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Summary of Stakeholders' submissions on the Islamic Republic of Iran*

Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

I. Background

1. The present report was prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21, taking into consideration the periodicity of the universal periodic review. It is a summary of 83 stakeholders' submissions¹ to the universal periodic review, presented in a summarized manner owing to word-limit constraints.

II. Information provided by stakeholders

A. Scope of international obligations² and cooperation with international human rights mechanisms and bodies³

2. All Human Rights for All in Iran (AHRAI) recommended the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.⁴ JUBILEE recommended the ratification of the Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.⁵ ARCHumankind recommended the ratification of the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.⁶ Joint Submission 20 recommended the ratification of the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.⁷

3. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons recommended that the country sign and ratify the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.⁸

4. Amnesty International (AI) highlighted that despite the standing invitation issued in 2002 and repeated requests for visit from the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran had not been able to visit the country since 2005.⁹ Geneva International Centre for Justice (GCIJ) called on the Government to fully cooperate

* The present document was not edited before being sent to United Nations translation services.



and engage in a substantive and constructive dialogue with the United Nations special procedures.¹⁰

B. National human rights framework¹¹

5. Joint Submission 13 (JS13) highlighted that the articles contained in the Charter were conditional, allowing for discrimination on such bases as religion and belief. JS13 also emphasized that the law was implemented in conformity with Islamic criteria, creating a legislative grey area, according to which certain actions might be considered crimes.¹²

6. Iranian Youth Association in Switzerland (IYAS) recommended that the country remove all provisions that allow for punishments that amount to torture or cruel and degrading treatment, including stoning, flogging, blinding, and amputation.¹³

7. Small Media emphasized that in addition to revising laws violating the rights of journalists, political activists and human rights defenders, such as the Iranian Penal Code and the Press Law, the Islamic Republic of Iran must revise also the 2010 Computer Crimes Law, which adversely impacts upon citizens' rights to free expression in online spaces. In this regard, Small Media also highlighted that the Government must ensure that all new legislation is fully in line with its international human rights obligations, while noting that at least five new internet governance bills are in the process of being introduced.¹⁴

C. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

1. Cross-cutting issues

Equality and non-discrimination¹⁵

8. Joint Submission 15 stated that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals continued to face multiple and intersecting forms of violence and discrimination and suffered from a range of human rights violations. The violations stemmed directly from the state's continued criminalization of same-sex consensual activity, restrictions around speech in terms of same-sex behaviour, and strict regulations around transgender persons right to legal recognition. These codified laws and their resulting stigmatization of LGBT people created challenges not only to their fundamental right to life and right to live free from violence and discrimination but also in terms of violations pertaining to arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of expression and association, access to justice and access to healthcare.¹⁶

9. 6Rang noted that high-ranking Iranian officials, religious leaders and state media continued to use hateful, derogatory and dehumanizing rhetoric against LGBT individuals. In this regard, it recommended that Iran ban and refrain from making public statements that incite hatred, violence and discrimination against individuals on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression.¹⁷

Development, the environment, and business and human rights¹⁸

10. Association of Citizens Civil Rights Protection noted the negative impacts caused by sanctions imposed on the country, including on malnutrition, unemployment and income inequality. It also emphasized that the sanctions resulted in the lack of proper access to healthcare resources and the lack of access to technologies that help conserve the environment, which will, in turn, hamper achievement of the SDGs.¹⁹

11. Similarly, Chant du Guépard dans de Désert noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran was one of the developing countries in urgent need of global participation and financial resources, as well as investments in the field of new technologies to deal with environmental crises, including the climate change crisis. Sanctions had caused the country to be deprived of access to the world market of clean and modern goods.²⁰

2. Civil and political rights

*Right to life, liberty and security of person*²¹

12. Joint Submission 8 (JS8) stated that there were approximately 200 acts for which the death penalty was foreseen in Iranian criminal law. JS8 noted that many of these capital offences did not meet the threshold of the “most serious crimes”, such as drug-related offences and economic corruption related crimes, as well as acts that must not be considered as crimes such as consensual sexual relations outside of marriage and consensual sexual conduct between adults of the same-sex, and those of religious nature, including apostasy, blasphemy. Broadly worded and vaguely defined offences such as *moharebeh*, corruption on earth and rebellion which give judges wide interpretive powers as well as ordinary crimes such as repeated convictions of theft or arson against public property could also attract the death penalty.²² ADF International noted that apostasy, proselytizing and attempts by non-Muslims to convert Muslims were punishable by the death penalty.²³ In this regard, it recommended decriminalizing blasphemy and apostasy, and immediately abolishing them as capital offences.²⁴

13. Alliance Internationale pour la Paix et le Développement noted that in late 2017, an amendment to the drug trafficking law amended punishments for certain drug offences from the death penalty to a maximum term of 30 years, which led to a significant reduction the number of persons executed in 2018.²⁵ In this regard, Joint Submission 11 (JS11) noted that a review process started in early 2018 for thousands of individuals sentenced to death for drug offenses under the terms of the reformed drug law. Assessing the impact of the reform was challenging due to the judiciary’s lack of transparency and the absence of official data regarding the number of executions and death row prisoners and their charges. The Tehran Prosecutor announced in November 2018 that 3,300 requests for review under the new law had been received in Tehran only.²⁶

14. According to AI, since its previous UPR, the country had executed at least 17 juvenile offenders, often after unfair trials. Over 90 others remained on death row.²⁷ In this regard, Human Rights Watch (HRW) also highlighted that in its midterm report to the Human Rights Council, the country promised to replace execution (*Hodoud*) of people under the age of 18 with alternative punishment, but in 2018 alone the country executed at least 5 people, including two women, for alleged crimes they committed as children.²⁸

15. AI stated that the country continued to commit crimes against humanity with impunity through the ongoing enforced disappearance of at least 5,000 imprisoned political dissidents who were forcibly disappeared and extra-judicially executed in secret between July and September 1988.²⁹

16. Menschenrechtszentrum für die Opfer des Fundamentalismus (MZOF) noted that already deprived of any access to clean, drinking water and food, the absence of adequate beds were also robbing political prisoners of any sleep.³⁰ MZOF recommended that: political prisoners must have the right of being represented by a lawyer; lawyers representing political prisoners must not be intimidated or persecuted for representing their clients; and prisoners must have access to medical care and medicine and be given regular family visits.³¹ Similarly, AI highlighted that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to violate the right to health with respect to prisoners, particularly those imprisoned for politically motivated reasons, including human rights defenders. AI had documented a pattern of prisoners being tortured or otherwise ill-treated through the deliberate denial of adequate medical care.³²

17. HRW highlighted that in 2018 alone, at least 5 people have died in custody and several activists had claimed that they had been tortured in detention, but authorities have systemically failed to investigate such serious abuses.³³

18. Joint Submission 7 argued that the country’s practice of targeting dual and foreign nationals and using them for diplomatic leverage constituted crimes of the most serious order including torture, enforced disappearances, hostage-taking and crimes against humanity. JS7 recommended that the country release all dual and foreign nationals that have been detained arbitrarily and return their passports.³⁴

*Administration of justice, including impunity, and the rule of law*³⁵

19. JS2 highlighted that judges in both systems lacked independence and impartiality.³⁶ According to AI, the judiciary lacked independence and was subject to political interference from the Revolutionary Guards and Ministry of Intelligence. AI highlighted that trials remained systematically unfair, including those resulting in death sentences. Trials before Revolutionary Courts were particularly unfair and generally remained closed and extremely brief. Detainees were routinely denied the right to access legal counsel from the time of arrest and during interrogations.³⁷

20. HRW stated that it had documented numerous cases in which authorities had prevented detainees from having access to a lawyer during investigation and later only access to lawyers from the approved list.³⁸

21. In this regard, AI recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran: ensure that all trials meet international standards of fairness, including by ensuring that detainees have access to a lawyer of their choosing from the time of arrest and throughout the investigation and trial, and that statements obtained in violation of individuals' right to access a lawyer are not admissible at trial; ensure that no one is coerced into to "confessing" guilt and that such "confessions" are never admitted as evidence, except against a person accused of torture or other ill-treatment; and repeal the Note to Article 48 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which denies individuals charged with certain offences the right to access an independent lawyer of their own choosing.³⁹

22. AI noted that independent investigations into allegations of torture and other ill-treatment remained absent and courts continued to admit as evidence "confessions" obtained under torture to issue convictions.⁴⁰ Joint Submission 2 (JS2) stated that the use of torture to extract confessions was widespread in the country. It highlighted that almost all prisoners who were arrested for drug offenses had been kept in solitary confinement and subjected to physical torture in the investigation phase following their detention, while being denied access to a lawyer.⁴¹

23. Association of Iranian Political Prisoners – UK stated that those involved in and responsible for serious human rights violations and mistreatment or abuse of detained persons enjoyed impunity as the country did not support and even stifled any attempt to secure the truth and justice for the victims of documented human rights violations.⁴²

24. Lawyers for Lawyers stated that the independence of the legal profession in the country was not guaranteed with respect to the Iranian Bar Association and was absent with respect to the Centre for Legal Advisors, Attorneys, and Experts of the Judiciary.⁴³

25. Partners for Transparency recommended that the authorities find effective ways to combat corruption in public institutions, including the judiciary.⁴⁴

*Fundamental freedoms and the right to participate in public and political life*⁴⁵

26. AI highlighted that the authorities imposed, on people of all faiths as well as atheists, codes of conduct rooted in a strict interpretation of Shi'a Islam. The right to change or renounce religious beliefs continued to be violated, with those converting from Islam or professing atheism at risk of arbitrary detention, torture and the death penalty. Members of religious minorities, including Bahá'ís, Christians, Gonabadi Dervishes, Yaresan (Ahl-e Haq) and Shi'a Muslims who converted to Sunni Islam, faced harassment, arbitrary arrest and prison sentences solely for practising their faith.⁴⁶ In this regard, Joint Submission 6 (JS6) recommended ending the campaign of arrests, and the use of excessive charges and punitive and unwarranted sentences against Christians who peaceably practice their faith.⁴⁷

27. ADF International recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran enhance the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the right to manifest individually or in community with others in public or in private, in workshop, observance, practice and teaching in compliance with its international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.⁴⁸

28. AI emphasized that the country had intensified its crackdown on dissent and arbitrarily detained thousands of people for peacefully exercising their human rights. Among those unjustly imprisoned were journalists, online media workers, students, filmmakers, musicians and writers, as well as human rights defenders, including lawyers, women's rights defenders, minority rights activists, trade unionists, environmental activists and those seeking truth, justice and reparation for the mass extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances of the 1980s.⁴⁹

29. Joint Submission 9 stated that human rights defenders, including lawyers, were frequently arrested without charge, held in prolonged pre-trial detention without access to legal representation of their choosing, sentenced to lengthy prison terms following unfair trials, and incarcerated in poor conditions.⁵⁰

30. Similarly, Front Line Defenders (FLD) highlighted that draconian restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly and movement of human rights defenders continued to be prevalent. They continued to face harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, and were subjected to systematic surveillance and their family members are targeted. Judicial harassment was one of the most common tactics used to silence human rights defenders and independent voices.⁵¹ In this regard, Freedom Now recommended that the Government immediately end all censorship or harassment of journalists, human rights defenders, opposition political leaders and other civil society or religious leaders and protect their ability to freely continue their work.⁵²

31. Joint submission 3 (JS3) highlighted that the highly restrictive legal framework continued to be abused to target dissenting voices, including human rights defenders, journalists, and human rights lawyers. Freedom of expression online had come under unprecedented pressure as the authorities had sought closer control over access to, and sharing of information online.⁵³ In this regard, JS3 noted that overbroad and vague restrictions remained both in the constitutional framework and in the Iranian Penal Code, which do not comply with international human rights law.⁵⁴

32. JS3 stated that independent media outlets operated under constant threat of forced closure by judicial order for potential infringements of the 2002 Press Law, encouraging self-censorship.⁵⁵ In this regard, JS3 expressed concern on a new bill (the Comprehensive Mas Media Regulation) that would threaten increased restrictions on media freedom by granting greater leeway to judges and prosecutors to determine whether an offence has been committed thereby facilitating the politically-motivated judicial harassment of the press.⁵⁶ The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) highlighted that since the last UPR cycle, press freedom in the country had deteriorated. CPJ stated that the authorities had arrested more journalists and journalists continued to be imprisoned over unspecified threats to national security.⁵⁷

33. JS3 noted that restrictive legislation had not been reformed, and that blocking and filtering of online content had been stepped up following the 2017 December protests. At the same time, the Government had taken steps to undermine online anonymity, and centralize Internet infrastructure to increase control over the free flow of information online.⁵⁸ Joint Submission 4 (JS4) specifically referred to the Press Law that criminalizes the publication of atheistic articles or information prejudicial to Islamic Codes, the publication of statements against the Constitution or the quoting of articles from the "deviant" press, parties and groups that oppose Islam. JS4 further stated that this provision was interpreted by the country to target and sanction journalists and media outlets that publish information critical of the state.⁵⁹

34. Small Media highlighted that the Government imposed filtering to restrict access to tens of thousands of websites, including those of political dissidents, marginalised communities, including ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities as well as lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons, human rights organisations, and international news organisations.⁶⁰ FLD also highlighted that the authorities continued to tighten censorship on the Internet and monitor, block or completely ban social media applications, including Facebook, Twitter and Instagram which are key media and messaging tools used by human rights defenders in the absence of free and independent media.⁶¹

35. JS3 also stated that peaceful protests had been subject to harsh repression, including unlawful use of force and mass arbitrary arrests.⁶² In this regard, JS3 stated that the government response to the anti-government protests in late December 2017 was marked by the disproportionate and unlawful use of force, including the use of tear gas, water cannons and physical attacks with batons.⁶³

36. JS3 recommended ceasing the unlawful surveillance, and digital attacks against individuals exercising their right to freedom of expression, assembly and association and ensure all such attacks are promptly, impartially and exhaustively investigated.⁶⁴

Right to privacy

37. JS3 emphasized that the 2010 Cyber-Crimes Law undermined the right to privacy. Vague provisions gave wide discretion to law enforcement authorities to pursue individuals they wish to silence.⁶⁵

3. Economic, social and cultural rights

Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work⁶⁶

38. Joint Submission 1 (JS1) emphasized that the Iranian Government was increasingly violating workers' rights to peaceful assembly and association. Dozens of labour and independent trade union activists were in prison for speaking out in defence of workers' rights.⁶⁷ Joint Submission 10 (JS10) also noted that the systematic repression of independent trade unions and the persistent detention of their members and leaders continued since the last UPR.⁶⁸

39. Similarly, JS4 highlighted that the authorities refused to allow the creation of labour unions that are not aligned to the state-controlled Islamic Labour Councils (ILCS). The processes of electing ILC members were often not transparent and heavily influenced by the authorities, and often those elected were conservatives from the Government.⁶⁹ In this regard, JS4 noted that the Government had regularly targeted the Iranian Writers Association (IWA) and its members, preventing the Association from holding meetings and arresting its members.⁷⁰

40. JS10 highlighted that there was a widespread practice of non-payment of wages, widely considered by experts to be a result of Government inability to set wages in line with rising costs of living. Many more victims did not complain for fear of being dismissed or punished for collective union activism.⁷¹

41. JS1 noted that steel workers had waged several major strikes in 2018 for the reasons of mismanagement of their factories and unpaid wages. Despite the heavy presence of security forces and previous mass arrests, they joined forces with the sugarcane workers in demanding the release of imprisoned workers.⁷² In this connection, JS1 recommended the release of imprisoned workers and guarantee the rights of workers to form independent trade unions.⁷³

Right to an adequate standard of living⁷⁴

42. Iran Against Hunger Charity noted that 50 per cent of the population had had shortages in receiving nutrients.⁷⁵

43. Joint Submission 14 noted that Sistan-Baluchistan, where the Baluchi ethnic group formed the majority of the population, was the country's poorest province, with the majority of the population living below the poverty line – 64 per cent and 77 per cent in urban and rural areas respectively. The province had the highest illiteracy and infant mortality rates in the country, and an estimated two thirds of the province lacked access to clean drinking water.⁷⁶

Right to health⁷⁷

44. 6Rang expressed concern that since the previous UPR, reparative therapies on gays and lesbians to change their sexual orientation or gender identity through cruel, inhumane and humiliating treatments had increased.⁷⁸ It recommended that Iran outlaw reparative

therapies that amount to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and ban all forms of forced, coercive or otherwise involuntary psychological, medical and surgical procedures designed to change or reassign people's sexual orientation, gender or sex characteristics without their free, prior and informed consent.⁷⁹

45. Associazione medici e Farmacisti Democratici Iraniani Residenti in Italia – Torino recommended that the protection of health care workers must be ensured through the adoption of “zero tolerance” laws and policies, as well as workplace safety measures.⁸⁰

46. While noting that sanctions have had negative impact on access to special medicines for autism, Autism Association of Iran recommended that the Government ensure provision of special medicines for children with autism.⁸¹

*Right to education*⁸²

47. Child Foundation noted that parts of the deprived and border regions of the Islamic Republic of Iran had problems in education, teaching tools and adequate education places.⁸³

48. Iranska Kultur Förening stated that university students were deprived of education.⁸⁴ Scholars at Risk noted that scholars, students, and higher education institutions faced significant pressures, both from government and higher education actors, which threaten individual academic freedom and the ability of the higher education space to function in a free and open manner.⁸⁵ Joint Submission 19 (JS19) highlighted that Bahá'í students had been expelled from their higher institutions of education upon discovery of their faith.⁸⁶ JS19 recommended expediting the adoption of the education bill (2018) and making sure that nobody can be denied enrolment at the University for another reason than his or her academic qualification.⁸⁷

4. Rights of specific persons or groups

*Women*⁸⁸

49. According to AI, women faced entrenched discrimination in family law and criminal law. The legal system puts women in a subordinate status relative to men. Under the Penal Code, the testimony of a woman is accorded half the value of that of a man. The age of criminal responsibility is set at nine lunar years (eight years and eight months) for girls but at 15 lunar years (14 years and six months) for boys. Women are also discriminated against under the Civil Code, notably in matters relating to marriage, divorce, child custody and inheritance.⁸⁹

50. AI also noted that the country had failed to criminalize gender-based violence, including domestic violence and marital rape. According to AI, under Iranian law, women and girls as young as nine years old who were seen in public without a headscarf could be sentenced to prison, flogging or a cash fine. Millions of women and girls face daily harassment and abuse at the hands of state agents enforcing Iran's strict Islamic dress code for women and girls.⁹⁰ GCIJ noted similar concerns.⁹¹ AHRAI recommended collecting data on femicide, especially on cases of honour killings by the guardians of underage girls, and providing enough shelters for women who are victims of violence.⁹²

51. Family Health Association of Iran (FHA Iran) noted that the Social Welfare, Services and Participations Organization of Tehran Municipality in the recent years had created shelters for the protection of abused and vulnerable women and girls, subjected to violence. FHA Iran recommended that the Government run education, awareness raising and advocacy programmes for prevention of domestic violence for soldiers in barracks, workers in factories, schools and universities directly or indirectly.⁹³

52. JS1 noted that Iranian women workers received less legal support and a lower minimum wage recommending that the Government remove all discriminating laws against women.⁹⁴

53. Iranian Women's Society in Sweden recommended that the Government protect the right of women to work, and promote, support and enable women's participation in political and other decision-making processes, as well as lift restrictions on women's equal access to

all aspects of education and women's equal participation in the labor market and in all aspects of economic, cultural, social and political life.⁹⁵

*Children*⁹⁶

54. According to Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (ODVV), the Generalities of Protection of Children and Juveniles Draft Bill was adopted on 24 September 2018, which contributes to prevention of child abuse, trafficking in children and protection of children and juveniles rights. The Bill criminalized child labour, sexual exploitation, cyberspace abuse, forcing children to commit offenses, child pornography and sale of children.⁹⁷

55. JS1 noted an increase in the number of child workers under the age of 15 years in contravention of Iran's Labour Law that prohibits employment of children under that age. In this regard, JS1 recommended banning child labour by highlighting that State organizations, social bodies, business enterprises, institutions and non-governmental organizations must be prohibited from employing minor children under the age of 16.⁹⁸

56. All Human Rights for All in Iran (AHRAI) recommended adopting a law that sets the minimum age of marriage, as a first step to prohibit underage marriage and pregnancies without any exception.⁹⁹

57. Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children (GIEACPC) noted that corporal punishment was prohibited in day-care centres and in penal institutions but it was still lawful in the home, in alternative care settings, in most day-care settings, in schools and as a sentence for a crime, including under religious law. GIEACPC highlighted that legislation should be enacted to explicitly prohibit all corporal punishment of children in all settings, including the home and as a sentence for a crime, and repeal all legal defences for its use, including in the Civil Code 1935, the Islamic Penal Code 2013 and the Child Protection Law 2002.¹⁰⁰

*Persons with disabilities*¹⁰¹

58. HRW stated that people with disabilities continued to face stigma, discrimination, and lack of accessibility when accessing healthcare, public transportation, and social services, including by the State Welfare Organization, the primary agency responsible for disability policy and services. People with disabilities might receive medical treatment, including electroshock therapy, without their informed consent.¹⁰²

59. Association of Iranian Short Statured Adults recommended that the Government continue to improve city and public spaces and pay attention to the special needs of short statured persons for their effective integration into society.¹⁰³

60. Charitable Institute for Protecting Social Victims called on the Government to allocate a bigger budget for the health sector, particularly for the health of persons with disabilities, and to create the infrastructure necessary for the protection of their rights.¹⁰⁴

*Minorities and indigenous peoples*¹⁰⁵

61. ADF International highlighted that religious minorities had been the target of violence, harassment and discrimination. Baha'is were severely discriminated against and Sunni and Sufi Muslim communities also reportedly experienced discrimination because of their beliefs. ADF International recommended that laws and judicial procedures be amended to provide that no religious groups are discriminated against.¹⁰⁶

62. According to AI, ethnic minorities, including Ahwazi Arabs, Azerbaijani Turks, Baluchis, Kurds and Turkmen, continued to face entrenched discrimination, curtailing their access to education, employment and adequate housing. Continued economic neglect of regions with large minority populations has exacerbated poverty. The Persian language remains the sole medium of instruction in primary and secondary education. Members of minorities who speak out against violations of their rights face arbitrary arrest, torture, unfair trials and imprisonment.¹⁰⁷ Association for the human rights of the Azerbaijani people in Iran recommended that the Government fully respect civil, political, cultural and linguistic and minority rights of the Azerbaijani Turks who comprise the largest minority

group in the country.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, JS16 recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran: put an end to the targeted attacks and disproportionate and discriminatory use of security rules against those working for the rights of non-Persian communities, including those operating internationally; safeguard the existence of non-Persian communities through environmental protection and legal and practical guarantees related to freedom of religion, cultural expression and language, including through guarantees to religious education and minority language education in the country; and ensure that the existence of a multicultural Iran is recognized both in law and in practice, guaranteeing political structures that enable all of the peoples of Iran to freely control their economic, social and cultural development and to participate in public life at all levels.¹⁰⁹

63. Bahá'í International Community (BIC) stated that since the previous UPR in 2014, human rights violations against the Bahá'ís had continued to intensify throughout the country. BIC highlighted that Bahá'ís were not free to practice their religion without harassment. Arbitrary detentions and interrogations were continually carried out against adherents of the Bahá'í faith. Members of the Bahá'í community had been arrested in different localities throughout the country and have suffered ill-treatment at the hands of government officials. They were also mistreated throughout the judicial processes.¹¹⁰

64. BIC noted that Members of the Bahá'í community across the country received threatening telephone calls, text messages, and anonymous letters, and they encountered anti-Bahá'í pamphlets in shops, schools, and other public places. In many localities, graffiti was spray-painted in and on Bahá'í cemeteries, houses, shops, orchards, and vehicles.¹¹¹ BIC highlighted that the authorities had continued their systematic discrimination by instituting policies that affect various aspects of Bahá'í belief and practice, which included, but was not limited to the Bahá'í community's holy places, cemeteries, and properties being confiscated, vandalized, or destroyed, and Bahá'ís being denied the right to observe burial practices.¹¹²

65. BIC also highlighted that Bahá'ís faced constant harassment in their professions and workplaces and had been barred from employment in the public sector. For the last several years, the Government had utilized a strategy of systematically sealing Bahá'í-owned businesses deemed to have acted illegally simply for temporarily closing to observe a Bahá'í holy day. Further, BIC noted that it was an official policy of the Government to expel individuals from universities and vocational training institutions as soon as they were identified as Bahá'ís.¹¹³

*Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers*¹¹⁴

66. Joint Submission 5 (JS5) stated that employers and governmental authorities continued to discriminate against migrant workers in general and migrant workers of a third country in particular. JS5 also stated that the police constantly threatened migrant workers with deportation and that any use of foreign nationals without a work permit or in work other than what was specified in that permit was punishable with 91 to 180 days of imprisonment for the employer in accordance with article 181 of the Labour Code.¹¹⁵

67. **ODVV** stated that all undocumented and documented refugee children from a third country enjoyed the rights to free education for 12 years.¹¹⁶ HRW also noted that in 2015, the Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly allowed all Afghan children, including undocumented ones, to enroll in schools after the issuance of a ruling by Ayatollah Khamenei.¹¹⁷

68. HRW also highlighted that it had documented that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps had recruited Afghan children residing in the country to fight as combatants in a neighbouring country in its Fatemiyoun division. It recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran ensure that refugee children are protected from recruitment in armed forces for battle.¹¹⁸

*Stateless persons*¹¹⁹

69. JS20 noted that there were administrative, economic, and cultural hurdles preventing parents from registering the birth of their children. The Iranian birth certificate, unlike the birth notification, was considered proof of Iranian nationality. Therefore, a stateless person

could not register the child's birth anywhere. For foreign nationals, the father's residence status was determinative of the registration steps to be taken. Parents whose child was born at home had to provide a written affidavit for the birth registration, either in the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs (BAFIA) for registered refugees, or the embassy for undocumented and visa holding foreign nationals. The process was usually considered to be very time-consuming and complicated for people who were not familiar with it. In this regard, JS20 recommended that the Government ensure that the birth of every child is registered, regardless of the nationality or lack thereof of their parents, by addressing legal, administrative, financial and cultural barriers.¹²⁰

Notes

- ¹ The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org.

Civil society

Individual submissions:

AAOI	Autism Association of Iran, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
ACCRP	Association of Citizens Civil Rights Protection, Shiraz (Islamic Republic of Iran);
ADFDI	Associazione medici e Farmacisti Democratici Iranian Residenti in Italia – Torino, Turin (Italy);
ADF International	ADF International, Geneva (Switzerland);
AFIF	Association des Femmes Irlandaises en France, Paris (France);
AHRAI	All Human Rights for All in Iran, Vienna (Austria);
AHRAZ	Association for the human rights of the Azerbaijani people in Iran, Oslo (Norway);
AI	Amnesty International, London (United Kingdom);
AIPD	Alliance Internationale pour la Paix et le Développement, Geneva (Switzerland);
AIPP-UK	Association of Iranian Political Prisoners – UK, London (United Kingdom);
AISSA	Association of Iranian Short Statured Adults, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
AJIDL	Association des jeunes Iraniens pour la démocratie et la liberté – Luxembourg, Betrange (Luxembourg);
ARCHumankind	Alliance to Renew Co-operation Among Humankind, Brussels (Belgium);
BDCO	Behnam Daheshpour Charity Organization, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
BIC	Bahá'í International Community, Geneva (Switzerland);
CF	Child Foundation, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
CHEECO	Chant du Guépard dans le Désert, Karaj (Islamic Republic of Iran);
CIPSV	The Charitable Institute for Protecting Social Victims, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
CSDHI	Comité de Soutien aux Droits de l'Homme en Iran, Paris (France);
CPI	Committee to Protect Journalists, New York (United States of America);
ECLJ	European Centre for Law and Justice, Strasbourg (France);
Egypt Peace	Egypt Peace (Egypt);
FHA Iran	Family Health Association of Iran, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
FLD	Front Line Defenders, Dublin (Ireland);
FN	Freedom Now, Washington D.C. (United States of America);
GICJ	Geneva International Centre for Justice, Vernier (Switzerland);
GIEACPC	Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
HRW	Human Rights Watch, New York (United States of America);
IAHC	Iran Against Hunger Charity, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);

	Iran);
ICAN	International campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, Geneva (Switzerland);
ICTUR	International Centre for Trade Union Rights, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
IFIW	International Foundation for Iranian Women, The Hague (The Netherlands);
IKF	Iranska Kultur Förening, Göteborg (Sweden);
IKFHV	Internationella Kvinnoförening för Hälsa och Välbefinnande, Göteborg (Sweden);
IKSS	Iranian Women's Society in Sweden, Stockholm (Sweden);
ILIA	Ertegha Keyfiat Zendegi Iranian Charitable Institute, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
IMAM ALI	IMAM ALI Charitable Institute, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
Iranref	Iran Ref Association, Brussels (Belgium);
ITS	Iranian Thalassemia Society, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
IYAS	Iranian Youth Association in Switzerland (Switzerland);
JFI	Justice for Iran, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
JIN	Young Dutch-Iranian Network, Rotterdam (The Netherlands);
JUBILEE	Jubilee campaign, Fairfax, Virginia (United States of America);
JVMI	Justice for Victims of 1988 Massacre in Iran, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
L4L	Lawyers for Lawyers, Amsterdam (The Netherlands);
LSFA	Lovers of Successful Families Association, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
MAAT	Maat Foundation for Peace, Development and Human Rights, Cairo (Egypt);
MGEC	Maryam Ghasemi Educational Charity Institute, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
MSAUIP	Medical Support Association for Underprivileged Iranian Patients, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
MZOF	Menschenrechtszentrum für die Opfer des Fundamentalismus, Vienna (Austria);
ODA	Barreau de Paris, Paris (France);
ODVV	Organization for Defending Victims of Violence, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
PICSD	Pouya Institute for Communications and Social Development, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
PFT	Partners for Transparency, Cairo (Egypt);
Rahbord Peimayesh	Rahbord Peimayesh Research & Educational Services Cooperative, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
SAR	Scholars at Risk, New York (United States of America);
Small Media	Small Media, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
SPASDI	Society for the Protection and Assistance of the Socially Disadvantaged Individuals, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
UFI	United Families International, Arizona (United States of America);
UNA-Iran	United Nations Association of Iran, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
WZPCPSA	West Azerbaijan Province Cancer Patient Support Association, Tehran (Islamic Republic of Iran);
6Rang	6Rang, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

Joint submissions:

JS1

Joint submission 1 submitted by: International Foundation for Iranian Women; Association of Iranian Refugees in The Netherlands; Association helps Iranian Conscience Prisoners;

- Association for the Protection of Refugee Rights (The Netherlands);
- JS2 **Joint submission 2 submitted by:** Advocates for Human Rights, Minneapolis (United States of America); World Coalition Against the Death Penalty, Montreuil (France); Iran Human Rights, Oslo (Norway);
- JS3 **Joint submission 3 submitted by:** Article19, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); AccessNow, New York (United States of America);
- JS4 **Joint submission 4 submitted by:** CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, Johannesburg (South Africa); Volunteer Activists, Amsterdam (The Netherlands);
- JS5 **Joint submission 5 submitted by:** Zamaneh Media, Amsterdam (The Netherlands); Impact Iran; All Human Rights for All in Iran, Vienna (Austria);
- JS6 **Joint submission 6 submitted by:** Christian Solidarity Worldwide, New Malden (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); Article18; Middle East Concern;
- JS7 **Joint submission 7 submitted by:** Centre for Supporters of Human Rights, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, New Haven (United States of America);
- JS8 **Joint submission 8 submitted by:** Abdorrahman Boroumand Centre, Washington D.C. (United States of America); Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan of Iran-Geneva, Geneva (Switzerland); Iran Human Rights; Ensemble contre la peine de mort, Montreuil (France); Impact Iran; World coalition against the death penalty;
- JS9 **Joint submission 9 submitted by:** International Federation for Human Rights, Paris (France); World Organization against Torture, Geneva (Switzerland); League for the Defence of Human Rights in Iran, Paris (France);
- JS10 **Joint submission 10 submitted by:** International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC); International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF); International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations (IUF); Education International (EI); International Federation of Journalists (IFJ);
- JS11 **Joint submission 11 submitted by:** Abdorrahman Boroumand Centre, Washington D.C. (United States of America); Harm Reduction International, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
- JS12 **Joint submission 12 submitted by:** Association of Iranian Ex-Political Prisoners in Canada (Canada); Association of Iranian Martyrs Family (Canada);
- JS13 **Joint submission 13 submitted by:** Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan – Geneva, Geneva (Switzerland); Association for the Human Rights of the Azerbaijani in Iran, Oslo (Norway); Impact Iran, New York (United States of America); Abdorrahman Boroumand Centre, Washington D.C. (United States of America); Siamak Pourzand Foundation; Balochistan Human Rights Group (BHRAG); Ahwaz Human Rights Organisation; All Human Rights for All in Iran, Vienna (Austria);
- JS14 **Joint submission 14 submitted by:** Minority Rights Group International, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); Centre for Supporters of Human Rights, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
- JS15 **Joint submission 15 submitted by:** Outright Action International, New York (United States of America); Small

	Media, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); Impact Iran, New York (United States of America);
JS16	Joint submission 16 submitted by: Underrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, The Hague (The Netherlands); Ahwaz Human Rights Organization; Balochistan Human Rights Group; Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan;
JS17	Joint submission 17 submitted by: Women's Human Rights International Association, Paris (France); France Libertés: Fondation Danielle Mitterrand, Paris (France); Nonviolent Radical Party, Transnational and Transparty, Rome (Italy); Hands Off Cain, Rome (Italy);
JS18	Joint submission 18 submitted by: Association to Defend Freedom & Human Rights in Iran, Sydney (Australia); Australian Supporters of Democracy in Iran, Sydney (Australia);
JS19	Joint submission 19 submitted by: Abdorrahman Boroumand Centre, Washington D.C. (United States of America); Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan of Iran- Geneva, Geneva (Switzerland); All Human Rights for All in Iran, Vienna (Austria); Association for the human rights of the Azerbaijani people in Iran, Oslo (Norway); Iran Human Rights; Ensemble contre la peine de mort, Montreuil (France); Impact Iran, New York (United States of America); Outright Action International;
JS20	Joint submission 20 submitted by: Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, Eindhoven (The Netherlands); Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights;
JS21	Joint submission 21 submitted by: Nonviolent Radical Party, Transnational and Transparty, Rome (Italy); Hands Off Cain, Rome (Italy).

² The following abbreviations are used in UPR documents:

ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
OP-ICESCR	Optional Protocol to ICESCR;
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
ICCPR-OP 1	Optional Protocol to ICCPR;
ICCPR-OP 2	Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty;
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;
OP-CEDAW	Optional Protocol to CEDAW;
CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
OP-CAT	Optional Protocol to CAT;
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child;
OP-CRC-AC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict;
OP-CRC-SC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography;
OP-CRC-IC	Optional Protocol to CRC on a communications procedure;
ICRMW	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families;
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
OP-CRPD	Optional Protocol to CRPD;
ICPPED	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

³ For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/28/12, paras. 138.1–26, 138.28, 138.50–51, 138.54–56, 138.65, 138.67–86, 138.92, 138.146, 138.287–288, 138.291.

- ⁴ AHRAI, p. 5. See also IKFHV, p. 4.
- ⁵ JUBILEE, para. 7.
- ⁶ ARCHumankind, p. 8. See also JUBILEE, para. 8.
- ⁷ JS20, p. 10.
- ⁸ ICAN submission.
- ⁹ AI, p. 1.
- ¹⁰ GCIJ, para. 18.
- ¹¹ For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/12, paras. 138.27, 139.28–41, 138.139–142, 138.149, 138.200–201, 138.203, 138.218.
- ¹² JS13, para. 7. See also ODVV, para. 5.
- ¹³ IYAS, p. 6.
- ¹⁴ Small Media, para. 3.
- ¹⁵ For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/12, paras. 138.27, 139.28–49, 138.52–53, 138.57–64, 138.66, 138.139–142, 138.149, 138.181–182, 138.189, 138.200–201, 138.203, 138.218.
- ¹⁶ JS15 submission. See also 6Rang, p. 2.
- ¹⁷ 6Rang, pp. 5–6.
- ¹⁸ For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/12, paras. 138.254–260, 138.268, 138.289–290.
- ¹⁹ ACCRP, p. 4. See also Rahbord Peimayesh, para. 12; IMAM ALI submission; LSFA, para. 41.
- ²⁰ CHEECO, para. 14.
- ²¹ For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/12, paras. 138.19, 138.87–91, 138.93–96, 138.116–120, 138.123, 138.125–130, 138.132–134, 138.136–137, 138.143, 138.168, 138.170–171, 138.183–186, 138.191–192.
- ²² JS8, paras. 7–8. See also JS11, p. 3; 6Rang, pp. 1–3; JS2, para. 16.
- ²³ ADF International, para. 10. See also JS2, para. 15; JS18 submission.
- ²⁴ ADF International, para. 18 (b).
- ²⁵ AIPD, p. 5.
- ²⁶ JS11, para. 31.
- ²⁷ AI, p. 6. See also AIPD, p. 5; MAAT, p. 5; JS21, p. 4.
- ²⁸ HRW, p. 2.
- ²⁹ AI, p. 6. See also AFIF, pp. 1–3.
- ³⁰ MZOF, p. 1. See also AI, p. 6.
- ³¹ MZOF, p. 10.
- ³² AI, p. 6.
- ³³ HRW, p. 2.
- ³⁴ JS7, pp. 8–9. See also JS12, pp. 4 and 7.
- ³⁵ For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/12, paras. 138.204–216.
- ³⁶ JS2, para. 27.
- ³⁷ AI, p. 3. See also JS9, para. 10.
- ³⁸ HRW, p. 2.
- ³⁹ AI, p. 7.
- ⁴⁰ AI, p. 2.
- ⁴¹ JS2, paras. 36–40. See also AI, p. 2.
- ⁴² AIPP-UK, p. 2. See also AJIDL submission; ARCHumankind, p.2; CSDHI submission; Iranref submission; JFI, p. 8; JIN submission; JVMI submission; JS17 submission.
- ⁴³ L4L, p. 3. See also ODA, pp. 4–5.
- ⁴⁴ PFT, p. 5.
- ⁴⁵ For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/12, paras. 138.115, 138.124, 138.131, 138.219–223, 138.225–230, 138.229, 138.231–239.
- ⁴⁶ AI, p. 5. See also ECLJ submission.
- ⁴⁷ JS6, para. 61.
- ⁴⁸ ADF International, para. 18 (a).
- ⁴⁹ AI, p. 2. See also AIPD, p. 2.
- ⁵⁰ JS9, para. 4.
- ⁵¹ FLD, para. 1.
- ⁵² FN, p.6. See also 6Rang, pp. 4–5.
- ⁵³ JS3, para. 3. See also JS4, paras. 3.1–3.8 and Small Media, para. 17.
- ⁵⁴ JS3, paras. 7–12.
- ⁵⁵ JS3, para. 21.
- ⁵⁶ JS3, para. 22.
- ⁵⁷ CPJ, para. 3.
- ⁵⁸ JS3, para. 33. See also PICSD submission.
- ⁵⁹ JS4, para. 4.4.

- 60 Small Media, para. 18.
- 61 FLD, para. 15.
- 62 JS3, para. 3.
- 63 JS3, para. 17.
- 64 JS3, para. 32.
- 65 JS3, para. 35.
- 66 For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/12, paras. 138.249–251.
- 67 JS1, p. 5. See also AI, p. 5 and ICTUR, pp. 4–5.
- 68 JS10, para. 13.
- 69 JS4, para. 2.3.
- 70 JS4, para. 2.4.
- 71 JS10, para. 14.
- 72 JS1, p. 9.
- 73 JS1, p. 10.
- 74 For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/12, paras. 138.252, 138.261–263.
- 75 IAHC, para. 4.
- 76 JS14, para. 33.
- 77 For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/12, paras. 138.264–267, 138.269–270.
- 78 6Rang, pp. 2–4.
- 79 6Rang, p. 6.
- 80 ADFDI, p. 3.
- 81 AAOI submission. See also BDCO, para. 6; CIPSV, paras. 6–7; MSAUIP submission; SPASDI, para. 3; WZPCPSA, paras. 5 and 8; ITS submission; MGEC submission.
- 82 For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/12, paras. 138.118, 138.271–275.
- 83 CF, para. 6.
- 84 IKF, p. 3.
- 85 SAR, para. 3.
- 86 JS19, para. 27.
- 87 JS19, p. 8.
- 88 For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/12, paras. 138.97–100, 138.102–111, 138.187, 138.193–199, 138.240–248.
- 89 AI, p. 4. See also AFIF, pp. 3–4 and AIPD, p. 5.
- 90 AI, p. 4.
- 91 GICJ, para. 17.
- 92 AHRAL, p. 5.
- 93 FHA Iran, paras. 7 and 10.
- 94 JS1, pp. 7 and 10. See also UFI submission.
- 95 IKSS, p. 5. See also ILIA submission; HRW, p. 4.
- 96 For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/31, paras. 138.188, 138.217.
- 97 ODVV, para. 17. See also UNA-Iran, para. 6.
- 98 JS1, pp. 7 and 10.
- 99 AHRAL, p. 3.
- 100 GIEACPC, p. 2.
- 101 For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/31, paras. 138.276–280.
- 102 HRW, p. 6.
- 103 AISSA, para. 10.
- 104 CIPSV, para. 17.
- 105 For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/31, paras. 138.113 FHA Iran, paras. 7 and 10.114, 138.121–122, 280, 138.282–284.
- 106 ADF International, paras. 14–17 and 18 (c). See also Egypt Peace submission.
- 107 AI, p. 5. See also JS14 submission; JS16 submission.
- 108 AHRAZ, pp. 5–6. See also AIPD, p. 3.
- 109 JS16, p. 14.
- 110 BIC, paras. 1–10.
- 111 BIC, paras. 23–26.
- 112 BIC, paras. 17–22.
- 113 BIC, paras. 11–16.
- 114 For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/31, paras. 138.281, 138.285–286.
- 115 JS5, p. 5.
- 116 ODVV, para. 12.
- 117 HRW, p. 6.
- 118 HRW, p. 6.

¹¹⁹ For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/28/31, para. 138.112.

¹²⁰ JS20, p. 10.
