon States had not fully complied with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, acceptance of additional, legal obligations such as additional protocols was absolutely not justified. Additional protocols were merely recommendations by the IAEA Board of Governors, not texts negotiated by all member States, and thus were voluntary and not mandatory.

73. The unprecedented decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to provide nuclear fissile material to a non-party with an active nuclear-weapons programme was in clear violation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. That decision, which had been taken under pressure exerted by the United States, was also a violation of the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to promote the universality of the Treaty, in accordance with the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

74. The current challenges of the Treaty regime required the establishment of a new arrangement and a robust strategy to prevent the arbitrary proliferation measures of some nuclear-weapon States.

75. In the view of the United States and its allies, clandestine development of nuclear weapons by some non-parties to the Treaty was justifiable. Worse yet, they believed that such nuclear programmes could be supported through cooperation and the transfer of nuclear technology, materials and equipment by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It was a matter of great concern that such an approach had been taken to the nuclear weapons programme of the Israeli regime.

76. The 2010 Review Conference should be based on the full implementation of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations with regard to non-proliferation and should take into account a number of key issues. Proliferation by certain nuclear-weapon States was the most immediate risk threatening the non-proliferation regime. The legal status of article I of the Treaty and its implementation by nuclear-weapon States should be defined. Establishing a verification mechanism similar to the one under article III of the Treaty was essential. IAEA had to be entrusted with the verification of the nuclear materials released from decommissioned nuclear weapons. The view according to which the risk of proliferation arises from non-nuclear-weapon States should be revisited and the new strategy of the Review Conference should be focused on the proliferation risks of nuclear-weapon States. It was essential for all proliferation cases made by certain nuclear-weapon States to be examined. In order to strengthen non-proliferation, the nuclear-weapon States must

also refrain from cooperating with non-parties to the Treaty and undertake not to transfer any nuclear material, equipment, information, knowledge or technology to them. The only solution to ensure non-proliferation and remove the threat of the possible use of nuclear weapons was the total rejection of nuclear deterrence, through the conclusion of a universal, legally binding nuclear disarmament treaty. More than ever before, IAEA should demonstrate its commitment to implementing the safeguards and to facilitating the development of nuclear energy as its primary purpose.

77. In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA was the sole competent authority for verifying the nuclear programmes of States parties and as such played an important and sensitive role in addressing the nuclear activities of its member States. In that regard, IAEA should act within its mandate, its Statute and the safeguards agreements concluded with States parties. Any interference by other bodies such as the Security Council, as well as undue pressure from individual countries, would definitely undermine the credibility and integrity of the Agency and its statutory functions. Furthermore, the confidentiality policies of IAEA must be strengthened to prevent any sensitive or confidential information from being leaked. The Agency should establish a mechanism to handle breaches of confidentiality.

78. Another matter of concern to States parties to the Treaty was the increase of baseless allegations against the peaceful nuclear activities of other States. Politically motivated allegations that were based on unreliable and fabricated evidence created mistrust and confrontation among States parties. The Agency must therefore exercise maximum vigilance in handling unattributed information, baseless allegations and documents lacking authenticity. Moreover, article III of the Treaty stipulated that safeguards must be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States parties.

79. All States parties had a basic and inalienable right to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes and nothing should be construed as restricting that right. States' decisions with regard to the peaceful use of nuclear technology and their nuclear fuel cycle policies must be respected.

80. IAEA must be recognized as the sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards obligations of States parties. The Review Conference was expected to stress that there should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process.

81. The Review Conference should recall the resolutions of the IAEA General Conference, specifically resolution 533, and reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities. It should also reaffirm that any attack against or threat to attack peaceful nuclear facilities, whether operational or under construction, posed a serious danger to human life and was a violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the IAEA Statute. In that context, the Review Conference must declare the urgent need for a comprehensive, multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

82. The Review Conference was expected to call on the Israeli regime to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty promptly and without conditions and to place all its nuclear materials and facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy

Agency safeguards in order to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Any proposal that excluded prompt accession as a prerequisite for the establishment of such a zone was doomed to fail.

83. The Review Conference must emphasize the fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, the legal obligations of States under their respective safeguards agreements and, on the other hand, voluntary confidence-building measures, which did not constitute a legal obligation.

84. The Conference was expected to propose the establishment of a legal mechanism for the settlement of disputes and to provide a framework for compensation for the damage inflicted by developed countries as a result of their non-compliance with article IV of the Treaty, specifically their denial of transfer rights and the restrictions imposed on developing countries party to the Treaty.

85. The Conference was expected to propose the establishment of a mechanism to protect the confidentiality of the IAEA verification process.

86. Iran's nuclear activities, which had commenced in 1956, had been placed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1957, the Governments of Iran and the United States had signed an agreement of cooperation. Subsequently, a five-megawatt research reactor had been constructed. The first fuel produced was 93 per cent enriched and had been used mainly for the production of radioisotopes. In 1974, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran had been established. That Organization had been involved in all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, and many countries — including the United States, Germany and France — had been fully cooperating in that area.

87. After the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the late Imam Khomeini, had condemned nuclear weapons on a number of occasions. In one of his speeches, he had said that if atomic weapons continued to be made, the world might be pushed into destruction, and that everyone should make people aware of that danger so that they would stand up to the nuclear powers and prevent the proliferation of those arms.

88. On several occasions, including at the Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran had declared that nuclear weapons were forbidden by religion.

89. Following the Islamic Revolution, Iran had adopted three pillars for its nuclear policy. First, nuclear energy could be an option in Iran's energy mix. Second, nuclear weapons were not an option and had no place in its defence doctrine; Iran would pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Third, Iran would comply with non-proliferation and disarmament principles. Consequently, Iran would continue its compliance as a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty even though that Treaty had been ratified during the previous regime.

90. Following the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian authorities had been confronted with a critical situation, since all nuclear projects had been halted and foreign suppliers, mostly European and American, had suspended their activities and failed to fulfil their contractual obligations. Due to its complete technical dependency on foreign suppliers, Iran had faced serious difficulties. Therefore, pragmatic and cautious steps, taking into account existing Iranian infrastructure and aimed at nuclear technology transfer, had to be taken.

91. In recent years, Iran's nuclear activities had been turned into a political issue. The representative of Iran recalled that in 2000 the Director General of IAEA had paid his first visit to Iran, when he had been informed by the national Atomic Energy Organization of its intention to undertake certain activities relating to nuclear fuel cycle technology and to build facilities, including the Uranium Conversion Facility. Although Iran had not yet adhered to the newly modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement, it had nevertheless willingly submitted to the Agency the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the Uranium Conversion Facility in Isfahan. Iran had submitted that questionnaire to the Agency in 2000, almost four years before it had been required to do so according to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

92. In 2003, the IAEA Director General had visited the Natanz enrichment facilities. In his meeting with Iran's president, he had suggested that Iran should accept modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement and sign the Additional Protocol. Iran had agreed to implement the modified Code 3.1 proposed by the IAEA Board of Governors and had invited the Agency's experts to explore the various technical, legal and security dimensions of the Additional Protocol in order to pave the way for a decision to implement it. According to IAEA, the establishment of that uranium-enrichment facility was not in contravention of the safeguards obligations and Iran had not been obliged to submit the DIQ. Therefore, it was absolutely unjustified to claim that those activities represented non-compliance or concealment.

93. Lastly, in order to show utmost cooperation with the Agency, Iran had negotiated a workplan with it in 2007 and that plan had been fully implemented. The Agency therefore had no other choice than to fulfil its obligation to consider Iran's safeguards a routine matter and drop the issue from the agenda of the Board of Governors. A new chapter had begun and Iran would, of course, continue its cooperation and remove any existing ambiguities.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

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**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

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Main Committee II

Summary record of the 2nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 10 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine)

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General exchange of views (*continued*)

Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Benítez Versón** (Cuba) said that non-proliferation was the best guarantee for nuclear disarmament and thus the two should not be considered separately. The qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new weapons — both violations of States' obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty — was of great concern, especially given certain States' plans to deploy new anti-missile defence systems and to strengthen alliances with other States whose military strategies involved nuclear weapons. Cuba rejected the selective approach and double standards that some States were trying to impose on the international community in addressing disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control issues and their links with terrorism. Such an approach focused excessively on preventing horizontal proliferation, while ignoring the dangers of vertical proliferation; only the prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons could guarantee that such weapons would not fall into the hands of terrorists.

2. By complying fully with its obligations under the Treaty and with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, Cuba had demonstrated its firm commitment to the non-proliferation regime. It was the responsibility of States members of IAEA to ensure that the Agency's Statute was respected, and to prevent interference in its activities, especially with regard to the verifications process, that could undermine its effectiveness and credibility. He expressed concern at the imposition of unilateral measures by certain States and the interference of the Security Council in the exercise by IAEA of its mandate: only the Agency could verify compliance with its safeguards agreements.

3. Cuba was a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and supported implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Cuba complied strictly with its obligation under article 14 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco to submit semi-annual reports to IAEA, and was actively involved in the implementation of that Treaty. Cuba participated in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database; no incidents involving nuclear material had been reported for Cuba. Non-proliferation concerns must be resolved through diplomatic means and related measures must be adopted within the framework of international law, relevant conventions and the Charter of the United Nations.

4. **Mr. Enkhsaikhan** (Mongolia) said that it was important to take practical steps to strengthen IAEA and the important role it played in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including by providing additional resources and technology. Additional protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements were of vital importance as they provided assurances that declared nuclear material was not being diverted from peaceful uses, and that there were no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in a given State. He called on States that had not yet done so to ratify the such agreements and protocols without delay.

5. Nuclear-weapon-free zones helped significantly to promote a world free of nuclear weapons. He therefore welcomed recent treaties on such zones and the United States Government's announced intention to ratify the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, as well as the outcome of the second Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia held in April 2010. While Mongolia's status as a single-State nuclear-weapon-free

zone enjoyed wide international support, it was necessary to institutionalize that status together with the Russian Federation and China and to obtain a pledge from them to respect it. He hoped that the final document of the current Review Conference would not simply recognize and affirm Mongolia's status, but express support for its policy to institutionalize its nuclear-weapon-free status in the near future. Another priority of the Conference should be to draft practical recommendations for implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference.

6. **Mr. van den IJssel** (Netherlands) said that while his Government supported the right of States parties to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it was imperative to ensure that such development met the necessary non-proliferation requirements. Transparency was key to building confidence in that regard and its importance should be reflected in the Committee's outcome document. Furthermore, comprehensive safeguards agreements, which were essential in verifying the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, needed to be supplemented by additional protocols to allow IAEA to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. His delegation would therefore like to see a reference to the additional protocols included in the outcome of the current Review Conference.

7. The Netherlands was committed to upholding the highest standards of export controls, which were a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing States parties' obligations under article III of the Treaty, and to full transparency in that regard. Targeted institutional reform of the Treaty review process as set out in working paper No. 4 was desirable, as it could ultimately contribute to progress on substantive issues regarding implementation of the Treaty. His Government welcomed recent initiatives to combat nuclear terrorism more effectively as well as the announcement by Indonesia of its intention to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

8. **Mr. Valero Briceño** (Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)) said that the existence of nuclear weapons was the single greatest threat to world peace. While the non-nuclear-weapon States had made efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, including by establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, much more needed to be done. He urged States parties to adopt a number of measures at the current Review Conference to strengthen both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: nuclear-weapon States must withdraw interpretative declarations to additional protocols and to annexes to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones; States parties must reiterate the importance of establishing such zones on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among the States concerned; and States parties must reaffirm the commitments made at the 1995 Review Conference, in particular, the establishment without delay of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

9. Non-proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, and disarmament efforts were part of an interdependent process that must include the adoption of concrete measures first and foremost by nuclear-weapon States in order to advance the objectives of the Treaty. States parties must take joint action to strengthen the nuclear disarmament regime, as well as the authority and credibility of IAEA. He expressed concern at any initiative that attempted to ignore or delegitimize the multilateral disarmament regime previously negotiated in the relevant multilateral

forums or that sought to undermine the technical, non-political character of institutions created to deal with that regime. His Government objected to undesirable practices that violated the principle of the legal equality of States. For instance, some States were expected to comply with obligations not listed in any international agreement, while other States were exempted from their obligations under existing international agreements.

10. He reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, especially developing countries seeking to diversify their energy sources and achieve technological independence. Any attempt to restrict that right undermined the fundamental principles of the Treaty. Therefore, imposing obligations in addition to IAEA safeguards agreements as a condition for technical cooperation would require a re-interpretation of the Treaty and of States' obligations under the Treaty.

11. **Mr. Kongstad** (Norway) said that it was the responsibility of Iran to restore its credibility by complying with international demands to suspend sensitive elements of its nuclear programmes, exercising full transparency and entering into genuine negotiations with a view to reaching an acceptable outcome for all parties concerned. It was important, however, to stress that no one denied Iran its right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy; in fact, Norway had allocated funds to the nuclear safety projects carried out by IAEA in Iran. It was furthermore essential to restart the diplomatic process with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in order to bring it back under the authority of the non-proliferation regime.

12. IAEA must be equipped with the necessary financial, political and legal tools to carry out its safeguards mandate. Underlining the key role played by the latter as guardian of the non-proliferation regime, he said that Norway had consistently advocated for additional resources to be provided to the Agency. States parties must agree on a standard point of reference for the safeguards regime, which should be, at minimum, a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. Additional protocols did not represent a constraint on non-nuclear-weapon States in getting access to nuclear technology and equipment for peaceful uses, and furthermore helped boost international confidence and thus facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation. Additional protocols should be made universal as part of the evolving safeguards regime: they were the only way for a State party to graduate to integrated safeguards, which should become the norm in a world free of nuclear weapons. States parties should explore how IAEA could expand its data collection capabilities, modernize its Safeguards Analytical Laboratory and further strengthen its network of independent laboratories. It was also important to further enhance the safeguards cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and IAEA and ensure that all nuclear activities were brought under the Agency's supervision.

13. An early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty were imperative to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Making the former Treaty legally binding for all countries in the Middle East and strengthening safeguards would contribute towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. He welcomed the broad consensus on the need to further strengthen the role of IAEA in the securing of all sensitive nuclear materials within four years, as per the outcome of the Nuclear Security Summit recently held in Washington, D.C., and noted that his Government had announced a substantial contribution to the IAEA

Nuclear Security Fund. He echoed the call for universal accession to the relevant multilateral conventions and implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) through the adoption and enforcement of appropriate national legislation and stressed that the importance of export controls should be recognized in that regard. It was particularly encouraging to observe that the conversion of civilian research reactors to low-enriched uranium rather than highly enriched uranium was gaining renewed momentum. Elimination of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector would further facilitate the safe and secure development of nuclear energy in accordance with article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

14. **Mr. Elgannas** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that since universal compliance with the Treaty provided the best means of preventing nuclear proliferation, every effort should be made to ensure that all States not party to the Treaty acceded to it as non-nuclear-weapon States, unconditionally and without delay, and concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements. Cooperation between certain nuclear-weapon States that were party to the Treaty and certain non-States parties undermined the non-proliferation regime and should therefore be prohibited. Similarly, the attempt by any country to accede to the Treaty as a nuclear-weapon State would damage the regime's credibility and give countries an excuse to withdraw from the Treaty.

15. The IAEA safeguards system was a central pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Given the Agency's important role in preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, its authority should not be undermined. Measures must be adopted to protect the rights of States parties under the Treaty and to prevent any restriction on the exercise of those rights, in particular the inalienable right to peaceful use of nuclear energy.

16. Assurances given to nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should be reinforced; voluntary agreements alone should not suffice in that regard. The time had come to expand the mandate of IAEA to include verification of nuclear-weapon States' fulfilment of their disarmament obligations, through agreements to be concluded with the Agency aimed at confirming declared arsenal and stockpile reductions, in order to bolster the credibility of the Treaty.

17. Expressing support for efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world, he welcomed the recent developments leading to the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.

18. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had been a matter of great concern for countries in the region, not only because of the threat posed by the Israeli nuclear arsenal to regional and international peace and security, but also because of the failure, 15 years on, to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. That resolution had been considered a main element of the package of decisions that had led to the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

19. The Arab Group had submitted several working papers on the subject, based on the resolutions adopted by the League of Arab States at several Arab Summit Conferences, the most recent of which had been held in Libya in March 2010. He hoped that the ideas and measures set forth in the unified Arab position on implementation of the resolution on the Middle East would be discussed objectively

by the Conference and included in its final document. Israel must be induced to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State without delay and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. IAEA should implement relevant resolutions, in particular its resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities. Nuclear-weapon States must undertake not to transfer to Israel any nuclear materials or assist it in the use of nuclear energy, whether for peaceful purposes or military purposes, in accordance with the relevant Treaty provisions. The United Nations must also hold a conference, within a specified time frame, on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. A standing committee made up of the members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference should be established to follow up on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East and of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

20. An objective discussion of practical, tangible steps that might be taken to implement the resolution on the Middle East would be a major factor in determining the success of the current Conference. Furthermore, it would be illogical for implementation of the resolution to hinge on other conditions that might prove impossible to meet even in the long term because of Israel's obduracy, thus extending the current stalemate indefinitely. It was up to the international community, in particular depositary States parties, which had adopted the resolution on the Middle East, to assume responsibility and work towards its implementation.

21. **Mr. García Moritán** (Argentina) said that the outcome of the current Review Conference should include a reference to current non-proliferation issues at which States parties had expressed concern because they affected the regime as a whole. The non-proliferation regime took as its basis not only the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards system established under IAEA and regional agreements, but also complementary instruments, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. He welcomed the enforcement by IAEA of its safeguards system, which was essential in verifying the compliance of all States with their obligations. The system should also help to establish a reliable framework for the peaceful development and use of nuclear energy and international cooperation. The Agency's continued effectiveness was linked to the appropriate use of resources in the application of safeguards. While it was important to draw the international community's attention to any non-compliance identified by IAEA, measures adopted to deal with the non-compliance of certain States must remain exceptional, rather than the norm. Argentina and Brazil had established the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to monitor peaceful uses of nuclear energy in both countries.

22. It was important to ensure that objectivity, technical expertise, non-discrimination and, above all, transparency, continued to guide the actions of IAEA. In particular, principles such as technical cooperation and the protection of industrial and commercial development of peaceful uses of nuclear technology must continue to underpin the system of international safeguards. He furthermore stressed the importance of responsible policies on nuclear exports, including additional transparency on export controls. Related initiatives must not impinge, however, on States parties' legitimate right to access peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Argentina was an active member of all export control regimes which sought to ensure that nuclear energy was used only for peaceful purposes. Lastly, the full compliance of all States parties with their obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) contributed significantly to non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism.

23. **Mr. Dai** Huaicheng (China) said that the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation was a necessary step towards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and the preservation of regional and international peace and security. All States should base their security doctrine on mutual trust and benefit, equality and coordination in the interest of a peaceful and stable international environment.

24. Approaches to nuclear proliferation issues should be multilateral, working through the United Nations and other international organizations that had universal participation and democratic decision-making and exclude double standards and pragmatism. The international non-proliferation regime should be strengthened by enhancing the universality, authority and effectiveness of the Treaty. The IAEA safeguards system was a key element in preserving the effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime, which required universalization of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol and action by States to rigorously implement Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009). Regional nuclear issues should be addressed peacefully through peaceful and diplomatic means, without the imposition of sanctions or the use or threat of force. Nuclear non-proliferation efforts should not undermine the legitimate right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, although countries should be prevented from proliferation activities under the guise of peaceful uses.

25. China strictly fulfilled all of its international non-proliferation obligations and had put in place and enforced a comprehensive set of export control laws and regulations. It had committed itself to promoting multilateral and bilateral exchanges and cooperation in the field. In China's view, the international community should promote peaceful solutions to regional nuclear issues through dialogue and negotiations. That applied both to the Korean Peninsula and to the Iranian nuclear issues. In that connection, he drew attention to working papers submitted by China on non-proliferation and nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.64 and 67)

26. **Mr. Kim** Bong-hyun (Republic of Korea) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty faced unprecedented challenges, of which the most serious involved non-proliferation. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear development programme represented a serious threat to regional peace and security and the international non-proliferation regime. That country was the only State party to have withdrawn from the Treaty, after which it had proceeded to conduct several nuclear tests. The international community had reacted resolutely to that challenge, both through the Security Council and in the Six-Party Talks. The Republic of Korea sought to resolve the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem through its "Grand Bargain" initiative, aimed at persuading its northern neighbour to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions, denuclearize and return to the Treaty.

27. The Iranian nuclear programme posed a similar challenge to the Treaty, especially since the Islamic Republic of Iran's revelation of a number of previously undisclosed nuclear activities. While the Republic of Korea firmly supported the right of States parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Iran's refusal to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency and open its activities to international verification undermined the international community's confidence that it was complying with its international obligations. A major concern was Iran's uranium enrichment programme, a problem that could be addressed by supplying that country with the necessary reactor fuel from regulated multilateral sources.

28. The IAEA safeguards system needed to be further strengthened as a growing number of States looked to nuclear energy to supply their rising energy needs. The Republic of Korea strongly supported the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol as the new verification standard. His delegation urged all States to ratify both instruments as soon as possible.

29. The Republic of Korea welcomed the entry into force of the Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. In that connection he urged other zones to adopt the additional protocol as a core safeguards standard and for member countries to consider ratifying the Small Quantities Protocol.

30. The Republic of Korea participated in a range of international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism and prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear materials, including the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). His country had welcomed the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., in April 2010, which had laid new groundwork for international cooperation in the nuclear security field. It fully supported the guidelines and principles on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones adopted at the 1999 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and welcomed the recent announcement by the United States of plans to ratify the Protocols to the Treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the South Pacific. His country also supported the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference and its call for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East.

31. **Mr. Belaoura** (Algeria) said that the three pillars of the Treaty were mutually complementary and attempts to have one pillar dominate would undermine its integrity, credibility and effectiveness. Nuclear-weapon States must discharge their disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty, which would help to strengthen non-proliferation.

32. Algeria called for strict implementation of the Treaty, as nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation could be guaranteed only within the NPT framework. The International Atomic Energy Agency was the institution entrusted with monitoring and enforcing compliance with the Treaty, and it must be provided with the resources and authority it needed to deal with all non-proliferation cases. Algeria called for the universalization of the Treaty, which required all remaining States to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones under article VII of the Treaty further contributed to its strengthening. He urged States, especially nuclear-weapon States, to ratify the treaties establishing such zones. In that connection, it must be pointed out that the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference with a provision calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had remained a dead letter. That resolution had been part of the bargain struck at the 1995 Conference in order to gain approval of the indefinite extension of the Treaty. It was essential for Israel to place its nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA safeguards and inspection, as called for in the 1995 resolution. Algeria had submitted a set of practical proposals to the 2010 Review Conference aimed at securing implementation of the 1995 resolution and he hoped that the Conference would adopt the proposals and establish the machinery required to implement it.

Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality

33. **Mr. Grinius** (Canada) said that he wished to address some institutional issues relating to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Recalling that the Secretary-General had stated at the opening of the 2010 Review Conference that implementation of the Treaty would benefit from more systematic national reporting and better substantive and organizational support, and that participants might wish to consider ways in which a small, permanent structure could help, citing the lack of an effective tool for cases of non-compliance as a significant institutional deficit, he noted that the Treaty, unlike the Biological Weapons and Chemical Weapons Treaties, had no official institutional support. The review process had some shortcomings, as could be seen from the failure of the 2005 Review Conference and the lack of an effective response to the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Treaty. Canada recognized the need for political will to energize the review process. Its ultimate purpose was to make progress on substantive issues facing the Treaty. He drew participants' attention to a working paper submitted by Canada and 16 other States on further strengthening of the review process (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.4), in which they offered three proposals and some decisions accompanying each proposal. The proposals included providing for shorter but more frequent annual meetings, including extraordinary meetings, that could take both procedural and substantive decisions, forming a "Chairs' Circle" of past, incumbent and future Chairs to better sustain the Treaty's work during and between meetings, and bolstering the administrative capacity of the review process with a small support unit.

34. **Mr. Soltanieh** (Islamic Republic of Iran) asked whether the points raised by the representative of Canada were related to the agenda item and whether they should not be raised in another subsidiary body.

35. **The Chairman** noted that it had been decided at the third session of the Preparatory Committee in 2009 that institutional issues should be discussed by Main Committee II under the current agenda item.

36. **Mr. Soltanieh** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that he still challenged the relevance of those issues to the agenda of the Committee and that a decision to include them could be undone by the Committee.

37. **The Chairman** pointed out that the 2010 Review Conference, meeting in plenary during the opening week, had confirmed the decision in question, which could be found in document NPT/CONF.2010/1 at the end of annex V.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

7 June 2010

Original: English

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 3rd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 12 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine)

Contents

General exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

General exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Baddoura** (Lebanon), speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States and referring to its working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.29), recalled that the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been one of the fundamental elements that had made it possible to extend the Treaty indefinitely without a vote. Fifteen years later, failure to implement the resolution damaged the credibility not only of all the resolutions adopted at that Conference, but also of the Treaty itself. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference stated that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East remained valid until its objectives were achieved and called for Israel to accede to the Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

2. At the sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Conference, the Arab States had submitted working papers setting forth their positions on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East. Israel's persistent refusal to accede to the Treaty and defiance of the relevant resolutions threatened the safety and security of the Arab States, all of which were parties to the Treaty, and that of the region as a whole, casting doubt on the capacity of the Treaty to provide security, which might lead the Arab States to review their approach to the issue.

3. Stressing the need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the Group called on the Security Council to exert genuine pressure on Israel to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions. It also insisted on the establishment of a subsidiary body under Main Committee II to take up the matter and determine a follow-up mechanism.

4. In view of such considerations, the Arab States strongly urged the 2010 Conference to adopt resolutions in order to emphasize that the existence of any nuclear weapons in the Middle East constituted a threat to regional and international peace and security; reiterate the call on Israel to accede without delay to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; affirm that nuclear-weapon States should refrain from transferring to Israel any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or assisting it to acquire or develop such weapons; stress that all States parties to the Treaty should declare their commitment not to cooperate with Israel in the nuclear domain; call on the United Nations to convene an international conference that genuinely aimed, within a specific time frame, to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions; request IAEA to prepare the necessary reference documents; establish a standing committee comprising the members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference, with a mandate to follow up and monitor implementation by States parties of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference, and to submit a comprehensive report thereon to the 2015 Review Conference and the sessions of the Preparatory Committee; request the Secretariat of the United Nations to circulate State party reports for consideration at the 2015 Review Conference and sessions of the Preparatory Committee; and affirm to the Agency that the relevant IAEA resolutions should be implemented, including the resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities (GC (53)/RES/17), and that interim

reports on implementation should be submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference.

5. Speaking as the representative of Lebanon, he said that, while the Non-Proliferation Treaty had played a pivotal role in containing nuclear proliferation, it had not prevented some countries from obtaining nuclear weapons. Moreover, it had been insufficient insofar as the disarmament undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States were concerned.

6. The participants in the 2010 Review Conference must step up their efforts on several parallel fronts: accession to the Treaty must be universal; resolutions adopted at previous Review Conferences, notably the 1995 resolution on the Middle East must be fully implemented; all States must enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA; treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones were important in advancing non-proliferation; pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be a priority; non-proliferation concerns and efforts, while of the utmost of importance, should not hamper international nuclear cooperation, especially with non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, nor should it erode the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination; the nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty should adhere fully to its articles I and III.

7. **Mr. Al-Sudairy** (Saudi Arabia), recapitulating the salient points contained in the working paper submitted by the Group of Arab States (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.29), said that his country was gravely concerned at the failure to implement the resolution on the Middle East, fifteen years after its adoption at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Saudi Arabia also affirmed the necessity of implementing the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and noted that Israel's consistent refusal to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to implement the relevant international resolutions posed a threat to the security and stability of the region as a whole, a state of affairs that might prompt the Arab States — all of which were parties to the Treaty — to revisit their approach to the issue. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and constitute a step towards achieving universality of the Treaty in the region. The Security Council should therefore bring pressure to bear on Israel in order to compel it to implement United Nations resolutions calling for the establishment of such a zone. It was to be hoped that the resolutions adopted by the 2010 Conference would reflect the recommendations set forth in the working paper submitted by the Group of Arab States.

8. **Mr. Ryabtsev** (Ukraine) said that all States must comply with their non-proliferation obligations, including their safeguards agreements with IAEA and relevant Security Council resolutions. Ukraine fully supported the efforts of IAEA to resolve safeguards implementation issues associated with States' safeguards agreements. It was very important for States to accept a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol so that IAEA could provide credible assurances regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear materials and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities.

9. Ukraine called for the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, especially in regions of tension and in the Middle East in particular. To

that end, it called on all parties concerned to take the practical and urgent steps required for full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference.

10. Ukraine welcomed the recent ratifications of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which constituted an important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, combating international terrorism and preventing nuclear materials and technologies from falling into the hands of non-State actors.

11. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation), referring to article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, said that the implementation of IAEA safeguards was an important prerequisite for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Furthermore, additional protocols, which helped to detect potentially undeclared activities, should be signed and ratified by all States as swiftly as possible and should also be one of the criteria used for decisions on nuclear exports. The Russian Federation was already prepared to make the existence of an additional protocol one of the conditions for the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology and equipment. Recommendations to that effect should be contained in the outcome document of the 2010 Review Conference.

12. Countries had a right to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, provided that they abided by their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and complied with their IAEA safeguards agreements. With respect to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, he therefore called on the international community to pursue a political and diplomatic solution to the current crisis, and urged Iran to show the goodwill necessary to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, including by complying with the relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors.

13. The Russian Federation supported the Agency's efforts to enhance the effectiveness of its safeguards, including with respect to their legal, organizational and technical aspects. It had been providing technical support to the Agency's safeguards system for 26 years through its own national programme, which included the analysis of environmental samples in Russian laboratories, the training of inspectors and personnel in accounting and control techniques at Russian specialized institutions, and the development of new technologies to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

14. His delegation also supported the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. They had shown that it was practicable to establish an agreed procedure for the transfer of controlled items without limiting the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The universal application of their control lists to nuclear exports and projects for cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be advisable. The Russian Federation export control system was itself based on the control lists and export regulations compiled by both bodies.

15. All countries should implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of non-State actors, particularly terrorists. Further progress in that area would be facilitated by the agreements reached at the Nuclear Security Summit held recently in Washington, D.C.

16. The Russian Federation was cooperating actively with IAEA to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material. In that connection, his Government underlined the importance of the Agency's systematic efforts to strengthen the international physical protection regime and welcomed the successful implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009; regularly submitted information to the Agency for inclusion in its Illicit Trafficking Data Base; would make a voluntary contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund in 2010 with a view to further strengthening the nuclear security regime; and urged all States to sign and ratify the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as soon as possible.

17. The Russian Federation supported the IAEA programme to reduce the level of enriched nuclear fuel in the research reactors of IAEA member States to below 20 per cent. While the success achieved to date was welcome, the most powerful research reactors using the greatest amounts of highly enriched uranium had still not been converted to low enriched uranium.

18. Lastly, his delegation welcomed the progress achieved by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, launched by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in 2006. The Global Initiative, with which 79 member States were now associated, was a positive example of international efforts to combat new threats and challenges. The Russian Federation attached great importance to the forthcoming sixth plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to be held in Abu Dhabi in June 2010.

19. **Mr. Lauber** (Switzerland) said that his country expected four elements to be included in the final document of the 2010 Review Conference. The first was a call for all States that had not yet done so to implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement as quickly as possible with IAEA. The implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement was an obligation under article III, paragraph 1, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, one with which some 20 States had yet to comply. The second was a request to IAEA to engage in discussion in order to identify incentives for States to implement an additional protocol and integrated safeguards, including a reduction in verification costs. Such an approach could facilitate discussions on the Model Additional Protocol and its eventual establishment as a key element of the new safeguards standard. The third element was the adoption of a process for the implementation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, pursuant to the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference. The fourth was the commitment of all States parties to seek ways of bringing States not party to the Treaty closer to the non-proliferation regime without undermining the principles of the Treaty. Such States had the same responsibilities as States parties for global stability. Hence, it was legitimate to demand that they integrate the rules of the non-proliferation regime into their practices. The start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would be a useful way of further involving States that were not parties to the Treaty in non-proliferation efforts.

20. Switzerland hoped that the final document of the Review Conference would address the institutional strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To that end, it had joined a number of other States in sponsoring working paper 4 (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.4), which envisaged the holding of annual meetings with decision-making powers and the creation of a Treaty support unit.

21. **Mr. Askarov** (Uzbekistan) said that it was in the interests of all countries to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was the cornerstone of international security, and that it was more important than ever to maintain a balance between its three pillars.

22. Against that background, he welcomed the signature of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction between the United States and the Russian Federation and commended the constructive contribution to non-proliferation efforts made by the Nuclear Security Summit held recently in Washington, D.C.

23. His delegation particularly wished to note that the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, held recently in New York, had reaffirmed that nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, made a major contribution to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process, and to regional and international security. The international community, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, must therefore provide appropriate support to facilitate the efforts of the States parties to treaties establishing such zones.

24. In that context, he welcomed the decision of the United States Government to seek the Senate's approval for ratification of protocols providing for United States participation in the nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the South Pacific, as well as its readiness to consult with the parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central and South-East Asia with a view to signing and ratifying the protocols to those treaties. However, further efforts were now needed by all relevant stakeholders to implement the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

25. Lastly, he urged the participants in the 2010 Review Conference to support the working paper on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones submitted by the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.54).

26. **Ms. Mishar** (Malaysia), reaffirming her country's commitment to non-proliferation and the central role of IAEA in nuclear safeguards and verification activities, called on all States to abide by their safeguards agreements; to exercise full transparency in their nuclear programmes, which should be subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols; and to fully comply with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Only those measures would provide credible assurances to the international community of the peaceful nature of all nuclear programmes. In that connection, IAEA must be given the necessary resources to discharge its mandate in an effective and professional manner. There was also a need for the Agency to enhance the rules and modalities governing the confidentiality of information related to safeguards.

27. Malaysia particularly wished to express its support for the IAEA project entitled "Enhancing Capabilities of the Safeguards Analytical Services" and for the addition of new certified laboratories to the Agency's Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) to address delays in environmental sampling. In that connection, she was pleased to announce that Malaysia was in the process of establishing its own environmental sampling laboratory which, she hoped, would one day be a part of NWAL.

28. As a country committed to fully implementing its safeguards obligations, Malaysia welcomed safeguards inspections at its sole research reactor facility. Furthermore, as an undertaking to ensure transparency, it continued to provide IAEA safeguards inspectors with access beyond the defined material balance areas of the facility.

29. Malaysia, which had taken note of the Agency's efforts to improve nuclear safety worldwide, called for greater international cooperation in the handling of nuclear and radiological material in view of the transboundary nature of potential hazards. It also called on those States that had not yet done so to immediately sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which Malaysia had ratified on 17 January 2008.

30. **Mr. Abbas** (Iraq) said that IAEA had been established to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to facilitate the exchange of relevant scientific information and technology between States parties to the Treaty, which would contribute significantly to human progress and to closing the scientific and technological gap between developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, peaceful nuclear programmes had been saddled with unjustified restrictions and conditions that contravened the letter and spirit of the Treaty, thereby preventing the Agency from fulfilling its mandate.

31. Referring to the working papers submitted by Iraq to the current Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.57-59), the contents of which his delegation hoped would be included in the outcome of the 2010 Conference, he called on IAEA to intensify its efforts to assist States parties in developing the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology to developing States, in particular through its Technical Cooperation Programme. IAEA was ideally placed to guarantee the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes; it should be possible, within the framework of IAEA, to devise an acceptable and non-discriminatory mechanism to enhance the transparency of such programmes. Nuclear cooperation between States should take place against the background and in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

32. Nuclear-weapon States and IAEA should step up their provision of technical assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty, and non-States parties should be urged to accede to the Treaty and thereby become eligible to reap the benefits of technical programmes.

33. Iraq was fully committed not only to disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements but also to international arrangements relating to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution. His country had signed an additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA in 2008 and would voluntarily apply the protocol as of 17 February 2010, pending its ratification. In addition, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs had further affirmed his Government's commitment to the non-proliferation regime in official letters to the Security Council and IAEA (S/2010/37), both of which had welcomed the steps taken by Iraq in that regard.

34. Nuclear terrorism posed a formidable threat to international security, hence the need for strict nuclear security measures to prevent nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists or other parties not authorized to possess them.

35. Since reliance upon nuclear weapons to ensure security would inevitably lead to a regional arms race, countries should instead opt for peaceful and diplomatic multilateral discussion in order to resolve tensions and conflicts. Nuclear non-proliferation could only be achieved by universal accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the placement of all installations and programmes under IAEA safeguards. Moreover, acceptance by States of the IAEA Additional Protocol would reinforce the Agency's verification role.

36. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would undoubtedly strengthen the non-proliferation regime and with it, national, regional and international security. Any attempt to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East must include the nuclear disarmament of Israel, its accession to NPT and placement of all its nuclear installations under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. Failure to implement the resolution on the Middle East would perpetuate regional tensions and further complicate the challenges linked to achievement of the universality of the Treaty, undermining its credibility. Security and stability in the region required the eradication of all weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, nuclear weapons, pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted annually by consensus, in addition to the resolution on the Middle East.

37. **Mr. Reyes** (Colombia) said that his delegation wished to emphasize the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones and of implementing the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference concerning such a zone in the Middle East.

38. Colombia also wished to emphasize the need for universal accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In addition, progress should be made in negotiating a legally binding instrument to expand and consolidate security assurances and in strengthening the review process.

39. Tightening non-proliferation measures was especially important in order to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons or technology. Colombia supported the independence and impartiality of IAEA. It therefore rejected any attempt to politicize the Agency's work. IAEA activities, especially those involving verification, must be carried out efficiently and with full transparency.

40. **Mr. Al-Hajraf** (Kuwait), recalling that the Arab States had agreed to the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on the condition that that Conference adopt the resolution on the Middle East, expressed regret that, to date, the resolution had not been implemented. The current Conference had before it an important opportunity to redress the situation by putting in place a clear programme of action to that end.

41. The Arab States' accession to the Treaty attested to their proactive approach to peace and constituted a gesture of goodwill, representing the first step towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Instead of guaranteeing the security of any State, possession of nuclear weapons was bound to aggravate tensions and make the terrifying prospect of a regional arms race increasingly likely, especially in the context of the Middle East region's particular security-related challenges.

42. His country insisted that Israel must accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. As the existence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East posed a threat to regional and international peace and security, the international

community must bring pressure to bear on Israel to implement the relevant United Nations and IAEA resolutions, in addition to refraining from supplying Israel with nuclear technology or otherwise cooperating with it in that area.

43. **Mr. Jonker** (Netherlands), speaking also on behalf of Belgium, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Spain and Turkey, drew attention to a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.69) which contained the views of those countries on the central role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the international non-proliferation regime. He hoped that the views expressed in the working paper, which elaborated on the working paper submitted by those countries to the third session of the Preparatory Committee held in May 2009 (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.33), would make a useful contribution to the final documents of the 2010 Review Conference.

44. **Mr. Obisakin** (Nigeria) said that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be encouraged until such time as nuclear weapons ceased to exist. Noting with satisfaction the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, he called on all African countries to sign or ratify that Treaty and particularly looked forward to its ratification by the United States of America.

45. In that connection, he reiterated his country's support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; called on all United Nations Member States in the Middle East, and all nuclear-weapon States, to support the urgent implementation of General Assembly resolution 50/66; and called for the United Nations to hold a conference aimed at resolving the Middle East crisis with the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including all Arab countries, Iran, Israel and the five permanent members of the Security Council.

46. Lastly, his delegation called for closer cooperation among the members of nuclear-weapon-free zones and stressed the need to undertake all efforts to enhance the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the work done by IAEA and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2010/MC.II/SR.4

**Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

Distr.: General

9 June 2010

Original: English

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 13 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine)

Contents

General exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

General exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Zanathy** (Hungary) said that the “nuclear renaissance” produced by the rising demand for nuclear energy would bring with it new proliferation challenges resulting from transfers of nuclear materials. A robust export control system was already in place to monitor and facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation in compliance with Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009) and in accordance with article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In that connection, Hungary urged all interested States parties to be guided by the export control arrangements contained in the Understandings of the Zangger Committee and the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Strengthened international solidarity and enhanced transparency in transfers of nuclear material and technology had been affirmed in decision 2 on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reconfirmed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

2. The Nuclear Suppliers Group had been operating on the basis of such principles and sought to promote openness and understanding of its activities and aims. It was prepared to support efforts by States to adhere to and implement the Guidelines, as reflected in the Public Statement adopted at its plenary meeting in Budapest in June 2009. It had also recently updated a document detailing its origins, role and activities, which was circulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as INFCIRC/539. The Group had also implemented an ambitious informational outreach programme to promote adherence to the Guidelines.

3. Since the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the Nuclear Suppliers Group had actively worked to update and strengthen its control lists, and the results of that review had been published in IAEA documents INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/

Part 2. On the basis of the Guidelines, the Group was working to strengthen export controls of enrichment and reprocessing technologies and to make adherence to the Additional Protocol a condition for nuclear supply. The Group had also examined issues raised by the proposed United States-India civilian nuclear cooperation.

4. In March 2009, the Hungarian parliament had approved a proposal on the enlargement of the Hungarian nuclear power plant at Paks by one or two units. Authorities would have to pay particular attention to physical protection and to the application of non-proliferation regulations with regard to nuclear dual-use technologies. Hungary hoped, in that connection, that the international export control regimes, in particular that of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, would become universally recognized.

5. **Mr. Gumbi** (South Africa) said that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had decided, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely. That decision had been adopted as part of a package consisting of decisions on principles and objectives and the strengthening the review process and the resolution on the Middle East. However, more than a decade later, no progress had been made in implementing the resolution to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle

East. South Africa called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty and put its nuclear facilities and activities under full-scope IAEA safeguards without delay.

6. **Ms. Barbulescu** (Romania) introduced Working Paper No. 3 submitted by Romania and the Russian Federation on the repatriation of all Russian-origin fresh highly enriched uranium (HEU) as well as spent fuel from Romania to the country of origin under the auspices of IAEA. The development of nuclear power programmes needed to be pursued with due consideration for nuclear safety and the application of IAEA safety standards.

7. Discussions in 1999 between the United States and the Russian Federation on the possibility of cooperation on a Russian take-back programme had evolved into a tripartite initiative with IAEA, with the United States providing the funding on condition that the reactor sending its HEU back to Russia agreed to convert to low-enriched uranium (LEU). The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) had been launched in 2004 to promote the repatriation of research reactor fuel, and the process of HEU minimization had been launched, a process sometimes called the “global nuclear clean-out”, to counter the threat posed by nuclear material, which was often held at poorly secured research facilities. Non-proliferation, physical security and environmental concerns were also important aspects of the process, involving safe management of spent nuclear fuel, storage capacity, availability of qualified high-density reprocessible fuel and national self-sufficiency. The Director General of IAEA had sent a letter in September 2000 to nearly all of the States with Soviet-supplied research reactors announcing the Russian take-back programme and the United States offer with regard to costs. In November 2003 the Russian take-back programme had been formalized in a United States-Russian agreement.

8. Research reactors had played an important role in the development of nuclear science and technology. Of the more than 650 research reactors that had been built around the world, only 275 were still operating and 375 had been closed, of which 168 had been decommissioned. A number of the currently operating reactors were under-utilized and might be closed in the near future. Civilian nuclear research reactors using HEU fuel were used in medicine, agriculture and industry and for basic scientific research. The countries of origin of that fuel had the long-standing non-proliferation goal of reducing the amount of HEU that was used and stored in those reactors. The United States had established a programme to convert reactors from HEU to LEU fuel, which was considered to be less of a proliferation threat, as well as other programmes to take back HEU from foreign research reactors for safe storage and disposal. The major goal of those programmes was to eliminate inventories of HEU by returning spent nuclear fuel to the country where it had originally been enriched. Those programmes were fully supported by IAEA under its Technical Cooperation Programme.

9. TRIGA research reactors, such as the Romanian plant at Pitesti running at 14 megawatts of thermal power, were unique in that they offered true inherent safety rather than relying on “engineered safety”. The Pitesti plant had completed the conversion process to LEU fuel. The other Romanian research reactor in Magurele was of a different type and had been decommissioned. One of the most important aspects of decommissioning was how to deal with the fresh and spent nuclear fuel stored on site in wet storage pools. In the framework of the programmes described earlier, Romania had repatriated all fresh HEU fuel to the Russian Federation in 2003 and all spent HEU fuel in 2009. Romania had thus become one of a dozen or

more countries to have all of its HEU removed, which had led to a permanent threat reduction in that potential bomb material had been removed. The cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation on spent nuclear fuel repatriation was beneficial to the entire world and represented leadership on the part of the nuclear super-Powers.

10. **Mr. Rauf** (International Atomic Energy Agency) said that he wished to inform the Committee that a recent ratification had reduced the number of safeguards agreements not yet in force from 20 to 19 and that there were 100 States parties that had ratified additional protocols.

11. **Mr. Hallak** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Syrian Arab Republic saw the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements under article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as providing the basic pillar of the NPT regime. Implementation of safeguards must not, however, hamper economic growth or international cooperation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. His delegation found offensive the allegations made by certain delegations that the military facility destroyed by Israel in September 2007 had been a nuclear facility under construction and that Syria had not cooperated fully and openly with IAEA. In June 2008 Syria had invited IAEA inspectors to tour the destroyed military facility and other sites, in particular the research reactor in Damascus, and had offered them full access and cooperation. The inspectors had collected environmental specimens and radiological measurements and had determined that the destroyed site bore no relation to nuclear activities and that Syria's declared nuclear materials remained in peaceful activities. The States making those false allegations would do better to improve their own cooperation with IAEA. Syria's cooperation with IAEA would continue in accordance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.

12. **Mr. Enkhsaikhan** (Mongolia) noted that various conferences and organizations, in particular the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, had recently endorsed Mongolia's institutionalization of its nuclear-weapon-free status. However, it was time to go beyond merely recognizing Mongolia's status to express support for its policy. In that connection, he drew attention to the conference room paper on the subject that his delegation had submitted to the subsidiary body of the Committee.

13. **Mr. Hoffmann** (Germany) stressed the importance of the IAEA verification system based on comprehensive safeguards agreements and the more recent additional protocols, which provided crucial elements in confirming peaceful use of nuclear energy and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. He pointed out that implementation of additional protocols led not only to gains in efficiency but also to cost savings.

14. **Mr. Masek** (Czech Republic) drew attention to the growing oversight and verification burden on IAEA and called for the recognition of the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the additional protocol as the new core verification standard. Requiring the implementation of additional protocols would facilitate cooperation between States and the Agency, give the Agency broader verification competence and enable a more structured approach to safe operation and verification.

The discussion covered in the summary record ended at 11.05 a.m.

NPT/CONF.2010/MC.II/SR.10

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

17 June 2010

Original: English

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 10th meeting*

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 24 May 2010, at 5.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine)

Contents

Draft report of Main Committee II

* No summary records were issued for the 5th to 9th meetings.

The meeting was called to order at 6.05 p.m.

Draft report of Main Committee II

1. **The Chairman** said that since consensus had not been reached, he took it that the Committee wished to submit to the Conference a draft report which was no more than a technical and procedural account, as contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/MC.II/CRP.2/Rev.1.

2. **Mr. Soltanieh** (Islamic Republic of Iran) proposed that in paragraph 7 of the draft report, in the second to last sentence, the words “and the Chairman’s intention to forward to the President of the Conference the draft reports contained in documents NPT/CONF.2010/MC.II/CRP.1/Rev.2 and NPT/CONF.2010/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.1” should be deleted.

3. **Mr. Aly** (Egypt), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, proposed that in paragraph 7 of the draft report, at the end of the last sentence, the words “without prejudice to any decision to be taken by plenary” should be added.

4. **The Chairman** said that he took it that the members of the Committee wished to conclude their work by forwarding to the plenary of the Conference the draft report as orally revised.

5. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.

D. Main Committee III

Summary records of the 1st to 2nd , 4th and 10th plenary meetings

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

Distr.: General
10 June 2010

Original: English

Main Committee III

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 10 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Nakane (Japan)

Contents

Organization of work

General exchange of views

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Organization of work

1. **The Chairman** said that Main Committee III had the task of dealing with agenda items 16 (d) and (e) and 17 (NPT/CONF.2010/1). In addition, the plenary Committee had established a subsidiary body which would focus on item 16 (e). He drew attention to the draft programme of work for the Committee and its subsidiary body, contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/MC.III/INF.1.

2. *The programme of work was adopted.*

3. **Mr. Cancela** (Uruguay), Chairman of Subsidiary Body III, said that the subsidiary body would discuss provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that were not addressed by Main Committees I and II or their subsidiary bodies. Its objective was to prepare a consensus text for inclusion in the report of Main Committee III to the Conference. Open, transparent and inclusive consultations would be held in order to determine which topics were worthy of consideration.

General exchange of views

4. **Mr. Abdelaziz** (Egypt), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, noted that the wording of agenda item 16 made it clear that Main Committee III should not only review the Treaty but also take into account the decisions and resolutions agreed upon at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. The Group intended to work with the Committee to agree on a strong and coherent outcome. To that end, he drew attention to the Group's comprehensive working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/ WP.46) and, in particular, to the specific proposals contained in the paragraphs relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

5. **Ms. Lacanlale** (Philippines) said that all States parties to the Treaty had a right under article IV to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The technical cooperation programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was the primary mechanism for implementation of that article. Her delegation therefore welcomed the announcement by the United States of America of an additional commitment of US\$ 50 million over the following five years towards a new IAEA peaceful uses initiative. Her delegation encouraged other States to make further contributions, and supported working paper 13 (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.13) submitted by Japan, which stressed the importance of nuclear knowledge sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries.

6. Her delegation supported strengthening of the IAEA safeguards and verification regime in order to ensure States' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. Nuclear security was vital and was the primary responsibility of States. At the same time, her country appreciated the value of regional networks and initiatives, which complemented the work of IAEA. The Philippines was considering the development of nuclear power, and was taking legislative action to ratify the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Although notable progress had been made in improving nuclear security, the use of nuclear power still met with widespread scepticism. Further efforts were

needed in order to strengthen the security regime and raise awareness. The Philippines also recognized the importance of accession to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management.

7. The Philippines supported a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, with a central role for IAEA. Such an arrangement would provide options in order to service nuclear facilities, while also strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The consultation process should continue in order to address outstanding concerns. The resulting mechanisms should ensure equal access to nuclear fuels, and guarantee that no State or group of States gained a monopoly over the process. Most of the proposals submitted thus far related to the front end of the fuel cycle. However, the issues of spent fuel management and the proper storage and disposal of nuclear and radioactive waste should also be addressed.

8. **Mr. Kruse** (Australia) said that as the world's third largest producer of uranium, his country took seriously its obligation under article IV to facilitate exchanges for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Australia was one of the main contributors to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, and also made significant extrabudgetary contributions to the Regional Co-Operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific. He welcomed the announcement by the United States Secretary of State that her country would make an additional contribution of \$50 million to the IAEA programmes for peaceful uses. The right to peaceful uses enshrined in article IV of the Treaty was clearly linked to the non-proliferation provisions of articles I and II, and it should be exercised in a framework that reduced proliferation risk and adhered to the highest international standards for safeguards, security and safety.

9. Not all States with nuclear programmes needed to have uranium enrichment facilities and proliferation of fuel-cycle facilities would pose serious security risks. A multilateral approach to the fuel cycle with a well-functioning market was the best assurance of adequate supply. The comprehensive safeguards agreement together with the Additional Protocol should be recognized as the verification standard for non-nuclear-weapon States. He hoped that the Conference would reach an understanding on appropriate international responses to withdrawal from the Treaty.

10. His country and Japan had submitted a new package of practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures to the Conference as working paper 9, which, inter alia, reaffirmed the right of all States parties to the Treaty to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, supported the work being done by IAEA to provide assistance to States for such use and urged States planning to build nuclear reactors to become parties to the relevant international instruments on nuclear safety. His delegation hoped to see the elements of that working paper reflected in the Committee's report to the Conference.

11. **Mr. Gumbi** (South Africa) said that peaceful nuclear cooperation and access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were integral components of the Treaty. Scientific exchange was of particular importance to his country and others in Africa that were exploring ways of diversifying their energy sources. As the use of nuclear energy became more prevalent, the activities of IAEA in implementation of its mandate to enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world would become increasingly important, notably in accelerating development and reducing poverty in Africa, and in that

regard he welcomed the announcement by the United States that it would increase its contribution to IAEA for such activities. It was time to include the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme under the Agency's regular budget in order to ensure predictable funding and, in general, to treat peaceful uses of nuclear technology on an equal footing with the Treaty's other objectives.

12. **Mr. Abdelaziz** (Egypt) said that, given the continuing impact of the energy crisis and global warming, the use of nuclear energy for both power and applications in health, food, agriculture and water resource management would increase. It was vital for the Conference to take steps to protect the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, in particular, to strengthen and fully fund IAEA technical cooperation activities. The Conference was not the appropriate forum for technical discussions related to safety, security, transport or liability.

13. The 2000 Review Conference had recognized that protection of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy was a fundamental objective of the Treaty and that in pursuit of that objective preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account. He expressed concern that talk of multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle would lead to curtailment of the sovereign right of States to develop a full nuclear fuel cycle. Such concerns were compounded by the fact that conditions for technical cooperation imposed on States parties were disregarded when entering into agreements with States that were not parties, in effect rewarding States for remaining outside the Treaty. Similarly, in some quarters there was a tendency to view withdrawal from the Treaty as more of a threat to international peace and security than non-adherence, when, in fact, the reverse was true. It was no coincidence that calls to restrict the right to withdraw were coming from the same sources as the practice of selective imposition of preconditions for technical cooperation.

14. **Ms. Mangin** (France) said that nuclear energy was becoming an increasingly attractive alternative in a world where the price of fossil fuels was on the rise and their cost to the environment becoming increasingly evident. Developing countries were eager to take advantage of the potential contribution of nuclear energy to development, and countries with uranium reserves were eager to exploit them. It was urgent for the international community to facilitate that process while limiting risks.

15. As a country that obtained 80 per cent of its electricity from nuclear power, France felt keenly its obligation to share its considerable expertise in managing the nuclear fuel cycle with the rest of the world. In cooperation with IAEA and with the support of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, it had hosted an International Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Energy in Paris in March 2010 that had been attended by 63 States, as well as various international organizations and private companies.

16. Increased use of nuclear energy presented many challenges, including preventing illegal trafficking, managing radioactive waste, protecting the environment, and financing training and development. Those challenges would have to be managed by a new nuclear regime administered by a strengthened IAEA. The right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy enshrined in article IV was conditional on a commitment to non-proliferation and the maintenance of the highest standards of safety and security. Such conditions did not make the right to peaceful uses of

nuclear energy any less inalienable; on the contrary, ensuring responsible exercise of that right would help to preserve and strengthen it. Her country was as firm in its support of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy for countries that complied with international safeguards as it was in its opposition to nuclear cooperation with any country that flouted them. It encouraged the countries with which it cooperated bilaterally to sign the Additional Protocol alongside a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

17. Properly trained human resources were critical to all aspects of nuclear power. She urged international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to fund nuclear power as a completely non-carbon energy source. France supported the establishment of a European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute and the creation of an international network of nuclear safety experts to conduct independent evaluations of nuclear power plants under IAEA auspices. It also supported the establishment of an international bank of low-enriched uranium to ensure against interruptions in fuel supply. While opposed to measures that barred countries from access to fuel-cycle technologies, it recognized the proliferation risks associated with such technologies, and, pending further decisions from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, would continue to maintain policies in line with the Statement on Non-Proliferation adopted by the Group of Eight Summit at L'Aquila. Her country employed a closed cycle that recycled a maximum amount of uranium and minimized waste, and would be happy to put its reprocessing facilities at the disposal of other States.

18. She commended the Director General of IAEA for his focus on nuclear applications in health, agriculture and resource management. The Conference offered an opportunity to create a new "nuclear solidarity" that struck the right balance between development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and responsible non-proliferation policies.

19. **Mr. Komizo** (Japan) said that as a country with few natural resources, Japan had embraced nuclear power early, and approximately 30 per cent of its electricity was supplied by nuclear power plants. It had signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol, ratified relevant international instruments, and enacted appropriate national legislation. It was a supporter of international cooperation on nuclear energy and was happy to share its expertise with a view to helping other countries create a "3S" infrastructure of safeguards, safety and security. As a country prone to earthquakes, Japan took particular interest in the seismic safety of nuclear power plants. It would also engage in confidence-building dialogue with coastal States to reassure them of the safety of transport of nuclear materials. It fully endorsed the communiqué and workplan adopted at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. He hoped that a consensus could be forged from the wide range of views being expressed on the nuclear fuel cycle.

20. One of the Treaty's main goals was promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy not only for electric power but also for applications in health, agriculture and industry. His country had submitted a working paper on strengthening the technical cooperation activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency which stressed the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries. In that regard, his country welcomed the IAEA Director General's cancer therapy initiative. His country had a 100 per cent rate of attainment

in its contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund and encouraged other States to pay their respective shares.

21. The withdrawal issue needed to be addressed seriously by the Conference's subsidiary bodies, but it should not be necessary to amend article X. As a country that had benefited greatly from nuclear energy, Japan stressed that peaceful uses of nuclear energy should conform to the highest standards of safety, security and transparency, and reaffirmed the role of IAEA in that regard.

22. **Mr. Parnohadiningrat** (Indonesia) said that like other developing countries, Indonesia took great interest in the potential contribution of nuclear energy to development. The right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was a fundamental component of the "grand bargain" of the Treaty, and care should be taken to ensure that additional tasks given to IAEA did not interfere with the Agency's statutory mandate of promoting nuclear technology for peaceful use. He welcomed the reiterated commitment of the Director General of IAEA to more predictable funding for technical cooperation and was pleased to announce that his country would join in sponsoring the working paper on strengthening IAEA technical cooperation activities submitted to the Conference by Japan.

23. The more widely nuclear technology was disseminated, the greater the risk that it would be put to uses that violated the Treaty. Multilateralization of the fuel cycle was one possible solution to that problem, provided that supplies were assured and accession to the Treaty was a condition of access. Export controls could also reduce the risk of proliferation, as long as they were non-discriminatory and took care not to restrict materials intended for humanitarian purposes. The Technical Cooperation Programme of IAEA should be the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and that Agency should not be politicized in any way. He looked forward to discussion of proposals designed to deter States parties from withdrawing and to encourage all States planning to build nuclear reactors to take the necessary domestic measures to become parties to the relevant international instruments.

24. **Mr. Mourão** (Brazil) said that his country rejected the view that the international community did not have adequate tools at its disposal to confront proliferation. Nuclear energy was an indispensable component of development and an increasingly desirable alternative to fossil fuels. The inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes predated the Treaty and should remain sacrosanct. Multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle should not impinge on that right or hinder the normal functioning of the international market for nuclear goods and services. While international cooperation was important, no country should be asked to depend on the goodwill of other countries for access to the benefits of nuclear technology. His country had been among several that had on occasion been denied access to nuclear goods and services to which they were contractually entitled.

25. In addition to reaffirming the right of States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and recognizing the legitimacy of peaceful nuclear programmes, the Conference should focus on universalizing the Treaty, strengthening IAEA safeguards and supporting the development of proliferation-resistant technologies. Instead of perpetuating the division between nuclear "haves" and "have nots", the Conference should act to ensure both the protection of rights and the fulfilment of obligations provided for by the Treaty.

26. **Mr. Grinius** (Canada) said that his country had dozens of nuclear cooperation agreements with dozens of countries, and was willing to extend cooperation to any partners that met its non-proliferation requirements. Ensuring that peaceful use of nuclear technology would not lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons was crucial for sustaining confidence in the Treaty.

27. The Committee should recommend that the Conference take action to ensure that the balance between rights and responsibilities enshrined in the Treaty was protected and practically implementable; stress that compliance with the Treaty's non-proliferation and verification requirements was the essential basis for peaceful nuclear cooperation; and recommend that IAEA continue to play its essential role in providing technical cooperation to developing countries. The IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme should be transparent, accountable and results-oriented. As current President of the Group of Eight, his country noted that the members of that Group stood ready to provide the technical assistance necessary for States to fulfil safeguards and safety and security requirements, and benefit from nuclear applications in the areas of power, health and food security. Canada had been contributing to IAEA Major Programmes since the Agency's inception and supported, inter alia, its Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power.

28. He welcomed the November 2009 decision by the IAEA Board of Governors to establish a low-enriched uranium reserve in Russia, as well as other proposals to establish multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle that would assure supply of fuel and services. The Conference should acknowledge the value of multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle that could offer additional confidence in supply beyond that provided by the market and eliminate the need for States to invest in costly and complex fuel-cycle technologies. The Conference should also address potential abuses of the Treaty's withdrawal provision. He drew attention to working papers submitted by the Vienna Group of 10, which contained specific recommendations related to peaceful uses, export controls, physical protection and other issues of relevance to the work of the Committee.

29. **Mr. Aguirre de Cárcer** (Spain), speaking on behalf of the European Union; the candidate countries Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the stabilization and association process countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia; and, in addition, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that every State had the right to determine its own energy strategy and to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The European Union would continue its efficient and effective support of IAEA. It supported plans to modernize the Agency's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory and was preparing a significant financial contribution to its work. A growing number of States parties to the Treaty were considering developing civil nuclear programmes. The European Union would work to promote such endeavours while ensuring that nuclear technologies were not used for military purposes.

30. The Council of Ministers of the European Union believed that Main Committee III should focus on broadening acceptance and support for the responsible development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions, and for multilateral approaches to the nuclear-fuel cycle (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.31). He also drew attention to the

proposals contained in the document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.26, and in particular paragraph 6. Those proposals could be included in a plan of action to be adopted by the Conference.

31. The European Union had developed one of the world's leading nuclear industries on the basis of the standards set forth in the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM Treaty). The European Union would continue to ensure that the effective verification of such programmes did not hinder the responsible use of nuclear energy. The European Union recognized the need to support States interested in developing a nuclear power programme by helping to provide training and establish the necessary regulatory, administrative and human environment. It noted with interest the convening in Paris on 8 and 9 March 2010 of the International Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Energy, which had allowed a fruitful exchange of experiences.

32. The European Union made substantial voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund of IAEA, and promoted the latter's nuclear security projects through such mechanisms as the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, and through bilateral cooperation with States. The European Union was the largest contributor to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund. Over €20 million had been invested to improve nuclear security in third States. He called on the States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the Amendment as soon as possible.

33. Where it was technically and economically viable to do so, States should minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in peaceful nuclear activities. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle had much to offer. They would complement the existing market without distorting it, thereby providing nuclear fuel supply security for States developing peaceful nuclear programmes.

34. Initiatives such as the establishment of a low-enriched uranium bank under the control of IAEA could facilitate long-term multilateral solutions. The European Union was prepared to contribute up to €25 million for the establishment of an IAEA nuclear fuel bank, once the modalities had been defined and approved by the Agency's Board of Governors. The European Union welcomed the agreement between the Russian Federation and IAEA for the creation of a low-enriched uranium reserve. Several States members of the European Union had put forward similar proposals. The Director General of the Agency had launched valuable initiatives regarding the medical uses of nuclear energy in developing countries with the objective of promoting economic development.

35. **Mr. Kruse** (Australia), speaking on behalf of the Vienna Group of 10, said that the Group affirmed the right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as long as they fulfilled non-proliferation, safety and security responsibilities. It had submitted working papers on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear safety, the nuclear fuel cycle and physical protection of nuclear material, each of which contained language carefully crafted to facilitate consensus. It had also submitted a working paper proposing specific elements it wished to see included in any action plan adopted by the Conference.

36. **Mr. Stratford** (United States of America) said that as the Treaty entered its fifth decade, the Conference provided an opportunity to review progress in the

peaceful use of nuclear energy. Under article IV, States had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as long as they fulfilled their non-proliferation responsibilities. Because uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing could be diverted for military purposes, IAEA had categorized them as sensitive technological areas. Fortunately, States did not need to invest in costly and complex fuel cycle technologies, because the market was capable of ensuring adequate nuclear fuel for civilian uses, and international nuclear fuel banks could provide added assurance of supply.

37. His country had been a pioneer in civilian nuclear cooperation. From the inception of its Atoms for Peace programme in 1953, it had worked with partners around the world on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was the single largest contributor to IAEA programmes to develop nuclear applications in health, agriculture and water management, providing over 25 per cent of both the Agency's regular budget and its Technical Cooperation Fund. In her speech at the Conference's opening session, his country's Secretary of State had announced an additional contribution of \$50 million over the next five years. Interest in the use of nuclear energy to generate power had increased dramatically in the five years since the previous review conference and was projected by IAEA to more than double by 2030. The United States was a major supporter of the Agency's efforts to guide that expansion based on clear milestones. It also had bilateral cooperation arrangements with over 40 countries.

38. The Treaty's three pillars were mutually reinforcing, and no one of them should be allowed to undermine any of the others. The United States would remain committed to addressing proliferation risks so that no State party would be hindered in its pursuit of peaceful uses.

39. **Mr. Kafando** (Burkina Faso) said that because future access to fossil fuels was uncertain, a growing number of States were seeking to develop nuclear energy. Nuclear technologies could make an essential contribution to agriculture, health and environmental protection. All States parties to the Treaty had an inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, that right was conditional on compliance with non-proliferation obligations and IAEA safeguards. Non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology were therefore mutually reinforcing.

40. Burkina Faso attached great importance to the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and believed that the Agency had sole responsibility for promoting that right. States that were in compliance with their obligations should not be hampered in the exercise of their rights. His country welcomed the leadership of IAEA and believed that it should receive the necessary resources for the fulfilment of its mandate.

41. **Mr. García López-Trigo** (Cuba) said that it was vital to maintain a balance between the three pillars of the Treaty. All States had the right under article IV of the Treaty to develop use and production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference had stated that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements. The 2010 Review Conference should reaffirm that principle.

42. Cuba attached particular importance to the technical cooperation programmes of IAEA and had been cooperating with the Agency since 1977. However, the Agency had experienced difficulties in obtaining the necessary equipment for its projects with Cuba. Because of the unilateral and unjust embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba, United States companies or companies in which United States investors had a stake could not sell equipment to Cuba. That situation hampered Cuba's peaceful nuclear programmes; for instance, equipment had to be bought from remote locations.

43. In accordance with the Statute of IAEA, technical cooperation programmes should not be subject to any political conditions. Cuba was concerned at attempts to introduce conditionalities for the full exercise of the right enshrined in article IV, for instance by establishing an obligation to ratify an additional protocol. Such obstacles contravened the letter and spirit of the Treaty, and hampered the Agency in the fulfilment of its mandate. Any attempt to use the Agency as a political tool must be rejected. Agreements for the monitoring of transfers must be transparent, non-discriminatory and open to all States. The Review Conference should establish a mechanism, such as a permanent committee meeting between review conferences, in order to address any specific cases in which transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes were blocked.

44. Cuba had taken note of the various proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. The issue was a complex and multifaceted one, and had wide-ranging technical, legal, political and economic implications. It therefore required cautious and thorough consideration and comprehensive and transparent negotiations. Discussion of the matter should be based on the idea that the provision of nuclear fuel must not under any circumstances become the monopoly of a small number of States, much less an additional mechanism for political pressure. Proposals on the topic should be consistent with the Statute of IAEA and should not prejudice the fundamental right enshrined in article IV of the Treaty. Any decision should be adopted by consensus and with the participation of all States.

45. Any attack or threat of attack against civil nuclear facilities, whether active or under construction, posed a danger for humanity and the environment and violated the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of IAEA. A comprehensive instrument should be adopted on the basis of multilateral negotiations in order to prohibit such actions.

46. **Mr. Enkhsaikhan** (Mongolia) said that nuclear energy could help to meet energy needs, improve health care, protect the environment, foster agricultural development and improve the management of water resources, thereby promoting sustainable development and the realization of the Millennium Development Goals. The Conference should reaffirm the right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. It should be clearly underlined that nuclear energy meant both power and other applications.

47. Over 60 countries were considering developing nuclear industry, in particular through the construction of nuclear power stations. While fully supporting the inalienable right enshrined in article IV of the Treaty, his delegation believed that compliance with the non-proliferation and verification requirements of the Treaty was essential for effective and fruitful cooperation. Mongolia had recently decided

to build a nuclear power station and to develop its uranium resources in full compliance with nuclear safety and security standards. All States should place their nuclear activities and materials under IAEA safeguards in order to maintain confidence in their peaceful character. In the same way, nuclear-weapon States should allow further access to IAEA inspections in order to ensure compliance with accepted norms and standards.

48. Mongolia was now taking action to accede to international conventions on nuclear safety and was examining the conventions on nuclear liability. Although safety was the primary responsibility of States, international cooperation was vital for the exchange of information and experience. His delegation therefore welcomed the outcome of the summit on nuclear security held in Washington in April 2010.

49. Mongolia welcomed the initiative of the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards to review and improve the overall structure of IAEA safety standards. Strengthening the role of the Agency meant, inter alia, enhancing its effectiveness and transparency, and increasing its resources for technical cooperation activities in a sufficient, assured and predictable manner.

50. The agreement between the Agency and the Russian Federation for the establishment of a low-enriched uranium reserve was a first step in addressing the issue. Numerous other proposals had been submitted. His delegation believed that the question should be examined comprehensively, and that any attempt to prevent fuel transfers on political grounds should be rejected.

51. **Mr. van den IJssel** (Netherlands) said that at a time of nuclear renaissance, the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy was essential, as were the corresponding responsibilities. As a country with enrichment capacities, the Netherlands took a particular interest in the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. Such mechanisms would allow the nuclear fuel market to expand while minimizing proliferation risks. His country welcomed the agreement between IAEA and the Russian Federation for the establishment of a low-enriched uranium reserve. The international discussion on such multilateral approaches had yet to yield tangible results. His country hoped that the Conference would endorse a process for multilateral nuclear fuel assurances.

52. The Agency played a fundamental role in helping States to exercise their rights and comply with their obligations under article IV of the Treaty. The Netherlands strongly supported the Agency's technical cooperation programmes, in particular those that contributed to realizing the Millennium Development Goals and supporting the least developed countries. That assistance should be provided under the best safety and security conditions. It was vital that IAEA should be adequately funded. The Netherlands would continue to make contributions, and called on the Conference to look at ways to ensure the best use of available funds.

53. **Mr. Valero Briceño** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that one of the most pressing contemporary challenges was to secure clean energy resources in order to fulfil basic needs. Over 60 developing States had requested IAEA assistance in order to gain access to nuclear energy, which could help to counter climate change and promote economic and social development. However, certain nuclear States applied the provisions of the Treaty selectively and placed restrictions on technical cooperation that would allow the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. His country rejected any attempt to hamper that legitimate right.

It was a cause of concern that certain States tended towards making technical cooperation conditional on the fulfilment of obligations over and above those set forth in IAEA safeguards agreements. Any attempt to hamper the peaceful use of nuclear technology reinterpreted and delegitimized the Treaty.

54. The Conference should therefore reaffirm the right of States to the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It should recognize the importance of nuclear energy in improving living standards and emphasize the technical nature of the Agency's work. Any attempt to restrict technical cooperation on political grounds was incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute of IAEA, and should be rejected. If the Conference failed to promote confidence in the international system, the credibility of the nuclear security regime would be undermined.

55. **Mr. Argüello** (Argentina) said that the right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes had existed before the Treaty and was an essential part of the understanding that had allowed its adoption. Any attempt to redefine the balance of the obligations contained in the Treaty or to question the right enshrined in article IV would undermine the non-proliferation regime. Argentina was convinced of the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and had acquired considerable experience in that area. His delegation wished to see further measures to promote the exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The Agency had special responsibility for promoting technical cooperation and maintaining safeguards. It should maintain a balance between those functions and should be adequately funded and staffed.

56. Recent attempts to redefine article IV of the Treaty were unhelpful. Instead, non-proliferation should be upheld through the rational application of existing regulations. Nuclear safeguards mechanisms had shown their effectiveness over the years. At the same time, there remained a risk that the current system could be abused for the development of nuclear weapons. In such cases, the international community should consider measures to impose sanctions, or to suspend or restrict cooperation. Argentina would not cooperate on nuclear technology with any State that failed to comply with its obligations under the Treaty and safeguards agreements. It was essential to implement responsible policies for the export of nuclear materials and to ensure greater transparency in the monitoring of such exports. Nor should nuclear trade be affected by measures of a non-technical nature. The international community must uphold non-proliferation standards and reaffirm article IV of the Treaty.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

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Main Committee III

Summary record of the 2nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 11 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Nakane (Japan)

Contents

General exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

General exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Pokhval'ona** (Ukraine), recalling the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, said that States should have unfettered access to such energy, which was important for sustainable socio-economic development, provided that they complied with the full scope of safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was crucial to ensure adequate, predictable financing for the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as it played an important role in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

2. States should take bold steps to ensure that nuclear energy was used in such a way as to reduce proliferation risks, in accordance with the highest international standards of safety and security. Ukraine was committed to doing its part: at the Nuclear Security Summit recently held in Washington, D.C., her Government had announced its decision to eliminate its national stocks of highly enriched uranium by 2012, provided it received sufficient international assistance. That decision also demonstrated Ukraine's commitment to implementation of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009).

3. It was important to continue international cooperation with a view to strengthening nuclear security, safe waste management, radiological protection and civil nuclear liability. She called on States that had not yet done so to accede to and implement all relevant IAEA conventions without delay. Ensuring the nuclear fuel supply was a complex process, with many technical, legal, commercial and economic implications. The benefits of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle were clear; however, assurance mechanisms should not distort the existing market. At the same time, such mechanisms should address the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing nuclear fuel supply security for countries developing a nuclear programme in the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions. Initiatives such as the establishment of a low-enriched uranium bank under the authority of IAEA could provide back-up mechanisms for interested States and facilitate lasting multilateral solutions to the growing need for nuclear fuel and related services while minimizing the risk of proliferation. She urged the IAEA Board of Governors to agree on measures to that end and welcomed the recent agreement between IAEA and the Russian Federation to establish a reserve of low-enriched uranium for supply to IAEA to be located at the International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Angarsk, Russian Federation.

4. **Mr. Kashout** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that his country attached particular importance to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the Treaty and the IAEA Statute. Concerns over nuclear proliferation thus should not interfere with the exercise of that right. Developed countries must not impose conditions or restrictions on the transfer of nuclear materials, technology or knowledge for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty and that had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA.

5. The Agency was the sole authority responsible for verifying compliance with Treaty obligations and comprehensive safeguards agreements. In order for the Agency to have a truly international character, its inspection and verification mandate must be extended to include all States, whether nuclear or non-nuclear.

6. The Agency should pursue in a balanced manner its objective of accelerating and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. Therefore, technical cooperation and assistance provided by the Agency must not be subject to political, military or economic conditions beyond those specified in the IAEA Statute. Similarly, no new standards or guidelines for the selection of technical cooperation projects should be added, as the existing standards were effective. Nothing in the Treaty forbade the transfer or use of nuclear materials or equipment for peaceful purposes, as long as they were placed under IAEA safeguards. The various technical, legal, commercial and economic dimensions of the proposal to ensure access to nuclear fuel supply would require in-depth consideration and transparent negotiation.

7. IAEA must participate in developing international safety and security standards for the benefit of each State, without hindering the peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly by developing countries. Libya called on the Agency to suspend its Technical Cooperation Programme with Israel, a non-State party that had not submitted its nuclear facilities and activities to international monitoring and inspection. It also repudiated the attack or threat of attack on nuclear facilities, given the potential repercussions of such acts on humankind and the environment.

8. The growing number of nuclear weapons and means for their transfer, the increase in fissile material for nuclear weapons, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, the failure to set a time frame for the destruction of the nuclear-weapon States' arsenals and the policy of double standards were sources of concern. By implementing their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, nuclear-weapon States could make a significant contribution to international peace and security and shoulder their responsibility. Moreover, IAEA must be given the necessary authority to carry out its nuclear-disarmament verification mandate.

9. In closing, he affirmed the sovereign right of States parties to withdraw from the Treaty, as enshrined in article X, and denied the validity of any attempt to amend, reinterpret or adopt restrictive measures in respect of that article.

10. **Mr. Park** Chul-min (Republic of Korea) said that promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was critical to ensure the viability and credibility of the Treaty and maintain the delicate balance between its three pillars. The Republic of Korea had significant experience in developing a peaceful nuclear programme, which had fuelled its economic development and become an indispensable part of its energy infrastructure. Recognizing the essential role played by IAEA in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the importance of ensuring adequate resources for the Technical Cooperation Fund, his Government would continue to support the Agency's activities by assisting other States in such areas as nuclear power infrastructure and human resources. It would furthermore contribute to the efforts of IAEA to establish a culture of nuclear safety in those countries.

11. The Republic of Korea's support for nuclear research and development was inextricably linked to the maintenance of the highest standards of non-proliferation, safety and security; to that end, his Government was actively involved in a number

of relevant international initiatives. Noting the various proposals on multilateral fuel supply assurance schemes presented to the IAEA Board of Governors, he said that addressing the issue of supply security would help to maintain confidence in the Treaty during the current transition to a nuclear renaissance. He welcomed the recent signing of an agreement by IAEA and the Russian Federation to establish a low-enriched uranium reserve in Angarsk, which would provide a test case for efforts to ensure reliable access to nuclear fuel. Due consideration should also be given to the back end of the fuel cycle, including waste management.

12. Although the right of States parties to withdraw from the Treaty should be respected, it was important to recognize that any withdrawal undermined not only the validity of the Treaty, but efforts to achieve its universality. Abuse of States' rights under article X, especially when combined with violations of the Treaty, would be detrimental to the security of all. The withdrawal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, combined with blatant violations of the Treaty, was the clearest example of such abuse. In that regard, the Republic of Korea reiterated the importance of reaching a common understanding on the need for an effective response mechanism. The right of withdrawal should be exercised in strict observance of the procedural requirements of the Treaty. States were responsible for any violations of the Treaty prior to their withdrawal and a fall-back safeguards system should be implemented.

13. **Mr. Reyes Rodríguez** (Colombia) said that his Government attached great importance to the outcomes of past Review Conferences. The inalienable right of States parties to the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear energy helped to maintain a balance between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. International cooperation and national capacity-building were crucial given the importance of energy demand as a factor in development. Nuclear technology was also essential to meet the objectives set by the international community regarding environmental protection and the fight against climate change. A safe and fair solution was necessary to allow developing countries access to the nuclear fuel cycle.

14. In order for the technological requirements of States parties to be met in a satisfactory manner, it was imperative to strengthen the financial, human and technical resources of IAEA. The Committee must make recommendations to guarantee access by all States to nuclear technology, at the same time ensuring that such transfers did not result in violations of the non-proliferation regime. He welcomed the announced contribution by the United States of America towards the work of IAEA and invited other developed countries, especially nuclear-weapon States, to make similar contributions.

15. In order to ensure that the vision of a "nuclear spring" became a reality, IAEA monitoring mechanisms must be given full political support and necessary financial resources. Stressing the need to preserve the integrity of the Treaty, he said that his delegation would oppose any modification of the text of the Treaty, including article X, as well as any attempt to interpret its provisions in a way that weakened the non-proliferation regime.

16. **Mr. Laajava** (Finland) said that public acceptance and international confidence in nuclear safety and security were prerequisites for a successful national nuclear power programme. International cooperation and the sharing of expertise were crucial in that regard. Finland, as a small country that had enjoyed the benefits

of nuclear energy since the 1970s, had a good safety record and excellent performance indicators. His Government had recently approved in principle the construction of additional nuclear power plant units and of an extended final disposal repository for spent nuclear fuel generated in Finland. Finland would thus make a dramatic shift towards carbon-emission-free energy production, while ensuring its self-sufficiency in electricity production for the first time in several decades.

17. Nations wishing to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy must consider the issue of nuclear waste management from the start. A plan for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, as well as the financing of such activities, was crucial. In Finland's case, the policy on spent nuclear fuel management was adopted in 1983. Final disposal of spent nuclear fuel would start by 2020, with all waste management and decommissioning costs being covered by nuclear power companies, rather than by the Government. The unique nature of the final disposal facility in the nuclear power industry had prompted IAEA to develop a specific safeguards approach. The new integrated safeguards system allowed the Agency to make optimal use of all the information available to it, while Finland's experience in implementing State-level safeguards had enabled it to achieve increased efficiency.

18. Finland's energy policy also strongly emphasized renewable energy, such as wind and bioenergy. His Government was a party to all relevant international instruments and informal arrangements on nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation, and actively participated in the development of related international standards and guidelines, particularly within the framework of IAEA. Finland had benefited from the advisory services of IAEA and several safety peer review missions had been conducted on its territory; he encouraged other States to do the same.

19. **Ms. Briza** (Algeria) said that the Review Conference should take steps to protect and promote the inalienable right of States parties to peaceful applications of nuclear energy, including by adopting practical measures to facilitate access to and cooperation on such applications. Algeria supported the important role played by IAEA, as well as all regional and international initiatives seeking to strengthen and diversify scientific and technical cooperation in that regard. The Conference should adopt recommendations to strengthen the Agency's mandate, particularly in areas relating to peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Obstacles to the full exercise by States parties of their right to develop civil nuclear programmes, regardless of the area of application, must be eliminated, provided that the States parties in question were in compliance with the Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. Furthermore, the Conference should call on all States that had not yet done so to ratify the amendment to article VI of the IAEA Statute for its immediate entry into force. Indeed, expanding the Board of Governors would strengthen the Agency's credibility and its decision-making process. Lastly, the Review Conference should adopt recommendations to increase the Agency's regular budget for technical and scientific cooperation and should call on donor countries to honour their commitments under article IV of the Treaty by providing further financial support to the work of IAEA.

20. Nuclear energy was as a strategic choice for many countries experiencing growing energy needs. IAEA, which had been asked by some 60 developing countries for assistance in introducing the use of nuclear energy, must be given the

necessary resources to be the vector of the nuclear renaissance. At the same time, the proposed multilateral mechanism for nuclear fuel supply should not be designed in such a way that it limited the rights of States to develop a civil nuclear programme. While such proposals could provide opportunities to facilitate access to nuclear energy, particularly for developing countries, discussions should be held in a spirit of openness and transparency, with a view to reaching consensus solutions that respected the right to benefit from peaceful applications of nuclear energy. In January 2007, Algeria had hosted the High-level African Regional Conference on the contribution of nuclear energy to peace and sustainable development, with the support of IAEA and the African Union. The Final Declaration of Algiers and detailed Plan of Action adopted by the Conference had been submitted to the Committee for its consideration and, it was hoped, its adoption of recommendations to facilitate and accelerate their implementation, particularly through IAEA.

21. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that his Government supported States parties' access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, as well as increased international cooperation in that area, in order to maintain the necessary balance between the development of peaceful applications and the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly the IAEA safeguards system. It actively participated in a number of multilateral cooperation initiatives on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nationally, nuclear power had taken on increasing importance: in fact, there were plans to nearly double the share of nuclear power by 2030. The legal, financial and institutional frameworks necessary for such progress had already been established. Currently, the Russian nuclear industry was prepared to supply low- and medium-power reactors to the market and thus contribute to the development of many countries. His Government also had plans to build new nuclear power plants and technologies and had actively cooperated with States parties in that area and others, such as nuclear fuel supply, nuclear security and waste management. Professional training, too, was available to national and international students and specialists, as an essential component of the Russian nuclear energy development programme. The Russian Federation attached great importance to cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

22. His Government intended to continue making voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund. It was important to retain the existing funding mechanism through contributions by IAEA members in their national currencies, the amount of which was determined on the basis of the United Nations scale of assessments. The Russian Federation worked together with IAEA on projects to develop the economies of the Agency's members, as well as with developing States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Access to peaceful applications of nuclear energy should be ensured through cooperation, enabling those States to cut costs when starting a national nuclear energy programme and limiting proliferation of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology as well. In January 2006, his Government had proposed the establishment of international centres for nuclear fuel cycle services in an effort to develop a global nuclear energy infrastructure; the International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Angarsk was a practical contribution to that goal. It was important to note that the proposal did not infringe on the rights of IAEA member States to develop their own nuclear production capacity, nor had any conditions been set in order for States to receive low-enriched uranium from the guaranteed reserve. Furthermore, the proposal did not conflict with other

multilateral nuclear fuel supply assurance mechanisms; the Russian Federation stood ready to cooperate with States parties to the Treaty to advance such initiatives. Several agreements regulating the establishment and use of a guaranteed stock of low-enriched uranium for supply to IAEA for its members had been signed recently by IAEA.

23. As a signatory of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, his Government attached great importance to the safety of nuclear power facilities. In an effort to strengthen safety and security internationally, it had assisted the Republic of Armenia in enhancing safety standards at its nuclear power plant as part of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, and had allocated funds to improve security at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and to accelerate its decommissioning. The Russian Federation had also ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and participated in various initiatives under the Convention and IAEA related to waste management. The issue of spent nuclear fuel might best be resolved through multilateral approaches and the provision of integrated services by supplier countries, an approach which had been adopted with several countries.

24. **Mr. Dolfe** (Sweden) said that multilateral nuclear fuel assurances and the work of IAEA in that area should be given high priority. Such assurances, which should remain entirely voluntary as a back-up mechanism, contributed to the goals of increased supply assurance and non-proliferation. As Sweden's experience had shown, even in the case of a fairly large national nuclear programme, reliance on a well-functioning international market proved more advantageous than initiating costly and uncertain national schemes. While disruptions in the nuclear fuel market had been rare in the past, multilateral nuclear fuel supply mechanisms would be useful, for instance, to ensure supply to States experiencing an unforeseen need for low-enriched uranium. Whether as a back-up reserve or in a more sophisticated form, such mechanisms could play a useful role in contributing to enhanced supply security and to the non-proliferation regime, without infringing on States' rights under the Treaty. In that connection, he drew attention to his delegation's working paper on the potential benefits of such arrangements (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.7) as well as to a working paper by the Vienna Group of Ten (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.18) on approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

25. **Ms. Mosley** (New Zealand) said that the issues of nuclear non-proliferation, safety, security and waste management must be addressed when developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear technology must remain accessible to all States parties, but it was crucial to ensure that such technology was managed safely and securely and did not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle could provide a cost-effective and viable alternative to the development of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities without affecting States' rights under the Treaty. Assurances should address real needs, including the back end of the fuel cycle; they should furthermore be transparent, independent, inclusive and applied in an equitable manner, using defined criteria in accordance with IAEA safeguards. Any proposal for a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle mechanism should provide for effective physical protection of the associated nuclear material and facilities as well as the highest standards of nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management. Her Government acknowledged the primary responsibility of individual States for maintaining the safety of nuclear installations within their territories or under their jurisdiction and the crucial importance of an

adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure in waste safety. Welcoming the essential role played by IAEA in improving the global nuclear security framework, she called on all States to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories and urged those States in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in that area. All States parties involved in commissioning, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors or considering nuclear power programmes should become parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety without delay. She also urged the application by States parties of IAEA safety standards to improve national nuclear radiation, transport and waste safety infrastructure.

26. International cooperation on safe maritime and other transport of radioactive material needed to be strengthened, including safety and security standards and the provision of timely information on such transport. Effective national and international nuclear liability mechanisms must be established to provide compensation for damages in the event of an incident during the maritime transport of radioactive materials. She welcomed the ongoing work of the Contractors International Group on Nuclear Liability in that regard, as well as the informal discussions on communication between shipping States and relevant coastal States with IAEA involvement, and the ongoing bilateral discussions between relevant shipping and coastal States on issues of mutual concern.

27. **Mr. Fazzam** (Kuwait), noting the importance of nuclear power as a source of energy and the potential benefits of its peaceful applications, reiterated that all States parties had the fundamental right to possess and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination. In 2009 Kuwait had declared its intent to launch a programme for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in order to meet growing domestic demand for electricity and water. To that end, a national committee on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had been established.

28. Kuwait had pledged \$10 million to the initiative to establish a nuclear fuel bank under IAEA supervision and was looking forward to a constructive dialogue leading to a consensus on its structure and administration.

29. Echoing the views expressed by other delegations regarding the existence of double standards in the transfer of nuclear materials and technology to non-States parties, he called for the suspension of technical assistance to those States until they acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and placed their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

30. **Mr. Wang Qun** (China) said that more and more countries saw nuclear energy as a technically proven, clean, safe and economically competitive source of energy and an important option for meeting energy demands. The promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation were mutually complementary and reinforcing. Non-proliferation efforts should, however, not undermine the legitimate right of countries, especially developing countries, to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

31. The International Atomic Energy Agency had been providing assistance through technical cooperation to its member States, in accordance with its mandate, in the fields of nuclear power, nuclear safety, waste management and nuclear

technology applications through technical cooperation. In that connection, the Technical Cooperation Fund should be supported with adequate resources.

32. Nuclear fuel supply assurances were of great importance in promoting the development of nuclear energy. The various multilateral nuclear supply mechanisms and initiatives involved political, economical, technical and legal factors and should be studied in depth to find a practical way acceptable to all, and meanwhile, the right of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be affected.

33. Enhancing nuclear security was of great significance and all countries bore the responsibility for taking physical protection measures to secure nuclear material and facilities within their respective jurisdictions. The existing international legal framework and international cooperation in that area needed to be strengthened.

34. China had set up a sound nuclear industry and had formulated a mid- and long-term nuclear power development plan, stressing research and development of next-generation technologies and nuclear safety and security in line with international standards. It had acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and had actively provided nuclear security assistance to other developing countries. It had also ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 2008, and had started the domestic ratification process for the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. China actively supported IAEA activities in the field of nuclear security and had had good cooperation with IAEA and other countries in that field during the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008.

35. At the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Energy in the Twenty-first Century, which China had co-sponsored, countries had exchanged views on experiences and future strategies concerning the development of nuclear energy. China had conducted fruitful cooperation with IAEA in nuclear technology, nuclear safety, non-proliferation, and human resources and actively participated in important international cooperation programmes such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). China had signed agreements on peaceful uses of nuclear energy with more than 20 countries and organizations. Further details on China's views on peaceful uses of nuclear energy could be found in the working paper NPT/CONF.2010/WP.65.

36. **Mr. Naziri** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the inalienable right of all States parties to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination under article IV of the Treaty emanated from the fact that scientific and technological achievements were the common heritage of humanity and from the need for balance between rights and obligations, which provided incentives for membership and compliance. The right to peaceful use was even more important given the increasing application of nuclear energy and technologies in the fields of human health, medicine, industry, agriculture, environmental protection and sustainable economic development, especially in the developing world.

37. The International Atomic Energy Agency played a fundamental role in the promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but it continued to face shortages in resources as well as restrictions imposed by some States. For example, the funding for IAEA technical cooperation was based on voluntary contributions,

which were unpredictable and subject to political motivations. In the view of his delegation, IAEA technical cooperation, like its safeguards activities, should be funded from the regular budget. Iran was ready to cooperate fully with countries in the region to hold technical workshops and seminars and to transfer related nuclear medical materials under the auspices of IAEA.

38. It was a matter of deep concern that the existing export control regimes, which operated in a non-transparent and arbitrary manner, continued to create undue restrictions on the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for the peaceful uses, in contravention of the letter and the spirit of the Treaty. Iran therefore called for the establishment of a mechanism within the framework of the review process to address the challenges facing the implementation of article IV.

39. Another source of serious concern was the fact that countries outside the Treaty were given preferential treatment in nuclear trade. The Nuclear Supplier Group was an exclusive and non-transparent export control regime that claimed to have been established to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, but had damaged the credibility of the Treaty by adopting its infamous decision in September 2008 in total defiance of paragraph 12 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference's decision 2 entitled "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", calling for acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons as a necessary precondition for any new supply arrangements.

40. In the view of his delegation, the inalienable right of States parties to peaceful uses included all aspects of nuclear technologies, including the fuel cycle. Article IV stated: "Nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop nuclear research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes ..." There were also no provisions in the IAEA Statute, the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement or even the Additional Protocol prohibiting or restricting the rights of the States parties to enrichment and reprocessing activities. The 2000 Review Conference had confirmed that each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

41. On the issue of multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle and assurances of nuclear fuel supply, Iran shared the view of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that that issue was very complex and multidimensional and had technical, legal, commercial and economic implications that would have to be considered extensively before a consensus could be reached. With regard to nuclear safety and security, under its Act on Radiation Protection, Iran had established a national regulatory body to ensure the safety and security of its peaceful nuclear facilities. Safety and security were national responsibilities, and IAEA should play the key role in the development of international nuclear safety and security standards.

42. It remained the legitimate expectation of developing countries that the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a fundamental pillar of the Treaty spelled out in article IV, should be realized. With the increasing gap between developing and developed countries in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the 2010 Review Conference should take concrete steps to achieve that goal.

43. In that connection, Iran had made a number of recommendations that it would like to see reflected in the Committee's report. The inalienable right of all States parties to develop research and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without any discrimination should be reaffirmed and each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies. It must also be emphasized that full implementation of article IV was essential for realizing the object and purposes of the Treaty and that any interpretation that would affect the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination must be rejected. The IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund should have predictable, secured funding sufficient to enable the Agency to respond to the ever-increasing need of developing countries for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The developed countries must therefore fulfil their commitment to assist in the development of nuclear energy by developing countries by facilitating their participation in the fullest possible exchange of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes. The Treaty did not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their "sensitivity" and only stipulated that such equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. The strengthening of IAEA safeguards should not adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation. Safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty without hampering the economic or technological development of the States parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use and production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes. Restrictions and limitations on the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful uses would hamper the access of developing countries to nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes; restrictions and limitations posed in contravention of the letter and the spirit of the Treaty should therefore be removed. A Standing Committee, consisting of qualified governmental individuals from the States parties members of the Bureau of the previous Review Conference should be established to consider cases of transfer denials upon request by concerned States Parties and take appropriate decisions. Lastly, the 1995 NPT Review Conference decision that "new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" should be reaffirmed.

44. **Mr. Al-Bayati** (Iraq), referring to Iraq's working paper on article IV of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.59), said that his Government affirmed the inalienable right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to obtain and transfer nuclear technology without discrimination and without the imposition of any obstacles, binding conditions or selective restrictions. It also emphasized the role of IAEA in assisting States parties, in particular developing countries, to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and urged it to redouble its efforts to that end. In that connection, he welcomed the recent remarks of the Director General of IAEA

regarding its readiness to assist interested countries in establishing a nuclear infrastructure. In such cases the Agency's safety standards must be applied in order to avoid nuclear accidents. He also welcomed the recent pledge by the United States of America to contribute \$50 million to the Technical Cooperation Fund over the next five years.

45. While his country supported efforts to achieve the universality of the IAEA safeguards system, it stressed that additional protocols, being a voluntary measure, could not be considered a precondition for the import of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Iraq also supported the IAEA initiative to establish a low enriched uranium bank, provided all the necessary assurances were given that States would retain their right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as well as their rights to enrich uranium and to obtain advanced technology and enriched uranium without discrimination and at fair prices.

46. With regard to security assurances on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, States should consult neighbouring countries when establishing nuclear plants, and should make arrangements between themselves, under the supervision of IAEA and the relevant regional and international environmental agencies, to ensure that negative impacts on human beings and the environment would be limited. Consideration must be given to border population clusters, international water courses and surface and groundwater sources when waste was disposed of or outdated technology was used that could lead to pollution. Nuclear safety standards and requirements must be observed when designing and building nuclear installations, because harmful radiation leaks ignored borders and had disastrous impacts on human beings and the environment.

47. **Mr. Canchola** (Mexico) said that a result of the so-called nuclear renaissance should be to strengthen the international nuclear regime that had been built over the past six decades. The International Atomic Energy Agency should occupy a central place in that scheme, as the implementing mechanism, which would only be possible by strengthening the Agency's authority and capabilities.

48. The international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be strengthened only by implementing its current provisions, not by reinterpreting them. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, unlike most instruments of international law, had not made adequate progress in moving from codification to implementation. Mexico had therefore joined the other sponsors in submitting NPT/CONF.2010/WP.4, containing proposals aimed at strengthening implementation. The IAEA Statute and international instruments on nuclear issues, including non-proliferation, contained the elements needed to promote and ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to penalize any violations.

49. Efforts to strengthen the Agency as the guarantor of the peaceful use of nuclear energy should emphasize the technical nature of its mandate, recognize the added value of its functions and seek to reinforce its capacities in a comprehensive and orderly manner, bearing in mind the role played by IAEA in other parts of the United Nations system, especially the Security Council, and the various initiatives to support non-proliferation and IAEA technical assistance. His delegation also wished in that connection to stress the importance of providing the Agency with greater financial resources so that it could properly carry out its mandate.

50. It was the hope of his delegation that the 2010 Review Conference would agree on the following commitments: to reaffirm the content, scope and validity of the provisions of the Treaty, particularly those in article IV; to urge States parties to comply fully with their obligations under the Treaty; to emphasize the importance of implementing IAEA safeguards as the standard for compliance with the provisions of the Treaty; to encourage the signature and/or ratification of the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as well as the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; to reaffirm the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the international nuclear regime; and to strengthen adequately the capacities of the Agency.

51. **Mr. Kongstad** (Norway) said that, although it was the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty, there had been too much focus on the possible constraining nature of much-needed non-proliferation steps, in particular in discussions of international cooperative efforts on the nuclear fuel cycle. The development of fuel assurances made it possible for newcomers to nuclear energy to benefit from that energy source without the costly investments in fuel production. The German and Russian proposals for fuel cooperative arrangements represented a way of reconciling peaceful uses of nuclear energy with collective non-proliferation concerns.

52. The “nuclear renaissance” posed challenges to the non-proliferation regime, human safety and the environment. Countries pursuing nuclear energy production must apply the highest security and safety standards and uphold its non-proliferation obligations. Norway urged all States parties to sign, ratify and implement the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention on Nuclear Safety and other relevant IAEA instruments. Transport of nuclear material must also be given greater attention, especially given the prospects for growing international cooperation on the front and back ends of the fuel cycle.

53. Implementation of non-proliferation measures such as the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol would foster confidence and facilitate full implementation of article IV of the Treaty. It should also be remembered that civilian nuclear cooperation covered not just nuclear energy but also other peaceful applications relating to the improvement of health, food security, water management and environmental monitoring. However, implementation of non-proliferation commitments must be the precondition for cooperation and assistance in peaceful uses. Another area of activity that would increase trust and confidence and strengthen nuclear security was the continued reduction in the use of high enriched uranium fuel in nuclear reactors and the progressive conversion of military stocks of high enriched uranium to low enriched and the placement of military stocks under IAEA safeguards.

54. **Mr. Salam** (Lebanon), speaking on behalf of the Arab Group and referring to its working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.30), said that by granting non-nuclear-weapon States the inalienable right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had struck a balance that had motivated many countries to accede to it. Indeed, the balance between nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on the one hand, and peaceful use of nuclear energy on the other, had made the Treaty the linchpin of the non-proliferation regime. The Treaty provided that all States parties were entitled to conduct research and

exchange scientific information in order to develop the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, and that none of its provisions were to be interpreted as affecting States parties' rights in that regard. However, certain States parties to the Treaty had modified their export policy in order to restrict the transfer of knowledge and technology to developing States parties. Moreover, the provision of technical assistance on nuclear issues to non-States parties by certain exporting States indicated the existence of double standards and contravened the Treaty and decision 2 adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which stipulated that new supply arrangements for the transfer of nuclear materials should require acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

55. At its 2007 and 2008 ordinary sessions, the League of Arab States had adopted two significant resolutions on the exercise by Arab States of the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In 2009, the League had adopted the Arab Strategy for the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy until 2020. In exercise of their rights as parties to the Treaty, a number of Arab States planned to increase their use of nuclear technologies in all areas that would promote sustainable development. Taking note of the initiatives of certain parties regarding the supply of nuclear fuel, the Arab Group strongly rejected any attempt to dissuade States parties from developing or obtaining nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

56. The Arab States were fully committed to adherence to all international instruments to which they were parties, and to cooperation with the relevant international agencies, chief among them IAEA, which had a prominent role in helping developing States parties to improve their scientific and technological capabilities in terms of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

57. In that context, the Arab Group stressed the following principled positions. First, any attempt to interpret the Treaty in a manner that restricted the inalienable right of all States parties to possess and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was unacceptable. Second, IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements were the legal framework and standard for verifying the peaceful use of nuclear energy, whereas additional protocols to such agreements were voluntary and non-binding. Third, no new commitments for non-nuclear-weapon States could be accepted until genuine progress was made towards achieving universality of the Treaty, nuclear disarmament and State party compliance with all current commitments, in particular, implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Fourth, IAEA, as the sole authority responsible for verifying implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements, must maintain its neutrality, in conformity with its Statute. Fifth, the Arab States called on the Agency to halt all technical cooperation with Israel until the latter acceded to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Sixth, the Arab States rejected attacks and the threat of attacks against nuclear facilities, as such actions undermined international law and threatened international peace and security.

58. **Mr. Ali** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that upholding the inalienable right of all States parties to develop, research and benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy was one of the fundamental objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In that respect, the Syrian Arab Republic expressed alarm at the continued imposition of restrictions on the export of materials and equipment for use in

peaceful atomic energy programmes to developing non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty and that had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA. Such restrictions hindered development projects in those countries. Syria rejected any attempt by States parties to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a means to achieve political ends, since such acts constituted a violation of the Treaty and of the Agency's mission.

59. His Government recognized the Agency's important role in assisting developed and developing States parties, and in particular, in accelerating socio-economic development projects, in accordance with its Statute. Financial and human resources must be provided and a detailed programme and strategy that addressed the needs of developing States must be put in place in order to maintain a sustainable Technical Cooperation Programme.

60. Certain nuclear-weapon States continued to contravene their Treaty obligations by supplying Israel with all the materials, equipment and technology to develop its nuclear arsenal, a matter of grave concern. Arrangements to monitor the Treaty regime must be characterized by complete transparency and be devoid of double standards.

61. Noting that the continued existence of Israeli nuclear arsenals outside the Treaty regime posed a threat to the safety, security and stability of the peoples of the region, he urged the international community, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to adopt serious measures to redress that major imbalance in the non-proliferation regime.

62. In order to bolster the Treaty's effectiveness and credibility, the Review Conference must intensify efforts to protect the right of States parties to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to preserve the delicate balance between the rights and the responsibilities stipulated by the Treaty. Syria hoped that the outcome document would contain clear references to the following points. First, nuclear-weapon States must commit fully to halting all support for Israel's internationally illegitimate development of nuclear weapons. Second, any reinterpretation of Treaty provisions in a manner that would run counter to its spirit and purpose must be avoided, and the balance between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States must be maintained. Third, countries must not impose restrictions or otherwise hinder the legitimate right of States parties to benefit from the peaceful applications of atomic energy, and the politicization of the work of IAEA must be prevented. If those recommendations went unheeded and the current policy of selectivity were to persist, the nuclear non-proliferation regime would face an uncertain future mired in chaos.

63. The demand by certain nuclear-weapon States to impose harsh restrictions on the right to withdrawal from the Treaty, which was stipulated in its article X, was the most glaring example of double standards, particularly in light of the unstinting provision of nuclear assistance by some nuclear-weapon States to Israel, which had developed military nuclear capabilities outside international supervision. Any amendment to the provisions of article X must be avoided, as must any attempt to adopt new measures in respect of withdrawal.

64. **Mr. Baddoura** (Lebanon) said that part of the "magic formula" holding the Treaty together and giving it consistency and meaning was the inalienable right, guaranteed to non-nuclear-weapon States in article IV of the Treaty, to benefit fully

from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in exchange for giving up their nuclear weapons option. Lebanon had placed its modest nuclear activities under the IAEA safeguards and verification regime and relied on the Technical Cooperation Programme in areas such as health, agriculture, water resources and research. Lebanon had ratified almost all relevant international instruments and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management would soon be ratified.

65. All indicators pointed towards heavier reliance on nuclear energy and nuclear power in the future, which warranted a greater emphasis on the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, especially for developing countries. His delegation cautioned against initiatives or developments that could, if not carefully and multilaterally guided, undermine that right.

66. States parties should avoid any action that could upset the balance between the three pillars of the Treaty or that sought to reorder IAEA priorities as enshrined in its Statute that might reduce its technical cooperation activities. In that regard, Lebanon echoed the call of many other delegations for a renewed commitment to a sufficient, assured and predictable financing of technical cooperation in IAEA. While Lebanon recognized that each right, including the right to peaceful use, entailed some duties, care should be taken not to blur the frontiers between what was legally binding on States parties, what was voluntarily agreed to by them, and what could seem desirable as confidence-building measures. Non-proliferation concerns were of the utmost importance, but they should not lead to undue or unjustifiable restrictions on the export of nuclear material or nuclear technology to developing countries. The issue of nuclear fuel supply assurances or, more broadly, the multilateralization of the fuel cycle, merited serious study, as hasty introduction of such complex arrangements might only create more problems.

67. **Ms. Mourabit** (Morocco) said that the current global context, with its new socio-economic realities, continued population growth, climate change and rising fossil fuel costs, had a strong impact on global demand for energy and electricity. Nuclear energy produced for peaceful purposes had therefore become an urgent need for all countries seeking to ensure their economic and social development.

68. Although many delegations had affirmed the inalienable right to peaceful use of nuclear cooperation, others had stressed the link between access to nuclear energy and the risks of nuclear proliferation. There was a danger in systematizing such a link, however; it could deepen divisions between nuclear and non-nuclear States. Solutions to such proliferation risks could be found in the generalized system of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and additional protocols. All States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including non-nuclear States, had pledged to avoid all risks of proliferation and to contribute to strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

69. Peaceful, transparent and responsible use of nuclear energy would contribute to economic and social development. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime should not pose new barriers to the promotion of international cooperation and transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The role of IAEA in assisting developing countries and in promoting access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be strengthened, and States parties with science programmes including nuclear technology should cooperate with developing countries in need of nuclear applications, particularly in the areas of health, agriculture and energy.

70. **Mr. Khaer Ibrahim** (Malaysia) said that IAEA must be equipped with sufficient, assured and predictable resources so as to maintain its technical cooperation activities, in particular the transfer of nuclear technology to States pursuing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such programmes should continue to be developed in a professional, impartial and non-discriminatory manner, in line with the IAEA Statute. Malaysia strongly believed that current guidelines and criteria as set out in INFCIRC/267 for the screening of project proposals, programme implementation and subsequent evaluation, were sufficient and effective.

71. Under the Treaty, States parties were entitled to have access to nuclear technology in a non-discriminatory manner. The Treaty also provided for the exchange of nuclear knowledge and scientific information and for cooperation among States to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which benefited participants in the fields of energy, food, water security and health care, as well as environmental preservation. Malaysia was one of the sponsors of the working paper submitted by Japan on strengthening the technical cooperation activities of IAEA (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.13).

72. Malaysia wished to explore the possibilities offered by assurances of nuclear fuel supply and called for the establishment of an open-ended working group to discuss the matter in detail. Nuclear fuel and fuel services must be made available under the IAEA Statute to all States parties that were in full compliance with their non-proliferation commitments under IAEA safeguards mechanisms, and with the exclusive verification of compliance by IAEA. However, Malaysia was concerned at the denials of transfer of nuclear technology, material and equipment, especially to developing countries, which adversely affected progress in medical technology and health-care applications. Malaysia welcomed the efforts of the International Steering Committee on Denials and Delays of Shipment of Radioactive Material to address that growing concern.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2010/MC.III/SR.4

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

Distr.: General
9 June 2010

Original: English

Main Committee III

Summary record of the 4th meeting*

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 13 May 2010, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Nakane (Japan)

Contents

General exchange of views

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

General exchange of views

1. **Ms. Trojanowska** (Poland) said that improvements in nuclear safety and security standards at international and national levels should be seen in the context of economic and technological development; they had led to a resurgence of global interest in nuclear power. Poland, for its part, had decided in 2009 to launch its own nuclear power programme. That decision had been dictated largely by the desire to achieve environment-friendly energy security at a reasonable cost, subject to appropriate regulations.

2. The proposal to start up Poland's first nuclear power reactor by 2020 had been a response to the country's obligation to meet international targets set by the European Union's climate and energy package and was based on the need for long-term security of electricity supply, the maintenance of acceptable prices for energy, reduced emission of pollutants and the increased importance attached to renewable energy sources.

3. The construction of nuclear power plants was a great challenge for Poland. The required preparation would entail developing and costing a nuclear power programme, determining its optimal scope in the foreseeable future and setting out a schedule of activities for the purposes of both administration and investment. Final approval of that programme lay with the Council of Ministers on the basis of extensive consultation and public debate. In that context, an operating model for the nuclear power sector had recently been developed, covering the complete construction cycle, the safe, secure and efficient operation of nuclear plant, decommissioning, including spent fuel and radioactive waste management, and the regulation of nuclear safety and radiological protection. The new regulations should set out the rights and responsibilities of all institutions and organizations fully or partially involved in the nuclear power programme and ensure their effective cooperation. A package of new laws was being prepared that would be governed by the principles of separation of the functions of regulation from those of promotion and coordination; transparency; and safety at every stage. All the preparatory work for Poland's nuclear power programme was being conducted in full observance of international law, European Union regulations and the relevant guidelines and recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including all the international legal instruments developed under the Agency's auspices. Poland attached the utmost importance to a high level of nuclear safety worldwide.

4. Nuclear power development in Poland required the assistance of international organizations possessing the necessary expertise and experience, such as IAEA and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and support from other important initiatives like the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Without such assistance, which would help to optimize the process and lower costs, the undertaking would be sure to founder. Subjects of cooperation should include personnel training, the issue of access to nuclear fuel and its secure supply, and spent fuel and radioactive waste management. Not only could Poland benefit from such cooperation; it could also provide it in many fields.

5. **Mr. Al-Sudairy** (Saudi Arabia) said that the balance between nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on the one hand, and peaceful use of nuclear energy

on the other, had made the Treaty the linchpin of the non-proliferation regime. The Treaty provided that all States parties were entitled to conduct research and exchange scientific information in order to develop the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, and that none of its provisions were to be interpreted as affecting States parties' rights in that regard. However, certain States parties to the Treaty had modified their export policy in order to restrict the transfer of knowledge and technology to developing States parties, in addition to imposing further obligations on the latter or asking them to surrender their rights under the Treaty. Moreover, the provision by certain exporting States of technical assistance on nuclear issues to non-States parties indicated the existence of double standards and was in contravention with the Treaty and decision 2 adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which stipulated that new supply arrangements for the transfer of nuclear materials should require acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

6. Saudi Arabia was fully committed to adhering to all international instruments to which it was a party, and it looked forward to cooperating with relevant international agencies, chief among them IAEA. His country also emphasized the Agency's role in helping developing States parties to the Treaty to improve their scientific and technical capabilities in order to benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

7. Based on the foregoing, he stressed that States parties had the fundamental, inalienable right to possess and develop nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, and that any attempt to reinterpret the provisions of the Treaty that granted that right was unacceptable. He also called on IAEA to halt its cooperation with Israel until such time as that country acceded to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and placed its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards, as a precondition for strengthening the Treaty's universality, efficacy and credibility.

8. **Mr. Jeenbaev** (Kyrgyz Republic), speaking on behalf of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan, said that not enough attention had been given in the past to mitigating the environmental consequences of nuclear weapons programmes. As had been noted at the 2000 Review Conference, there had been cases of significant environmental damage from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel cycle activities. The environmental problems thus caused to the Central Asian States by nuclear weapons production were often overlooked; for that reason, those countries attached great importance to the work of the current Conference.

9. In particular, the condition of the toxic radioactive uranium tailings left by the mining industry in the territories of the Central Asian States had not met safety standards at that time and had further deteriorated since then, as mining operations had been shut down or reoriented; in a number of cases the situation was almost catastrophic. The situation was aggravated by the fact that many burial sites of highly toxic uranium were located in active seismic regions, landslide-risk areas prone to floods and high groundwater zones and nearby river banks, which formed the foundation of the extended water basin of the Central Asian region. In the event of natural disaster or natural degradation of protective structures, the highly toxic substances from those tailings would be likely to seep into freshwater sources. As the waste could then spread quickly and freely across the region, it could lead to

large-scale contamination of vast territories of neighbouring countries, thus affecting tens of millions of people. The resulting environmental catastrophe would be not only regional but global in scale. Effective efforts were therefore needed at all levels to prevent further contamination.

10. In April 2009, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic had met in Bishkek with representatives of the United Nations Development Programme and the Eurasian Economic Community to discuss practical measures to address the uranium tailings problem and make concrete proposals to the High-level International Forum on Uranium Tailings held in Geneva in June 2009. He reiterated the appeal of the 1995 and 2000 Conferences to all Governments and international organizations possessing expertise in the clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance for radiological assessment and remedial purposes in the affected area.

The discussion covered in the summary recorded ended at 3.40 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2010/MC.III/SR.10

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

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Original: English

Main Committee III

Summary record of the 10th meeting*

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 24 May 2010, at 5.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Nakane (Japan)

Contents

Draft report of Main Committee III

* No summary records were issued for the 3rd meeting and the 5th to 9th meetings.

The meeting was called to order at 6.30 p.m.

Draft report of Main Committee III (NPT/CONF.2010/MC.III/CRP.5)

1. **The Chairman** said that the draft report was a technical description of the Committee's work, to which it had been hoped that a substantive part would be added, setting out the conclusions of the Committee's deliberations. As, however, no consensus had been reached on that part of the report, reproduced separately as the Chairman's revised draft report of Main Committee III (NPT/CONF.2010/MC.III/CRP.4), the words "the results of the discussions are outlined in paragraph 7 below", contained in paragraph 6, should be deleted.

2. **Mr. Nasri Asl** (Islamic Republic of Iran) asked for confirmation that, as in the reports of the other Main Committees, a paragraph would be added to the effect that the Committee had not been able to agree to attach document NPT/CONF.2010/MC.III/CRP.4 to the report for consideration by the Conference.

3. **The Chairman** confirmed the understanding of the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He would report to the President of the Conference that no consensus had been reached on the Chairman's proposed text.

4. *The draft report of Main Committee III, as revised, was adopted.*

5. **Mr. Idris** (Egypt) wished to know whether the last sentence of paragraph 6 of the report just adopted, according to which "summary records [of the Committee] and working papers [submitted to it] form an integral part of the Committee to the Conference", was in line with the practice of the other Main Committees.

6. **The Chairman** said that it was his understanding that all the Main Committees followed the same approach.

7. **Mr. Idris** (Egypt) said that the summary records of the Committee and the working papers submitted to it formed an integral part of the work of the Conference as a whole. His delegation reserved the right to revert to the aforementioned sentence in the light of the approach adopted by the other Main Committees.

8. **Mr. Bouchaara** (Morocco) said that, although there had been agreement in the informal consultations on some of the substantive paragraphs proposed by the Chairman, those paragraphs had not been included in the draft report. He wished to know whether the discussion on those paragraphs was closed.

9. **The Chairman** said that the discussion was closed without prejudice to any questions that might be raised in a plenary of the Conference.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.

E. List of participants

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

25 May 2010

ENGLISH/FRENCH/SPANISH

New York, 3-28 May 2010

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**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

3 June 2010

ENGLISH/FRENCH/SPANISH

New York, 3-28 May 2010

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